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The tendency of macro-level economic forces to drive language shift is 
frequently referred to in scholarship on language planning and policy (LPP). 
Despite this, there has, to date, been very little research that attempts to 
systematically explain how economic change contributes to language 
minoritisation. This thesis takes steps towards addressing this deficit by 
examining the effects of the “Great Recession” which began in 2008 on the 
vitality of the Irish language in those peripheral communities where it remains 
a vernacular, collectively known as the “Gaeltacht”. Although the first official 
language of the Republic of Ireland, Irish was in a severely threatened state in 
the Gaeltacht even before 2008, and this work demonstrates how the Great 
Recession served to significantly exacerbate what was an already challenging 
situation. 
The decade following 2008 saw a rapid intensification of neoliberal policy 
measures both in Ireland and elsewhere. Given the international dominance of 
neoliberalism, this period thus offers a valuable opportunity to examine how 
neoliberal policies can negatively impact LPP initiatives. Drawing on concepts 
which are well established in the wider field of public policy studies, but not yet 
prominent in the more specialised area of LPP, the neoliberalisation of Irish-
language policy between 2008-18 is charted, as are the disproportionately 
severe budgetary cutbacks received by institutions serving to promote the 
vitality of the Gaeltacht. It is argued that neoliberalism’s inherent antipathy 
towards social planning and redistributive economic policies meant that 
measures to support the Gaeltacht were inevitably hit particularly hard in an 
era of austerity. 
The findings of ethnographic research conducted in some of the strongest 
remaining Gaeltacht communities in Galway and Donegal in the mid- and 
north-west of the country are also presented. These illustrate some of the 
micro-level consequences of the macro-level language policy reforms that took 
place in the wake of the crash, as well as many of the broader consequences 
of the recession for these communities, particularly with regard to their effects 
iv 
 
on the sociolinguistic vitality of Irish. Labour market transformations, drastically 
increased out-migration and the dismantling of important community 
institutions are documented, along with other related developments. 
This study thereby demonstrates some of the key ways in which the peaks and 
troughs experienced by Ireland’s economy – which itself is one of the most 
neoliberal in the world – have contributed to the weakening of the Irish 
language in its core communities in recent years. In doing so it adds empirical 
weight to the assertions on the centrality of economic change to language loss 
that are so commonplace in LPP literature and highlights some of the 
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1.1 Language loss and macro-level social change 
As many authors working in the area of language loss and endangerment have 
observed, the majority of the roughly 7,000 languages currently spoken are 
destined to be extinct by the end of the present century. Figures show that on 
average one language becomes extinct every ten days and that the “terminal 
speakers” of more than half the world’s languages are already alive (Harrison, 
2007: 1, 5). 
In attempting to explain this enormous, unprecedented rate of loss, Cooper 
(1990), Nettle and Romaine (2001) and Mufwene (2017), amongst many 
others, have observed that language shift is an epiphenomenon of macro-level 
social change. With the early years of the 21st century being marked by 
“fundamental social transformation perhaps unmatched since industrialization” 
(Putnam and Goss, 2004: 14), it is thus unsurprising that we face such an 
immense reduction in global linguistic diversity. 
Endeavouring to get closer to the root of what drives such developments, 
statements linking language loss to economic forces are commonplace in 
Language Planning and Policy (LPP) literature. Grenoble and Whaley, for 
instance, state that economics “may be the single strongest force influencing 
the fate of endangered languages” (1998: 52) and Romaine similarly notes that 
the power of state language policies to produce intended outcomes is 
severely constrained by a variety of social, political and economic 
structures which sociolinguists have typically not addressed, even 
though their consequences are profound and of far more importance 
than language policies (Romaine, 2006: 456).1 
 
1 Statements linking language minoritisation to economic forces can also be found in the following 
works: Baker, 2011: 62; Crystal, 2014: 175-6; Edwards, 1984: 304; Herbert, 2011; Kaplan and Baldauf, 
1997: 280; McColl Millar, 2005: 26; Nelde et al., 1996: 7-11; Nettle and Romaine, 2000: 126-47; Ó 
Ciosáin, 2013: 362; Ó Murchú, 1996: 39; Ó Riagáin, 2001: 206; O’Rourke and Pujolar, 2013: 54; 
Phillipson, 2008; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000: 436-76; Tabouret-Keller, 1968: 113; UNESCO et al., 2003: 5; 




Despite the frequency of such comments, as Grin (1999: 169), Austin and 
Sallabank (2011: 21) and Amano et al. (2014: 2) have observed, very few 
authors in the field of LPP have explained how precisely macro-level economic 
developments affect the fate of endangered languages. In light of the 
immediacy of the challenges facing those committed to the maintenance of 
linguistic diversity, it is, however, appropriate that a detailed understanding of 
this fundamental link be developed. This thesis takes some preliminary steps 
towards filling this gap in our knowledge. 
While acknowledging that the concept of language shift has been contested 
by some scholars (e.g. Heller and Duchêne, 2007: 3) this thesis follows 
Potowski’s definition of it being “the replacement of one language by another 
as the primary means of communication and socialization within a community” 
(2013: 321). By better understanding the causes of language shift, it is hoped 
that the path to reversing this process will become more evident (cf. Fishman, 
1991: 39). 
Through examining the interaction between macro- and micro-level 
developments, this study offers a contribution to the study of social causality 
and the effects of economic structures on minoritised language communities 
and language revitalisation policy. In order to move beyond the high level of 
abstraction seen in much of the LPP literature which refers to economic 
factors, the consequences of the global economic crisis that began in 2008 for 
the Irish language, particularly in its heartland “Gaeltacht” communities, are 
explored. A case study is thereby provided in how macro-level developments 
in the global economy can precipitate significant social – and sociolinguistic – 
change in endangered language communities. While Grin (1999) has 
discussed the implications of both regulated and deregulated market contexts 
for minoritised languages, this thesis documents a period of transition from a 
relatively heavily regulated language policy regime to a much more 
deregulated one in the decade after the 2008 crash. 
Although constitutionally the first official language of the Republic of Ireland, 




to the 2016 census, 73,803 people speak Irish daily outside the education 
system, out of a population of 4,757,956 (CSO, 2017a: 8, 66). As section 1.3 
describes, after the foundation of the state in 1922, Irish enjoyed a level of 
institutional protection much greater than other similarly sized minoritised 
languages. This support was particularly important for Gaeltacht communities, 
which are overwhelmingly located in poorer, peripheral areas. As will be 
demonstrated, however, the 2008-18 period saw the strength of this support 
greatly weakened. Indeed, capital expenditure on Irish a decade after the 
Great Recession began was less than one seventh of what it had been in 2008, 
despite the end of “the time of cuts” being announced in 2018 (see 4.2.4; 4.3). 
With the 2008 crisis ultimately being a crisis of neoliberalism (Blyth, 2013; 
Gamble, 2014) – the present phase of capitalism – the analysis of neoliberal 
theory and policies makes up a key part of this work. Following this introductory 
chapter which details research questions and offers a brief history of Irish-
English language shift and revitalisation measures pre-2008, Chapter 2 
presents a theoretical framework and literature review. The emergence of 
neoliberalism as a global hegemony, the 2008 crash and the deeply neoliberal 
nature of the Irish economy are discussed therein, and relevant literature from 
the fields of sociolinguistics, sociology and anthropology is reviewed. The 
ethnographic methodology adopted in this thesis is described in Chapter 3. 
Chapters 4 and 5 detail this work’s findings: macro-level policy reforms are 
analysed in Chapter 4, and ethnographic data is presented in Chapter 5 to 
highlight the meso- and micro-level consequences of macro-level 
developments. The ethnographic fieldwork for this study took place in Galway 
and Donegal, the counties home to the strongest remaining Irish-speaking 
areas, although even there the language was under severe pressure before 
the 2008 crash (Ó Giollagáin et al., 2007a). The sixth and final chapter offers 
a summary of key findings and some concluding thoughts on language loss in 




1.1.1 Research Questions 
In order to best address the issues outlined above, this thesis will answer the 
following research questions: 
• What is the relationship between the economic ideology of 
neoliberalism and the Gaeltacht? 
• How did the recession which began in 2008 affect Gaeltacht areas in 
Galway and Donegal in socioeconomic and sociolinguistic terms? 
• In a country in which the state is ostensibly committed to language 
revitalisation, how are language policies shaped by dominant economic 
orthodoxies and why did these result in such severe cuts to Irish-
language provision in the wake of the 2008 crash? 
It is hoped that in answering these questions this thesis will provide a valuable 
contribution to the sociology of language, and particularly to the study of 
language loss and revitalisation, both in Ireland and elsewhere. 
1.2 Irish-English language shift: a historic overview 
As is the case for many minoritised languages, the roots of the Irish language’s 
marginalisation lie in colonial conquest. While the Anglo-Normans took control 
of much of the island following an invasion in 1169, they were assimilated into 
Irish-speaking society relatively quickly. With the exception of some Anglicised 
settlements, primarily near Dublin, Irish consequently remained dominant 
across the island throughout the middle ages (Doyle, 2015: 11-8). 
It was only in the wake of the Tudor conquest which concluded with the final 
destruction of the Gaelic political order in the early 17th century that widespread 
shift towards English began, with urban centres and the upper classes 
adopting the language first (Ó Murchú, 1970: 25-6). In addition to military 
oppression and the exiling of the Gaelic aristocracy, the indigenous population 
were subjugated by the plantations which occurred throughout this period and 
the decades that followed, whereby the most fertile land was confiscated and 
given to English speakers who settled in Ireland in their thousands. Although 




during the brutal Cromwellian conquest, with the population being reduced by 
a staggering 50% between 1641-51 (Curtis, 1984: 28). The Penal Laws 
(enacted 1695-1704) institutionalised yet further marginalisation of the Irish-
speaking, Catholic majority. Further to restricting the operations of the Catholic 
church, these laws prevented Catholics from voting, running for office, 
practicing law, buying land, bearing arms and owning either horses or property 
worth more the £5 (Doyle, 2015: 81-2). 
This destruction of Irish political autonomy sparked a concomitant loss of 
cultural sovereignty, with an unstable Irish-English diglossic situation emerging 
in which English was definitively established as the language of power. The 
Catholic church’s adoption of English as the language of instruction in the 
Maynooth seminary (founded 1795) was a further blow to Irish-language 
vitality, with the religion that was to become so central to Irish identity being 
largely associated with English from this point on (see Wolf, 2014, however, 
for examples of the clergy using Irish throughout the 1800s). The 
establishment of the English-medium-only national school system in 1831 was 
a further factor detrimental to Irish, with Patrick Pearse famously describing it 
as “the murder machine” due to its Anglicising effects (Pearse, 1976). These 
various forces combined thus began a steady westward retreat for the Irish 
language, the final stages of which are being played out in the present day. 
In light of these assimilatory dynamics, by the time Ireland was formally 
incorporated into the British state under the Acts of Union in 1801, Irish was 
already spoken by only a minority of the population (Fitzgerald, 1984). As Wall 
describes, it had “ceased to be the language habitually spoken in the homes 
of all those who had already achieved success in the world, or who aspired to 
improve or even maintain their position politically, socially or economically” 
(1969: 82). Nonetheless, the Irish-speaking minority was a sizeable one. Ó 
hIfearnáin estimates that out of a population of 5.4 million at the beginning of 
the 19th century, some 2.4 million were Irish speakers (2010: 541, following 
Hindley, 1990: 15; see also Ó Riagáin, 1997: 4). While numerous, these 




overwhelmingly concentrated in peripheral areas, typically in the west of the 
country, where the introduction of the potato allowed the population to grow 
rapidly throughout the 1700s. Irish speakers therefore suffered 
disproportionately during the Great Famine of 1845-49, when the combined 
effects of starvation and emigration saw the population of the island fall by at 
least two and a half million (Ó Murchú, 1970: 28). The Famine initiated an 
enduring pattern of mass emigration, with the population continuing to decline 
until the 1960s, when it began to slowly increase. This widespread 
outmigration caused English to be seen as a key skill necessary for emigrating 
(Corrigan, 1992; McMahon, 2008: 15), thereby destroying what little prestige 
the language had maintained and prompting an extremely rapid process of 
language shift in the latter half of the 19th century. 
The 1851 census, conducted in the immediate wake of the Famine, was the 
first to include a question on language ability. It recorded some 1,524,286 Irish 
speakers (29%), including 319,602 monoglots (Fitzgerald, 1984: 140), 
although methodological issues mean this may have been an underestimate 
(Ó hIfearnáin, 2010: 542). Perhaps unsurprisingly, areas with a high 
concentration of monoglots in 1851 closely correspond to districts where Irish 
has survived to this day (Fitzgerald, 2003: 204). By 1891, however, the census 
registered only 680,000 Irish speakers, and, of these, a mere 3.5% were under 
10 years of age (Ó hIfearnáin, 2010: 541; Hindley, 1990: 15). As Ó Cuív 
summarises, so rapid was language shift throughout the 19th century that by 
1891 99% of the population could speak English and 85% could not speak 
Irish (1969: 128). Of those who were Irish speakers at the close of the 19th 
century, over 80% of them lived in counties which are home to Gaeltacht areas 
in the present day (Ó Neachtain, 2014: 373), with the exception of Meath, 
where a small “neo-Gaeltacht” was established in the 1930s. 
In response to the widespread disruption of the era, political nationalism took 
on a renewed vigour throughout the country from 1798 on, with groups such 
as Young Ireland and the Irish Republican Brotherhood organising several 




other important movements such as the Land League and the campaign for 
Catholic Emancipation operated overwhelmingly through English, in the last 
quarter of the century cultural nationalism emerged as a significant ideological 
force in Irish society. Taking influence from a mixture of romanticism, 
Darwinism and fin de siècle thinking (Ó Conchubhair, 2009), those involved in 
this “Gaelic revival” saw Irish as the key marker which indexed Irish identity. 
While a number of language-focused scholarly and antiquarian organisations 
were established in the early 1800s, The Society for the Preservation of the 
Irish Language (founded 1876) was the first organisation which specifically 
aimed for the restoration of Irish as the nation’s vernacular (Ó Murchú, 2001). 
This society was succeeded in 1893 by Conradh na Gaeilge (“The Gaelic 
League”), which quickly grew into a mass movement, ultimately serving a key 
role in the ideological development of many of those involved in the struggle 
for independence (Garvin, 1987: 80). Within twenty years membership had 
grown to 100,000 and some 950 branches had been founded (Garvin, 1987: 
79; McMahon, 2008: 87-8). 
As well as organising night classes, immersion courses for teachers and 
publishing propaganda and educational materials, the League achieved 
several important political goals, particularly regarding the use of Irish in the 
education system. As part of their policy of “killing home rule with kindness” 
(Jackson, 2010: 147), in 1900 the British authorities permitted the teaching of 
Irish as an optional subject in schools, and competency in the language 
became compulsory for admission to the National University of Ireland in 1913 
(Ó hÉallaithe, 2004: 161). Despite those involved in the League being 
predominantly middle-class urbanites, the importance of maintaining Irish-
speaking communities came to be widely accepted amongst revitalisation 
advocates (e.g. Bergin, 1911: 8). Indeed, it was during this period that the term 
“Gaeltacht” first came to prominence as a way of denoting such areas, with 
“Galltacht” occasionally being used to refer to the rest of the country (Ó Torna, 
2005; see also Walsh, 2011a: 403 for a problematising of the concept of the 
Galltacht). Echoing romanticist understandings of the pre-industrial peasantry, 




homogenising effects of contemporary society, a resource which could be 
drawn upon to support revitalisation efforts throughout the country (Doyle, 
2015: 193-200). This understanding would be of key importance to early 
language policy after the Free State was founded in 1922, and continues to 
hold some currency to this day. 
1.3 Early state policy and the institutionalisation of the 
Gaeltacht 
Shortly after its establishment, the Irish Free State set about implementing an 
extensive programme of language revitalisation. This “megapolicy” (Ó 
Buachalla, 1994) rested on four main pillars, namely (i) using the education 
system to spread knowledge of Irish in areas where it had died out; (ii) 
encouraging the use of Irish in the civil service and institutions of public 
administration; (iii) elaboration and standardisation of the language, including 
the “domain recapture” of higher registers that had been lost during the 
process of language shift; and (iv) maintenance of communities where Irish 
remained a vernacular, which were seen as “the repository of the linguistic 
elixir of Irish nationhood” (Ó Tuathaigh 1990: 11; Ó Riagáin, 1997: 15-9). 
Although evidence suggests that the political elite of the newly founded state 
never believed these measures would truly reinstate Irish as the nation’s 
vernacular, but at best hoped for a bilingual state (Ó Giollagáin, 2014a: 37; Ó 
Tuathaigh, 2011: 82), these early policies were adopted with a vigour that has 
not since been matched. Despite the economic situation of the country being 
dire during these early years, such was the influence of revivalist ideology on 
Free State leaders such as Éamon de Valera, Eoin MacNeill and Ernest Blythe 
that they were willing to commit resources to revitalisation measures in a way 
that has not occurred since the end of the nationalist and protectionist phases 
of Irish political development, circa 1960 (Watson, 2016). 
In order to provide an empirical basis for the formulation of Gaeltacht policy, a 
Gaeltacht Commission was established in 1925 with the goals of deciding what 




Irish-speaking, as well as making recommendations regarding maintaining the 
use of Irish in such communities (Coimisiún na Gaeltachta, 1926: 1; Walsh, 
2002). The commission’s report proposed that those areas in which Irish was 
spoken by over 80% of the population be recognised as fíor-Ghaeltachtaí 
(“true-Gaeltachts”), while those where between 25-79% were Irish speakers 
would be deemed breac-Ghaeltachtaí (“speckled-Gaeltachts”). These 
categories contained 168,279 and 307,907 people respectively (Ó Riagáin, 
1997: 18), although the number of these who were competent Irish speakers 
was almost certainly overstated (Ó Cuív, 1951). While 18% of the population 
were returned as Irish speakers in the 1926 census, Ó Riagáin estimates that 
by this stage only 3% of the population lived in Irish-dominant communities 
(1997: 271). Further to the vast majority of Irish speakers living in areas where 
the language was already moribund and of very low prestige, the concentration 
of the language in areas of widespread underdevelopment meant that 
Gaeltacht life was “characterized by extensive out-migration, depopulation and 
deprivation” (Ó Riagáin, 1997: 17; see also 5.2.3). The challenging economic 
situation of the Gaeltacht continued to be a major impediment to language 
maintenance throughout the 20th century and, as this thesis will describe, 
continues to be of great significance to the present day. 
Amongst the proposals made by the 1926 commission were a multitude of 
recommendations for incentivising and spreading the use of Irish in Gaeltacht 
schools, including offering additional training and wages to teachers and third-
level scholarships to Gaeltacht residents, with the hope that many would 
become teachers themselves. The recruitment of native Irish speakers to the 
civil service, army and police force, as well as giving greater remuneration to 
public servants stationed in the Gaeltacht was also recommended, with it being 
stated that no non-Irish speaker should be employed by the state in the 
Gaeltacht, a proposal yet to be implemented (Coimisiún na Gaeltachta, 1926: 
59-63; 4.2.9). 
The commission also made proposals regarding the economic development of 




included land redistribution and agricultural aids such as state-funded vets and 
plant nurseries; grants for the improvement of housing; the resettlement of 
communities as “large homogenous groups” to more productive land 
elsewhere in the country; development of the fishing industry via the building 
of ports and processing factories; and supporting the homespun cloth industry 
(Coimisiún na Gaeltachta, 1926: 63-4). 
As Ó Tuathaigh notes, however, a fundamental problem with implementing 
such policies was that the state “did not have a coherent policy of economic 
investment and social planning within the context of overall community 
development” at this time (1990: 5). Furthermore, prefiguring the post-2008 
developments that this thesis will focus on, financial constraints were a major 
stumbling block which impeded the acceptance of many of these proposals 
(Mac Giolla Chríost, 2008: 77), with Lee arguing that the commission was “duly 
sabotaged” as a result (1989: 135). Key proposals were rejected by the 
Department of Finance – despite its then head, Ernest Blythe, being a 
committed Gaelic League member – seemingly for fear that non-Gaeltacht 
areas would demand similar provision, something state finances could not 
support (Lee, 1989: 135). Overall, only 14 of 82 recommendations contained 
in the white paper published in response to the commission were ever 
implemented (Uí Chollatáin, 2016: 192). Watson thus claims that early 
attempts to maintain the Gaeltacht ultimately amounted to little more than 
“preservation through neglect and seclusion” (2016: 66), with Ó Tuathaigh 
describing those schemes that were implemented as being merely “plugs in a 
shattering dyke” (1990: 5). 
Despite this, some innovative measures were instigated in the early years of 
the state, chief amongst them perhaps being Scéim Labhairt na Gaeilge (“Irish-
speaking scheme”; established 1934). Under this scheme, described by Ó 
Broithe as one of the most important LPP initiatives the state ever implemented 
(2012: 238), an annual grant was given to Gaeltacht parents whose children 
passed an Irish-competency exam designed to test whether Irish was spoken 




had been for several hundred years a deeply stigmatised language, this 
scheme provided an important insight into rates of intergenerational 
transmission in the Gaeltacht (Ó Broithe, 2012: 239-40). As Chapter 4 
describes, however, this initiative was one of many discontinued under post-
2008 austerity measures. 
Significant progress was also made regarding the position of the language in 
the education system. Irish-medium teacher training colleges were 
established, Irish was made a compulsory subject in all schools and the 
percentage of schools teaching entirely or partially through Irish reached 55% 
by 1940 (Fishman, 1991: 138), with all Gaeltacht schools being entirely Irish-
medium. Irish competency was also made compulsory for new recruits to the 
civil service. 
Nonetheless, in the decades following the foundation of the state the Gaeltacht 
continued to atrophy. With the hoped-for national revitalisation failing to 
materialise and language shift continuing apace, in 1956 a specific state 
department for the Gaeltacht was established and the borders of the Gaeltacht 
were redrawn, with the fíor-/breac-Ghaeltacht distinction being abolished and 
most Breac-Ghaeltacht areas losing their Gaeltacht status entirely (Walsh, 
2012a: 181-2). The new borders more accurately reflected the true standing of 
the language than the heavily aspirational designations proposed in 1926, 
which included areas where Irish was spoken “regardless of the extent to which 
English may have an ascendancy in daily use” (Coimisiún na Gaeltachta, 
1926: 6-7). Under the new delineations, however, the “political Gaeltacht” 
continued to be larger than the “real Gaeltacht” (Lee, 1989: 673). The first 
Gaeltacht minister, Patrick Lindsay, saw to it that the borders were defined in 
such a way as to maximise the flow of grant-aid to residents in deeply 
impoverished – but only weakly Irish-speaking – areas of his constituency in 
north-west Mayo (Ó Giollagáin, 2016: 99-100). With the official Gaeltacht 
nonetheless shrinking considerably as a result of this review, the non-
contiguous nature of the remaining Irish-speaking territories became even 




districts such as county councils. This continues to provide a major managerial 
challenge – particularly in light of Ireland’s lack of empowered local 
government institutions – with such disparate enclaves being deeply 
“unamenable to bureaucratic convenience or administrative economies” (Ó 
Tuathaigh, 1990: 6; Breathnach, 2000; Walsh, 2012a: 183-90). 
In response to the mass emigration from the Gaeltacht that occurred 
throughout the 1950s (see 5.5.1), a more concerted approach to economic 
development was adopted towards the end of the decade. A Gaeltacht-specific 
development agency, Gaeltarra Éireann, was established in 1958 at a time 
when state economic policy was beginning to undergo a major re-orientation, 
as the following section describes. While initially focused on the development 
of indigenous industry in much the same way the 1926 commission had 
proposed, Gaeltarra played a key role in modernising the economy of the 
Gaeltacht by attracting much-needed inward investment and subsidising 
industry which would otherwise not have located in such areas (Fennell, 
1981a: 34). As noted below, however, this strategy itself presented distinct 
challenges for language maintenance. 
1.4 State withdrawal from the revitalisation project 
While including some commendable efforts at reinvigorating the flagging 
revitalisation process, the second half of the 20th century saw state 
commitment to the revitalisation project wane considerably. At the request of 
then-Taoiseach Éamon de Valera, in 1958 An Coimisiún um Athbheochan na 
Gaeilge was established to assess policies to date and offer advice regarding 
future measures. This commission’s report was explicit in its opinion that 
funding for revitalisation efforts needed to be increased significantly: 
[i]s lánmhithid a aithint go soiléir go mbainfidh caiteachas mór le 
hathbheochan na Gaeilge, caiteachas nach féidir dul uaidh má tá uainn 
go mairfidh an teanga. Ní leor go mbeadh rún daingean againn an 




againn an cúnamh airgid atá riachtanach chuige a chur ar fáil (An 
Coimisiún um Athbheochan na Gaeilge, 1963: 85).2 
The government white paper published in response to the report made no such 
promise of appropriate funding, however, instead couching many of its 
commitments in terms like “as far as practicable” (Government of Ireland, 
1965; Ó Croidheáin, 2006: 220; see also 4.2.9). Furthermore, this paper 
provided the first official acknowledgment that re-Gaelicisation was not a viable 
policy (Government of Ireland, 1965: 10-12). In what can be seen as one of 
the first steps in the state’s abandoning its revitalisation goals, it instead 
acknowledged the importance of English and proposed the creation of a 
bilingual society as an official goal, conceding that “[i]s mór is fiú an Béarla mar 
theanga idirnáisiúnta i gcúrsaí cumarsáide, trádála agus cuartaíochta agus 
mar mheán rannpháirtíochta i ngnóthaí ar fud an domhain” (Government of 
Ireland, 1965: 11). With the stage thus set for the beginning of state withdrawal 
from the language project, by 1968 the original commission claimed that “few 
of the recommendations of the white paper policy had been put into effect” (in 
Ó Huallacháin, 1994: 152). 
As well as the cynicism brought about by several decades of failure to revive 
the language, wider economic and political developments in Irish society at 
this time contributed to the lacklustre nature of this official response. As the 
state’s first generation of leaders began to retire, by the mid-1960s and early 
1970s a new cohort was coming to power. Many of this second generation of 
politicians were closely linked to business (Coakley, 2012: 163) and intent on 
reforming what were seen as failed policies in both the economic and cultural 
spheres. The adoption in 1958 of the Economic Development plan written by 
Department of Finance official T. K. Whitaker “in close consultation with World 
Bank advisors” (Coakley, 2012: 158) led to the end of protectionist policies 
under the modernising government of Seán Lemass (1959-66; Bew and 
Paterson, 1982: 118). In accordance with this shift, political support for 
 




ambitious – and often unpopular (Ó Riagáin, 1997: 21) – language 
revitalisation measures began to diminish: 
[p]rotectionism, of all varieties, gave way to “openness”, to cultural no 
less than economic forces: the application was being prepared for 
membership of the European “Common Market”, the new setting in 
which Irish identity would be refurbished and reconfigured (Ó 
Tuathaigh, 2008: 33). 
The implementation of this new development paradigm by the state opened 
the door for the development of neoliberalism as the key economic policy in 
Ireland over the following decades (Kirby, 2010: 14-30). In accordance with 
the arguments that will be made throughout this thesis regarding the 
fundamental tension between such policies and language revitalisation, the 
withdrawal of state support for Irish at this juncture must be placed in the 
context of this move towards economic liberalisation, which made it all but 
inevitable that the state would begin to withdraw from this area (see sections 
2.2;  4.2.10; 5.1). 
The period of “stagnation and retreat” (Ó Riagáin, 1997: 19) in Irish-language 
policy that followed this economic reorientation did indeed see significant 
decline in institutional support for the language from the early 1970s. This 
included the abolition of the language requirement for entrance to the civil 
service, the closing of Irish-medium teacher training institutions, the removal 
of the requirement to pass Irish to earn the Leaving Certificate, as well as a 
sharp decrease in numbers of Irish-medium schools outside the Gaeltacht (Ó 
Riagáin, 1997: 19-25). 
Although official language policy weakened considerably post-1965, it must be 
acknowledged that the reformed state economic programme did bestow 
considerable benefit on the Gaeltacht, compared with previous protectionist 
policies. The successful attraction of industry to the Gaeltacht for the first time 
saw employment opportunities increase and, following massive emigration in 
the 1950s, “the historic pattern of demographic decline was arrested and 
reversed between the mid-1960s and the late 1970s” (Ó Tuathaigh, 1992: 10). 




all three main Gaeltacht areas continued to lose a significant number of 
young adults through emigration; but in-migration (with a high quota of 
married couples with children) compensated for the emigration losses 
(Ó Tuathaigh, 1992: 10; 5.5). 
This period also saw those involved in the revitalisation effort begin to engage 
with language planning on a more scientific basis, taking lessons from the 
burgeoning field of sociolinguistics. The advisory group Comhairle na Gaeilge, 
established in 1969 as a result of the 1965 white paper (Government of Ireland, 
1965), published important works that situated Irish-language planning in the 
context of contemporary developments in the linguistic and social sciences 
(e.g. Ó Murchú, 1970; see also CILAR, 1975). While its founding was an 
extremely fraught process (Ó Huallacháin, 1994: 170-87), the opening of 
Institiúid Teangeolaíochta Éireann in 1974 as a full-time research and policy 
unit was also an important development. The following year a nationwide 
language promotion body Bord na Gaeilge was established (since succeeded 
by Foras na Gaeilge, see 4.2.6). 
Furthermore, a small Gaeltacht Civil Rights Movement based in Galway in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s successfully campaigned for the establishment of 
a Gaeltacht radio station (see 4.2.8.1) and a democratic authority for the 
Gaeltacht. Údarás na Gaeltachta (hereafter ÚnaG), was founded in 1979, 
replacing Gaeltarra Éireann as the Gaeltacht development authority. Unlike 
Gaeltarra, the board of ÚnaG was elected by Gaeltacht residents every five 
years. The establishment of such a democratic body was a major achievement 
for grassroots campaigning at a time when the state was otherwise 
withdrawing support for language revitalisation. While originally intended to 
have a significantly wider remit than its predecessor, such powers failed to be 
granted to – or demanded by – ÚnaG, meaning that it ultimately failed to live 
up to the aspirations of those who campaigned for it (Walsh, 2011a: 299). As 
4.2.4 describes, the ÚnaG election was abolished in 2012 as a cost-saving 
measure, and the institution’s budget cut by almost 75% between 2008-15. 
While the “ethnic revival” of the 1960s and 70s saw significant gains by 




developments were thus more modest, with progressive energies focusing, 
particularly throughout the 1970s, on the war in the north-east of the island 
(Fennell, 1981a: 37). Consequently, there was relatively little grassroots 
resistance to the state’s “de-institutionalization of the Irish language” (Mac 
Giolla Chríost, 2005: 122). Such was the extent of state prevarication on 
language policy during this time that Fishman, writing to Irish-language scholar 
and activist Colmán Ó Huallacháin in 1971, claimed that 
[w]hat does disturb me . . . is the now quite apparent delaying tactics 
whereby recommendations are neither rejected nor implemented but 
simply surrounded by administrative silence and inaction. After four 
years of waiting I have come to the conclusion that I have been used 
not as a consultant but as an unwitting participant in a master plan to 
do nothing, i.e. nothing real or decisive . . . Policy has continued to be 
mere verbiage, being neither decisive no[r] informed. I have lately 
concluded that this then is exactly what the Irish government wants and 
my only regret it that it hasn’t had the courage to say so to me, to you 
and to the public (in Ó Huallacháin, 1991: 133, original emphasis). 
One striking illustration of this behaviour which is of particular relevance to this 
thesis (particularly Chapter 4) is to be seen in a formerly confidential document 
written at the height of the recession of the 1980s. The document in question, 
which was released under the 30-year rule in December 2015, is an internal 
ministerial memorandum which details the Department of Education’s decision 
to publish, but, due to budgetary constraints, not implement a far-reaching 
policy for reforming Gaeltacht education. Indeed, the then minister for finance 
noted the need to ensure “that expectations are not raised and interest groups 
given no encouragement to press for implementation” (in Delap, 2015). While 
it is notoriously difficult to measure what public policy scholars term the 
“second face of power” – the decision by elites not to act (Cairney, 2012: 52; 
4.2.4; 4.2.10) – such documents provide perhaps the most tangible proof of 
this concept that social scientists could hope for and clearly demonstrate the 
challenges Fishman and others faced in dealing with the Irish state. 
This lack of concerted state support unsurprisingly saw Irish-speaking areas 
continue to shrink, with language shift continuing unabated throughout the 




in no way sufficient to counteract the major socioeconomic changes which 
began to take place in Ireland from the mid-1960s onwards and which spurred 
an increased turn towards English in the Gaeltacht. As Ó Riagáin describes, 
the transformation of the traditional agrarian economy and the integration of 
the Gaeltacht into the wider national and international economy at this time 
saw language shift begin even in areas that had previously been relatively 
stable linguistically. Increased rates of car ownership allowed those from 
remote areas to travel much more readily for employment located outside their 
communities. Shopping, recreation and pursuing education outside the 
Gaeltacht also became much more commonplace, thereby “intensif[ying] the 
frequency of interactions between Irish-speakers and English-speakers” (Ó 
Riagáin, 2008: 57). Ó Riagáin’s assessment thus sees the 1960s and 70s as 
the period when language shift began in heartland Gaeltacht areas, rather than 
being confined to the contraction of much more weakly Irish-speaking areas 
on the periphery of the Gaeltacht, as had previously been the case (2008: 57). 
In accordance with this analysis, Ó Curnáin has described the linguistic 
implications of the Conamara Gaeltacht becoming increasingly integrated into 
wider patterns of socioeconomic organisation. Offering a typology which sees 
those born before the 1960s as being speakers of “traditional Irish”, Ó Curnáin 
details the linguistic changes and reduced acquisition of younger speakers, 
defining those born between 1960-90 as speakers of “non-traditional Irish” 
whose speech is marked by high levels of English-influenced idiom and 
morphological/phonological innovation (Ó Curnáin, 2012a: 287). As discussed 
in 5.10, the most recent generations of Gaeltacht natives (born since 1990) are 
seen by Ó Curnáin to be speaking “reduced Irish”, a variety marked by a high 
degree of influence from English and significant use of functional code 
switching (cf. Dorian, 1977). 
In light of this analysis, it is unsurprising that Fennell, writing in 1981 about 
recent developments where he lived in Maínis, Co. Galway – one of the 
strongest Irish-speaking communities – claimed that the shift to English had 




triggering this Anglicisation (see 5.5), Fennell claimed that “[i]n the course of 
the 70s, in most parts of the (real) Gaeltacht, most parents of young children 
began to rear them in English” (1981b: 8). Assessing the strength of the 
language in the mid-70s, he concluded that only about 1/3 of the population of 
the official Gaeltacht lived in communities where Irish was dominant, 
amounting to some 25,900 people spread across three main areas in Donegal, 
Galway and Kerry (1981b: 11). 
These observations were later echoed by Hindley’s oft-cited findings which 
presented a bleak picture of the level of Irish use in the Gaeltacht, based on 
data concerning the use of Irish in families. While not published until some 
years later, Hindley’s research throughout the 1970s and 1980s led him to very 
similar conclusions, namely that language shift was occurring rapidly in the 
strongest remaining Gaeltacht districts, with it thus being only a matter of time 
until even the most remote areas shifted to English, just as the rest of the 
country had done over the preceding centuries (Hindley 1989, 1990). 
Reflecting on this continuing contraction of the Gaeltacht and the generally 
weakened nature of state support for the language compared to the early 
decades of Free State efforts, in 1989 Lee thus concluded that “[p]olicy for 
about two decades has clearly been to let the language die by stealth” (1989: 
673). 
Adopting the terminology of public policy studies, language policy since the 
foundation of the state can therefore be broadly characterised as consisting of 
a period of “incrementalist” progression (Cairney, 2012: 94-108) from 1922 
until the mid-1960s. A large-scale re-evaluation of state priorities at this time, 
however, saw this equilibrium punctuated, with the beginning of a further 
incrementalist process of withdrawal which was to continue steadily – albeit 
with some important exceptions – over the following decades. The economic 
transformations of the time also saw the Gaeltacht integrated into the modern 
economy to a degree that had not previously occurred, with the erosion of the 
strongest remaining Gaeltacht areas consequently beginning in earnest from 




1.5 Language Policy during the Celtic Tiger 
Despite the overall trend following the pattern of withdrawal that had been 
underway since the 1960s, the Celtic Tiger period of the 1990s and early 2000s 
in which the Irish economy underwent a process of rapid growth (see 2.4) 
nonetheless saw several noteworthy and positive developments take place in 
Irish-language policy. The prosperity accompanying the boom allowed for 
some significant investments to be made in the sector, although relatively little 
was done to engage with the challenge of ongoing language shift in the 
Gaeltacht. Indeed, similar to the socioeconomic transformations of the 1960s 
and 70s, this era of socioeconomic transformation intensified language shift in 
core Gaeltacht areas, further exacerbating an already precarious linguistic 
situation (cf. Ó Curnáin 2007: 59; 2012a). 
Following the steady marginalisation of Irish in state domains over the 
preceding decades, at the beginning of the Celtic Tiger in 1993 the Department 
of the Gaeltacht had its remit significantly expanded, being renamed the 
Department of Arts, Culture and the Gaeltacht. While some were hopeful this 
would give the relevant minister more bargaining power at the cabinet table, it 
ultimately amounted to a substantial reduction of the importance of the 
Gaeltacht at government level, as a civil servant who has been in the 
department since the 1980s explained to me during an interview: 
P: [S]ílimse gur chéim mhór chun cúil a bhí ann in ’93 nuair a rinneadh 
ar shiúil le Roinn na Gaeltachta. Agus an rud is aistí fá dtaobh de ní 
raibh mórán raic fá dtaobh de ó lucht na Gaeilg ag an am. Agus an rud 
a chiallaigh sé sin, suas go 1993 bhí roinn stáit amháin sa tír ag obair 
is ag feidhmiú go hiomlán trí Ghaeilg. An t-aon cheann amháin. 
Rinneadh ar shiúil leis sin nuair a tugadh ealaíon agus oidhreacht agus 
na rudaí sin isteach. Agus anois níl ionainne ach sciar bheag den roinn, 
atá ag feidhmiú trí Ghaeilg. I dunno cé mhéad duine atá ag obair leis 
an roinn anois, 300 b’fhéidir. Bheadh Gaeilg ag b’fhéidir 50 acu. 
The department’s portfolio was expanded yet further in 1997 when it became 
the Department of Arts, Heritage, Gaeltacht and the Islands, a pattern of 





A significant boon for the language, however, came in 1996 with the 
establishment of the Irish-language television station, TG4 (then TnaG/Telefís 
na Gaeilge). While this was a very positive development, it is notable that – as 
with the Gaeltacht radio station – it was brought about due to the sustained 
efforts of grassroots campaigners, rather than being an example of the 
ambitious top-down LPP measures that characterised earlier state policy 
(Watson, 2003: 62-115). Nonetheless, this was a key development in making 
language-based employment available not only where the TG4 headquarters 
is based in Conamara in west Galway, but throughout the Gaeltacht, with 
independent production companies in many Gaeltacht areas working as 
contractors for the station (TG4, 2016a: 22). It has also had a significant 
positive impact on the language’s prestige nationally (Mac Donnacha, 2008: 
104). A detailed discussion of the effects of austerity measures on the station 
is provided in 4.2.8.2. 
In 2000, the Department of Arts, Heritage, Gaeltacht and the Islands undertook 
a review of the status of the Gaeltacht, which, it has been argued by both Ó 
Giollagáin (2014b) and Mac Donnacha (2014), was the belated official 
response to Hindley’s controversial work (1990). Taking precedent from the 
initial Gaeltacht Commission in 1926, this “Second Gaeltacht Commission” 
reported in 2002 and made clear that the policy status quo was untenable if 
the state intended to maintain the Gaeltacht as a distinct linguistic community. 
One of its main recommendations which was enacted was the commissioning 
of a comprehensive study of the current status of Irish in the Gaeltacht 
(Coimisiún na Gaeltachta, 2002: 17). This study, published in 2007 (Ó 
Giollagáin et al., 2007a), demonstrated that “not only was Hindley’s analysis 
accurate, but that he had been, if anything, slightly optimistic”, as one of the 
report’s main authors has since put it (Mac Donnacha, 2014). 
A further key recommendation of the second Gaeltacht commission was that 
a language act be implemented which would give legislative force to the 
constitutional status of Irish (Coimisiún na Gaeltachta, 2002: 17). While the 




by a period of typical equivocation and delay, until the process was spurred on 
by a case taken against the state by a private citizen in 2001 (Bohane, 2005: 
2). Two years later the Official Languages Act 2003 finally came into being 
(Government of Ireland, 2003). 
While some commentators saw this Act as being too little, too late – “a last 
hurrah” in Ó Riagáin’s words (2008: 65; see also Ó Béarra, 2008: 64) – it was 
nonetheless generally welcomed by the Irish-speaking community as a 
positive development. It legislated for a variety of language rights and 
provisions, including regarding the use of Irish in the courts, in interactions with 
the state, in parliament, on road signs, etc. Notably, however, the Act prefixes 
many of these measures with the remarkable disclaimer “with the consent of 
the minister for finance” (Government of Ireland, 2003: 12, 18, 20). Perhaps 
the most important provision made in the Act was to establish an independent 
language commissioner, An Coimisinéir Teanga, whose office monitors the 
implementation of the Act, particularly the requirement for public bodies to 
prepare language schemes detailing services that they will provide through 
Irish if requested to do so by the department responsible for the Gaeltacht. The 
relevant minister is required to give approval to such schemes in order for them 
to come into effect. The Act also requires that such schemes make provision 
for ensuring that Irish becomes the working language of state offices in the 
Gaeltacht and that all services are available in Irish therein, as originally 
proposed by the 1926 Gaeltacht Commission. As section 4.2.9 describes, 
however, the work of the Coimisinéir has been most challenging, with the Act 
being widely ignored, a tendency seemingly intensified as a result of extensive 
public sector rationalisation in the wake of the recession. 
A further change of note during the Celtic Tiger period was the acceptance in 
2005 of Irish as an official working language of the EU, with full translation 
provision to begin in 2007. This too was amongst the recommendations of the 
second Coimisiún na Gaeltachta (2002: 17) and had been the focus of a 
sustained campaign by activists over several years which culminated in a 




welcomed by language organisations, Irish was placed under “derogation” by 
the government and as such the EU has not been required to provide the full 
range of translation services afforded to other official languages. In 2015, 
under pressure once again from language groups, it was announced that the 
government would endeavour to end this derogation status by the end of 2021 
(OLRS, 2016: 25) – a far from ambitious target. 
This period also saw the publication of the Statement on the Irish Language 
2006 (Government of Ireland, 2006). The appearance of this statement, a 
glossy full-colour document typical of government publications during the 
Celtic Tiger, strikingly contrasts with the black and white, pictureless 20-Year 
Strategy for the Irish language published in 2010. With there having been no 
explicit elucidation of state ambitions for the language since the White Paper 
on the Restoration of the Irish Language (Government of Ireland, 1965), the 
Statement was greatly anticipated. While short and making few new 
commitments, it re-affirmed state support for the preservation of the Gaeltacht 
and announced the state’s intention to produce the 20-Year Strategy 
(Government of Ireland, 2006: 4-6), the result of which is discussed in 4.2.2. 
A year later, the Comprehensive Linguistic Study of the Use of Irish in the 
Gaeltacht (“CLS”; Ó Giollagáin et al., 2007a) was published. This report clearly 
demonstrated once again the most urgent need for significant reform of 
Gaeltacht policy, and marks the final important development regarding the 
language during that took place before 2008. 
Although the case of the Gaeltacht was repeatedly demonstrated to be 
worsening throughout this time, there were nonetheless several important 
macro-level policy developments during this period of “minority survivalism” (Ó 
Giollagáin, 2014a: 25). The affluence of the time saw investment in projects 
such as TG4, as well as ÚnaG receiving some €25.5m in funding by 2008. 
This positivity was to be short-lived, however, with the 2008 crash seeing a 




1.6 Thesis structure 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 offers an overview of 
neoliberalism as an ideological hegemony, the nature of the 2008 crash and a 
discussion of Irish economic development in recent decades, along with a 
review of relevant academic literature. Reflecting the interdisciplinary nature of 
this study, it discusses contributions from a variety of fields, including literature 
on language shift in Ireland, ethnographic work in LPP, anthropologies of rural 
Ireland and research on economic aspects of Irish-language decline and 
revitalisation. 
Chapter 3 describes the methodological approach used for this study. It 
explains how ethnographic participant observation data was used in 
combination with 52 semi-structured interviews, policy analysis and statistical 
data to “triangulate” findings. 
Chapter 4 analyses Irish-language policy between 2008-18, drawing on 
concepts which are popular in public policy and political economy literature, 
but which have not been widely adopted by scholars in the field of LPP. The 
extreme rationalisation of the sector during this time is detailed, including the 
vastly disproportionate nature of the cuts to Irish-language promotion bodies 
such as ÚnaG and the state department responsible for the Gaeltacht. It is 
argued that these cuts are reflective of neoliberalism’s antipathy towards 
“culturalist” endeavours such as minoritised language promotion which are 
seen to be of little or no value to the interests of international capitalism. The 
content and implementation of key policies such as the 20-Year Strategy for 
the Irish Language and the Gaeltacht Act 2012 are considered, and it is 
concluded that they amount to state withdrawal from the language 
revitalisation project on a scale not hitherto seen, with the 2008 crisis having 
punctuated the previous policy equilibrium and allowed for widespread 
rationalisation of Irish LPP. 
Chapter 5 presents the findings of my ethnographic fieldwork in some of the 




micro-level consequences of the policy reforms detailed in Chapter 4. As well 
as documenting how reformed language policy impinged on the sociolinguistic 
vitality of these areas post-2008, broader effects of the Great Recession such 
as labour market transformations and increased emigration are also explored. 
Several case studies describe the effects of the cuts on specific institutions 
and community infrastructure. The chapter concludes with a discussion which 
further explicates how these multitudinous factors contributed to the 11.2% 
decrease in the daily use of Irish in the Gaeltacht between 2011-16 which was 
recorded in the 2016 census. 
A summary of the key arguments made in this thesis as well as some more 
general observations on the nature of language loss in a time of various 





2. Theoretical background and literature 
review 
2.1 Introduction 
As noted in 1.1, many authors in the field of LPP have identified economic 
forces as being key factors driving language minoritisation, although there is 
very little empirical research supporting such assertions. Providing the 
theoretical background for this study’s attempt to uncover how exactly 
economic disruption between 2008-18 has contributed to the minoritisation of 
Irish, this chapter first explores the nature of neoliberalism, the globally 
hegemonic economic ideology that has emerged since the mid-1970s. The 
Great Recession that began in 2008 is discussed, and the ways in which 
neoliberal boom and bust have impacted Ireland in recent decades are 
explored. Literature from various fields relevant to this study is then reviewed, 
with important deficits in our understanding of the sociolinguistic 
consequences of socioeconomic change being identified. 
Despite Ireland’s long history as a colony which helped fuel British economic 
growth (Coakley, 2012), it is notable that only a very small section of the 
literature that emerged from the language revitalisation movement since the 
late 19th century theorised the asymmetric power relations inherent in 
instances of language shift as being linked to economic exploitation. 
Nonetheless, important reports on language revitalisation did reference the 
economic difficulties facing the Gaeltacht, with the Committee on Irish 
Language Attitudes Research stating simply that “[t]he main underlying 
problem of the Gaeltacht is the weakness of its economic base” (CILAR, 1975: 
347; see also An Coimisiún um Athbheochan na Gaeilge, 1963: 181-220). 
Furthermore, another small but important current connected the language to 
economics, albeit with Irish-language revitalisation being a vector for economic 
growth, rather than assessing the power bias inherent in capitalism as an 
obstacle for the language movement’s efforts. Conradh na Gaeilge, for 
instance, established an “Industrial Committee” in the early 20th century which 




in the Gaeltacht, although this committee was short-lived and never held any 
major influence, even within the league itself (Walsh, 2011a: 78-80). 
Nonetheless, over the last century opinions similar to those of this group have 
been espoused periodically, with various authors drawing a positive 
connection between language promotion and economic development. A 
comprehensive overview of such literature is provided by Walsh (2011a: 69-
112). 
Despite having this historical tradition to draw on, since its emergence as a 
distinct academic field in the 1970s, Irish-language sociolinguistics has 
generally treated economic issues as being of relatively minor concern. 
Although the works of authors such as Grin (1994; 2006) and Vaillancourt 
(1996) popularised the field of language and economics since the mid-1990s, 
few authors have attempted to apply such thinking to the Irish case. As section 
2.6 will demonstrate, research in this area is confined to a small number of 
papers published in the 1980s and work by a handful of academics who have 
written on the matter more recently, with very little attention being paid to the 
major economic transformations that have taken place in recent years. 
2.2 The emergence of neoliberal hegemony 
Neoliberalism is the name most commonly given to the present phase of 
capitalism, one which replaced the Keynesian and social democratic 
consensus that dominated in the developed west for approximately 30 years 
in the post-WWII period. Neoliberal ideology was originally theorised between 
the mid-1940s and 60s by economists such as Friedrich Hayek, Milton 
Friedman and other members of the Mont Pelerin Society, a group Hayek 
helped establish in 1947 to further his ideas via an international network of 
think tanks (Mirowski, 2013: 44-7). Seeing attempts by states to regulate the 
market as being responsible for the totalitarianism of both Nazi Germany and 
the USSR, Hayek claimed that the redistribution of resources via welfare 
programmes and social planning was “the road to serfdom” (2006 [1944]) 




Although often conflated with laissez-faire liberalism or free-market 
libertarianism, neoliberalism stands apart from such ideologies. While sharing 
with these theories an understanding of the market as being a “super 
information processor” capable of distributing resources with an efficiency that 
human planning can never hope to match (Mirowski and Nik-Khah, 2017: 59), 
neoliberalism does not argue for a complete withdrawal of the state from the 
market as some related ideologies do. Indeed, Hayek himself claimed that 
“[p]robably nothing has done as much harm to the liberal cause as the wooden 
insistence of some liberals on certain rough rules of thumb, above all the 
principle of laissez-faire” (2006 [1944]: 18), and that 
it is the character rather than the volume of government activity that is 
important . . . a government that is comparatively inactive but does the 
wrong things may do much more to cripple the forces of a market 
economy than one that is more concerned with economic affairs but 
confines itself to actions which assist the spontaneous forces of the 
economy (Hayek, 2011 [1960]: 331). 
As Mirowski thus summarises, “mature neoliberalism is not at all enamoured 
of the minimalist night-watchman state of the classical liberal tradition” (2013: 
40). Instead, it envisions a utopia consisting of “the free economy and the 
strong state” (Gamble, 1994), with such a state providing the legal and judicial 
structures required to both create and maintain the market. In contrast to 
neoclassical theories, neoliberalism therefore sees a role for significant state 
intervention in the market, but argues that economic intercessions should take 
place only in favour of capital, and that the state should not stray into other 
areas of social policy or governance (Hayek, 2006 [1944]: 43-4, 98; Mirowski, 
2013). It was based on this distinction that Foucault (2008: 131) concluded that 
neoliberalism was not just “old wine in new bottles”, but instead marked a 
distinct phase in the development of capitalism.3  
 
3 As Chomsky (2012: 262) has pointed out, however, in practice the policies of pre-neoliberal 
capitalism often closely resembled those espoused by neoliberalism. While publicly advocating a 
market free from state interference, early capitalists depended enormously on state intervention to 
forcibly enclose commons, to remodel the economies of colonised areas, to create a “surplus 




Neoliberalism contends that ensuring capitalist enterprises are as successful 
as possible will lead to the greatest aggregate benefit for all, as wealth “trickles 
down” (Greider, 1981) from the top of the class structure to the bottom. The 
pursuit of profit is therefore seen as an eminently moral act, with Milton 
Friedman famously declaring that “[t]he social responsibility of business is to 
increase profits” on this basis (2007 [1970]: 173). 
Further to inevitably paving the way to totalitarianism, theorists associated with 
neoliberalism claim that state provision of welfare inhibits the entrepreneurial 
spirit naturally present in human beings, conceptualised as homo economicus, 
causing them to become lazy and dependent (Murray, 1990). By limiting the 
maximisation of profit in this way, welfare states inevitably act against society’s 
best interests. Neoliberalism thus explicitly rejects the notion of collective rights 
and is characterised by a strongly negative conception of liberty. 
Such theoretical arguments notwithstanding, as Harvey (2005) has explained, 
neoliberal doctrine ultimately served to justify policy changes proposed by an 
international capitalist class which, due to the confluence of a number of 
important factors, felt their position threatened. By the end of the 1960s, almost 
three decades of Keynesian and social democratic policies redistributing 
wealth downwards, the oil shock and the emergence of numerous anti-
systemic movements across the world had combined to see the balance of 
power shift firmly away from capital. These and various other internal 
contradictions of Keynesianism (see Blyth, 2016, drawing on Kalecki, 1943) 
saw rates of profit falling globally, with the “stagflation” period of the early 
1970s being the most severe economic crisis since the 1930s. Both stagflation 
and many of the forces depressing rates of profit were eventually overcome by 
the abandonment of Keynesianism in favour of neoliberal reforms, which were 
promoted as policy solutions by a capitalist class anxious to shift the balance 
of power away from labour (Harvey, 2005: 19; Blyth, 2016: 220). 
 
can nonetheless certainly be seen as a continuation of centuries-old capitalist strategies of 




This intensification of neoliberalism over the following years saw spending on 
a wide range of welfare programmes reduced in states across the developed 
west. While the concept of austerity only came to public prominence after 
2008, scholars such as Pierson (2002) had long since claimed that neoliberal 
states entered a period of “permanent austerity” in the 1970s, when the 
growing costs of welfare programmes began to be tackled through 
retrenchment and the privatisation of various aspects of the public sector. 
Although the implementation of neoliberalism on a global scale has been an 
uneven and contested process, it is fundamental to the process of globalisation 
which has occurred in recent decades (Gamble, 2009: 67), and has become 
“a hegemonic discourse with pervasive effects on ways of thought and political 
economic practices to the point where it is now part of the common sense way 
we interpret, live in, and understand the world” (Harvey, 2007: 22). As such it 
can be seen to fit Hall’s notion of a “policy paradigm” so ingrained that it is 
taken for granted and enacted without question (Hall, 1993: 279; see also 
Gramsci, 1992). 
In the context of this thesis’ emphasis on the effects of the 2008 economic 
crisis, it is important to note that the political manipulation of crises has been a 
key strategy through which neoliberal goals have been furthered (Klein, 2007). 
With the mass of the population otherwise occupied by the exigencies of daily 
life and the political elite generally desperate for solutions that appease 
international investors, crises often see the opening of a “policy window” 
(Cairney, 2012: 237), allowing for the implementation of measures that would 
be politically unthinkable in times of relative stability. “Only a crisis – actual or 
perceived – produces real change”, as Friedman put it (2002 [1962]: xiv). 
Further to manipulating crises in order to ensure pro-market reforms, 
neoliberalism is also crisis-generating. While the cyclical move from boom to 
bust has long been accepted by economists as fundamental to capitalism’s 
mechanics, this trend has been greatly intensified since the 1970s, with there 
having been hundreds of financial crises since then, compared to relatively few 




Despite its claims to be an efficient way to ensure a just distribution of 
resources, a vast body of research across the social sciences has documented 
how neoliberalism has ultimately served to create enormous levels of 
inequality which, in turn, have egregious social consequences (e.g. Piketty, 
2014; Picket and Wilkinson, 2010). It has significantly contributed to the 
creating of deeply precarious living conditions for huge sections of the world’s 
population and has led to a series of interconnected environmental 
catastrophes so severe that they present existential challenges regarding the 
very future of civilisation (Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2006; Standing, 2014; 
Verhaeghe, 2014; Monbiot, 2016). 
As will be demonstrated throughout this work, neoliberalism also inherently 
conflicts with efforts to ensure the vitality of minoritised languages. Through 
opposing state intervention in areas which do not facilitate the needs of capital, 
the adoption of neoliberal policies has “profound implications for the orthodox 
understanding of language planning” (Williams and Morris, 2000: 180). While 
not always explicitly framed in such terms, language revitalisation typically 
requires the redistribution of resources to marginalised groups (see 4.2.10.1). 
With neoliberalism conceiving the market as a moral as well as economic 
force, it argues against such redistributive “social justice” policies on the 
grounds that they require the redistribution of resources which the market has 
justly allocated. It is thus in fundamental tension with many language 
revitalisation efforts, seeing them as neither social nor just. Chapters 4 and 5 
explore in detail the implications of this tension after 2008 in the Republic of 
Ireland, which, as section 2.4 explains, is an extremely neoliberal country. 
2.3 The Great Recession 
The economic crash of 2008 marked the onset of the third generalised crisis 
of industrial capitalism in its 250-odd year history as a global economic force, 
seeing neoliberalism enter a period of transnational crisis (Gamble, 2009: 10). 
Similar to the depression of the 1930s, the only other crisis of this scale in 




became an international phenomenon whose ramifications continue to be felt 
across much of the world ten years after it began. 
The early tremors that foreshadowed what would become known as the “Great 
Recession” (Smith et al., 2011) were felt when the “credit crunch” began in late 
2007, with the Bear Stearns investment bank announcing significant losses 
and a run on British high-street bank Northern Rock, the first such run in Britain 
in over 100 years. It was in 2008, however, that the full magnitude of the 
coming disruptions started to become clear, as the insolvency of much of the 
financial sector and the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers quickly 
led to international crisis (Gamble, 2009: 23). 
As Gamble has explained, the roots of the Great Recession can be traced to 
the policies adopted in the 1970s as a way to overcome stagflation, with the 
solution to one crisis ultimately generating the next (2009: 10). While, then, it 
was neoliberal economics which caused the 2008 crash (see Blyth, 2013 and 
Bresser-Pereira, 2010 for detailed discussion of this process), the Great 
Recession was peculiar in that it did not see capitalism adopt a new regime of 
accumulation in response to the crisis, as has historically occurred in response 
to such challenges, such as the move from Keynesianism to neoliberalism. 
Instead, neoliberal measures were intensified after the crash, which was used 
as an opportunity to further the programme of privatisation and restructuring to 
a degree not previously possible (Crouch, 2011; Mirowski, 2013). In 
accordance with neoliberalism’s requirements for implementing pro-capital 
interventions, both nation-states and supra-national bodies such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank enforced harsh 
programmes of austerity which saw an enormous transfer of wealth to the 
upper-classes. As the following section describes, the Republic of Ireland was 
one of the countries most severely affected by the recession, in no small part 
due to its having adopted neoliberal policies with particular vigour in the years 
preceding 2008. 
The disastrous social consequences of austerity have been documented at 




and Whyte, 2017; Mendoza, 2015; Varoufakis, 2016). Notably, however, there 
has been very little substantive discussion of the Great Recession in LPP 
literature, a deficit which this thesis addresses. 
2.4 Irish economic development – peaks and troughs 
over recent decades 
As Britain’s first colony, Ireland was chronically underdeveloped by the time 
three quarters of the island gained political independence in 1922 (Coakley, 
2012). With the legacy of centuries of colonialism being exceedingly difficult to 
overcome, the Irish Free State (as it was initially called) remained one of the 
most impoverished polities in Europe for most the 20th century (Lee, 1989: 
664). In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, however, Ireland’s4 economic 
fortunes were transformed, triggering a rapid period of “catch up” growth 
(McDonough, 2010; Kirby, 2010). This transformation became known as the 
“Celtic Tiger”. Although this term was first used in 1994 (Kirby et al., 2002: 17-
8), as McDonough (2010) has demonstrated, the roots of the phenomenon can 
be traced back to 1987, when several key policy changes were implemented. 
The Irish economy was rapidly neoliberalised during the Celtic Tiger, which 
saw widespread privatisation and extremely low levels of regulatory oversight 
in the financial services and corporate sectors, and the development of Ireland 
as a prototypical “competition state” which serves the needs of capital above 
those of its residents (Kirby and Murphy, 2011). Based initially on the Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) of international corporations – for whom the country 
operates as a tax haven (McCabe, 2013: 168-70) – the Celtic Tiger later saw 
the development of a property bubble, with house prices trebling between 
1998-2008 (Gamble, 2009: 3). In line with international trends, labour was 
greatly weakened during this period, as trade unions adopted a managerialist 
negotiating strategy known as “social partnership” which effectively brought an 
end to industrial action, defanging what had within recent memory been an 
 




active and militant trade union movement (McDonough, 2010: 452; McCabe, 
2012; section 5.6). 
Although the steep increase in the country’s GDP at this time saw it heralded 
internationally as an exemplary case illustrating the virtues of neoliberal policy, 
Kirby has characterised this “economic success” as being a “social failure” 
(2010: 7), due to wealth being squandered and structural inequalities and 
exclusion in Irish society going largely unchallenged. 
The recession which began in 2008, of course, brought an abrupt end to this 
high-growth period. Having thoroughly embraced the neoliberal model, the 
country suffered enormously when the crisis struck. As Blyth explains 
[t]he combined result of the property-bubble collapse and the banking 
system implosion was “the largest compound decline in GNP of any 
industrialized country over the 2007-2010 period.” Government debt 
increased by 320 percent to over 110 percent of GDP as the 
government spent some 70 billion euros to shore up the banking 
system. Meanwhile, unemployment rose to 14 percent by mid-2011 
[from approximately 5% pre-crash], a figure that would have been 
higher had it not been for emigration (Blyth, 2013: 66). 
Responding to pressure from both national and international elites, the Irish 
government implemented a harsh programme of austerity consisting of a 
drastic contraction in public spending combined with tax increases that were 
particularly regressive for those on lower and middle incomes. These 
measures were necessary to fund the bailing out of the banks, which, as noted 
above, was itself an excellent example of the sort of pro-capital intervention 
that neoliberalism favours. As Blyth observed, this bailout cost Ireland’s 
inhabitants an enormous €70 billion, described by the IMF as “the costliest 
banking crisis in advanced economies since at least the Great Depression” 
(Laeven and Valencia 2012: 20). Indeed, so severe was the crisis that 
supervision of the Irish economy was ultimately taken over by the IMF-ECB-
EC Troika between 2010-13. A 2016 report for the IMF retrospectively 
observed that “[t]he extent and rapidity of Ireland’s fiscal deterioration in the 
latter part of the 2000s was virtually unprecedented among post war industrial 




The magnitude of this crisis saw the proportion of the population deemed to 
be suffering from deprivation almost double between 2007-10 – increasing 
from 11.8% to 22.5% (NERI, 2012: 75). By April 2013, the IMF calculated that 
a “staggering” 23% of the Irish labour force was either un- or underemployed 
(IMF, 2013: 26). As a result of this, some 610,000 people (of a population of 
4.59 million) left the country between 2008-15 (Glynn and O’Connell, 2017: 
299), averaging one departure every six minutes in the twelve months to April 
2013 (Smyth, 2013; section 5.5). Following the international pattern described 
in the previous section, despite this crisis of the neoliberal model, Ireland after 
2008 saw an “intensification of neoliberal policies” (Allen, 2012: 425), rather 
than any kind of reversal or reorientation of this dominant economic orthodoxy. 
Notably, however, by 2016 the Irish economy had emerged from the crisis, and 
by 2018 the country’s economy was growing at three times the Eurozone 
average. While the activity of corporations registered in Ireland for tax 
avoidance purposes but with no significant operations in the country 
significantly distorts these figures (Irish Times, 2018a), by April 2018 
unemployment had nonetheless fallen to 5.9%, just 0.1% above the rate a 
decade previously (CSO, 2018a). 
Despite the Irish economy having moved from peak to trough and back again 
in recent years, the spatial distribution of the recovery has been very uneven, 
occurring mostly in the main population centres, particularly Dublin. As Taft 
explains “[w]hether in the last four years or the last year, Dublin has generated 
approximately two-thirds of jobs . . . Outside Dublin, even though 70 percent 
of the total labour force resides there, only a third of jobs were generated” (Taft, 
2016a). The age-graded nature of the recovery was also marked, with youth 
unemployment remaining high by April 2018, at 12% (CSO, 2018b). 
In 2017 the Pobal HP Deprivation Index concluded that the country as a whole 
had recovered from the recession by just two-fifths (Hasse and Pratschke, 
2017a: 8). Disposable incomes, too, remained well below their peak even after 
growth had returned (Taft, 2016b), although were predicted to finally rise come 




emigrate, by 2017 more Irish people were still leaving the country than 
returning (Irish Times, 2017b). Projections suggest that public expenditure per 
capita will not exceed 2008 levels until 2023, 15 years after the crash (Taft, 
2018). In light of this, many have referred to the post-2008 period as being “a 
lost decade” (Irish Independent, 2018), with the scars of austerity running deep 
in Irish society. This is particularly true in much of the Gaeltacht, as this study 
will demonstrate. 
As a result of the policies of recent decades, Ireland has been consistently 
ranked as one of the most globalised countries in the world. Indeed, it was 
placed second on the 2017 index of globalisation, which collates a variety of 
economic, political and cultural data for all countries, including number of 
cross-border financial transactions, investment and revenue flows, capital 
restrictions, number of international treaties ratified and cross-border 
information flows (KOF, 2017). Mufwene’s assertion that “[t]he higher the local 
globalization index, the stronger the tendency toward monolingualism” (2016: 
132) is thus most pertinent to the fate of Irish. Accordingly, Romaine has 
claimed that “Irish warrants our gaze for what it may tell us of the fate that 
globalization portends for the survival of the world’s linguistic diversity” (2008: 
13), an opportunity which this study aims to exploit. 
2.5 The Irish language in development studies and 
socioeconomic literature 
With Ireland as a whole, and rural areas in particular, suffering from sluggish 
development and depopulation for a great deal of the 20th century and in the 
wake of the 2008 crash, it is of no surprise that rural development is an 
important field of study in Irish academic circles. Most probably due to the fact 
that the Gaeltacht is home to only a tiny percentage of the population (2% in 
2016), issues pertaining to Gaeltacht-specific development are often most 
notable in this body of literature by their absence, however. To take one 
relatively recent example, Rural Economic Development in Ireland, a major 
work published by Teagasc (“The Irish Agriculture and Development 




2014). Acknowledging the differential impact the recession had on rural 
Ireland, where unemployment increased at double the rate of urban areas, 
(O’Donoghue, 2014: 19), the report sets about discussing in great detail those 
areas which offer potential for promoting economic development in rural areas, 
as well as those sectors which are particularly problematic in developmental 
terms. 
Despite the impressive scope of the book – at more than 500 pages long and 
with over 30 contributors – the Irish language is not mentioned once. 
References to the Gaeltacht do not go beyond acknowledging the existence of 
ÚnaG and the Department of Community, Regional and Gaeltacht Affairs as 
being among the many “enterprise promotion agencies” which focus on rural 
development (Breathnach, 2014: 317). This trend is reflected throughout much 
of the academic literature of recent decades, including Curtin and Wilson 
(1989), Varley et al. (1991) and McDonagh (2001) – all important works in the 
field of rural development in Ireland which make little or no reference to the 
Gaeltacht. 
Two exceptions to this tendency are, however, worthy of mention. Firstly, 
McDonagh (2002) contains a valuable chapter on ÚnaG written by the then-
deputy CEO of the organisation in which he discusses the unique challenges 
the “periphery of the periphery” presents for economic developers, including 
the inability to generate economies of scale and the discontiguous nature of 
the Gaeltacht (Ó hAoláin, 2002). McDonagh et al.’s work (2009) also contains 
a chapter on Gaeltacht-specific development, drawing on the findings of the 
CLS report which was referenced in 1.5 (Ó Giollagáin and Mac Donnacha, 
2009). 
Similar to most academic work on rural development, the pattern of neglecting 
the Gaeltacht is also visible in much official state development policy. As with 
the Teagasc work cited above, the important policy document, Ireland’s Rural 
Development Programme 2014-2020 (Government of Ireland, 2014), failed to 
make a single reference to the Gaeltacht or the Irish language in its 474 pages. 




2018, discusses the need to increase funding to the Gaeltacht, as sections 
4.2.4 and 4.2.5 show, these proposals are in themselves extremely 
problematic. Walsh (2004: 1) cites further examples of government 
development policies published in recent decades ignoring the Gaeltacht, and 
Williams (1988: 267) has claimed that the disregarding of minoritised 
languages in development studies is a common phenomenon internationally, 
with language issues apparently not aligning with the concerns of those 
involved in this discipline. 
A further illustration of the peripheral nature of the Gaeltacht in Irish academia 
can be found in recent literature on political economy. Although much work 
assessing the effects of the Great Recession on Irish society has been 
published since 2008, none of these studies make any reference to the 
Gaeltacht or the Irish language. Despite the fact that provision for the language 
was hit disproportionately hard by austerity – as Chapter 4 will demonstrate – 
significant works such as Allen and O’Boyle (2013), Nagle and Coulter (2015), 
Moore-Cherry et al. (2017) or Roche et al. (2017) fail to afford this issue any 
attention whatsoever. 
2.6 Sociolinguistic literature on the Irish language in 
an economic context 
The field of Gaeltacht sociolinguistics is quite an active one. Valuable 
contributions have recently been made by Lenoach et al. (2012) and Péterváry 
et al. (2014), who document the asymmetrical English-dominant bilingualism 
of children currently being brought up as L1 Irish speakers (see 5.10). Ní 
Ghearáin (2011; 2018) has addressed issues of institution-led corpus planning 
and code-switching in Gaeltacht communities, discussing the reluctance of the 
L1 community to adopt official neologisms. Ó Murchadha (2011) has 
discussed related issues of standardisation and done a large amount of work 
on language attitudes of young people in the Gaeltacht and the “post-
traditional” Irish of “new speakers”, including measuring the overt and covert 
prestige of various new and traditional dialects (2012; 2013a; 2013b; 2018). 




years, with Walsh, O’Rourke and Rowland (2015) and Walsh and O’Rourke 
(2014; O’Rourke and Walsh, 2015) making significant contributions to this 
previously understudied area. 
Ó hIfearnáin has studied issues of prestige and speaker attitudes to language 
shift in the Gaeltacht (2010; 2013) and has edited two important Irish-language 
sociolinguistics textbooks, covering a wide range of fundamental 
sociolinguistic concepts (Ó hIfearnáin and Ní Neachtain, 2012; Ó hIfearnáin, 
2019). Notably, however, neither volume addresses the economic aspects of 
language use or shift. Ní Dhúda has recently discussed the strength of the 
Mayo Gaeltacht based on census data and other quantitative studies, as well 
as the importance of linguistic ideologies and “language managers” in 
promoting the use of Irish in weak Gaeltacht areas (Ní Dhúda, 2014; 2017; 
2018). Rowland (2016; 2018) has offered a historical look at ideological 
conflicts regarding language revitalisation during the 1960s and 70s, 
examining how the modernization of Irish society at that time led to the 
emergence of various pressure groups who campaigned for changes to 
language policy, arguing either for greater or less state involvement in the area. 
Brennan’s recent work (2013; Brennan and Costa, 2016) has addressed the 
symbolic use of Irish as part of a marketing strategy of “de-homogenisation” 
by businesses in non-Gaeltacht contexts. 
An important, if relatively small, current of literature has examined issues of 
economic development in the Gaeltacht. As will be seen, however, very little 
of this research was conducted in the last decade, despite the significance of 
the economic fluctuations seen during this time. 
Breathnach is one author to have previously undertaken such work. A 
geographer by training, he analysed Ireland as a neo-colonial economy whose 
main function since the development of industrial capitalism has been to 
supply cheap labour and resources to core industrial economies (1988). His 
writing has focused on how this has influenced rural development, with him 
seeing “the reorientation of agricultural production away from local needs to 




rurality cannot overcome given current patterns of uneven development and 
core-periphery relations. Focusing specifically on the Gaeltacht, Breathnach 
applied a similar analysis in addressing the structural challenges which restrict 
development in such peripheral areas, especially within the industrialisation 
paradigm which has been applied there in recent decades. As long as 
organisations such as ÚnaG continue to follow the strategy favoured by the 
state throughout the 1990s and early 21st century of attempting to base growth 
on FDI, the Gaeltacht, Breathnach contended, can never really be ensured of 
its future (see section 5.3.4 for further discussion of this issue). While 
discussing the important development of the co-operative movement in the 
1960s and 70s as a grassroots reaction to the failure of government institutions 
and FDI to provide a sufficient basis for sustainable Gaeltacht communities, 
Breathnach also observed that many of these were short-lived and under-
resourced (1986: 105; see also 5.9.1). Furthermore, despite ÚnaG being 
founded in response to demands for a democratic authority which would 
greatly enhance Gaeltacht autonomy, it is a relatively weak institution which 
lacks the power to affect the sort of changes Breathnach proposes (2000; see 
also Ó Neachtain, 2014; section 1.4). Indeed, changes to the structure of ÚnaG 
that were brought about by the Gaeltacht Act 2012 have served to greatly 
reduce the democratic control that Gaeltacht communities have over the 
institution, as 4.2.4 describes. 
Despite the importance of these contributions to the study of the Gaeltacht in 
economic terms, Breathnach’s work in recent years has moved away from this 
issue. He now directs his attention to issues of rural development more 
generally, being one of the contributors to the Teagasc work cited in 2.5. While 
his earlier works provide a useful basis for this study, they are by now quite 
heavily dated and do not address more recent trends in the Irish economy. 
Ó Cinnéide and Keane also offered an analysis of the Gaeltacht which focused 
on similar issues. Like Breathnach, they too found fault with the weakness of 
the institutions charged with promoting community vitality in the Gaeltacht, 




institutions has led to failure, disappointment and a widespread disillusionment 
with top-down approaches to community – and therefore language – 
revitalisation. To address this deficit, a more democratic and participative 
approach, as well as a large-scale decentralisation of power to local institutions 
was advocated, with the authors claiming such a model would do much to 
empower what are often largely disenfranchised communities who lack an 
“acceptable” development plan (Ó Cinnéide and Keane, 1990: 475). 
In a perceptive observation made almost thirty years ago, they stated that 
[i]t is becoming increasingly apparent that rural communities cannot rely 
on government or other external agencies to promote their areas. 
Rather, the communities themselves must take an active responsibility 
for developing and testing economic development strategies (Ó 
Cinnéide and Keane, 1990: 485). 
Despite the veracity of this observation (which is equally valid today, as 
Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate), it is notable that the authors did not situate 
this trend in any wider ideological context in the way Breathnach did. Nor did 
this work offer an in-depth analysis as to why the “inhospitable business 
environment” of the Conamara Gaeltacht (Ó Cinnéide and Keane, 1990: 481) 
is so unamenable to economic development, especially in light of it being close 
to a major economic centre (Galway city) – which is certainly not the case for 
many other Gaeltacht areas. As with Breathnach, Ó Cinnéide and Keane have 
not followed up this research in the intervening decades, meaning that the 
significant developments of the Celtic Tiger era were unaddressed by these 
and similar writers. Neither was work by Mac an Iomaire (1983) or the valuable 
contribution by Commins (1988) on socioeconomic development and language 
maintenance in the Gaeltacht – which foreshadowed much of Ó Riagáin’s later 
work (discussed below) – developed, meaning that some promising work on 
language and economics in the Gaeltacht petered out before the economic 
transformation of the 1990s had taken place. 
In more recent years, Ó Giollagáin has attempted to situate Irish language 
sociolinguistics in its global economic context. Indeed, in a 2011 work, Ó 




heritage and the global financial crisis – noting that each crisis affected large 
groups of people, disproportionately affected the poor, and was a source of 
ongoing controversy and uncertainty (2011: 146). Notably, however, he did not 
argue that there is any causal relationship between the two crises, as this 
thesis will contend. Ó Giollagáin has claimed, however, that the current 
globalised economic order is one which is deeply infused with the cultural 
values of the developed west and that neoliberal policies are creating a 
“frontier linguistics”– the ever-expanding capacity of English to reach every 
part of a community’s life – which is inhibiting the social reproduction of 
bilingualism in many minoritised language communities (Ó Giollagáin, 2008). 
Addressing the Irish case more specifically, Ó Giollagáin has argued that the 
success of the counter-revolution in the Irish Civil War (1922-23) led to 
reactionary forces abandoning much of the language revitalisation rhetoric 
which had initially inspired the War of Independence (1919-21). As such, 
commitment to the policy of “re-Gaelicisation” began to wane even in the early 
years of the state, a waning which was accelerated greatly in the 1960s and 
70s (Ó Giollagáin, 2014a; section 1.4). Furthermore, he has claimed that policy 
developments in recent years have seen much of the state’s remaining 
commitment to language promotion dissipated and replaced by a neoliberal 
model of language planning (Ó Giollagáin, 2014b). While a valid observation 
– and, indeed, one which is elaborated on in Chapter 4 of this thesis – little 
attention is paid by Ó Giollagáin to the link between the Great Recession and 
the economic exigencies which likely drove many of the policy decisions taken 
in the wake of the 2008 crash. 
Nonetheless, work such as Ó Giollagáin’s challenges much of the discourse 
that revolves around LPP in Ireland. Significantly for this thesis, he has claimed 
that rather than being a continuation of the incrementalist withdrawing of 
commitment and resources from language revitalisation efforts that began in 
the 1960s, state policy in the early years of the 21st century has “been 
effectively inflated to a fully-fledged policy of abandonment” (Ó Giollagáin, 




terms, the findings of this thesis do accord with the notion that state withdrawal 
from the revitalisation project has intensified rapidly in the last decade. 
In a paper analysing recent policy developments, Ó Giollagáin details the 
state’s disregard of those recommendations made by studies such as the CLS, 
which was written with the goal of informing official policy (Ó Giollagáin et al., 
2007a). The apparent half-heartedness of the state’s engagement with these 
recommendations and the non-implementation of the 20-Year Strategy (see 
4.2.2) which followed them are, he contends, a response from the powerful 
whose “main concern at this stage is to effect budgetary contraction” (2014b: 
117) and who see the crisis of the Gaeltacht as a marginal issue unworthy of 
serious consideration. 
Despite this prescience, Ó Giollagáin fails to go further in locating the nature 
of these policy abandonments in terms of the class bias that is inherent in 
austerity. While he draws attention to the scale of state disengagement and 
does much to situate these developments in the broader context of 
globalisation, an analysis of why these policy choices are being enacted 
remains absent. An attempt at offering such an analysis of the 20-Year 
Strategy, the Gaeltacht Act 2012 and other official policies will be made in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
One of the few other scholars who has made a systematic study of the Irish 
language in economic terms in recent years is John Walsh. As noted in 2.1, 
for over a hundred years the revitalisation movement has asserted the 
importance of Irish as a vital source of traits such as group cohesiveness, 
confidence, identity and innovation, and claimed that these traits can aid with 
the development of economic growth. Recent expositions of such assertions 
can be found in Bradley and Kennelly (2008; 2013). Walsh’s work attempts to 
add an explicit theoretical and empirical basis to contentions of this sort, 
investigating how, or if, the language can be used as part of a wider 
programme of socioeconomic regeneration. In doing so he has endeavoured 
to provide what he terms a “linguistic political economy of development” rooted 




Adopting an interdisciplinary approach which draws on both sociolinguistic 
approaches and development studies models such as the UN’s Human 
Development Index, Walsh challenges the contemporary modernisation 
approach to economic development offered by both neo-classical and 
neoliberal economics. The modernisation paradigm, he observes, typically 
views issues of language as tangential – at best – to economic development, 
or, at worst, directly contraindicated to it. This approach, Walsh contends, 
therefore leaves little room to manoeuvre for those who wish to address issues 
involving linguistic diversity. Despite it having been the dominant ideology in 
Ireland since the founding of the Free State, and particularly so since the 
Economic Development policy document was implemented from the early 
1960s onwards (Bew and Patterson, 1982: 118; section 1.4), Walsh sees the 
modernisation paradigm as a wholly deficient way to theorise development 
(2009: 74). 
Attempting to address this theoretical deficit, Walsh has used various 
instances of economic development in the Gaeltacht and of language-based 
enterprises located outside the Gaeltacht as case studies to examine the link 
between language revitalisation and economic performance. While avoiding 
reductionist and economistic measures of development such as GDP or GNP, 
Walsh contests that the human development model proposed by Sen (1999) 
would suggest that minoritised languages can indeed have a positive effect on 
development and human welfare when understood from a holistic point of 
view. Furthermore, he claims that this can be equally true in the Gaeltacht as 
for the country as a whole (Walsh, 2010: 77). 
As well as exploring this relationship between language and development, 
Walsh has written extensively on economic policy with regard to the Gaeltacht. 
Citing the example of ÚnaG and its predecessor Gaeltarra Éireann, he has 
noted that historically an awareness of language planning has been almost 
totally lacking from strategies which aimed to develop the Gaeltacht and 
integrate it into the wider economy (2006: 142). Evidenced with material 




as a study of historic policy documents, Walsh notes that Irish-language 
organisations for many years showed a distinct lack of ambition towards 
becoming involved in national development programmes (2006: 142). Despite 
this, he claims that an awareness has grown since the mid-1990s of the limited 
linguistic value of this approach. Attempting to address these concerns, in the 
early years of the 21st century ÚnaG made moves towards re-orientating its 
policies and embracing a more holistic view of community development, one 
not solely rooted in the modernisationist, industrial paradigm. This re-
orientation has led to a tension emerging between various civil society 
development and/or business groups in the Gaeltacht and ÚnaG, however, 
with people largely viewing it with a mixture of cynicism and disdain (Walsh, 
2010: 128-30), similar to the tensions noted by Ó Cinnéide and Keane (1990) 
thirty years earlier, and those discussed in 5.3.4. 
Walsh’s work provides a valuable contribution to the literature and offers useful 
data on language and economics in Ireland. It is not clear, however, that the 
development and regeneration that Irish supposedly promotes is not purely the 
product of public subsidy, rather than being connected to language per se. 
With ÚnaG directing government subsidies into the Gaeltacht and the Irish-
language sector to a degree that other rural areas rarely receive, this 
regeneration could, instead, be the result of a multiplier effect which could just 
as easily exist in any other sector. With the extent of the cutbacks in the last 
few years and the waning of the state’s commitment to the Gaeltacht, it may 
be the case that more recent data would provide a less significant correlation 
between Irish and positive developmental outcomes. 
For all its merits, work such as that of Walsh remains peripheral, having failed 
to inform either mainstream academic discussions of economic development 
or government policy, as section 2.5 demonstrated. In spite of the strengths of 
this work, it would appear that issues such as cultural and linguistic promotion 
are simply not seen as a priority under current development paradigms and 
that arguments which contest the validity or efficaciousness of such a model 




modernisation paradigm impinges on language revitalisation efforts (2011: 
168-71). 
Another author whose work has been influential in the formulation of this PhD 
is Ó Croidheáin (2006), who offers a framework which addresses gaps 
common in other literature and goes some way towards explaining why efforts 
such as Walsh’s have relatively little mainstream impact. Adopting a Marxist 
reading of the place of the language in Irish society throughout the 20th century, 
Ó Croidheáin presents an ideological position which has been largely absent 
from other works in the field. Notable for its engagement with class dynamics 
as they pertain to language and the use of the historical materialist paradigm, 
his book goes a long way toward filling a theoretical void unaddressed by the 
works of Walsh or Ó Giollagáin. While published in 2006, the book makes 
much use of case studies and data gathered in the late 1990s and so is by 
now somewhat dated. Despite this, it is exceptional for its explicit engagement 
with the materialist basis of language minoritisation in Ireland throughout the 
course of the 20th century, examining the ways in which the unequal 
distribution of resources and class privilege in Irish society conditioned the 
form of both language shift and attempts to reverse it. 
Positioning himself in opposition to analyses which focus primarily on official 
state language policy (e.g. Ó Riain, 1994), Ó Croidheáin challenges 
conventional, “culturalist” accounts of the social relevance and standing of 
Irish. Through adopting a radical political outlook, he provides a unique 
analysis which, while acknowledging the social antagonisms and class 
stratification produced by capitalism, avoids descending into economistic 
reductionism. 
Ó Croidheáin is clearly indebted to the works of author and republican activist 
Máirtín Ó Cadhain, who espoused a similarly radical and anti-capitalist view of 
the language (Ó Cadhain, 1969), a view that influenced activist groups such 
as Gluaiseacht Cearta Sibhialta na Gaeltachta and Misneach, and which 
continues to hold a certain currency (e.g. Mac Ionnrachtaigh, 2013; Mag 




academic context in recent years, however, a fact perhaps reflective of the 
wider marginalisation of the radical left in Ireland in the wake of decades of 
social partnership and the Celtic Tiger era (Allen, 2013: 164, see also 5.6). 
Similar to Ó Giollagáin (2014a: 26), Ó Croidheáin notes the omnipresence of 
Anglo-American culture as being an important factor in the attrition of Irish use 
in the Gaeltacht. Unlike Ó Giollagáin, though, he situates this phenomenon as 
being a form of neo-colonial hegemony, inherently linked to 
a global system of international capitalism that seeks to homogenise 
markets by reducing national and linguistic boundaries, thereby 
increasing power and profits at the expense of the well-being and 
autonomy of national populations (Ó Croidheáin, 2006: 18). 
While such an argument ignores some of the mechanisms through which 
capital extracts profit from heterogeneity (Grin, 1999), Ó Croidheáin’s work is 
nonetheless valuable for challenging the prevailing culturalist model that is so 
often a cornerstone of the Irish-language movement. He claims that in order to 
effectively promote Irish, a broader struggle based on issues of resource 
distribution must be waged to prevent the co-option of the language movement 
by institutionalism. So great are the “homogenising processes of international 
capital” (2006: 27) which he sees as responsible for the language’s 
marginalisation that they can only be challenged as part of a broader struggle 
which seeks common cause with other social movements aiming to overthrow 
capitalism. Unlike the work of Walsh, Ó Giollagáin, or others who address 
language planning and economics, Ó Croidheáin makes little attempt at 
offering a programme of reformist policy recommendations, instead arguing for 
the fundamental transformation of Irish society and the abolition of capitalism 
as being prerequisites for saving the language (2006: 18, 310-11). In making 
such proposals, Ó Croidheáin’s position is reminiscent of Bourdieu’s view that 
language revitalisation requires “a total struggle” (1991: 57), although Ó 
Croidheáin gives little practical advice about how such a struggle could be 




With the notable exception of Ó Croidheáin, other Irish LPP works avoid 
explicit application of a class analysis. While at times identifiable as a 
background theme and subtle subtext, for instance in Ó Giollagáin’s 
identification of the current language policy regime as being neoliberal (Ó 
Giollagáin, 2015), an explicit discussion of neoliberalism’s class biases and 
the implications such prejudices have for marginal, rural communities like the 
Gaeltacht has not been forthcoming. Following Ó Croidheáin’s lead, this thesis 
will attempt to explicitly engage with the class dynamics inherent in 
neoliberalism, and capitalism more generally (Harvey, 2007: 22), and explore 
their implications for language revitalisation efforts in neoliberal economies 
(see in particular section 5.2.3 for a discussion of social class in the Gaeltacht 
and its relevance to the issue of language policy; also Ó Croidheáin, 2006: 29). 
One other important author that has brought a discussion of class and 
economic development into the discourse on language shift in Ireland is Ó 
Riagáin. In seminal works such as Language Policy and Social Reproduction 
(1997), Ó Riagáin demonstrates the way in which the changing economic 
dynamics of Gaeltacht life contributed to language shift in the second half of 
the 20th century (see 1.4). 
In order to help address the long-standing confusion of the ultimate goal of 
state language policy, Ó Riagáin draws a distinction between its revivalist and 
maintenance aspects. The goal of the former is seen as the re-establishment 
of Irish in areas where it had ceased to be spoken, whereas the latter seeks 
the preservation of Irish as a vernacular in the Gaeltacht. As Ó Riagáin 
explains, the maintenance component of Irish LPP largely took the form of a 
regional economic development programme for the Gaeltacht (2008: 56). As 
described in 1.4, these efforts were not, however, sufficient to counteract the 
socioeconomic transformations that took place in Irish society from the 1960s 
onwards. Similar to Commins (1988: 25), Ó Riagáin notes that language shift 
towards English is “both a symptom and a consequence of large-scale 
economic and social changes that relate to the modernisation of Irish society” 




minoritisation in an assessment of economic transformation. For him, as with 
Ó Croidheáin, the relevance of economic and social policies that are unrelated 
to language have “consequences for language maintenance objectives [which] 
were, and are, extensive and of more importance than language policies per 
se” (1997: vii; see also Romaine, quoted in 1.1 above).  
Other work by Ó Riagáin (2007), following Hannan and Tovey (1978), relates 
issues of class stratification to questions of ethnocultural identity and 
discusses the role of cultural or linguistic capital in class reproduction. The 
emphasis here is largely on language ideologies and prestige, however, and 
does not attempt to address why language shift continues apace in the 
Gaeltacht or why state support has declined so significantly in recent decades 
and years.  
While the works of Ó Giollagáin, Walsh, Ó Croidheáin and Ó Riagáin provide 
much of the main theoretical background for this study, it is worth noting that 
several other authors have made occasional attempts to situate Irish-language 
revitalisation in a broader political and economic context, albeit in a fashion 
more often rhetorical than analytical. They frequently follow a logic similar to 
that espoused by Ó Croidheáin or Ó Cadhain in calling for the language 
movement to develop links with groups that seek to challenge dominant 
economic paradigms, such as the anti-globalisation movement or 
environmental campaigns. McCloskey, for instance, has declared that 
[t]he effort to support Irish should ideally involve trans-national alliances 
with the marginalised and often impoverished groups who are trying to 
organise across the globe to resist the coercion of powerful national and 
international elites. The effort to support Irish is in fact one strand, or 
ought to be one strand, in an international effort to open cracks, 
however small, in the dreary homogeneity of culture and ideology 
created by global capitalism (McCloskey, 2001: 42; see also Holloway’s 
2010 work on opening “cracks” in capitalism). 
Similar sentiments have been expressed by Cronin, who has called for a series 
of interconnected revolutions to take place in response to the cultural, 
environmental and social challenges presented by neoliberal globalisation. 




could be brought about in the face of the globalised capitalist panopticon, 
Cronin polemically proposes they would bring about an ecologically 
sustainable way of living in which power would be decentralised and resources 
would be distributed more equitably (2011: 228-35). 
Several other authors have also commented on this link between the 
revitalisation movement and a broader struggle against neoliberalism, with 
Kirby (2004), Soper (2013) and Mag Uidhir (2018) all expressing similar views 
to Cronin and McCloskey. Mac Síomóin (2006) has also discussed the need 
for Irish-language activists to link their struggle with an understanding of other 
oppressed and minoritised groups in order to affect a process of de-
colonisation, following Memmi (1990) and Fanon (2001). Section 5.6 of this 
thesis discusses the sectionalism of the Irish-language movement and offers 
some thoughts on why such links between language activists and those 
engaged in other forms of anti-systemic activism have thus far not emerged. 
Mac Síomóin has also written about the challenges faced by Catalan-language 
activists in confronting the forces of neoliberalism and discussed lessons from 
their experience that would be of benefit to efforts in Ireland (2005). More 
recently he has echoed the sentiments of Ó Croidheáin and Ó Giollagáin that 
the steady encroachment of Anglo-American consumer culture, claimed to be 
inherently linked to neoliberalism, constitutes the “third colonisation of Ireland” 
and presents a key challenge for the survival of Irish (Mac Síomóin, 2014: 111-
8). 
While, then, numerous authors have expressed an awareness of a link 
between the current status of the Irish language and our economic system, the 
overall corpus of language and economics works in Ireland remains quite 
small, with only a handful of authors discussing the matter in detail. While some 
significant articles were written in the 1980s, writers such as Breathnach and 
Ó Cinnéide and Keane soon turned their focus to wider issues of rural 
development, and while Ó Croidheáin’s one-off contribution is valuable, 
excepting some largely polemical works, it is only Walsh and Ó Giollagáin who 




of Irish-language scholarship as a whole is considered – particularly in terms 
of literature and folklore studies – it seems surprising that this important issue 
has not received more attention to date. Significantly, despite the extent of the 
reforms of public policy and state expenditure that the 2008 crisis engendered 
(Mercille and Murphy, 2015), those few explicit references to the implications 
of austerity for language policy in both Irish and international LPP literature 
have, to date, been extremely limited in their scope (e.g. Ó Giollagáin, 2014b: 
116-7; Ó Flatharta, 2010: 388; Williams, 2012: 178), a deficit addressed in this 
work. 
2.7 Critical Sociolinguistics 
Another body of literature of relevance to this study is that of critical 
sociolinguistics, a subfield of sociolinguistics which centres “questions of 
power and inequality” and investigates how language is of importance 
“socially, politically and economically” (Heller, Pietikäinen and Pujolar, 2018: 
2). Similar to the approach of this thesis which is described in the following 
chapter, critical sociolinguistics very often adopts an ethnographic 
methodology for the purposes of data collection (e.g. Heller, 2006, 2011; 
Duchêne, Moyer and Roberts, 2013). Furthermore, questions of power and 
resource distribution – key issues discussed in this study – serve as a 
significant source of inspiration for those working in this field: 
language is involved in the varied ways in which categorization, 
selection, and legitimization occur . . . [doing critical ethnographic 
sociolinguistics] means identifying what resources are circulating, what 
resources people are competing for, as well as the conditions that make 
them available and valuable; it means figuring out how their distribution 
is organized and how it works, and how people position themselves with 
respect to them; and it means figuring out what the consequences of 
these processes are, for whom, in terms of who gets to control access 
to resources and who gets to assign their value (Heller, 2011: 39). 
In assessing the material and social implications of issues concerning 
language, this field has placed much emphasis on “late capitalism”, a term 
seemingly used as a synonym for neoliberalism to describe the present phase 




1). The interplay between language and the economy is most typically 
demonstrated in the critical sociolinguistics literature through discussion of the 
ways in which linguistic resources are commodified (e.g. Heller and 
McElhinney, 2017; Pujolar, 2018) and the linguistic implications of increased 
population mobility under globalised modernity (e.g. Lorente, 2012). The work 
of Pujolar (e.g. 2000, 2018) on mobility and tourism, primarily in the Catalan 
context, has particular resonance for the discussions in section 5.4 and 5.5 
below which explore local inflections of these matters in the Gaeltacht context 
in recent years. While only tangentially relevant to the topic of this thesis, work 
such as the volume edited by Duchêne, Moyer and Roberts (2013) addresses 
important questions around the reproduction of social inequality amongst 
migrants in the workplace via the regimentation of linguistic capital. 
It is of note, however, that despite being keenly aware of many of the macro-
level forces that this study attempts to interrogate, work done under the rubric 
of critical sociolinguistics has to date had little to say about how these 
processes drive language minoritisation. This is a significant deficit in a field 
that claims to see issues of social justice and power inequities as being of 
central concern (Heller and McElhinny, 2017). 
2.8 Ethnographies of Ireland – a review of 
anthropological literature 
Having examined much of the key literature relating to the language and 
economics aspect of this study, some important works on the study of life in 
rural Ireland will now be discussed. I will look at anthropological and 
sociological works which applied an ethnographic approach to data collection, 
as they provide an important methodological background to this present work. 
With the earliest works pertaining to Ireland that can be broadly classified as 
ethnographies dating back as far as the late 1800s, ethnography in Ireland has 
a considerable pedigree. Indeed, Ireland was one of the first sites in the world 
in which anthropology was conducted (Wilson and Donnan, 2006: 1). Similar 




now clear that such research was culpable of some deeply problematic 
practices. Studies by Haddon and Browne which took place in Oileáin Árann 
and south-west Conamara (which remain to this day some of the strongest 
Gaeltacht areas) offered an contentious assessment of the inhabitants, 
presented in racialist terms and complete with the use of craniometers and 
efforts to record “indices of negressence” (Haddon and Browne 1892; Browne, 
1898; Browne, 1900; see also Egan and Murphy, 2015: 135). Such early work 
in Irish anthropology often expressed a romanticism that yearned for an idyllic, 
pre-industrial rural culture that was soon “destined to pass” – an ideology also 
key to inspiring much of the early language revitalisation movement (see 1.2). 
The 1930s saw the Harvard Irish Study funding several studies in the “most 
Irish part of Ireland” – the rural west. This research largely continued the 
romanticist approach of earlier studies but produced important publications 
such as Arensberg and Kimball’s examination of a village in west Clare, one 
of the earliest “modern” ethnographic studies of a rural Irish community (1968 
[1940]). Despite remaining influential until the 1980s, their study is laden with 
much of the problematic rhetoric typical of early anthropology (Egan and 
Murphy, 2015). While they did break new ground in conducting long-term 
ethnographic work in rural Ireland, they also controversially contended that 
their study was one of a homogenous rural lifestyle which was all but identical 
across the whole of the island. In claiming that their conclusions could 
therefore be unproblematically extrapolated to give a picture of all of rural 
Ireland, they fell into a classic pitfall of essentialist thinking. 
After a period which saw anthropologists taking the work of Arensberg and 
Kimball as canonical, with anthropological studies primarily attempting to 
“prove or disprove” their findings (Wilson and Donnan, 2006: 21), several 
important ethnographies were published in the 1970s. Attempting to address 
the anomalously high rates of schizophrenia in the area, Scheper-Hughes’ 
famous Saints, Scholars and Schizophrenics (1979) examined life in a 
Gaeltacht community in Co. Kerry. Addressing the repressive role of 




siècle fatalism that characterised earlier anthropologies of Ireland, Scheper-
Hughes painted a view of a community and way of life that was “pathological” 
and “in decline”. Such characterisations of perceived dysfunctionality did little 
to endear her to her host community, who shunned her on return visits (Egan 
and Murphy, 2015: 138). Despite espousing what is now a contentious 
viewpoint, similar attitudes are echoed in the works of Scheper-Hughes peers’ 
who were working on the anthropology of Ireland concomitantly. 
One example of a work that adopted a perhaps similarly dated approach to 
Irish ethnography – but one of several possible examples of the so-called 
“literature of decline” – is Brody’s Inishkillane: Change and Decline in the West 
of Ireland (1974). Similar to Scheper-Hughes, Brody was a foreign academic 
entering the culture from the outside and depicting rural Irish life, as the book’s 
subtitle suggests, as being in a state of decrepitude. The work shares many 
key themes with Scheper-Hughes, with the introduction telling us “it is the 
breakdown of the communities, the devaluation of the traditional mores, the 
weakening hold of the older conceptions over the minds of young people” 
(1973: 2) which provides the central focus of the book. 
Basing his research in two remote parishes – one in Co. Clare and the other 
in Co. Cork – Brody characterises their populations as being fundamentally 
“demoralized” (1974: 16), seemingly powerless as they watch their 
communities destroyed by emigration and poverty. With the increased ease of 
communication that came with the rural electrification scheme of the 1940s, 
accounts of newfound prosperity flooded back from friends and families who 
had emigrated to Britain or America. No longer satisfied with the isolation of 
rural Ireland, people’s conceptions of success expanded in accordance with 
the reports they heard from foreign metropoles, with many thus left unwilling 
to remain in their home communities (1974: 15). It is this change in attitudes 
which allegedly condemned what was seen as typical rural Irish culture to a 
protracted death. The ensuing demoralization led people to actively turn 
against their locality and to largely reject the reproduction of their heritage 




Brody is undoubtedly most effective in situating these trends in a wider 
discussion about the effects of Ireland’s neo-colonial positioning and the 
fraught nature of a rural peasantry confronted with industrial capitalism (1974: 
10, 15). As with other works mentioned above, however, developments in 
anthropology over recent decades leave his work appearing somewhat dated, 
showing tinges of the exoticism that characterised anthropology as it was 
conducted in decades past. Like his predecessors Arensberg and Kimball, 
Brody adopts what has been termed a “homogenising narrative” (Egan and 
Murphy, 2015: 134) in contending that his findings in Inishkillane could be 
unreflexively extrapolated to all of rural Ireland. 
Anthropological literature on Ireland in the 1980s saw the emergence of works 
critiquing studies such as Inishkillane and Saints, Scholars and 
Schizophrenics, contesting the claims of cultural uniformity that marked these 
and other early ethnographic works. Authors such as Kane (1986) questioned 
the validity of describing all Irish rurality as “pathological” and challenged the 
stereotypes which works such Inishkillane, with its narrative of decay and 
decline, promulgated. 
As part of this turn in Irish anthropology and sociology, a new kind of 
ethnography emerged, one which was cognisant of the discipline’s spectres, 
of the racialized exoticisms and homogenising tendencies of its forbearers 
(Egan and Murphy, 2015: 136). Work such as Peace’s (2001) ethnography of 
a Co. Clare village – notably the same county that Brody set much of 
Inishkillane in – offer a unique insight into the daily life of a rural community as 
they approached the turn of the millennium, one which explicitly rejected the 
assumed typicality common in earlier works. 
Ó Laoire’s study of the musical traditions of Oileán Thoraí follows in a similar 
vein. In contrast with an era when anthropology in Ireland was overwhelmingly 
done by foreign academics, Ó Laoire is a native of the mainland parish that 
overlooks Toraigh in the Donegal Gaeltacht. Furthermore, his study was 
originally written in Irish with the English version published three years later 




maintaining a rapport with his informants, all native Irish speakers themselves. 
Ó Laoire is expressly conscious of the historically uneasy relationship with 
methodological ethics that anthropology has had, not least its tendency to 
gloss over or deny power inequities. He thus adopts what he terms a “dialogic 
anthropology” – a model which seeks to “equalise the field” (2002: 21, my 
translation). This approach is notable for viewing informants and key actors as 
more than mere repositories to be mined for information, but rather as “co-
researchers” in the ethnographic project who are just as important to the 
formation of knowledge as the ethnographer themselves. 
While the primary focus of Ó Laoire’s work is the transmission of song in 
Toraigh’s oral culture, he devotes significant space to discussions of the social 
practice and behaviours of the island’s community (2002: 46). Adopting the 
post-modernist model of culture that has come into vogue in anthropology in 
recent years, he bases his methodology on a reflexive approach to 
ethnography. This approach challenges the ethnographer to examine and 
deconstruct many of their own preconceptions and beliefs which may 
otherwise colour their interpretation of the field and their analysis of the data 
they collect (2002: 43-4). 
While there is no such thing as a truly “unbiased” researcher, as Fairclough 
(2001: 4) reminds us, such an approach nonetheless promotes a worthwhile 
attempt at producing a more objective and representative form of ethnography, 
an instructive example which I aim to emulate (see 3.2). In adopting such an 
approach, Ó Laoire follows the “reflexive turn” that came to the fore in 
anthropology in the 1980s and saw “meditations of the conditions of an 
ethnography’s production become prerequisite” (Marcus, 2009: 1), adding an 
important ethical dimension and helping anthropology move further from its 
troubled roots. 
In their recent discussion of “anthropological ancestors” and of a modernizing 
discipline which strives to lose the shackles of this difficult past, Egan and 
Murphy offer an engaging narrative “of how a distinct contemporary 




challenges the discipline of anthropology in Ireland to “exorcise” the various 
ghosts that continue to cast their shadow over the field and, following Curtin et 
al. (1993: 13), be responsive to the high levels of reflexivity and 
cosmopolitanism which characterise late modernity in Irish society. 
Significantly for this thesis, their calls for such a reimagined approach appeal 
for researchers to treat the anthropology of Ireland as an anthropology of 
globalisation, reflecting Ireland’s status as a society wholly integrated into the 
global neoliberal infrastructure. They reference many examples of modern 
ethnographies that serve to illustrate the diversity of topics examined by recent 
ethnographic studies in Ireland. Notably, however, there is no reference to 
language anywhere amongst these examples. They nonetheless provide 
some valuable comments about the future direction of ethnography in Ireland 
and leave the way open for much positive innovation. 
2.9 Developing a sociolinguistic ethnography of 
language and economics in the Gaeltacht 
As has been shown, ethnography in the Gaeltacht has a long history, with the 
earliest ethnographies of Ireland taking place in the Galway Gaeltacht. The 
west of Ireland in general appealed to early anthropologists, being seen in 
romanticist terms as a fringe of the fringe, a last bastion of Celticism and 
untarnished pre-industrial culture, and it was therefore suitably exoticised in 
early studies. As the previous section described, numerous important 
ethnographies have also been located in the Gaeltacht in more recent 
decades. 
For all this ethnographic focus on the Gaeltacht, it is notable that there have 
been very few in-depth ethnographies which explicitly focus on what is surely 
these regions’ most unique feature, the continued use of Irish as a vernacular. 
Despite comments on the poverty and underdevelopment of rural Ireland being 
commonplace in the literature, little academic effort was made to examine the 
links between this underdevelopment and language maintenance/shift. While 
there have been some ethnographic works that address various aspects of the 




which made use of ethnographic-style interviews in the Gaeltacht (2011a), 
these have focused on language outside the Gaeltacht. Mac Ionnrachtaigh’s 
account of Republican prisoners learning Irish while interned in Belfast’s H-
blocks in the 1980s, for instance, used ethnographic interviews to explore this 
remarkable period (Mac Ionnrachtaigh, 2013). Similarly, Zenker (2013) used 
ethnography to explore language revival efforts in the North of Ireland more 
generally. Although Irish ethnographies no longer confine themselves to the 
rural west, instead offering a rich diversity of studies on gender, sexuality, 
crime, secularization, sports and more, all but no ethnographic work has been 
published that looks at Irish in its remaining heartlands, rendering the 
Gaeltacht a “zone of cultural invisibility” (Egan and Murphy, 2015: 137) in 
ethnographic terms. 
While valuable work has been done on Gaeltacht development, studies such 
as those discussed in this chapter have typically not adopted an ethnographic 
approach to their work and have therefore neglected an important 
epistemological approach which can offer unique insights on the sociolinguistic 
vitality of such communities. The remaining corpus of sociolinguistic literature 
pertaining to the Gaeltacht that has been published in recent years is very 
linguistically focused, leaving a gap in addressing the sociological context in 
which the Irish language continues to be transmitted, however tenuously. 
It is with this deficit in mind that this thesis attempts to combine the 
sociolinguistic and economic study of language shift with ethnographic 
methods in attempting to answer the research questions detailed in 1.1.2. 
Further to contributing to our understanding of language shift under economic 
imperatives, by adopting such an ethnographic approach I hope to be able to 
answer Egan and Murphy’s recent call for the application of a modern 
ethnographic imagination to one of the “multiple Irelands” (2015: 138), and 
offer an analysis that moves beyond the simplistic, homogenising 





In providing the theoretical background to this study’s findings, this review 
chapter has attempted to foreground several interconnected areas which have 
received very little attention in academic work published to date. 
Despite the frequency with which sociolinguistic literature notes the importance 
of economic forces in driving language shift, there are clearly still significant 
deficits in our understanding of how this process plays out in practical terms 
(see 1.1). While academic commentators in Ireland have published a great 
volume of valuable material on all manner of language revitalisation-related 
topics over the last 130 years, it is nonetheless notable that there has been 
relatively little academic investigation into how the country’s – and particularly 
the Gaeltacht’s – often precarious economic situation has contributed to 
language shift in this context. 
Furthermore, the dramatic economic transformations that have occurred on 
both national and international scales, primarily the growth of neoliberalism as 
a global hegemony, have received only limited attention in discussions of LPP 
in either Ireland or elsewhere. Although there is a large volume of research in 
the fields of political economy, public policy and sociology discussing the 
egregious effects of the austerity measures adopted since the great crash of 
neoliberalism in 2008, none of this international literature has addressed 
language use. LPP scholarship has also been similarly silent on the 
consequences of austerity measures for language vitality. 
While the west of Ireland (and indeed, the Gaeltacht itself) was one of the 
earliest sites of ethnographic research, anthropological work in such areas 
primarily addressed issues not related to language, including migration, mental 
illness, marriage patterns and so on. Somewhat surprisingly, there has been 
very little work in the Gaeltacht explicitly addressing the question of language 
use and loss through an ethnographic lens, with most recent literature in this 




Having identified the various gaps in relevant academic work conducted to 
date, this thesis will endeavour to address some of these deficiencies, 
examining how the economic disruptions that occurred between 2008-18 
affected covert and overt language policy and language maintenance in the 
Gaeltacht. The following chapter details the methodological approach adopted 
in order to complete this task of developing a “Gaeltacht sociolinguistic 
ethnography of language and economics”, with analysis of recent policy 







3.1 Introduction – my personal background in the 
Gaeltacht 
As someone who learned Irish to a high level of competence as a young adult, 
I was most fortunate to be able to do so through receiving significant linguistic 
input both inside and outside of an institutional context. Before beginning this 
doctorate, I spent over three years living as a lodger in the Galway Gaeltacht. 
Situated on the eastern bank of Loch Corrib, the area, Mionloch, is one of two 
weak Gaeltacht areas bordering the city, but, unlike Cnoc na Cathrach to the 
west, it is separated both geographically, and, indeed, linguistically (although 
dialect differences are comparatively slight) from the main Galway Gaeltacht 
in Conamara. 
During this period I was fortunate enough to live with a middle-aged native Irish 
speaker who has an above-average interest in the language and who 
frequently attends cultural events in different Gaeltacht areas throughout the 
country, maintaining close friendships with people in Donegal and Conamara 
in particular. Throughout my stay in Mionloch I was therefore most fortunate to 
have the opportunity to travel to various areas of the Gaeltacht and to be 
introduced to many native Irish speakers, with my landlord acting as a 
“gatekeeper” and “sponsor” in social situations which would have been 
otherwise impossible for a learner to access (Bryman, 2008: 407). This 
repository of varied social connections was of great importance during the 
course of data collection and in securing access to target groups for the 
purposes of researching this PhD. 
While living in Mionloch I also spent a year doing a master’s degree in 
language planning with Acadamh na hOllscolaíochta Gaeilge, the division of 
the National University of Ireland, Galway which runs third-level courses 
through the medium of Irish. In comparison with other third-level institutions in 
Ireland, the Acadamh has a very high proportion of students who were raised 




me a further opportunity to become acquainted with people from the Gaeltacht 
and I maintain many of these friendships to this day, including with people who 
have gone on to work in significant Gaeltacht institutions such as ÚnaG or in 
the Acadamh itself. During the course of this study several of these individuals 
served as “key informants”, people who helped with issues of access and 
clarification when needed (Bryman, 2008: 409). 
My involvement with language activism on a grassroots level as part of various 
university societies and civil society campaign groups both prior to and during 
this study has also provided me with opportunities to interact with many 
individuals active in language promotion efforts in the Gaeltacht. It also gave 
me occasion to work with various other “community leaders”, people involved 
in local politics in the Gaeltacht, Irish-language media personalities, etc. – 
experience which provided me with a further insight and a certain level of 
understanding of the communities that are the focus of this study. 
Although being competent in the Irish language itself is of obvious importance 
for a project such as this, relevant skills by themselves, as Crang and Cook 
caution, are far from a guarantee of being accepted as an “insider”. This, 
however, is not necessarily wholly negative, allowing for a certain distance to 
be maintained which can be conducive to academic analysis (Crang and Cook, 
2007: 48). While certainly not giving me the in-depth understanding of a 
Gaeltacht native, these years of experience nevertheless greatly facilitated my 
research, making it far easier for me to recruit informants, understand contexts, 
and, hopefully, interpret data with a greater degree of insight than would 
otherwise have been the case. As McCarty reminds us, “sometimes the best 
research context is not far away or “exotic,” but is one we already know 
something about” (2015: 84). 
3.2 Methodological overview 
This study adopted an ethnographic approach to data collection. While not 
having been traditionally favoured in LPP research, as Hult and Cassels 




in the last two decades (2015: 1), being ever more widely accepted since the 
first full-length LPP ethnography was published in 1988 (Hornberger, 1988). 
Commenting on this trend, Blommaert has referred to LPP ethnographies as 
“chronicles of complexity” and espoused their usefulness in analysing what are 
often complex and contested socio-cultural grounds (Blommaert, 2013). 
McCarty (2011) has edited an important collection of works on the ethnography 
of LPP, and Tusting and Maybin have noted this approach’s suitability for 
demonstrating links between different sociological levels “in the contexts of late 
modernity and globalisation” (2007: 576).  
In contrast to the approach once favoured by anthropologists, current 
understandings of ethnography no longer see this methodology solely as an 
exercise in participant observation. It is now appreciated that the analysis of 
other relevant data, such as texts (in my case language plans, policy 
documents, etc.) and quantitative data can greatly contribute to the “thickness” 
of an ethnography (Bryman, 2008: 402). In line with such trends towards 
adopting an “expansive” approach to ethnographic production, much use was 
made in this study of already available data in order to elaborate on the findings 
of my ethnographic work and help prevent this study from falling into 
“anecdotalism” (Bryman, 2008: 599). 
Through adopting such a methodology, an attempt has been made to present 
a comprehensive picture of the effects of the recession on the Gaeltacht. 
Information obtained from existing sociolinguistic literature on the Gaeltacht 
was used to not only inform my line of questioning and the direction of my 
research, but also, wherever possible, to support or refute claims made by 
informants in the field. The epistemological triangulation offered by such a 
mixed methods approach has been widely adopted in the social sciences in 
recent years, with the well-rounded nature of research conducted in this 
manner being increasingly appreciated, leading researchers to become ever 
more committed to such “methodological pluralism” (McCarty, 2015: 30). As 




[m]ixed methods has come of age. To include only quantitative or 
qualitative methods falls short of the major approaches being used 
today in the social and human sciences . . . The situation today is less 
quantitative versus qualitative and more how research practices lie 
somewhere on a continuum between the two (Creswell, 2003: 4; see 
also Bernard, 2011: 267). 
Reflecting on this move towards “interface ethnography”, Ortner notes that 
anthropological work has been moving in this direction for some time 
now . . . The move toward multi-sited fieldwork (Marcus, 1998), the use 
of archives (e.g. Dirks, 1992), or in any event a deeper engagement 
with history (e.g. Ortner, 1999), the greater reliance on interviews (e.g. 
Ortner, 2003), the use of texts of every kind as both sources of 
information and embodiments of deeper meanings (starting with Geertz, 
1973) – all of these have been expanding the anthropological toolkit in 
extremely valuable ways (Ortner, 2010: 219). 
In their call to “slice the [LPP] onion ethnographically”, Hornberger and Cassels 
Johnson (2007), prominent authors in the burgeoning field of the ethnography 
of LPP, also advocate such a broad-based approach to LPP ethnographies. 
Presenting both policy analysis (Chapter 4) and ethnographic findings 
buttressed with reference to extant quantitative material (Chapter 5), this study 
accords with this innovative approach. It is hoped that in doing so it presents 
the most complete and accurate representation of the subject matter attainable 
in a project of this scale. 
Further to adopting this methodology, I have aspired to use what Lin, drawing 
on Habermas, refers to as the “critical research paradigm” (2015: 21). This 
approach calls on researchers to be aware of, articulate and challenge how 
their own personal backgrounds and the ideological assumptions of their 
discipline influence their interpretation of data and creation of knowledge. It 
requires not only reflexivity around issues of researcher positionality, but also 
regarding how research will affect those who are being researched. The critical 
research paradigm asks how ethical research can best be done in an unjust 
world in order to empower subordinated groups and inhibit the reproduction of 
dominating institutions or practices. The adoption of such a stance has been 




justice and challenging unequal relations of power often found in LPP contexts” 
(Lin, 2015: 30). It is hoped that the use of such an approach helps ensure that 
while there may be inherent biases in the research, that they are duly 
acknowledged and addressed as is required by an ethical approach to 
ethnography (Ó Laoire, 2003). 
3.2.1 Ethnographic Research 
As explained above, the majority of data for this study were collected through 
ethnographic research in the Gaeltacht. With this project aiming to gain a 
detailed understanding of how macro-level processes of economic disruption 
play out at meso- and micro-levels, it was important that my research 
methodology allowed me to conceptualise the research subject in the most 
holistic terms possible. As Gille and O’Riain (2002) and Nic Craith and Hill 
(2015) have observed, the ethnographic method is a most efficacious way to 
gather data aimed at examining the destabilization and disembedding of social 
relations under globalisation, and as such it offered a suitable way for me to 
address my research questions. Furthermore, with much of the most important 
research done on language shift in the Gaeltacht in recent years being of a 
quantitative nature (Ó Giollagáin et al. 2007a; Ó Giollagáin and Charlton, 
2015a), ethnography allows for the filling of a significant gap in extant literature. 
The validity of the ethnographic method can certainly be challenged on various 
grounds – primarily pertaining to a perceived subjectivity and a lack of the 
scientific rigour that allegedly characterises some other epistemologies. As 
Crang and Cook have pointed out, however, such “scientism” arises from a 
misunderstanding of the reality of how the “hard scientific” method is actually 
applied in reality (2007: 8-15). These same authors offer several 
recommendations, which I elaborate on below, for allowing the ethnographer 
to move from a “mere subjectivity” to a “rigorous objectivity” by ensuring the 
correct use of purposive sampling, obtaining “saturation”, adopting a 
theoretically adequate framework of analysis and rooting such practices in an 
in-depth understanding of relevant literature (2007: 15). Ultimately, however, it 




social sciences. Even though we should always apply methods that promote 
objectivity and neutrality, we must accept that “regardless of the research 
methods we select from our toolkit, in the end, all social science research is 
always interpretive” (Hult and Cassels Johnson, 2015: xii). 
In undertaking this ethnographic study I drew on my previous period of intense 
cultural immersion and the network of contacts that I have built up over the 
years as a pool from which to locate informants. Having been fortunate enough 
to have already visited strongly Irish-speaking, “category A” Gaeltacht areas 
(Ó Giollagáin et al., 2007b: 13) on many occasions, I had a reasonable 
understanding of the social terrain I intended to traverse. Nonetheless, as 
ethnographers inevitably are, I was ultimately reliant on acquaintances who 
acted as gatekeepers, facilitating access and offering guidance as required. 
The existence of such gatekeepers helped in developing an emic perspective 
and avoiding the “simplistic inductivism” of believing it is sufficient to merely 
“hang out” in a community, without any form of facilitation, direction or 
guidance (Silverman, 2000: 60-2). 
These “key informants” (Bryman, 2008: 409) were mostly people who I knew 
from my time living in the Gaeltacht and being a student of the Acadamh and 
were typically involved in community development projects of various types. 
Further to being “local power brokers” (Fetterman, 1989: 12), they were mostly 
individuals who had previously shown an interest in my research and 
expressed a desire to assist me where possible. Making the most of such 
generosity, I was able to gain access to situations which would likely otherwise 
be out of bounds for a researcher (Bryman, 2008: 407-8). 
Such “meta-informants” and various other existing contacts of mine were used 
to draw up a list of potential interviewees. Working with these individuals, I 
employed the “snowball”, friend-of-a-friend method to recruit further informants 
who were not previously known to me. Similar to Ó hIfearnáin (2013: 353), at 
the end of each interview, interviewees were asked if they could recommend 
anyone else in their area who might be interested in talking to me about the 




As is typical for ethnography, rather than attempting to obtain a totally random 
or proportional sample, I applied a process of “judgemental sampling” 
(Fetterman, 1989: 43), also known as “purposeful” or “theoretical sampling” 
(Crang and Cook, 2007: 12). This approach relies on the judgment of the 
ethnographer to ensure the appropriateness of a sample and attempts to 
capitalise on “natural opportunities, convenience and also luck” (Crang and 
Cook, 2007: 12), rather than making pretensions to total randomness. Unlike 
pure convenience sampling (where a sample is studied simply because it 
happens to be available to the researcher), judgemental sampling is conducted 
with specific goals in mind, allowing the researcher to follow up on certain 
cohorts or individuals who are particularly pertinent to the research project 
(Bryman, 2008: 415). This method seeks to confirm the relevance of 
informants to the target information and thus ensures that those most capable 
of providing useful and valid data are not lost to the randomness that defines 
many other sampling methods (Bryman, 2008: 415). 
Key to the effective use of purposeful sampling for a project such as this, of 
course, is ensuring that a wide variety of informants of different backgrounds 
with widely varying roles in the community are sought out. An effort was 
therefore made to include not only well-known and vocal “community leaders” 
amongst my interviewees, but also the less outspoken but equally relevant 
individuals who make up the bulk of any community (Crang and Cook, 2007: 
18). While this does not totally nullify sampling bias, it is hoped that my efforts 
in this regard obtained a representative range of community opinions, thereby 
adding to the validity of the data. 
As this methodology adopts a non-probability sample, however, it is 
understood that the findings it produces cannot immediately be generalised to 
the whole population. As with Hornberger’s pioneering LPP ethnography in 
Peruvian schools (1988), or Jaffe’s work on Corsica (1999), it is nonetheless 
hoped that there is still be a certain amount of transferability to other cases in 




paramount that I took steps to ensure my ethnography is sufficiently thick, for, 
as Hult and Cassels Johnson observe: 
[v]ariability across contexts is taken for granted, but if the ethnographer 
provides enough rich and detailed description and analysis of one local 
context, it should be possible for the reader familiar with another local 
context to sort out what findings might or might not transfer. In that 
regard, the greater the particularity of description and interpretation, the 
more likely it is that a reader will be able to determine whether these 
particular findings apply to another context . . . The transferability and 
generalizability of these authors’ ethnographies lie, not perhaps in the 
representativeness or randomness of their cases, but in their providing 
particular, “thickly described” accounts informed by and contributing to 
the wider research literature on processes of minoritization – and 
revitalization (Hult and Cassels Johnson, 2015: 17). 
3.2.1.1 Data collection procedures 
In total, over eight months were spent conducting fieldwork in the Gaeltacht for 
this project. It has been traditionally understood that at least six months is 
required for a full-scale ethnographic study, more where possible (Fetterman, 
1989: 18; Ó Laoire, 2005: 40), with this study thereby exceeding this threshold. 
The main periods of fieldwork undertaken were during the summers of 2015 
and 2016, when I was free from teaching duties in the university. In addition to 
these periods, I was also able to spend time at different parts of the year in the 
Gaeltacht during various holidays. As well as adding to my understanding of 
these communities during the “off season” when there were very few tourists 
around, these periods allowed me to follow up on specific points with 
informants who were interviewed during the summer, obtaining further 
comment or clarification as required. Much of the writing up of this thesis was 
also conducted while once again living in the Gaeltacht. 
During my fieldwork I lived in communities in both Galway and Donegal. With 
the Donegal Gaeltacht being in a significantly more peripheral location than 
most of Galway, this provided an informative insight into the spatially 
differentiated consequences of the economic crisis. Although there are also 
Gaeltacht areas in Munster, an examination of this area was beyond the scope 
of this project. As Galway and Donegal contain the largest category A 




daily basis (Ó Giollagáin et al., 2007a), it was felt that these would provide 
greater opportunities for answering my research questions. Furthermore, the 
southern and eastern parts of the country are significantly better off socio-
economically than the north and west, which are categorised differently in 
European Union development typologies (Ó hAoláin, 2002: 31; Finn, 2002: 
15). 
Rather than attempting to be a totalising ethnographic monologue 
documenting the entirety of social life in these areas, my emphasis is confined 
to those aspects of Gaeltacht life impacted by the Great Recession. 
Consequently, I do not believe that conducting all my fieldwork in one 
community would have been helpful in mapping the terrain I wished to cover. 
I therefore divided my time between several areas that have historically seen 
significant economic interventions aimed at community and linguistic 
maintenance, staying in each area until I had achieved theoretical saturation 
and gathered the various narratives regarding the economic crisis that were 
practised in each community. 
While the timeframe involved was sufficient to allow this work to be classed as 
an orthodox ethnography, and although the substantive focus of my research 
is relatively traditional – involving rural, often isolated communities in the west 
of Ireland notable for a unique linguistic trait – the multi-sited nature of my 
study sees it diverge from more orthodox ethnographies. Where 
ethnographers traditionally locate themselves in a single community, often with 
a relatively clear delineation of its boundaries, I did not focus on one single 
“bounded” community for the duration of my fieldwork, making this thesis more 
a work of comparative ethnography. My focusing on the category A Gaeltacht 
areas of both Galway and Donegal was partly a response to the varied 
locations of my existing contacts, no significant majority of which were located 
in any one area, but also in deference to Marcus’ (1998) contention that the 
study of an increasingly globalised world is best accomplished through the use 
of multisited ethnography. Such an approach allowed for a wider view of the 




obtained by focusing solely on one community, with the comparison between 
the two main Gaeltacht areas of Galway and Donegal producing worthwhile 
and informative comparative data. 
During my fieldwork I adopted the typical ethnographic approach of engaging 
in “informal interviews” where the opportunity arrived (Fetterman, 1989: 49). 
These unrecorded “interviews” – in effect day to day, informal interactions – 
supported the recorded interviews which served as my primary data point, and 
hopefully provided the more in-depth understanding of issues which is best 
obtained through observing the banality of informal, day to day life. As is well 
documented in sociology and anthropology, such participant observation is key 
to achieving an emic view and ethnographic thickness sufficient to provide a 
worthwhile body of data to be used in later analysis (Geertz, 1973; 1988; 
Fetterman, 1989: 114). 
As is standard practice in ethnography, regular field notes – “the heart of the 
ethnographic enterprise” (McCarty, 2015: 85) – were kept throughout the 
course of my fieldwork. These notes detailed events that were telling in regard 
to the social, economic and/or linguistic vitality of these areas. The settings 
they occurred in, age groups involved, verbatim quotes, etc. were all recorded 
in as much detail as possible. Following recommendations by Bryman (2008: 
417-9), these notes were initially taken in a pocket notebook or on a 
Dictaphone as soon as possible after the event and later transferred to an 
electronic research diary. This material allowed for later analysis of events and 
proved a valuable reference point when writing up my findings. 
Typical of ethnographic work of this nature, participant observation notes were 
augmented through detailed semi-structured interviews conducted with 
informants recruited via the “snowballing” method described above. I 
conducted 52 interviews, after which I had clearly achieved theoretical 
saturation, having heard the dominant discourses relating to the recession that 
are prevalent in the Gaeltacht repeated many times. Furthermore, detailed 
interviewing of a larger sample than this would simply not have been feasible 




corpus of some 375,000 words which were coded and analysed once fieldwork 
was completed. 
While attempting to balance the representation of dialectal features with 
standard conventions for writing Irish, interviews were transcribed to give as 
accurate a reflection as possible of what interviewees said, non-standard 
grammatical features and profanities included. As such, the interview extracts 
used throughout the thesis often include instances of words not being mutated 
as standard usage would expect. Furthermore, irregular verbs are often 
regularised or other non-standard conjugations used, and there is a large 
amount of code-mixing and outright switching to English, as is typical of 
colloquial Gaeltacht speech (Ní Ghearáin, 2018). All such features were 
transcribed as uttered, with non-standard spellings being used to convey 
dialectal pronunciation where deemed appropriate, broadly following the 
practices of Ó Curnáin (2007) and Ó Laoire (2002) regarding Galway and 
Donegal Irish respectively. As codeswitching was unmarked by my informants 
it has not been indicated in transcription. Unspaced ellipses (“…”) are used to 
indicate an unfinished statement, while spaced ellipses (“. . .”) denote that a 
section of the informant’s speech has been removed from the extract for 
reasons of brevity or clarity. 
23 of my interviewees were from Galway and 26 from Donegal, with the 
remaining three being employees of language promotion bodies based in 
Dublin. Despite my best efforts to gain a more even gender mix, just fifteen of 
these informants were female. This is the result of several issues. Primarily, 
due to the patriarchal nature of Irish society, those involved in economic 
development and other areas of key importance to this thesis, including 
business owners, executives in development agencies, local politicians and 
community activists, are all much more likely to be male. Furthermore, females 
were unfortunately noticeably more reluctant to discuss their opinions on 
record, even when anonymity was ensured. 
Sixteen informants were in the “young adult” category, aged 18-34. Six were 




owners of large businesses which employed in excess of 30 people each. At 
least eleven were rearing children under the age of 18, many others had adult 
children. As is typical for the Gaeltacht, many of my informants worked in 
sectors that were dependent on state support. The gender imbalance 
notwithstanding, these 52 informants covered a wide range of social classes 
and backgrounds, with interviewees being chosen to ensure I spoke to people 
from a wide range of socioeconomic positions, including skilled and unskilled 
workers, as well as those who owned large businesses and the unemployed. 
The corpus of interviews these informants conducted with me therefore offered 
a suitable data set from which conclusions could be drawn to answer my 
research questions. 
3.2.2 Analysis of existing policy documents and quantitative 
data 
As discussed above, in addition to my ethnographic data, a key part of this 
thesis, presented in Chapter 4, analyses language policy decisions made 
during the 2008-18 period. As well as providing an important insight into the 
effects of the economic crisis and the austerity measures that ensued, this 
analysis, along with existent quantitative data on the Gaeltacht, helped me to 
triangulate and corroborate much of the information I obtained through 
ethnographic means. 
Fortunately for this study’s purposes, in comparison with many other 
languages with a similarly-sized speech community, Irish has a vast amount 
of sociolinguistic literature pertaining to it, with much of this work focusing on 
the Gaeltacht. Furthermore, Irish has a significant amount of legal and 
institutional provision. This support extends to the legal delineation of the 
Gaeltacht as an area with a unique linguistic heritage and which has been 
privileged with institutional and financial supports not available to areas of 
similar socioeconomic standing outside its borders. As this involves state 
provision, there is a large amount of pertinent documentation and legislation 




Government budgets and memoranda post-2008, for instance, were very 
instructive in the way they have addressed issues of funding for the Gaeltacht. 
While public spending in almost all sectors was reduced post-2008, Chapter 4 
compares cuts to funding for Gaeltacht-based institutions with similar non-
Gaeltacht bodies, clearly demonstrating the disproportionate nature of the cuts 
received by Gaeltacht institutions. The analysis of such differential rates of 
budgetary contraction comprises a key part of this thesis’ argument in relation 
to neoliberalism’s antipathy towards language revitalisation efforts and 
accords with many of the ethnographic findings presented in Chapter 5. 
As described in Chapters 1 and 2, academic literature on the Gaeltacht 
includes several important studies that are of great relevance to this thesis. 
One that was particularly useful in helping identify suitable fieldwork sites was 
the CLS (Ó Giollagáin et al., 2007a). This study primarily used census data to 
provide a detailed analysis of the relative strength of the Irish language in the 
155 electoral divisions that comprise the official Gaeltacht. In 2015 an update 
to this study was released, using census data from 2011, at the height of the 
recession (Ó Giollagáin and Charlton, 2015a), allowing for an informative 
comparison of the Gaeltacht pre- and post-crash. 
In a typology somewhat reminiscent of the fíor/breac-Ghaeltacht distinction 
proposed in 1926 (see 1.3), the CLS categorised Gaeltacht areas based on 
the self-reported percentage of daily users outside of the education system. It 
concluded that language shift is effectively complete in 75% of the official 
Gaeltacht, and was actively taking place in another 9% – areas respectively 
termed categories C and B (Ó Giollagáin et al., 2007b: 13). Referring to these 
findings allowed me to focus my research in particular on those areas of the 
Gaeltacht in Galway and Donegal in which over two-thirds of the population 
use Irish daily outside the education system (category A areas), as noted 
above. The availability of this quantitative data was of great importance, as the 
recession could only have a small impact on language maintenance in areas 
where Irish has already ceased to be transmitted intergenerationally and is 




As well as works such as the CLS and other sociolinguistic research pertaining 
to the Gaeltacht, the detailed information pertaining to language use, 
employment, migration and so on that is available in the records of the Central 
Statistics Office (CSO) was also immensely useful. This provided a 
quantitative overview of the demography of specific Gaeltacht areas, allowing 
me to explore, for instance, migration patterns to and from the Gaeltacht, 
employment and labour force participation rates, commuting patterns, rates of 
educational attainment and other markers of socioeconomic prosperity or 
deprivation. Relevant CSO data are presented at the beginning of Chapter 5 
to help contextualise the ethnographic findings which make up the bulk of the 
chapter, offering a diachronic overview of economic and social change in the 
Gaeltacht before, during and after the Great Recession. Such data is also used 
where appropriate to make synchronic comparisons between stronger and 
weaker parts of the Gaeltacht, thus permitting an exploration of the differential 
impact of the crisis on the most geographically remote areas. 
3.3 Ethics 
As Ó Laoire (2003: 113) has described, in recent decades the field of 
ethnography has been increasingly problematized and many of its basic 
assumptions challenged. What was once seen as a relatively straightforward 
approach to knowledge creation through which cultures, heritage objects and 
life stories were collected and catalogued is now understood as a fraught 
territory replete with asymmetric power relationships and ethical quandaries. 
As explored in 2.8, the history of ethnography in Ireland is one which has been 
culpable of what are now understood as highly problematic methodologies, 
with anthropologists still struggling to shake off the legacy of the discipline’s 
dark past and colonialist associations. 
Conscious of this legacy and acknowledging the tendentious nature of both 
the “field” and “informants” (both problematic concepts in themselves – see 
Fetterman, 1989: 58; Ó Laoire, 2003: 122-3), this project accorded every due 




As part of my critical ethnographic approach, I adopted the notion of ethics 
being something you do, rather than as merely an approval to be gained at a 
study’s outset and then promptly forgotten about (Canagarajah and Stanley, 
2015: 35). This approach is part of a larger critical turn in social science 
scholarship, whereby researchers are required to be aware of their own 
ideological positions, and how these may run contrary to those of their 
informants: 
[w]hile the positivistic tradition adopted the stance of objectivity, 
neutrality, and disinterestedness, the critical tradition engages with 
issues of power inequality, value differences, and subject positions as 
they influence the representation of knowledge, researchers, and 
participants (Canagarajah and Stanley, 2015: 35). 
Being an individual with a deep personal interest in language revitalisation – 
which I understand as part of my commitment to a broader politics of 
decolonisation and libertarian socialism – my ideological positioning is 
undoubtedly divergent from many of those I encountered in the field, a fact 
which I remained aware of throughout my research in order to ensure it did not 
unduly colour my work or impact on the rigours of best academic practice. 
As my study is of a relatively uncontroversial nature and involved only 
consenting adults, level one clearance was obtained in accordance with the 
ethical guidelines for PhD students laid out by the School of Literatures, 
Languages and Cultures at the University of Edinburgh. Furthermore, following 
protocol laid out by the School and a custom that is acknowledged in the field 
as best practice (ESRC, 2015: 29), all interviewees were asked to read and 
sign a consent form before the interviews began. Only those capable of making 
such an informed decision were involved in the research. This document was 
available in either Irish or English and explained the broad focus of the study, 
what participation would involve and informed them what use would be made 
of the data they supplied. It also offered my personal contact details and those 
of the university and the Department of Celtic and Scottish Studies should 
participants have wished to query any aspect of the study at a later stage. As 




In order to afford further protection to both myself as a researcher and also to 
those who participated in my study (who, as Fetterman reminds us, are 
ultimately those with the most at stake in any ethnography (1989: 136)), all 
personal names and the specifics of locations in my personal notes were 
anonymised. While a certain degree of geographical specificity is required by 
the nature of the study, this is given in as general a manner as is practical. The 
names of individuals, specific areas, businesses, etc. have all been 
anonymised or redacted in interview extracts cited throughout this work. In this 
manner I endeavoured to both lessen the “burden of authorship” on myself 
(Geertz, 1988) and assuage any worries participants may have had in taking 
part in this research. 
As a further attempt to reduce the inequities of power inherent in the 
ethnographic encounter, interviewees were free to conduct the interview 
through Irish, English or a mixture of both, however they should see fit. 
Considering the now heavily bilingual make-up of the Gaeltacht and the 
decreasing domains in which the language is used (Ó Giollagáin et al., 2007a), 
I was aware that some speakers may be uncomfortable speaking entirely in 
Irish about subjects which require a register and vocabulary that they may not 
be very familiar with – the language of cutbacks, austerity, recession and so 
on. 
As much recent research has shown, even in those communities which 
maintain a high percentage of daily speakers of Irish, someone’s age is 
frequently an indicator of their relative comfort and competence in using the 
language. The overwhelming majority of young people who are brought up 
through Irish in strong Gaeltacht areas are significantly more competent in 
English, especially when using registers of language other than those 
pertaining to the home and educational environments (Ó Giollagáin et al., 
2007a; Péterváry et al., 2014). Conversely, there remains a significant 
percentage of older people in the Gaeltacht who are more comfortable 
speaking in Irish than English – a second language which for many of them 




541; see also Ó Curnáin, 2012a for a typological description of likely speaker 
competencies based on which generation they belong to). While this study 
clearly focuses primarily on those inhabitants of the Gaeltacht who are active 
Irish speakers, participants were nonetheless assured that they were free to 
use whichever language they preferred during the interview. All but two 
interviews were ultimately conducted in Irish, although, as noted above, many 
were marked by a high-degree of codeswitching, as is commonplace in 
contemporary Gaeltacht speech. The remaining two informants, each of whom 
were learning Irish at the time of our interaction, did not feel sufficiently 
comfortable in their Irish-language ability to discuss the subject matter with me 
and as such opted for English. 
3.4 Conclusion 
While still associated in the popular imagination with the image of a researcher 
going to a far-flung locale and being immersed in a culture totally foreign to 
them for a long period, contemporary approaches to ethnography have 
developed significantly since the days when such practices were first 
popularised. Indeed, the traditional divisions between quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies that were previously so fundamental in the social 
sciences have recently been breaking down, with good research now best 
understood as lying on a continuum between these two opposing poles. 
Ethnographers nowadays make use of a wide variety of textual, visual and 
quantitative data, on the understanding that doing so can only help increase 
the “thickness” of any ethnographic study, greatly helping with the triangulation 
of research findings. Further destabilising traditional understandings of the 
ethnographic method, the use of multisited ethnography has come to be seen 
as an effective way to analyse the macro-micro sociological interface that is so 
fundamental to globalisation. 
In a further departure from ethnography’s roots, author reflexivity has come to 
be seen as a prerequisite of the ethnographic method, as has the critical 




do, rather than merely being a box-ticking exercise designed to satisfy 
university authorities. It is thus unsurprising that an increasing number of 
authors in the field of LPP are seeing the advantages of such an expansive 
and progressive methodological approach as that adopted by contemporary 
ethnographers. 
As has been described, this project will accord with this trend. The vast corpus 
of official documentation and budgetary decisions regarding Irish LPP 
published in recent years will be analysed in the following chapter. Both this 
and other pre-existing research will be used to help buttress the findings of the 
ethnographic data which follows in Chapter 5, allowing for connections 
between the macro-, meso- and micro levels of LPP and language shift to be 
demonstrated to a much greater degree than would be the case if this work 





4. Political and economic aspects of Irish-
language policy, 2008-18 
4.1 Introduction 
The death of the Celtic Tiger described in section 2.4 had a significant impact 
on a wide range of public policy, including, as will be demonstrated in this 
chapter, language policy. Although there will be much focus on explicitly 
language-focused policies such as the 20-Year Strategy for the Irish Language 
2010-2030, in attempting to afford due attention to the wider politico-economic 
context in which such policies operate, policies not specifically related to 
language which informed the state’s response to the Great Recession will also 
be examined. As well as providing a key part of my analysis of how 
neoliberalism operates as “covert language policy” (Piller and Cho, 2013: 23) 
in the Gaeltacht context, this chapter serves to contextualise the ethnographic 
data presented in Chapter 5 which explores the micro-level consequences of 
these policies for Gaeltacht communities. 
For reasons of brevity and in keeping with the overall focus of this thesis, I will 
look primarily at policies that have particular relevance for the Gaeltacht, but 
will also explore the rationalisation of the Irish language “voluntary sector” and 
the place of Irish in the public sector in general, an area which offers particular 
insight, I believe, into the influence of neoliberal thinking on language-related 
public policy. 
As explained in 2.4, Ireland’s policies over the last several decades have led it 
to become one of the most neoliberal countries in the world (Judt, 2010: 27-8), 
a process intensified in the wake of the 2008 crash. Developing on Ó Riagáin’s 
observation that “[t]he various dimensions of Irish language policy have been 
heavily conditioned by the way the Irish economy and, in turn, Irish society has 
developed since independence” (1996: 36), it will be demonstrated that the 
extremes of neoliberal reform associated with the death of the Celtic Tiger led 
to an acceleration of state withdrawal from Irish-language maintenance efforts. 




with neoliberal ideology militating against language revitalisation efforts. 
Adopting a term favoured in public policy studies, I will contend that 
developments in Irish LPP between 2008-18 amounted to a “punctuated 
equilibrium”, a sudden reform of a policy which had previously been changing 
only incrementally (Cairney, 2012: 172-99). 
To demonstrate this, my discussion will focus initially on the report of The 
Special Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes, 
which was the main document that informed the state’s programme of austerity 
and restructuring after 2008 (McCarthy et al., 2009a, 2009b). Although this 
report effectively provided a road map for the reform of state language policy, 
it has to date received only very limited attention in academic literature on Irish 
and the Gaeltacht. I will then go on to provide “policy vignettes” (Cairney, 2012: 
29) of “overt” language policies such as the 20-Year Strategy for the Irish 
Language 2010-2030 and the Gaeltacht Act 2012 that were introduced while 
the Irish economy was under the direction of the IMF-ECB-EC “Troika”. 
Following Shohamy’s important observation that a political entity’s language 
policy “should not be observed only through declared policy statements”, but 
also those policies unrelated to language that serve “to perpetuate language 
practices, often in covert and implicit ways” (Shohamy, 2006: xvi), a study of 
more covert aspects of recent Irish-language policy will then follow. This will 
include discussion of key developments such as the differential impact of the 
cuts on both ÚnaG and the state department with responsibility for the 
Gaeltacht, as well as the controversy surrounding the publication of the update 
to the Comprehensive Linguistic Study of the Use of Irish in the Gaeltacht in 
2015 and cuts to Irish-language media funding. 
I will then attempt, through an examination of the use of Irish in the public 
service and the neoliberal management structures that regulate this area, to 
provide a sociologically-informed structural account of the apparent antipathy 
of the public service towards the language. This chapter concludes with some 
further observations on neoliberalism’s operation as a structural force inhibiting 




Although the teaching of Irish as a compulsory subject in all schools is 
undoubtedly a major aspect of official language revitalisation policy, this is 
funded from the budget of the Department of Education and Skills and is not 
ordinarily understood as dedicated Irish-language spending. While austerity 
saw education budgets cut, these measures did not result in reductions in the 
level of provision for Irish. In response to a long campaign, a new Gaeltacht 
education policy was introduced in 2016. While space constraints 
unfortunately do not permit discussion of this development here, Ó Duibhir 
(2018) offers a detailed analysis of this new curriculum, which has been 
significantly under-resourced since its implementation (Tuairisc.ie, 2017a). 
4.2 Language Policy developments post-2008 
A great deal has been written about the wider political implications of the crash 
and the significant upheavals it engendered for Irish society as a whole (e.g. 
Coulter and Nagle, 2014; Maher and O’Brien, 2014; Roche et al., 2017), but in 
terms of its influence on language policy a number of key points are worth 
mentioning. One must be the arrival of the IMF-ECB-EC Troika in December 
2010, a development which entrenched the neoliberal character of the state’s 
response to the crisis. To a large degree, however, they merely insisted on an 
approach the Irish elite were set on implementing regardless (see 4.2.10.1). 
Another point of note was the electoral defeat of the dominant Fianna Fáil party 
in the February 2011 election and their replacement with a Fine Gael-led 
government. 
Having long since been understood as a party with limited sympathy for the 
language (Ó hÉallaithe, 2004: 169), Fine Gael’s election manifesto in early 
2011 – just two months after the launch of the 20-Year Strategy for the Irish 
Language – proposed the abolition of Irish as a compulsory subject for the 
Leaving Certificate. Although this plan was ultimately withdrawn due to 
widespread public opposition, the Fine Gael-Labour coalition of 2011-16 
nonetheless presided over a period of significant disruption in language policy, 
although, notably, this amounted to a continuation of the policy trajectory 




being characterised as significantly more neoliberal than Fianna Fáil-Green 
coalition that governed up to 2011, as Murphy notes, the new coalition’s 
policies did not differ significantly from their predecessors: 
[w]ith the Troika MOU [memorandum of understanding] as a roadmap, 
the new government continued the path dependence that locks Ireland 
into the liberal model. While partisan politics had some impact, both 
crisis governments were dominated by centre to centre right parties and 
were largely consistent (Murphy, 2014: 140). 
While far from an exhaustive account, the following sections discuss the most 
significant changes in Irish LPP, particularly with regard to the Gaeltacht, 
between 2008-18. In order to fully understand these developments, however, 
it is important to first examine the economic context from which such decisions 
emerged: as Lowi (1964) famously noted, too many assessments of policy 
focus on specific policy makers rather than the environment in which they 
operate. I will therefore begin with a discussion of the document that proposed 
the majority of austerity measures which were implemented post-2008. This 
and following sections will serve to illustrate how the Great Recession can be 
seen as having punctuated the generally incrementalist pattern of change that 
prevailed during the boom years and led to the adoption of a significantly more 
neoliberal language policy regime in the years since the crash. 
4.2.1 An Bord Snip Nua: The Special Group on Public Service 
Numbers and Expenditure Programmes 
With its claim that “differential schemes aimed at Gaeltacht areas are not 
justifiable” (McCarthy et al., 2009b: 41) the Report of the Special Group on 
Public Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes was unambiguous 
about its view of the approach the state should take towards the Gaeltacht as 
a result of the crisis. The report – which, along with the Troika’s Memorandum 
of Understanding (IMF, 2010), was a key blueprint for the state’s austerity 
policies – included drastic recommendations for cost savings relating to the 
Gaeltacht and a huge number of other areas financed by the public purse. As 




of this chapter occurred under this report’s influence, it is important that it be 
addressed firstly. 
The Special Group was convened by finance minister Brian Lenihan in late 
2008 and reported in July 2009. Known popularly as An Bord Snip Nua (“The 
New Snip Board”) or the McCarthy Report after the group’s chairman, Colm 
McCarthy, the report proposed €5.3 billion in cutbacks, including 17,300 public 
sector job cuts – a reduction of 5% in staffing numbers. While this seemed 
drastic at the time, these proposals would come to seem mild compared to the 
cuts of over €20 billion and the reduction of almost 10% in public servant 
numbers that ultimately occurred (MacCarthaigh, 2017: 149). As noted by 
Mercille and Murphy, McCarthy himself, an economist based in University 
College Dublin and a competent Irish speaker, “had previously recommended 
‘slash and burn’ policies during the economic recession of the 1980s”. He had 
been part of the original Bord Snip established in 1987 to address that 
decade’s recession and has long since had a “reputation for espousing the 
virtues of laissez-faire economics and market discipline” (Mercille and Murphy, 
2015: 133). Despite social partnership having been in place for almost two 
decades by 2009 (see 2.4), membership of the “special group” included no 
trade union or “third sector” voices, a decision which foreshadowed the state 
effectively ending social partnership unilaterally later that year. 
Gaining impact and implementation that very few policy-focused academics 
ever achieve, McCarthy’s proposals heavily influenced the 2010 budget, along 
with much of the emergency financial legislation that followed. Despite having 
such high-level impact, the recommendations of the board were deeply 
unpopular, with John McHale, professor of economics in the National 
University of Ireland, Galway, comparing them to the “shock therapy” applied 
after the collapse of the USSR (Indymedia.ie, 2009). While complete data on 
the implementation of the report’s recommendations is difficult to obtain, some 
eleven months after the report’s release the minister for finance reported that 





As noted, the report made proposals for a radical reform of state engagement 
with the Gaeltacht. It observed that the Department of Community, Regional 
and Gaeltacht Affairs’ [DCRGA] seemingly very progressive remit was 
to promote and support the sustainable and inclusive development of 
communities, both urban and rural, including Gaeltacht and island 
communities, thereby fostering better regional balance and alleviating 
disadvantage, and to advance the use of the Irish language (McCarthy 
et al., 2009b: 33). 
Nonetheless, the report proceeded to recommend that the department “should 
be closed and its various functions either redistributed to other Government 
Departments, or discontinued as appropriate”, due to it having “a relatively 
lower priority in terms of the existing pressures on the public finances” 
(McCarthy et al., 2009a: 37). This would allow for a saving of some €151.1m, 
with it being proposed that those residual matters relating to the Irish language 
and culture which were not discontinued be assigned to the Department of 
Education and Science (McCarthy et al., 2009a: 37; 2009b: 36), and that 
DCRGA staff be laid off. While proposing an overall reduction of 9.4% in state 
expenditure, the functions performed by the DCRGA were to be cut at a 
significantly higher rate of 32%, the highest of any state department. 
Furthermore, within the DCRGA, the cuts recommended for Gaeltacht and 
islands expenditure amounted to 58% (Guth na Gaeltachta, 2010), a figure 
significantly higher than that recommended for any other subsector. Although 
the department was not ultimately closed, as will be seen in 4.2.5, it suffered 
severe cuts in a very short period which have not since been reversed. 
Another suggestion with extremely significant implications for the Gaeltacht 
was the proposal to “[c]onsolidate all indigenous enterprise support and sector 
marketing functions in Enterprise Ireland . . . and rationalise the organisations 
losing functions as appropriate” (McCarthy et al., 2009a: 27). This was to 
include ÚnaG, thereby saving €6.9m (McCarthy et al., 2009a: 36), with the 
group noting “the high cost per job created” by ÚnaG as one of the reasons for 
its decision (McCarthy et al., 2009b: 42). Although the functions of ÚnaG would 




language groups insisted this approach was deeply unsuitable considering the 
unique needs of the Gaeltacht (Guth na Gaeltachta, 2010). As with the 
DCRGA, while ÚnaG was not closed – most probably due to such a proposal 
not being politically viable at the time – it suffered a massive reduction to its 
budget over a very short period, severely curtailing the organisation’s work 
(see 4.2.4). As described in the following extract from an interviewee employed 
in Irish-language advocacy, the retention of the DCRGA and ÚnaG was 
permitted only on condition of them losing the vast majority of their resources: 
M: [B]hí moladh má théann tú siar ag an moladh a bhí ag Colm 
McCarthy agus Bord Snip a dó, fáil réidh leis an roinn agus fáil réidh 
leis Údarás na Gaeltachta agus fáil réidh le y’know nach mór gach 
institiúid a bhain leis an nGaeilge. So bhí siad faoi bhrú, bhí siad faoi 
ionsaigh ach glacadh cinneadh iad a choinneáil agus Údarás a 
choinneáil agus eile ach tá sé ar nós gurb é sin an bronntanas – “seo 
daoibh, tá sibh in ann iad a choinneáil ach tá muid chun iad a scrios”. 
Other cuts proposed – and ultimately implemented – included the 
discontinuation of Gaeltacht-specific schemes such as the housing grant for 
Gaeltacht residents and the grant paid to parents of Irish-speaking children, 
Scéim Labhairt na Gaeilge, both of which aimed “to incentivise inhabitants to 
remain in Gaeltacht areas” (McCarthy et al., 2009b: 41). The Community and 
Recreational Schemes which funded infrastructure such as community centres 
and sports pitches in Gaeltacht areas and the Gaeltacht Improvement 
Schemes which aided physical and economic development were also 
abolished. 
An Bord Snip’s proposals to discontinue Scéim na bhFoghlaimeoirí Gaeilge 
(“Irish-learners’ scheme”, see 5.4.3.1) and close COGG (a policy and 
promotion agency focused on Irish-medium education) were successfully 
resisted, however. The proposal to abolish Scéim na bhFoghlaimeoirí Gaeilge 
in particular, which provides a subvention for those who host attendees at Irish-
language summer colleges for teenagers, was the subject of a well-organised 
campaign which successfully saw it maintained, although reduced by 10% for 
the duration of the crisis, as described in 5.4.3.1. Section 5.6 offers a detailed 




Further to those measures that focused directly on the DCRGA, many of the 
cuts proposed by An Bord Snip for rural Ireland more generally were also of 
direct relevance to Gaeltacht communities. Cuts to county councils, the Local 
Development Social Inclusion Programme and the Community Development 
Programme all further reduced the support available to such rural areas, as 
too did the recommendation to close or amalgamate primary schools with 
fewer than 100 pupils. With almost all Gaeltacht schools being in rural 
locations, this proposal threatened up to 100 primary schools therein, although 
it was at least partly resisted due to a nationwide campaign driven by both 
parents’ groups and teachers’ unions (Save Our Small Schools, 2012). 
Similarly, the proposed discontinuation of the Rural Environmental Protection 
Scheme and other similar supports to disadvantaged regions such as the Rural 
Transport Scheme created a deeply unstable environment in what were 
already often vulnerable, underprivileged areas. 
While the CLS described above called for a large-scale programme of 
community investment in the Gaeltacht in 2007, in 2009 An Bord Snip Nua 
advised the exact opposite – a drastic programme of cuts that amounted to a 
rapid intensification of the state’s steady process of withdrawal from supporting 
the Gaeltacht, which was disproportionately affected by the cuts. As would be 
predicted by much academic literature on public policy, the neoliberal direction 
pursued by the state throughout the Celtic Tiger proved to be a path dependent 
one, meaning that “initial moves in one direction elicit[ed] further moves in that 
same direction . . . [with] the trajectory of change up to that point constrain[ing] 
the trajectory after that point” (Kay, 2005: 553, original emphasis). In the tense 
post-2008 economic climate many further neoliberal measures were thus 
implemented, in both the public and private sectors. 
Significantly, perhaps the most important example of community resistance to 
austerity in the context of this thesis, the Guth na Gaeltachta campaign, was 
set up with the specific aim of opposing the recommendations of An Bord Snip, 




4.2.2 The 20-Year Strategy for the Irish Language 2010-2030  
Emerging from a commitment made in the Statement on the Irish Language 
2006 (see 1.5), the 20-Year Strategy for the Irish Language 2010-2030 
(henceforth “Strategy”) was the most detailed exposition of state language 
policy since 1965 (Government of Ireland, 1965; see 1.4). Although it was 
originally planned for the Strategy to be published in 2008, this process was 
delayed for several years due to difficulties recruiting suitable consultants (Ó 
Murchú, 2008: 42). 
Most unserendipitously, the Strategy’s eventual launch in December 2010 (at 
which the Taoiseach introduced it in Irish) took place during the same week 
that the Troika took control of state finances. In this context it is unsurprising 
that the Strategy contained only an extremely watered-down set of goals 
compared to the recommendations made in the CLS, despite it claiming that 
the government “accepts the broad thrust of the Comprehensive Linguistic 
Study” (Government of Ireland, 2010: 20). With the overarching goal of 
“creating a bilingual society”, the Strategy aims to increase the visibility of Irish 
in public life, ensure the provision of services through Irish and increase the 
number of Irish-speaking families (Government of Ireland, 2010: 3). 
Furthermore, it contains the aim of increasing to 250,000 the number of daily 
Irish speakers outside the education system by 2030 (Government of Ireland, 
2010: 9), a figure which would have required a seemingly impossible 6% 
annual increase. In the Gaeltacht, it aims for a 25% increase of daily speakers, 
leading, unsurprisingly, to the widespread derision of these goals as being 
utterly unattainable (e.g. Ó hÉallaithe, 2017a). Ó Giollagáin (2014b: 104-6) has 
provided an in-depth comparison between the recommendations of the CLS 
and the Strategy, and consequently they will not be detailed here. 
It must be noted, however, that the historical precedents described in 1.3 and 
1.4 and international literature on evidence-based policy making would make 
it seem extremely unlikely that the state would ever have implemented the full 
range of recommendations included in the CLS (or, indeed, the Strategy itself), 




introduction. Nonetheless, politicians at the highest level stated both at its 
launch in 2010 and over the following years that the crisis significantly 
impinged on the state’s ability to implement the Strategy (Irish Independent, 
2010; Seanad Éireann, 2017). While plausible, this may also be more a 
convenient excuse for a policy trajectory which the state would have pursued 
regardless. Similar to opinions espoused by Klein (2007), Mirowski (2013) and 
Krugman (2015) regarding the use of crises as opportunities to implement 
radical neoliberal policy reforms long since desired by elites (see also 2.2), Ó 
Giollagáin sees the recession as providing an “effective camouflage for 
language policy insincerity” with the 
inertia and inaction . . . plausibly depicted as an unfortunate off-shoot of 
negative economic circumstances rather than a lack of will and concern. 
It is probably more realistic to depict the excuse of the economic 
recession for the general institutional lassitude as a carriage of 
convenience for a much-awaited exit strategy from ideological and 
policy commitments for which the elite no longer has any patience (Ó 
Giollagáin, 2014b: 114). 
In this way, under the rubric of fiscal responsibility, the state has been able to 
accelerate the de-regulation of language policy, just as the crisis has 
“facilitated the rolling out of drastic reforms more rapidly and thoroughly than 
would otherwise have been possible” in a wide range of public policy (Mercille 
and Murphy, 2015: 27). In doing so, the “deepening” of neoliberalism in Ireland 
has been promoted to a degree “that had not yet been seen and with a noted 
vigour on the part of political and economic elites” (Mercille and Murphy, 2015: 
27). 
Despite the weak nature of its proposals, it is widely understood that the 
Strategy has not been implemented in any meaningful way since its launch in 
2010 (Walsh, 2014b; Tuairisc.ie, 2017b). Walsh, having initially welcomed the 
Strategy as offering the best chance for positive development that was likely 
to be available to the Irish-speaking community (2011b), observed that by early 
2014 the Strategy was “geall le corpán” and that Irish was “níos imeallaí ná 
riamh sa státseirbhís” (2014a). A clear illustration of this status is to be seen 




been implementing the Strategy in their own department, published at the 
quarter-way point of the policy in December 2015, contained just 225 words. It 
stated merely that the Taoiseach was the chairperson of the committee 
dedicated to the Strategy’s implementation, that his department was in 
discussions with stakeholders to overcome the EU derogation described in 1.5 
and that future schemes of the department would specify roles requiring 
fluency in Irish, with no such positions existing at the time of its writing 
(Department of the Taoiseach, 2015). 
Furthermore, the DCRGA 2014 review of the strategy’s overall progress was 
so similar to those issued by individual state departments that it would seem 
certain that it was simply copied and pasted from the various department 
reports (Tuairisc.ie, 2014a). This level of indifference clearly demonstrates 
why, during the initial consultations about the Strategy, many experts claimed 
that the role of monitoring the Strategy’s implementation should be given to 
the Coimisinéir Teanga, rather than allowing the DCRGA to police itself. As 
with the vast majority of recommendations made during the public consultation 
on a draft of the Strategy in 2009, however, such sentiments went unheeded 
(Ó Giollagáin, 2014a: 26). This non-implementation has meant, effectively, a 
continuation of the pre-Strategy policy status quo, but with much less funding 
now available for policy implementation (Ó Giollagáin, 2014a: 35). 
In a further blow to the Strategy’s effectiveness, in July 2017 the Oireachtas 
committee chaired by the Taoiseach which oversaw the implementation of the 
strategy was abolished. While they had been meeting far less frequently than 
other committees and the importance of the Strategy to their work had been 
greatly reduced since receiving the additional duty of overseeing arts policy in 
2016 (Tuairisc.ie, 2017c), this nonetheless further relegated the Strategy to 
insignificance. Jordan and Richardson’s concept of “placebo policies” which 
aim to create the appearance of action on issues in which the state is 
fundamentally uninterested is brought to mind (1987: 233).  
Unsurprisingly in this context, a 2018 report compiled for TG4 (the Irish-




authors of the CLS, concluded that none of the structures proposed in the 
Strategy were operational, with many of them never having been established 
(Tuairisc.ie, 2018a). 
Shortly after this damning report was issued, an action plan for the Strategy 
was published in July 2018 with the aim of progressing the functioning of the 
policy (Government of Ireland, 2018). This came a full year late, however, with 
the result that it was renamed the Plean Gníomhaíochta 2018-2022 instead of 
covering the five-year period 2017-2022 as intended (Dáil Éireann, 2018a). 
While containing various re-affirmations and commitments to implement areas 
of the Strategy that had been largely ignored over the previous eight years, 
this document, as Ó Giollagáin (2018) describes, contains little that is sufficient 
to addresses the continuing erosion of the Gaeltacht that was predicted in 2007 
by the CLS, with it amounting largely to a continuation of the policy trajectory 
pursued in recent years. 
4.2.3 The Gaeltacht Act 2012  
While not discussed with anything like the same frequency as the Strategy by 
either Irish-language media or advocacy groups, the Gaeltacht Act 2012 
(hereafter “2012 Act”) is arguably of far greater significance for the Gaeltacht, 
not least because it, unlike the Strategy, has been largely implemented since 
its enactment. As an update to both the original Gaeltacht Act 1956 which 
established the current Gaeltacht boundaries and the Údarás na Gaeltachta 
Act 1979, the 2012 Act – which gives legislative effect to some of the goals of 
the Strategy – was the first significant piece of legislation focused on the 
Gaeltacht in over 30 years. The 2012 Act was deeply controversial at the time 
of its proposal, however, being criticised heavily by both opposition parties and 
language promotion groups. Despite over 150 amendments being proposed 
while the bill was going through the Dáil, all of these were rejected by the Fine 
Gael-Labour coalition during the three hours allocated for their discussion, 
thereby prompting a walkout of the opposition, a very uncommon occurrence 




The language planning process laid out in the 2012 Act aims to redefine the 
Gaeltacht on the basis of Language Planning Areas (LPAs).5 Based originally 
on recommendations contained in the CLS and accepted in the Strategy which 
aimed to redraw the Gaeltacht borders to more accurately reflect the reality of 
the use of Irish as a community language, the official Gaeltacht was divided 
into 26 LPAs by the Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht (as it was 
titled until May 2016). Each of these areas is required by the 2012 Act to write 
a language plan and have it approved by the department in order to retain their 
Gaeltacht status (Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht, 2016: 37-
48). 
As described in 1.3, ever since the first Gaeltacht commission reported on the 
extent of Irish-speaking areas in 1926, the official borders of the Gaeltacht 
have been somewhat aspirational in their expansiveness. This exaggeration 
continues to be a source of frustration for some Gaeltacht activists (Ó 
hÉallaithe, 2017a). While the 2012 Act could conceivably have led to a re-
drawing of the borders, the political class’ reluctance to formally remove 
Gaeltacht status from any area means that language plans (completion of 
which is the sole requirement for the retention of Gaeltacht status) are being 
written in even the weakest category C areas in which language shift is 
effectively complete. Illustrating the scale of this reticence to concede any part 
of the official Gaeltacht, during my fieldwork an ÚnaG employee told me of the 
frustration of working with language planning committees who are incapable 
of conducting their affairs through Irish (see also 5.8). 
In effectively placing the language planning duties formerly conducted by 
various state institutions onto voluntary community groups, the procedures 
spelled out in the act are strikingly neoliberal, bringing Williams’ and Morris’ 
observations on the “grass-rootism of neo-liberalism” to mind, with 
neoliberalism often being implemented via highly localised structures (2000: 
 
5 Despite being a Gaeltacht act, the legislation also makes provision for the legal recognition of Irish-
speaking networks outside the Gaeltacht, as well as for “Gaeltacht service towns” in or near the 




180). Through outsourcing language planning responsibilities to marginalised 
communities, the state, under the guise of democratising the language 
planning process, is effectively able to withdraw from a key part of its historic 
commitment to language revitalisation. As Ó Giollagáin has observed 
[i]t seems that the Act overestimates the capacity of local Gaeltacht 
communities to influence societal trends through local plans, while at 
the same time ignoring the potential of significant realms of state to 
exacerbate existing trends towards linguistic assimilation (Ó Giollagáin, 
2014b: 111). 
The implementation of this aspect of the 2012 Act is discussed further in 
sections 4.2.4 and 5.8. 
Commenting on both the Strategy and the 2012 Act, an employee in the Irish-
language sector pointed out that the far-reaching changes instigated by both 
of these documents were matched not with extra resources for their 
implementation, but rather with the significant budgetary cuts detailed in 4.2.4 
and 4.2.5 below: 
M: [T]háinig an dá rud sin isteach ach níor cuireadh aon acmhainní 
breise ar fáil i ndáiríre chun an obair sin a dhéanamh. In aon polasaí 
rialtais eile thuigfeadh siad go mbeidh costas ag baint le polasaí chomh 
mór leis sin agus chomh fairsing leis sin a chur i bhfeidhm agus go 
mbeadh acmhainní breise curtha ar fáil. Y’know a mhalairt de sin – 
bhain siad airgead ón dá institiúid is mó a bhaineann leis ó thaobh 
cúrsaí maoinithe . . . So y’know níl siad ag tabhairt faoi seo i ndáiríre 
muna bhfuil siad ag cur na hacmhainní ar fáil freisin. 
Another employee of a language promotion organisation explained the 
provisions of the 2012 Act and the manner in which it was forced through by 
the government as being a response from a civil service which had been 
frustrated by language rights victories achieved in recent years: 
B: [A]g breathnú ar an rud go stairiúil, má théann tú siar b’fhéidir 15 
bliana nó pé rud, d’éirigh linne, d’éirigh le pobal na Gaeilge buanna 
áiride a bhaint amach, le streachailt, mar ní bhaineann muid aon rud 
amach gan streachailt. Ach bhí rudaí ar nós TG4, mar shampla, stádas 
na Gaeilge san Eoraip, an Acht Teanga – agus aríst ní raibh aon duine 
go hiomlán sásta ach bhí siad ann. Agus fuair muid Coimisinéir Teanga, 




thuairim féin, scanraigh sé sin méid áiride daoine, agus scanraigh sé an 
státseirbhís . . . Ní raibh taithí acu ag plé le leithéid Seán Ó Cuirreáin 
[an chéad choimisinéir] agus go raibh orthu glacadh leis an rud seo, [a 
bheith] dáiríre faoin rud. Agus ba léir gur frithionsaí cuid dhó seo [Acht 
na Gaeltachta] . . . Toradh nádúrtha é sin ar an ais-throid sin, bhí sé 
thar a bheith lag. Bhí sé dochreidte ó thaobh córas polaitiúil nach raibh 
siad sásta glacadh le oiread is leasú amháin. 
While there may well be some truth to this sentiment, it must also be 
remembered that the 2012 Act was introduced at a time when Ireland was still 
beholden to the Troika’s structural adjustment programme, unemployment had 
risen from under 5% in early 2008 to nearly 15% in 2012 and the state had 
already spent €70 billion on bank bailouts (Murphy, 2014: 135). As Hardiman 
and Regan noted at the time: “[a]ll budget decisions must be cleared with the 
Troika, fiscal performance is subject to quarterly reviews and Troika personnel 
are embedded in the core government departments” (Hardiman and Regan, 
2012: 9). Furthermore, the conditions of the Memorandum of Understanding 
between Ireland and the Troika “required a continued liberalisation of Ireland’s 
political economy and increased marketisation of previously protected public 
spheres” (Murphy, 2014: 134). 
While, then, the unsuitability of the 2012 Act may be connected to the attitude 
of hostile elements within the civil service (see 4.2.9 for detailed discussion of 
this issue), it would seem more likely that the extraordinarily constrained 
economic circumstances facing the state by mid-2012 made it all but inevitable 
that the implementation of the 2012 Act would deliver a far from satisfactory 
outcome. The truth, of course, may well lie in a mixture of these elements, with 
the crisis both providing an excuse for and requiring an accelerated withdrawal 
of state support for the language. Either way, the enactment of the 2012 Act 
and the provisions it contains echoes Williams’ and Morris’ comment that 
neoliberalism means that language planning “can no longer be conceived of in 
terms of the modernist conception of state benevolence, acting on behalf of 





Although Ó Giollagáin’s description of the act as “the half-hearted conviction 
of a reluctant duty” (Ó Giollagáin, 2014b: 111) is fully justified, his analysis fails 
to give sufficient attention to the economic and political conditions of crisis in 
which it was produced and, like my interviewee above, places excessive 
weight on the machinations of “anti-Irish” public servants (see 4.2.9). 
Furthermore, in his detailed account of the state’s ignoring the 
recommendations of the CLS in both the Strategy and the 2012 Act, Ó 
Giollagáin (2014b: 103-15) does not seem to acknowledge the fact that such 
ignoring of expert advice is not at all an uncommon occurrence in public policy 
making, either in Ireland or internationally. As discussed in 4.2.7 below, 
evidence-based policy making is very often the exception rather than the rule. 
Rather than being necessarily reflective of a political class expressly opposed 
to Irish, it can plausibly be seen as a product of the bounded rationality and 
“satisficing” which policy makers and the elite inevitably face, whereby they 
can only hope to make reasonably satisfactory policy in the face of incomplete 
knowledge and resources (Cairney, 2012: 95-8), as well as the structural 
factors which constrain their actions (Cairney, 2012: 111-31). 
Tellingly, the mark of neoliberal austerity measures is very visible in relation to 
the 2012 Act, with the Explanatory and Financial Memorandum attached to it 
stating 
[i]t is estimated that Part 3 of the Bill [regarding the ÚnaG election] will 
result in savings of approximately €100,000 annually and up to 
€500,000 every five years. It is not expected that the remaining Parts of 
the Bill will result in any additional costs to the Exchequer (Government 
of Ireland, 2012: 44). 
This note provides a striking counterpoint to the various public assurances 
from the government after the enactment of the 2012 Act that resources would 
to be made available for the implementation of the language planning process 
laid out in the 2012 Act – a process discussed in detail in 5.8. Indeed, in 
accordance with the sentiments of this memorandum, what money that has 
since been made available for the implementation of the language planning 




to Gaeltacht roads – a great number of which are of a poor standard (Dáil 
Éireann, 2017). The act also had significant implications for ÚnaG, as 
discussed in the following section. 
4.2.4 Údarás na Gaeltachta 
Since its foundation in 1979, ÚnaG, the Gaeltacht development authority, has 
successfully attracted a significant number of enterprises to the Gaeltacht, at 
least for the short term. Implementing a localised version of the national 
economic strategy, this has been primarily achieved through offering tax 
breaks and other incentives to companies who are willing to locate there. 
Although this approach has been widely critiqued as being unsuitable for 
Gaeltacht development (e.g. Walsh, 2011a; section 5.3.4), the proposal by An 
Bord Snip Nua (4.2.1) that ÚnaG be abolished outright caused much concern 
for Gaeltacht communities. While this abolition did not ultimately occur, the 
institution, as will be seen, was severely debilitated by the ensuing cuts, which 
were much more severe than those experienced by comparable non-Gaeltacht 
institutions. 
Indeed, one of the most expedient ways of gaining an insight into “covert 
language policy” (Shohamy, 2006) in the wake of the crash is through 
examining the differential treatment visited on ÚnaG compared to its non-
Gaeltacht equivalents. As figure 4.1 shows, ÚnaG’s budget was reduced much 
more significantly than those of either the Industrial Development Authority 
(IDA) or Enterprise Ireland, despite it performing the functions of these two 
organisations combined, albeit in a Gaeltacht-specific context. 
State attitudes towards ÚnaG are all the more evident when one considers that 
these cuts were made to an agency whose main duty – like the IDA and 
Enterprise Ireland – is to create employment, a goal which each government 
of the post-crash period regularly claimed to be their priority. Furthermore, this 
reduction was implemented despite an independent report concluding in 2010 
that the organisation required a minimum budget of €12m per annum simply 




increasing this amount (Ó Clochartaigh, 2013). Unsurprisingly, these cuts led 
to a significant fall in the numbers employed in ÚnaG client-companies during 
this period (Conradh na Gaeilge, 2017: 10-1; see also 5.3.2). The agency itself 
also lost a large proportion of its staff as a result of these measures: while it 
had had 130 staff members in 2008, this had fallen to 79 ten years later 
(Oireachtas Éireann, 2018a). 
 Údarás na 
Gaeltachta 
Enterprise Ireland Industrial 
Development 
Agency 
2008 €25.5 million €56.4 million €78.5 million 
2015 €6.7 million €52.7 million €116 million 
% change 2008-15 -73.7% -6.6% +47.8% 
Table 4.1 Comparison of enterprise promotion agencies’ budgets 2008-15 
(Údarás na Gaeltachta, 2009a: 9, 2016a: 11; Enterprise Ireland, 2009: 48, 
2016: 42; IDA, 2010: 36, 2016: 33). 
As one of my interviewees in Donegal noted: 
A: [Ó] thaobh an Údaráis de, bhí tú ag caint ar bhuiséad caipitil suas le 
fiche, fiche ’s a cúig milliún nó rud éigean mar sin agus tá sé sin rite 
síos go sé mhilliún. So tá, bhfuil ’s agat, ísliú ollmhór tagtha ar an 
bhuiséad sin agus má chuireann tú sin i gcomórtas le, mar shampla, 
Enterprise Ireland agus an IDA . . . [N]íl dabht ach go bhfuil, mar a 
déarfá, teachtaireacht áirid ansin. 
In an interview with a now-retired senior member of ÚnaG who presided over 
the organisation through both the height of the boom and the worst depths of 
the recession, he explained the implications of this enormous budget reduction 
as such: 
S: [T]á ceangal nó nascanna ollmhór idir buiséad eagraíocht agus . . . 
na torthaí a bhíonn acu. An difear a chonaic mise, nuair a thoisigh mise 




feidhmeannaigh ábalta dul amach agus iad muiníneach astu féin dá 
mba rud é gur chas siad le infheisteoir nó go raibh infheisteoir ag fiosrú 
go raibh siad ábalta a bheith láidir faoi agus a rá “is féidir linn cuidiú leat, 
is féidir linn cuidiú leat”. Now níl aon cheist faoi sin agus ná bíodh ceist 
faoi. So nuair a thiteann an buiséad go sé nó ocht milliún d’airgead 
caipitil, b’fhéidir go mbeidh na feidhmeannaigh ag rá an rud céanna, 
ach. . . déarfaidh siadsan “bhuel an bhfuil buiséad agat?” 
One of these feidhmeannaigh referred to in the quote above explained his view 
of the matter to me as follows: 
É: [T]á lá na himeartha caillte againn, you’re not a player anymore. Ní 
bhíonn daoine ag caint fúinn, ní bhíonn muid ag caint ar an raidió, 
síleann daoine go bhfuil an cath caillte againn. Tá baint aige sin uilig 
leis an ghearradh siar tubaisteach a tharla dúinn. Agus an rud eile go 
bhfuil, anois tá coimhéad iontach teannta ar achan rud a níonn muid. 
An rud a deir siad faoi neoliberalism, reductive, reductivism . . . 
reductivity. Tá achan rud gearrtha anuas. Tá monatóireacht mhór 
déanta ar achan rud. Tá níos mó monatóireacht déanta ar achan rud 
anois mar tá na budgets chomh teannta. 
As part of its commitment to “strengthening Ireland’s rural fabric”, the National 
Development Plan 2018-2027, launched in February 2018, stated that €178m 
would be invested in the Gaeltacht, including an “incremental increase in the 
annual capital allocation to €12 million” for ÚnaG (Government of Ireland, 
2018b: 50). No deadline was provided for the fulfilment of this commitment, 
which, even if implemented in full, will see funding for ÚnaG at less than 50% 
of the 2008 figure come 2027 (Tuairisc.ie, 2018b). Furthermore, research 
commissioned by the civil society campaign group Teacht Aniar demonstrated 
that during the four-year period between 2005-9 capital expenditure on the 
Gaeltacht and islands was €299m, vastly more than the €178m which is 
promised for the ten-year period from 2018-27. Even based on the assumption 
that this proposed investment is made in full, expenditure on Irish by 2028 will 
still be significantly less than it was in 2008. Indeed, this €178m amounts to 
only slightly more than half of what was spent on this sector between 2006-16, 
post-2008 cutbacks notwithstanding (Byrne, 2018: 10). 
Further to these budgetary cuts, in line with other areas of the public service, 




Finance in 2009. When coupled with the incentivised early retirement schemes 
introduced in 2012, this meant that ÚnaG not only lost almost three quarters 
of its budget, but also a large amount of its most experienced staff, who have 
not been replaced, as a Galway-based factory owner with many years of 
experience dealing with ÚnaG described to me: 
M: Suas go 2008, 2009 b’fhéidir, bhíodar éifeachtach. Bhí sé iontach, 
bhí tú in ann goil isteach agus cruinniú a bheith agat le Pádraig Ó 
hAoláin [príomhfheidhmeannach na linne], nó le Jim Keogh a bhí i 
gceannas ar chúrsaí fostaíochta, cúrsaí tionscail. Ach héis na buiséid a 
bheith gearrtha, agus sin an rud a tharla leis an Údarás, agus is rud 
suntasach é seo freisin . . . Nuair a bhí na daoine istigh san Údarás, 
thosaigh siad amach le Gaeltarra Éireann agus bhí siad in aois an 
phinsin in 2008-09. Agus tháinig na pacáistí móra . . . Ní bhfuair cuid 
acu ach rabhadh dhá sheachtain agus cuireadh an gunna lena 
gcloigeann agus dúradh leob má imíonn tú roimh dheireadh na míosa 
beidh tú ar an seanphinsin, muna n-imíonn tú beidh tú ar an bpinsin nú. 
No brainer a bhí ann do na boys ar fad. Agus chailleadar straidhp mór 
de dhaoine. Agus ghortaigh sé sin an tÚdarás go mór. Timpiste a bhí 
ann, toisc gur bunaíodh Gaeltarra Éireann [ag an am sin] agus 
baineadh an cheannasaíocht uilig dhon rud. 
Another ÚnaG employee who I interviewed in 2016, talking about the “titim 
thubaisteach” in employment in ÚnaG’s industrial site in Donegal, told me that 
there were almost 900 fewer jobs in the estate than there had been during the 
middle of the Celtic Tiger: 
É: But an difear mór atá ann anois, a Bhen, ná tá 21 comhlacht ar an 
eastát anois ag fostú 430. Bhí 21 comhlacht i 1998 ag fostú 1,300. So 
na comhlachtaí atá againn anois tá siad ag fostú níos lú daoine. 
He told me that the crash had seen the end of an era, the end of manufacturing 
in the area, with the industries now supported on the estate being largely small-
scale, local start-ups, as opposed to the industrial plants that had once 
employed hundreds each. He also commented on the tendency of large 
international companies to simply re-locate overseas during challenging 
economic periods: 
É: Na comhlachtaí a d’imigh den chuid is mó is comhlachtaí 
déantúsaíochta, traidisiúnta a bhí iontu . . . Chuaigh an obair sin uilig 




ceann ar bith acu, ach ceann amháin, d’aistrigh siad. Sin an rud atá 
tábhachtach, d’aistrigh siad. Cionn is go dtiocfadh leo 20 oibrí a fháil 
san Ind ar son pá oibrí amháin anseo. 
While their inability to retain such companies long term is a criticism frequently 
levelled at ÚnaG, this point goes to the heart of globalised neoliberalism. Such 
fluidity of capital is a defining trait of this paradigm (Carroll and Sapinski, 2016: 
39), and one which is, clearly, almost impossible for a small enterprise 
promotion agency based on this model to resist while operating in some of the 
most remote parts of Ireland – particularly so in wake of a budget cut of almost 
75%. The FDI model based on attracting footloose international capital is 
clearly, however, deeply inappropriate for the Gaeltacht, as the many 
abandoned, dilapidated factories scattered across the Gaeltacht attest. 
Sections 5.3.2, 5.3.4 and 5.3.5.2 discuss these issues further. 
Further to these challenges, under the Gaeltacht Act 2012, the elections for 
the board of ÚnaG was abolished, despite the institution having originally been 
set up as a result of the Gaeltacht Civil Rights campaign aiming specifically for 
the creation of a democratic local government institution in the Gaeltacht (1.4; 
Akutagawa, 1990: 59). Partly undertaken in accordance with the Fine Gael-
Labour coalition’s Public Service Reform Plan (Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform, 2011), it was noted that this reform would save some 
€500,000 every five years (Irish Times, 2011a; see also 4.2.3 above). 
Prior to 2012, three of the 20 members of this board were appointed by the 
minister responsible for the Gaeltacht, while the remaining 17 were elected by 
Gaeltacht residents (Walsh, 2011a: 300). In line with the Gaeltacht Act 2012, 
the board is now composed of twelve political appointees selected both by 
county councils which contain Gaeltacht communities within their jurisdictions 
and the relevant minister (Government of Ireland, 2012: 26-9). 
While ostensibly a democratic forum, it is important to note that there was 
widespread dissatisfaction with the pre-2012 electoral process for the board. I 
was often told during interviews that the restructuring made little difference, as 




A: Sílim má théann tú amach agus ceist a chur ar daoine ar an tsráid 
déarfaidh siad nár chuir sé isteach ná amach orthu. 
C: Ní bheadh muintir [na h-áite seo] ag smaointiú ar Údarás na 
Gaeltachta. Bheadh a fhios acu go bhfuil sé ann agus go bhfuil baint 
acu leis an pháirc gnó, ach an gnáthdhuine, sin deireadh a bheadh a 
fhios acu. 
Despite this rather widespread apathy, several of my informants had much 
more polarised opinions on the matter. The Galway woman cited in the next 
extract, for instance, strongly felt that the loss of the election was a severe 
blow to Gaeltacht communities, greatly reducing political accountability:  
G: Is cuimhneach liom fadó toghchán an Údaráis agus ó, tharraingeodh 
sé neart cainte. Ó bhíodh an oiread caint air! Agus bhíodh daoine ag 
tarraingt anuas póstaeirí agus cur póstaeirí suas agus anuas . . . [A]gus 
má bhí tú ag iarraidh cead pleanála le haghaidh do theach, abair – mar 
tá sé chomh deacair cead pleanála a fháil – abair dá mbeifeá héis 
labhairt le polaiteoir eicínt agus iad ag rá “ó beidh mise in ann cúnamh 
a thabhairt dhuit faoi sin”. Ó bhíodh sé ina chraic. Agus nuair a thiocfadh 
siad ag an doras thiúrfá fúthub! Is mó suím, caithfidh mé a rá, a bhíodh 
i dtoghchán an Údaráis ná sa toghchán náisiúnta. Mar bhí aithne a’d 
orthub seo, d’fheicfeá chuile áit iad. Agus, y’know, bheifeá ag rá 
“tiúrfaidh mé vóta dhuit má chuireann tú caoi ar an mbóthar sin. Agus 
nó go bhfeicfidh mé leoraí ag tarraingt ansin in aice an tí [ní bhfaighidh 
tú é]”. . . Agus sin é an chaoi a bhfuair tú go leor rudaí déanta. Now 
ceart nó [contráilte], níl ’s a’m – sin an chaoi ar oibrigh sé. Yeah ‘sé an 
feall nach bhfuil sé ann níos mó. 
Other informants felt that although the new system was deeply defective, so 
too was the electoral procedure that preceded it: 
M: D’athraigh Fine Gael agus Labour sin agus fuair siad réidh leis an 
toghchán agus anois ceaptar daoine ar an bhord bainistíochta an 
Údaráis agus an caighdeán duine atá siad ag ceapadh . . . An 
bhfeiceann tú cró na gcearc thíos ansin? . . . Na daoine atá siad ag 
ceapadh ar bhord Údarás na Gaeltachta, ní chuirfinn i mbun an fuckin 
cró cearc sin iad. 
B: Dáiríre? 
M: Yeah. Timeservers. Ní thig leotha áit a fháil ar chomhairle contae. 
Seasann siad don chomhairle contae agus teipeann orthu. So níl 
muintir na háite sásta iad a thoghadh isteach i gcomhairle contae so 




Údarás na Gaeltachta, you’re so fuckin shite at everything else, cuirfidh 
muid isteach ar fuckin bord bainistíochta Údarás na Gaeltachta thú. 
B: [gáire] 
M: But sin an fhírinne! . . . [E]ven nuair a bhí toghchán ann – caidé a 
rinne Fianna Fáil i gContae fuckin na Gaillimhe – fear nach raibh Gaeilg 
aige?! Agus fuair sé isteach! . . . See thíos sa phub, fad is nach bhfuil 
duine ar bith sa phub ón Údarás, d’aontódh achan duine liom. 
While expressed rather vociferously, such a sentiment is reflective of a 
significant minority of opinions I heard, and, indeed, would not seem to be 
without some basis in fact. During my fieldwork I had the opportunity to 
interview several former members of the board, and while most of them 
appeared to be diligent and committed individuals, one interviewee seemed to 
adhere to the stereotypes suggested in the above extract, speaking of his time 
on the board as such: 
S: [M]una mbeadh rudaí ann a bhainfeadh liom, ní labhróinn…Deir 
[comhalta boird eile] liom cúpla babhta, haigh bhfuil tú ag éisteacht leis 
seo?! Ar do cheantarsa atá muid ag caint! Agus mise i mo chodladh! 
[gáire] 
The existence of such individuals understandably meant that a significant 
number of my interviewees believed that the majority of their communities 
were not overly upset about the removal of the election. Nonetheless, its 
discontinuation has certainly not improved the standing of ÚnaG in the 
communities it serves. As Ó Neachtain has argued, the lack of political 
autonomy afforded to the Gaeltacht has been “a serious handicap in terms of 
the linguistic community’s authority and capacity to plan and implement 
programs which might more effectively contribute to the language community’s 
survival and sustainable development” (2014: 367-8; see also Breathnach, 
2000). 
Although a blow to Gaeltacht democracy, however dysfunctional it may have 
been, this type of decision is not unique to the Gaeltacht. As Murphy noted, 
“further centralisation of power has been a key institutional strategy of both 




bypassed parliamentary processes” (2014: 138) in the wake of the crash. 
Indeed, Bachrach and Baratz’s famous conception of the “second face of 
power” (discussed further in 1.4 and 4.2.10.1) notes the appointment of 
supporters of the status quo to boards as a key way in which the powerful can 
set agendas and prevent public discussion of certain issues (Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1970: 54-9, 70; see also Hay, 2002: 175). 
In light of these various developments, it is of little surprise that in a letter from 
the trade union Unite to the management of ÚnaG in summer 2016 it was 
claimed that the relationship between staff and management was “at an all-
time low” and “on the brink of collapse” (Tuairisc.ie, 2016a). While interviewing 
a long-term employee of ÚnaG shortly after this story broke publicly in the 
media, he explained the situation to me as being even worse than was 
reported:  
B: [C]éard faoi morale san eagraíocht . . .? 
É: [deasaíonn sé a bhrathadóir síos don urlár le taispeáint go bhfuil sé 
íseal]  
B: Muise? 
É: Iontach olc.  
B: Chonaic mé an méid a bhí ar Thuairisc.ie. 
É: 100% cruinn. Tá rudaí níos measa ná sin fiú. 
B: Dáiríre? Agus cén uair a thoisigh sé sin? 
É: Trí nó ceithre bliain ó shin. 
B: Mar gheall ar...? 
É: Rationalisation. 
B: Na coinníollacha oibre agus é sin? 
É: Yes. Tá an tríú cuid den fhoireann [imithe], nuair a imíonn daoine 
cuireann siad cosc duin’ neacht eile a fháil. I bhfad níos mó oibre a 
dhéanamh le níos lú daoine, daoine ag an bharr, brú ón roinn ag iarraidh 
an rud uilig a chúngú isteach, níl siad ag iarraidh seo agus siúd a chur 




budget a bhí deich mbliana ó shin. Tá siad ar 30% níos lú foirne, tá an 
foireann atá fágtha aosta. Níl duine ar bith úr ag teacht isteach. Thit siad 
amach leis an cheardchumann. Tá siad seo ag iarraidh na rudaí seo a 
bhrú ar aghaidh gan pairtnéireacht ar bith, gan a ghoil i gcomhairle. Dhá 
vóta muiníne caillte ag an bhainistíocht le 70% le dhá mhí . . . Tá an 
bainistíocht ag brú, ag bullaíocht ar dhaoine. 
Similar to the rest of the public sector (see 4.2.9), then, it is clear that ÚnaG 
was deeply affected by austerity measures, which certainly does not bode well 
for their future ability to drive the “preservation and extension” of Irish in the 
Gaeltacht as their remit requires (in Walsh, 2011a: 298). Despite the reduction 
in the resources available to them, however, responsibility for the language 
planning process required by the Gaeltacht Act 2012 was delegated to ÚnaG 
by the state department responsible for the Gaeltacht. 
With its well-documented history of promoting industrial development in such 
a way that it contributed the Anglicisation of the Gaeltacht (Mac an Iomaire, 
1983; Hindley, 1990: 183-4; Ó Murchú, 1993: 483; Walsh, 2010), it is 
unsurprising that a more language-focused approach would be recommended 
for ÚnaG. Indeed, recommendations to this effect were made by both the 
second Gaeltacht Commission (Coimisiún na Gaeltachta, 2002: 16) and in Ó 
Cinnéide et al. (2001: 147-48), and were beginning to be adopted come 2005 
(Walsh, 2011a: 313). In light of the cutbacks to both budget and staff numbers, 
however, the effective implementation of the language planning process has 
been problematic, and ÚnaG has delegated much of these duties to local 
ceanneagraíochtaí (“head organisations”) – typically community co-
operatives, which were warned that their funding would be cut further if they 
were unwilling to comply with this measure. As one co-op member explained: 
B: Go bunúsach tá Roinn na Gaeltachta ag rá tá freagracht againne so 
tá siad ag rá le Údarás na Gaeltachta “caithfidh sibh é a chur i gcrích 
nó bainfidh muid an t-airgead díbh” agus tá Údarás na Gaeltachta tar 
éis a rá leis an bpobal, “caithfidh sibhse é a chur i gcrích nó bainfidh 
muid an t-airgead díbh”. Agus tá, tá mé lárnach sa gcóras sin mé féin, 
ar an receiving end, agus sin atá ag tarlú. 
In turn, as predicted by Ó Giollagáin (2014b: 109), the co-operatives have 




without adequate resources or expertise. This matter is discussed in detail in 
5.8. 
As Mercille and Murphy point out, such withdrawal of the state from areas in 
which it previously intervened significantly is entirely in accordance with the 
neoliberal project of privatisation and restructuring (2015: 91). When one 
considers Williams’ contention “that political autonomy and economic autarchy 
[are] the twin pre-conditions . . . of successful language regeneration” (1991: 
3), the removal of both the election for the ÚnaG board (flawed as it was) and 
the large majority of the organisation’s budget, government policy towards the 
institution in recent years cannot but be seen as deeply damaging to the vitality 
of the Gaeltacht as a whole. There was, however, a welcome growth in 
employment created by ÚnaG in 2017, with indications that the growth the 
national economy has been experiencing since 2016 was beginning to reach 
the Gaeltacht. Although this growth was modest in most areas (in Galway, for 
instance, the net gain was only one job), the 103 jobs created in Donegal were 
a welcome reprieve from the difficulties suffered in that county in recent years 
(Údarás na Gaeltachta, 2017). 
4.2.5 The department of state responsible for the Gaeltacht 
The department of state responsible for the Gaeltacht was founded in 1956 
under the same act that gave legal definition to the current Gaeltacht 
boundaries. As described in 1.5, it was known simply as the Department of the 
Gaeltacht until 1993. A designated minister was therefore able to represent 
Gaeltacht concerns at the cabinet table, giving the Gaeltacht significant 
representation in internal government debate. In 1993 it had its remit extended 
and became the Department of Arts, Culture and the Gaeltacht. While this title 
has gone through many permutations since then, with its rebranding as the 
Department of Arts, Heritage, Regional, Rural and Gaeltacht affairs 
(DAHRRGA) in May 2016 it seemed that the Gaeltacht aspect of the portfolio 
was becoming ever more marginal. Indeed, in June 2017 a cabinet reshuffle 
proposed removing the word Gaeltacht from the title entirely, replacing it with 




becoming instead the Department of Culture, Heritage and the Gaeltacht. 
Nonetheless, the Irish-speaking community’s continued tendency to refer to 
the “Department of the Gaeltacht” is more of a throwback than a reality, with 
the Gaeltacht often appearing at the end of a long list of largely unrelated briefs 
– a “Frankenstein department” covering the “bean an tí, ballet, bogs, and 
broadband”, as one opposition politician claimed after the 2016 reshuffle (Irish 
Times, 2016a; see also Mac Donnacha, 2013: 10). 
While the continued existence of a department with “Gaeltacht” somewhere in 
the title perhaps obscures this fact, the post-2008 developments concerning 
the department arguably amounted to an implementation in all but name of 
those proposals made by An Bord Snip Nua which aimed to abolish the then 
Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs (DCRGA). As 4.2.1 
detailed, the Bord Snip Nua recommended this abolition with the aim of saving 
some €151.1m. The DCRGA was the only department whose outright closure 
was recommended. 
Following the spirit of the Bord Snip recommendations, if not the letter, a 
government plan in 2010 proposed to reduce the department’s budget from 
€105m to €30m between 2010-16 (Department of Finance, 2010: 101). Unlike 
the great majority of government plans and policies that concern the Gaeltacht 
which languish unimplemented for years, this one was executed in a 
significantly shorter timescale than that which was proposed: a minister of 
state in the department stated in 2016 that they lost 70% of their budget in just 
three years, 2008-11 (Irish Times, 2016b; see also Ó Murchú, 2014: 210). This 
is a huge reduction by any standards and one which has not been restored 
(Byrne, 2018). Although the 2018 budget saw the department receive €2.5m 
extra to spend on Irish and the Gaeltacht, this was just half of the additional 
€5m that their pre-budget submission to the Department of Finance claimed 
was necessary to meet its requirements (Tuairisc.ie, 2018c). Furthermore, as 
Byrne (2018) demonstrates, total capital expenditure on the Gaeltacht and 
islands by 2017 was over seven times lower than in 2008, having fallen from 




Like many sectors facing neoliberal restructuring, the expanded remit of the 
department saw it left with a greater workload but much less funding, especially 
after having been given the additional remits of “regional and rural” affairs in 
2016. As a result of the disproportionate cuts the Gaeltacht sub-sector faced 
within the department, as someone working therein told me, it is now probably 
the smallest division of the smallest state department: “seans maith gurb é 
muidinne an rannóg is lú [sa státchóras]”. Indeed, this informant went on to 
claim that there is now only one civil service office which operates entirely 
through Irish, although this office, in Donegal, has only three staff members. 
This interviewee also told me that since the cutbacks removed their budget for 
community work, this same office now conducts work largely unrelated to the 
Gaeltacht: “thiocfadh leis an oifig seo a bheith áit ar bith anois, ní bhaineann 
sé leis an Ghaeltacht”. Their standing in the community reflects this – none of 
the employees I spoke to in the factories directly adjacent to their office were 
able to tell me where I would find “Roinn na Gaeltachta” when I asked for 
directions. 
In light of this, when An Bord Snip Nua recommended that ÚnaG and the 
department responsible for the Gaeltacht should both be abolished, the core 
aim of their proposals was largely implemented, with these institutions 
receiving huge reductions to their budgets, a view expressed by this same 
department employee: 
P: Bhí siad ag iarraidh deireadh a chur linn ar fad, nach raibh? Bhuel, 
bhí siad ag iarraidh nach mbeadh baint ar bith ag an Roinn leis an obair 
ar an talamh, go mbeadh sin uilig tugtha don Údarás agus nach mbeadh 
ionainne ach cineál policy makers. Agus is dócha gur shin an rud a 
tharla cuid mhaith den bhealach . . . níor tharla sé go huile is go hiomlán 
ach tá scéim na bhfoghlaimeoirí still againn, ach níl baint ar bith againn 
le cúrsaí infreastruchtúir níos mó. 
Much of this infrastructural work which is referred to involved those schemes 
which have historically been used to incentivise the use of Irish and retain the 
population of the Gaeltacht, as explained in 4.2.1. While, as Ó Broithe (2012) 




sometimes problematic in its implementation, it was nonetheless another 
important LPP measure. The following extract taken from an interview with a 
Donegal parent who discussed this scheme’s discontinuation is informative: 
A: Rinneadh moltaí, bhfuil ’s agat, chun feabhas [a chur ar Scéim 
Labhairt na Gaeilge] sa Staidéar Cuimsitheach agus rinne . . . Guth na 
Gaeltachta, Tuismitheoirí na Gaeltachta, rinne muid moltaí chun 
feabhas a chur ar an scéim. Ach mhol muid uilig nár chóir deireadh a 
chur leis. But cuireadh deireadh leis agus níor cuireadh aon rud ina áit! 
So sin an rud atá mé ag rá, tógadh an deis, tapadh an deis le deireadh 
a chur le cuid mhór rudaí. Mar shampla ceann de na rudaí eile a 
cuireadh deireadh leis nó an scéim scoláireachtaí Gaeltachta, bhfuil ’s 
agat, do mhic léinn dara leibhéal. So bhí tú cineál ag tabhairt incentive 
do dhaoine a gcuid scolaíochta a dhéanamh trí mheán na Gaeilge. 
Cuireadh deireadh leis. Caidé a cuireadh ina áit? Rud ar bith! 
Similar to the debate on the 2012 Act (see 4.2.3) and the rationalisation of the 
voluntary sector discussed in the following section, there was a clear refusal 
on the part of the state to negotiate such matters, with these cuts being 
implemented in disregard of both expert recommendation (e.g. Ó Broithe, 
2012) and community will. The beginning of the crisis in 2008 and the 
punctuated equilibrium thereby created thus opened a policy window which 
allowed reform of the department to take place at a very rapid pace, 
reminiscent once again of the processes described by Klein (2007) or Mirowski 
(2013; see also 2.2; 4.2.2). 
4.2.6 Foras na Gaeilge’s New Funding Model 
Foras na Gaeilge (henceforth “FnaG”) was founded in 1999 under the Good 
Friday Agreement which ended the violent conflict in the North of Ireland. It 
operates under the aegis of An Foras Teanga, which also supervises The 
Ulster-Scots Agency, receiving 75% of its funding from the southern state and 
25% from the north. Its all-island jurisdiction sees it function primarily as a 
funding agency distributing grants to various voluntary Irish-language 
organisations and community projects. Despite not receiving the significant 
increases in its budget that comparable institutions such as The Arts Council 
got during the Celtic Tiger, FnaG saw its budget (most of which is used to 




from which point it began to decline (Conradh na Gaeilge, 2017: 8-9). The 
organisation’s budget for 2018 was €14,532,000, 28% below its 2007 level, 
having received no increase at any time over this period. When inflation is 
taken into account, FnaG’s budget for 2018 was 38% below the 2007 figure 
(Conradh na Gaeilge, 2017: 8-9). 
In December 2009, FnaG was directed by the North-South Ministerial Council 
(which has ultimate oversight of FnaG’s work) to undertake a major re-
organisation of the 19 language promotion organisations which received their 
“core” funding from the agency. The stated purpose for this re-structuring was 
to eliminate duplication of efforts amongst these groups and reduce 
overheads. Although rationalisation of this nature might well have taken place 
regardless of the 2008 crash, budgetary contraction certainly expediated this 
process. As FnaG’s 2008 annual report states: 
The change in economic circumstances worldwide was the most 
significant event during the year. It reminded us all of the importance of 
careful spending to ensure value for money. This gave rise to the review 
of corefunded organisations, although it was not the main reason for it 
(Foras Teanga, 2009: 8). 
As discussed in 4.2.1, 4.2.9 and 5.9.2, in accordance with the 
recommendations of An Bord Snip Nua, rationalisation was taking place at this 
time across all manner of public bodies and so-called “third sector” 
organisations, not just within the Irish-language sector. 
FnaG initially proposed two possible methods of rationalisation. One would 
have seen language promotion activities contracted out via short-term tenders 
to organisations which did not receive any core funding from the agency. The 
other option proposed to maintain core funding, but make it available to a much 
smaller number of organisations (Ó Murchú, 2014: 239). 
FnaG ultimately decided to pursue the latter of these two proposals, seemingly 
seeing this as the least unpopular option. It was duly announced that this so-
called “New Funding Model” would see thirteen of the nineteen core-funded 




remaining six organisations. The 20-Year Strategy (see 4.2.2) re-affirmed this 
course of action, committing to “a radical re-organisation of State-funded 
language organisations” – one of the few goals that have been implemented 
since the Strategy’s introduction (Government of Ireland, 2010: 25). 
This proposal to close the majority of core-funded organisations was strongly 
opposed by both the sector and the vast majority of submissions to a brief 
public consultation process (Ó Murchú, 2014: 239-40). In opposing the New 
Funding Model, core-funded organisations insisted that they were already 
collaborating on efforts to increase effectiveness and reduce duplication. FnaG 
dismissed these efforts, however, as an employee of one of the core-funded 
organisations told me: 
B: Bhí [Conradh na Gaeilge], bhí Glór na nGael, bhí Comhluadar, bhí 
an tOireachtas agus bhí cúpla dream eile [ag obair le chéile chun 
réiteach a fháil ar dhúblú na hoibre]. Bhí a lán oibre déanta anseo, bhí 
plean oibre curtha le chéile againn, go dtiocfadh muid le chéile ó thaobh 
roinnt áiseanna . . . Fós is féidir le gach grúpa [cloí] lena gclár oibre féin, 
but cinnte níos mó comhoibriú. But just dhiúltaigh Foras na Gaeilge plé 
leis sin, i ndáiríre bhí olc orthu go rabhamar ag plé leis sin, mar, again, 
‘sé an rud céanna ó thaobh cuid de na rudaí . . . leis an státseirbhís 
agus dul ar ais go hAer Árann [see 4.2.9; 5.6.3.1], bhí plean ag an 
bhForas, bhí siad ag iarraidh an rud seo a chur tríd, my way or the 
highway . . . Dá mba rud é go raibh tusa i mbun comhlachta nó i mbun 
gnó . . . agus go raibh ort athrú ollmhór a dhéanamh, ní ghabhfadh tú 
ina mbun ar an gcaoi a rinne Foras na Gaeilge é . . . Ní raibh aon risk 
assessment de shaghas éigean, de shaghas ar bith déanta. 
FnaG’s refusal to engage with the sector’s own proposals for reform, as well 
as their disregard for a great many other attempts by the sector to challenge 
the process, created a very fraught relationship between the agency and the 
core-funded sector. While space does not permit a full discussion of these 
developments, Ó Murchú (2014: 237-96) offers an exhaustive account of the 
affair. Notably, however, the voluntary sector claimed that they had “been 
consistently frustrated in every attempt [they] made to engage with the 
process” (Ó Murchú, 2014: 248) and that “none of their arguments at meetings 
nor . . . the documentation they provided [were] taken seriously or fed in any 




dissatisfaction that fifteen of the nineteen organisations eventually took to 
boycotting meetings with FnaG, stating that effective negotiation was being 
made impossible by, amongst other issues, FnaG’s refusal to make pertinent 
documentation available before such meetings. The process nonetheless 
proceeded, with FnaG repeatedly citing the need to implement the directions 
of the North-South Ministerial Council. FnaG’s board of directors – themselves 
paid appointees of the north and south governments – approved various 
contentious proposals despite the absence of productive discussion with key 
stakeholders (Ó Murchú, 2014: 239). As an employee of FnaG itself told me: 
K: [A]n tuairim atá agam le formhór cruinnithe bord, má fheiceann tú in 
aon eagraíocht, ní hiad an bord a dhéananns na polasaithe, ‘siad na 
stáitseirbhísigh, mar a déarfá, cuireann siad an polasaí os comhair an 
bord, deireann an bord “ó yeah, go breá”. B’fhéidir go mbeidh athrú 
beag nó dhó ag athrú rudaí but de ghnáth leanann siad ar aghaidh . . . 
[M]á deireanns an roinn [rialtais] ansin caithfidh tú seo a dhéanamh, 
caithfear é a dhéanamh. 
Relations between FnaG and the sector ultimately became so strained that by 
2011 the North-South Ministerial Council was calling for professional mediation 
to occur between the two sides (Ó Murchú, 2014: 249). 
In February 2012 the Irish media published an open letter by academics in the 
LPP field (both in Ireland and elsewhere) regarding the New Funding Model, 
claiming that the proposal was “completely at odds with international language 
planning principles” and destined to “prove detrimental to the development of 
Irish across the country”. The letter was also publicised as a public petition 
which gathered some 2,000 signatures within a few months (Activism.com, 
2012; Ó Murchú, 2014: 254). 
The contentious nature of the proposed model and the energy spent lobbying 
against it also, of course, meant that affected organisations had less time to 
perform their main duties regarding the promotion of the language. As one of 
my interviewees, a former employee of one of these organisations, said: 
D: Rinneamar ana-obair ansin nuair a bhí sé sin ag dul ar aghaidh, 




contae. Éinne dúinn a bhí ag obair dúinn go lánaimseartha bhuaileamar 
le na TDs in ár ndáilcheantair féin agus y’know aon duine le cineál 
cumhachta polaitiúil. Bhí muid istigh i dTeach Laighean agus is dócha 
ar lámh amháin bhí daoine ag rá go mbeadh [eagraíocht s’aigesan] 
ceart go leor . . . go mbeadh siad roghnaithe. Ach ag an am céanna ní 
raibh ’s ag duine ar bith agus . . . rinne sé dochar d’obair [na 
heagraíochta] ag an am sin mar níl acmhainní millteanach ag aon 
ghrúpa mar sin, grúpaí óige ach go háirithe. So bhíomar ag caitheamh 
céatadán mhaith dár gcuid ama ag socrú rudaí mar sin in áit ag díriú ar 
obair óige agus in áit ag díriú ar an obair a bhí i gceist againn a 
dhéanamh, bhí orainn bheith in ár bpolaiteoirí . . . [I]s cinnte go raibh 
deacrachtaí againn mar fhoireann ag déileáil leis seo. Agus tá ’s agam 
na grúpaí agus na ceanneagraíochtaí eile gur cuireadh roinnt mhaith 
ama, ní amú an focal ceart, ach caitheadh roinnt mhaith ama ag socrú 
seo in áit ag díriú ar rudaí. Agus is muidne, bhíomar agus cúig ghrúpa 
eile, d’éirigh linn an stáid sin a bhaint amach. Bhí 19 eagrais a bhí ag 
déanamh [na stocaireachta] díreach céanna . . . Bhí go leor deacrachtaí 
agus chruthaigh sé teannas i measc na grúpaí, bhí sé ar nós an 
seanmhana cineál “divide and conquer” . . . [G]rúpaí ar nós Chomhdháil 
Náisiúnta na Gaeilge a bhí ar siúl ó b’fhéidir na 40idí, just d’imigh siad. 
Is cinnte go ndearna an cheist maoiniú sin deacrachtaí. 
Several other interviewees who were involved in the process (including a 
disgruntled employee of FnaG itself) echoed this sentiment, feeling that these 
organisations expended an enormous amount of energy attempting to agree a 
compromise solution, only to find that FnaG was intent on implementing the 
New Funding Model regardless of the wishes of either the voluntary 
organisations or of the Irish-speaking community more generally. 
Eventually, in January 2014 the six “lead organisations” FnaG would continue 
to fund were announced, namely Gaelscoileanna, Gael Linn, Conradh na 
Gaeilge, Glór na nGael, Cumann na bhFiann and An tOireachtas, with the 
remainder being disbanded come June of that year. As the above quote 
explains, even those employees whose organisations were maintained felt the 
process had been deeply flawed and showed a disregard for democratic 
procedure, language planning and management principles alike. It is thus 
unsurprising that the FnaG employee I interviewed told me that “níl meas mada 
ag aon duine ar Fhoras na Gaeilge”. 
Political lobbying and online petitions of the sort described above 




inherent in this rationalisation process seemingly prevented the sort of 
collective action that could have rendered the new funding proposals 
inoperable. With such action not forthcoming, the majority of the main Irish-
language promotion organisations ceased to exist from June 2014. 
While the organisations that were retained initially saw their budgets 
increased, this drawn-out and divisive rationalisation process was clearly far 
from conducive to language revitalisation, the stated aim of both FnaG and the 
sector it had aggravated so severely. The lack of consultation and refusal to 
engage with alternative proposals which characterised the affair is reminiscent 
of the democratic deficit which saw the government reject all 150 amendments 
proposed for the bill that became the Gaeltacht Act 2012 (see 4.2.3), as well 
as many other schemes that were cut or reduced since the recession began 
(see 4.2.5 and 5.6.3.2 for further examples of such disregard for popular will). 
Section 4.2.9 discusses broader implications of the rationalisation of public 
sector bodies for language revitalisation efforts. 
4.2.7 Controversy surrounding the publication of the 
Nuashonrú ar an Staidéar Cuimsitheach Teangeolaíoch 
ar Úsáid na Gaeilge sa Ghaeltacht: 2006-2011 
The covert aspects of government policy are tellingly illustrated by the 
controversy surrounding the Nuashonrú ar an Staidéar Cuimsitheach 
Teangeolaíoch ar Úsáid na Gaeilge sa Ghaeltacht: 2006-2011 (henceforth 
“Nuashonrú”; Ó Giollagáin and Charlton, 2015a). In 2013 ÚnaG commissioned 
an update of the original CLS (Ó Giollagáin et al., 2007a), with the aim of 
providing an analytic basis for the language planning process laid out in the 
Gaeltacht Act 2012. The CLS was based on the results of the 2002 census 
and data from the 2003/4 Scéim Labhairt na Gaeilge, as well as specially 
commissioned questionnaires and focus groups. The Nuashonrú referenced 
more recent census figures from 2006 and 2011, as well as data from Scéim 
Labhairt na Gaeilge in corresponding years. It concluded that the prognosis 
presented in the CLS had been overly optimistic and that language shift was 
proceeding at an even faster rate than the 2007 study had predicted (Ó 




economic crisis, in light of the findings presented in this and the following 
chapter, such a faster-than-expected rate of language shift post-2008 is 
unsurprising. Commenting on current language policy, it claimed that “[i]s 
ionann cloí le cleachtais reatha agus glacadh go praiticiúil le próiseas an dul i 
léig mionteanga sa Ghaeltacht” (Ó Giollagáin and Charlton, 2015a: 11). 
Although the authors submitted the completed report in April 2014, it was not 
published until May 2015. This delay was the result of both the DAHRRGA and 
subsequently ÚnaG objecting to the inclusion of recommendations from the 
authors in the report (Tuairisc.ie, 2015a). ÚnaG requested two further re-
writings of the report, before deciding it was unwilling to publish it while it 
included the authors’ recommendations. 
After several months of deadlock, a compromise was eventually reached 
whereby the main body of the report was published by ÚnaG (Ó Giollagáin and 
Charlton, 2015a) and the authors’ recommendations were made available 
independently online (Ó Giollagáin and Charlton, 2015b; subsequently 
published in Ó Giollagáin and Ó Curnáin, 2016: 107-12). While the 
commissioning body were adamant that the authors were charged with 
producing a statistical analysis and that the inclusion of policy 
recommendations exceeded their remit, as noted in the recommendations 
themselves, modern liberal states are often reluctant to be connected to 
proposals that are not in accordance with the requirements of the market (Ó 
Giollagáin and Charlton, 2015b: 9). As such ÚnaG’s decision is not, perhaps, 
overly surprising. The whole affair does, however, provide an illustration of the 
“master plan to do nothing” to which Fishman referred (see 1.4) and the covert 
policy agenda operating behind state rhetoric regarding the 20-Year Strategy 
and similar policies. 
One of the report’s authors, Ó Giollagáin, has stated that he views the 
behaviour of both the DAHRRGA and ÚnaG as an attempt at censoring 
conclusions which conflict with their position (Tuairisc.ie, 2017d). Such 
practices are far from unknown in Irish politics. A detailed report issued while 




the state uses threats to funding and other surreptitious tactics to regulate 
those things “which are best left unsaid” and control the work of groups 
involved in advocacy and research which conflicts with official state narratives 
(Harvey, 2014). Recent scandals in the police force showed such practices to 
exist across many levels of the public service (O’Toole, 2017). 
One senior lobbyist from a language advocacy group explained ÚnaG’s 
decision to me as follows: 
M: Is é an roinn a chuir ina gcoinne nach ea, na moltaí, níor lorg an 
Údarás iad . . . [B]hí an roinn róbhuartha faoi bheith ceangailte le moltaí 
a bhí ag teacht ó na saineolaithe mar, I suppose, níl siad ag cur an 
Stráitéis 20 bliain na Gaeilge i bhfeidhm i gceart, níl siad ag cur na 
hacmhainní ar fáil don Acht Gaeltachta agus eile so is dócha go dtéann 
sé sin mar chuid den, mar chuid den chur chuige sin, yeah, an Ghaeilge 
a chur ar leataobh agus méid áirithe a dhéanamh ach gan mórán a 
dhéanamh. 
While it was the recommendations rather than the content of the report itself 
that were the main source of disputation, as an employee of the department 
responsible for the Gaeltacht told me: “[d]á mbeadh tusa an tAire a bhí 
freagrach as cúrsaí Gaeltachta an mbeifeá ag iarraidh an t-eolas sin a 
scaipeadh? I dunno!” 
It may well, however, be the case that the minister then responsible for the 
Gaeltacht, Joe McHugh, or senior elements of the civil service hoped simply 
to delay the report’s findings long enough for them to move departments (as 
McHugh did in 2016) and not have to deal with the fallout from the report’s 
challenging findings, with the recommendations serving as a convenient 
excuse to delay publication. As one of my interviewees from a language 
promotion group observed “sin an rud faoin státseirbhís agus an rialtas go 
ginearálta, they play the long game”. 
Further to the delay to its publication, as noted by Ó Giollagáin (2017), the 
policy implications of the Nuashonrú have been ignored in the years since its 
publication. No changes have been made to existing policies as a result of its 




in light of the severe crisis it documented. While certainly creating the 
impression of a political elite ill-disposed to the language, as noted in 4.2.3, it 
is well established in the literature on public policy that states very commonly 
ignore expert advice about all manner of issues. Writing concomitantly to the 
Nuashonrú’s publication – although about very different issues – two public 
policy academics noted that 
The use of research evidence in policy-making in Ireland has only ever 
been irregular and inconsistent. One explanation for this is that the 
barriers to change, to the proper implementation of research findings, 
are many and considerable. Some are even justifiable. Financial 
constraints, geographic considerations or social values may act as 
legitimate breaks [sic] on the application of new insights. But it is also 
clear that lobbying from vested interests and political favouritism 
present equally serious barriers to good practice (Rouse and Duncan, 
2015). 
Indeed, in 2013 a review of twenty years of reports on one of the greatest 
turmoils to have faced Irish society since independence, that of institutional 
child abuse, concluded that while many recommendations had been 
implemented, “recommendation fatigue” meant that their effect on “policy and 
practice” was far from optimal (Buckley and Nolan, 2013). When an issue of 
such wide-spread concern as this struggles to produce the political action it 
deserves, it is unsurprising that Irish-language policy recommendations are 
also frequently neglected politically. 
4.2.8 Effects of the recession on Irish-language media 
Although the extent to which having their own media outlets benefits 
minoritised languages is still a source of debate (Browne, 1996: 169; Cormack, 
2006, 2007; Fishman, 1991: 374-5), grassroots campaigns between the 
1960s-90s consistently argued that Irish-language radio and television stations 
were necessary components of the revitalisation process. The campaigners’ 
efforts eventually saw success – a radio station was established in 1972 and 
a television channel finally followed in 1996 (Watson, 2003). Most of the Irish-
language media have provided employment which is located in the Gaeltacht 




explicitly language-based. Accordingly, this sphere of economic activity holds 
particular relevance for Irish-language use in the language’s core 
communities, even in an era in which the dominance of such “legacy media” is 
being challenged by web-based news and entertainment platforms (Webster 
and Ksiazek, 2012). 
As Watson recounts, the emergence of neoliberalism as Ireland’s dominant 
economic paradigm has significantly influenced Irish-language media policy 
since the 1980s (2016: 73). Although Watson’s account focuses on broadcast 
media, the effects of neoliberal reforms are also evident in print media in Irish, 
as 4.2.8.3 describes. As with other sectors described in this thesis, budgetary 
re-allocation between 2008-18 saw Irish-language media become subject to 
market forces to an ever-greater degree, with notable effects in terms of 
audience numbers and scheduling for broadcasting in Irish, as well as the 
range of print media available in the language. 
4.2.8.1 Raidió na Gaeltachta 
While FnaG funds local radio stations in Dublin, Belfast and Galway city, the 
only Irish-medium radio station broadcast across Ireland is, somewhat 
ironically, Raidió na Gaeltachta (“Radio of the Gaeltacht”; hereafter “RnaG”). 
The station’s national audience share is only 0.7%, but it has a high level of 
audience penetration within the Gaeltacht: the most recent survey publicly 
available showed that it enjoyed a 45% share of listenership in the Gaeltacht 
in 2009 (RTÉ, 2009a; RTÉ, 2018a: 37). Similar to Scotland’s Radio nan 
Gàidheal, it is key for publicising Gaeltacht affairs (Dunbar, 2003) and its 
importance to the Gaeltacht and the broader Irish-language community is 
widely accepted amongst Irish speakers. Prior to the station’s founding, Irish 
was frequently perceived by its native speakers as a purely localised code not 
associated with life outside their immediate area (Watson, 2016: 69), but the 
establishment of RnaG is often understood as having been key to the “re-
imagining” of the Gaeltacht as a unified community (cf. Anderson, 1991), 




The station operates under the auspices of the state broadcaster RTÉ (“Raidió 
Telefís Éireann”) and has studios in the Galway, Donegal and Kerry 
Gaeltachtaí, with its headquarters in west Galway. As it would likely be difficult 
to attract significant income via advertising to its small audience, the station 
does not broadcast commercial advertising and is funded solely by the licence 
fee. As the secretary general of the Department of Communications, Energy 
and Natural Resources stated in 2013, however, the combination of the 
recession and rapid technological change caused a steep increase in 
incidences of non-payment of the licence fee post-2008. Court cases brought 
for non-payment doubled between 2008-13 (Oireachtas Éireann, 2013a: 5-7) 
and have stayed at this elevated level since (Irish Times, 2018b). Such evasion 
is a significant source of RTÉ’s financial difficulties (Indecon, 2016: 146; 
Oireachtas Éireann, 2017a: 14), with RnaG being affected accordingly. 
Due to the decline in licence fee and advertising income for RTÉ as a whole, 
as well as cuts to direct state support, RTÉ’s Irish-language budget was 
reduced by 29% between 2008-12. With RnaG comprising the vast majority of 
RTÉ’s Irish-language expenditure, it absorbed the bulk of this reduction. The 
station’s funding fell from €15,063,000 in 2008 to €10,697,000 in 2012 
(National Treasury Management Agency, 2014: 61, 73). By 2017 the station’s 
budget was €11,576,000 – still some 23% below the 2008 figure. Significantly, 
RTÉ’s overall budget for this time decreased by substantially less, by 8%, from 
€200,852,000 in 2008 to €186,068,000 in 2017 (RTÉ, 2009b: 52; 2018: 126). 
These cuts served to compound what were already unequal conditions for 
RnaG staff, who receive lower pay than their English-language counterparts in 
other branches of RTÉ. An employee of the station discussed this issue with 
me in 2016: 
P: [N]íl ciall ar bith leis . . . an méid ganntanas foirne atá ann agus an 
méid atá le déanamh againn. But caithfidh tú glacadh leis. An dóigh go 
n-oibríonn muidinne, mar shampla tá mise ag obair ar chlár raidió 
laethúil agus tá mé ag léiriú agus ag láithriú liom féin. Níl duine ar bith 
eile, níl taighdeoir, níl léiritheoir, níl fuck all, right. Dá mbeadh sin in RTÉ 
bheadh b’fhéidir seisear, seachtar ag obair ar an chlár agus bheadh clár 




na Gaeltachta ina saoránaigh den darna grád taobh istigh den 
eagraíocht . . . Tá muid ar tuarastal i bhfad níos ísle, i bhfad níos ísle 
[le béim] ná achan duine atá ag déanamh an obair chéanna in RTÉ. 
B: Agus cén leithscéal atá leis sin? 
P: Níl leithscéal ar bith, it’s just nár, nár…Y’know tá siad i gcónaí ag 
caint air, ag rá gur chóir dúinn é a throid, ach níor throid muid riamh é. 
Ba chóir dúinne cás a thabhairt go dtí fuckin...Ach níl muid á dhéanamh 
. . . Ba chóir dúinn an dlí a chur orthu, go dtí fuckin Eoraip, iad a fuckin 
súe-áil like. Ba chóir dúinn. But níl muid á dhéanamh . . . But b’fhéidir 
bhí eagla ar dhaoine, bhí cúlú eacnamaíochta ann agus ní raibh tú ag 
iarraidh tabhairt le fios “ó sin an dream sin ag cuartú airgead”. Anyway, 
is pointe suimiúil é. Tá muid ag obair le níos lú acmhainní agus ar 
thuarastal níos lú. 
While not ultimately taking the issue any further, the National Union of 
Journalists did draw attention to these unequal conditions in July 2017, at a 
time when the gender pay gap in RTÉ was being widely discussed in the 
media: 
The time has also come for RTÉ to address linguistic discrimination 
within the State broadcaster. Raidió na Gaeltachta is a national radio 
station providing a national service and there is no justification for the 
policy of paying RnaG journalists less than their colleagues based in 
Dublin (NUJ, 2017). 
Several submissions to the Joint Committee on the Future Funding of Public 
Service Broadcasting for their 2017 report also referred to this issue 
(Oireachtas Éireann, 2017b: 122, 247). 
Employment conditions which see those working in the Irish-language sector 
being paid less than people performing comparable work in other publicly 
funded organisations was something several other informants also addressed. 
As an interviewee with many years’ experience working for Irish-language 
organisations told me 
D: [F]eicim sin go minic . . . de bharr go bhfuil tú ag obair leis an 
nGaeilge is léir go gcreidtear go bhfuil tú ag obair “ar son na cúise” . . . 
ní amharcann daoine ar – agus nuair a deirim daoine is údaráisí, rialtais, 
daoine cumhachtacha – ní amharcann siad ar Ghaeilge agus obair 
forbairt pobail mar obair cheart. Like ní fhaigheann daoine pá ceart i 




muid ag déanamh na rudaí seo de bharr go dtaitníonn siad linn agus go 
bhfuil spéis faoi leith ach is ceart go mbeadh, y’know, an pá agus an t-
aitheantas féaráilte is atá aon ghrúpa eile á bhfáilt. Ach feictear sin go 
minic, aon rud a bhaineann le forbairt pobail, Gaeilge nó Béarla, glactar 
leis go dtarlóidh sé, in áit aitheantas a thabhairt. Like má íocann tú 
daoine faigheann tú – nó bheifeá ag ceapadh go bhfaigheann tú – 
daoine níos fearr agus go mbeidh rath níos fearr ar an obair atá ar siúl. 
Similarly, until 2016 those employed in ÚnaG were also paid significantly less 
than others in the public service who perform comparable work through 
English (Tuairisc.ie, 2016b). 
Figures made available in late 2017 showed daily listener numbers for RnaG 
had dropped by 40% since 2014, demonstrating the extent of the challenges 
faced by the station (Tuairisc.ie, 2017e). While audience share had increased 
from 2005-08, it then began to drop, with a National Treasury Management 
Agency report noting that this “may be attributable to the corresponding fall in 
opex [“operational expenditure”] during this period” (2014: 73). While it is 
difficult in the absence of detailed research on the matter to identify the exact 
causal factors behind this decrease, it would seem probable that it is at least 
partly the result of the budget cuts experienced by the station over the 
preceding years, just as the director of the Irish-language television station 
stated that that channel’s declining viewership was a consequence of the cuts 
it received since 2008 (see following section). While research has not yet been 
conducted on the matter, it was recently claimed that the station’s favouring of 
traditional Gaeltacht dialects – as opposed to the Irish of “new speakers” – 
may be a factor limiting its appeal (Moal, Ó Murchadha and Walsh, 2018: 196-
7). 
Reflecting on the greater numbers of music programmes and repeats 
broadcast on the station in recent years, one of my interviewees claimed these 
developments made her reluctant to listen to it: 
E: [C]heapfainnse ag an bpointe seo gur cur amú é RnaG. Níl ann ach 
cheapfainn, níl siad ag caint ach ar scéalta báis . . . Níl na cláracha ann 





The significant reduction in daily Irish speakers in the Gaeltacht that was 
demonstrated in the 2016 census is another factor possibly contributing to the 
station’s declining listenership. With there being over 2,500 less daily speakers 
of Irish in the Gaeltacht in 2016 compared to 2011, as well as a drop in the 
number of daily speakers of Irish in the rest of the country, it is unsurprising 
that there was also a reduction in the numbers listening to the Gaeltacht radio 
station. Although the 40% decline in RnaG listeners is obviously much greater 
that the 11.2% decline in daily speakers in the Gaeltacht, this may partly reflect 
the fact that the station’s listenership consists primarily of those in older age 
cohorts (Indecon, 2017: 12). As the oldest of these listeners die off it seems 
plausible that they are not being replaced by younger listeners, who are less 
likely to be active Irish speakers (Ó Giollagáin and Charlton, 2015a), more 
likely to use online platforms for news and entertainment (see 5.10) and more 
likely to have emigrated since 2008 (5.5.1). 
Unfortunately, in October 2016 due to financial constraints RTÉ withdrew a call 
for tender for research which aimed to gain a better understanding of RnaG’s 
listenership (Tuairisc.ie, 2016c). This research would have aimed to address 
the “easnamh mór a bhí ann go dtí seo nach raibh taighde 
cruinn againn maidir le lucht éisteachta RTÉ Raidió na Gaeltachta” and hoped 
to allow the station to provide improved services to listeners (Tuairisc.ie, 
2016d). Such an insight is undoubtedly needed, with the steep fluctuations in 
listenership undoubtedly being a cause for concern for a station that has been 
credited with being of great benefit to the language. 
Despite RnaG clearly being in need of increased investment, in light of its 
reduced budget and the ongoing challenges faced by the traditional media, 
RTÉ began an organisation-wide rationalisation scheme in August 2017 that 
aims to cut costs and reduce staff numbers by approximately 10%. Under this 
scheme, RnaG staff were offered the opportunity to apply for redundancy and 
early retirement packages, for which a significant number applied, including 
half of the staff in the Donegal studio (Tuairisc.ie, 2017f). In light of the long-




employed in the station, it is perhaps unsurprising that such a large percentage 
desired to leave the station. Seven RnaG presenters were ultimately granted 
these packages, all of whom had been employed for over the 18-year minimum 
required to ensure eligibility. This prompted significant scheduling challenges 
for the station and led to the shortening or discontinuation of some of its key 
chat and news programmes, these often being the programmes in which the 
most spoken Irish was to be heard (Tuairisc.ie, 2018d). 
4.2.8.2 TG4  
Established in 1996 just as the Celtic Tiger was gaining momentum, TG4, the 
Irish-language television station, was perhaps the key victory secured by Irish-
language campaigners during the boom period. The channel has more of a 
national focus than RnaG, and has often been noted for having had a 
significant status planning function for Irish on a national scale due to its 
presentation of the language as contemporary and vital (O’Connell et al., 
2008). While having some vocal anti-Irish detractors in the media (Delap, 
2008: 158) and also receiving criticism from some Irish speakers who bemoan 
the excessive use of English in its programming (Mac Síomóin, 2006: 3), the 
quality of its output is generally commended by both the Irish-speaking minority 
and the English-speaking majority (Irish Independent, 2015). While having a 
very low percentage share, as discussed below, as of 2016 it had some 
450,000 daily viewers, with a 92% weekly reach amongst daily speakers of 
Irish (Oireachtas Éireann, 2017c: 10; TG4, 2018a: 1). 
As well as employing eighty people directly, primarily in the station’s 
headquarters in Conamara, TG4 outsources much of its programming, 
spending €20m annually on contracts with over 90 production companies who 
employ some 350 people in total (Broadcasting Authority of Ireland, 2013: 148; 
TG4, 2018b). This investment has allowed for the growth of an independent 
production sector, much of which is based in the Gaeltacht, and, in some 
cases, reported to have been important for maintaining a community’s use of 




One of my interviewees, who was himself involved in the campaign to have 
the station established, explained the beneficial social and linguistic 
consequences of the station as follows: 
S: [C]eann de na rudaí is mó cinnte a tharla sa gceantar le scór bliain 
anuas ná bunú TG4. Agus rinne sé sin difear an-mhór, níl aon dabht 
faoi sin. Now bunaíodh é sin tráth a raibh . . . borradh ag teacht faoin 
eacnamaíocht . . . [C]hoinnigh sé ag obair san áit go leor daoine an-, 
an-, b’fhéidir, chruthaitheach, ealaíonta, a bheadh imithe as an áit. Agus 
tá glúin áirid agus tá is dócha cúpla céad duine, abair, a coinníodh san 
áit nó a tugadh isteach san áit a bhfuil luí acu leis an nGaeilge. I mean 
tá sé sin tábhachtach, taobh amuigh den tionchar atá ag an telefís féin, 
tá sin tábhachtach ó thaobh an ceantar, mar a déarfá, mar cuid mhaith 
de na daoine sin tá cónaí orthub sa gceantar, tá siad ag tógáil clann 
anois faoin am seo, cuid mhaith acub. Chabhraigh sé sin go mór leis an 
gceantar agus thug sé stádas áiride don teanga freisin i measc lucht 
gnó sa gceantar. Thug mé sin faoi deara – lucht gnó, bhí siad ag athrú 
a ndearcadh féin ó thaobh na teanga. B’fhéidir go mbíodh siad cineál 
diúltach ó thaobh na teanga, gur thosaigh siad ag smaoineamh, bhuel, 
b’fhéidir . . . tá stádas ag an nGaeilge anois, stádas na teilifíse agus 
cheapfainn go raibh sin tábhachtach ó thaobh íomhá na teanga sa 
nGaeltacht féin.  
State funding of the broadcaster increased significantly from €10m in 2001 to 
€35.5m in 2008 (Irish Times, 2010; TG4, 2009: 43), although this was 
subsequently reduced in line with the recommendations of An Bord Snip Nua 
(see 4.2.1) to reduce the exchequer subvention of TG4 by €10m “at a 
minimum” (McCarthy et al., 2009b: 26). The cuts the station received, while 
significant, were nonetheless less than An Bord Snip’s proposal – a 2016 
submission by TG4 to the Joint Committee on Communications, Climate 
Action and Environment noted that “funding ha[d] been reduced by over €3m 
per annum” between 2008-15 (TG4, 2016b: 2), falling from €35,473,000 to 
€32,240,000 (TG4, 2009: 42, 2016b: 30). When added, however, to “new 
levies and reductions in commercial income due to the downturn in the 
economy these have resulted in an almost €6m reduction in funds available 
for TG4's operations on an annual basis” (TG4, 2016b: 2). This submission 
requested that the recommendations of various independent economic 
advisors be implemented and their budget increased “at the very least [to] 




also noted that “[t]he combination of the downturn and media market 
developments have resulted in TG4's advertising and sponsorship income 
declining by approximately 50% between 2008 and 2016” (TG4, 2016b: 3-4; 
see also Ó Gairbhí, 2017: 278-297). 
While perhaps not giving due accord to the decline of legacy media that is 
occurring regardless of budgetary contraction, according to the channel’s 
director inadequate funding was the primary cause of the fall in the channel’s 
audience share from 3.2% in 2005 to 1.8% in 2016 (Oireachtas Éireann, 
2017c: 16-7). Similarly, an independent 2016 report stated that “an increase in 
funding is required if its audience share is not to continue on its downward 
trend” (Indecon, 2016: ix). The Broadcasting Authority of Ireland also told the 
Oireachtas that the channel would be unable to deal with further cuts, it already 
being run on an extremely frugal basis (TG4, 2016b: 4; Ó Gairbhí, 2017: 285). 
In light of the aforementioned status-raising function of the channel, such a 
significant decline in viewership is surely unhelpful for the language’s prestige 
both in the Gaeltacht and nationally. Despite numerous such appeals for the 
channel’s budget to be increased to at least 2014 levels, by 2017 funding was 
€32.79m, €147,000 below the 2014 figure, which itself was over €3m less than 
the 2008 budget (TG4.ie, 2018). 
Under the Broadcasting Act, 2009 the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland (under 
whose direction TG4 is run) is required to “promote and stimulate the 
development of Irish language programming and broadcasting services” 
(Government of Ireland, 2009: 33). Also included in this act is a requirement 
for the minister of communications to develop “broadcasting funding schemes” 
aiming, amongst other objectives, to “develop . . . programmes in the Irish 
language” (Government of Ireland, 2009: 156-7). These schemes are to be 
funded by “an increase in the allocation of licence fee money from RTÉ to the 
Broadcasting Funding Scheme (from 5% to 7%), of which TG4 is a main 
beneficiary”, in order to increase the quantity and quality of Irish-language 
broadcasting (Government of Ireland, 2010: 27). Despite this positive 




scheme become significantly more challenging. As explained in 4.2.8.1, the 
paying of licence fees dropped significantly after 2008, due to both the 
recession and the increasing turn away from traditional media. 
While the station continues to promote Irish in so far as it can, it would seem 
probable that its reduced budget and the consequent decline in ratings was 
responsible for some of the recent scheduling decisions which saw a decrease 
in the number of programmes directed at the station’s “core” Irish-speaking 
viewers. Major changes were made to the station’s schedule in 2017, with 
programmes such as Comhrá, Béaloideas Beo and Róisín being discontinued 
– all of which had formats based primarily on interviewing native Irish speakers. 
In their place there was an increase in programmes in which relatively little 
Irish is heard, such as those focusing on music like Glór Tíre, a talent show for 
up-and-coming singers from around the country, few of them Irish speakers. 
Sports coverage was also increased, it being seen as “a good attraction for 
non-Irish audiences and maintaining audience shares” (Indecon, 2016: 30; see 
also Ó Gairbhí, 2017: 309-10). The station also broadcasts a large number of 
repeats or imported filler programming such as English-language quiz or 
“reality” TV shows. Even before these recent scheduling changes took place, 
Indecon’s 2016 review of TG4’s funding noted that “[t]here has been a slight 
decrease in Irish language hours broadcast across 2013-2015”, falling from 
5,188 hours in 2013 to 4,956 (57% of its total broadcast hours) in 2015 (2016: 
34). Despite being well received by critics, the 2017 drama series 
Klondike was notable for its high degree of bilingualism, perhaps imitating a 
Welsh model that aims to appeal to Welsh and non-Welsh speakers alike 
(Tuairisc.ie, 2017h; see also Mac Dubhghaill, 2008). 
Although the employment created by TG4 is obviously of great importance, 
much of this is itself problematic – not least due to a large amount of it being 
conducted through English, leading to the creation of the sort of “Potemkin 
village” that McLeod (2002: 68) warned against as being an unhelpful false 





C: [B]’fhéidir go bhfuil lochtanna ar TG4, agus tá, ach tá go leor like 
comhlachtaí eile héis teacht chun cinn mar gheall ar TG4. Comhlachtaí 
príobháideacha a bhíonns ag déanamh scannánaíocht iad féin . . . agus 
ó thaobh fostaíochta de tá sé sin maith. Ach an rud faoi, mar a déarfá, 
ní postanna buan iad . . . Agus is trí Bhéarla a bheadh a bhformhór. 
Several other interviewees also noted the tendency of those employed in TG4 
to speak English at work, something not reported to be the case with RnaG or 
the print media discussed in the following section. This same informant 
claimed this was due to TG4’s employees lacking the ideological commitment 
to the language that those involved in the founding of RnaG had: 
C: Ach bhí locht mór ar TG4 go raibh an dream a bhí ag obair ann ag 
Béarlóireacht. Now, ní raibh chuile dhuine . . . [I]s cuimhneach liom goil 
isteach in oifig agus Béarla ar fad a bhí á labhairt ann . . . Sin rud nár 
tharla le Raidió na Gaeltachta. Y’see sin mar gheall go raibh an dream 
an-dáiríre, gur throid siad ar son Raidió na Gaeltachta a fháil, gur throid 
siad ar son na Gaeilge agus lucht TG4 ní raibh ann ach post dóibh. Sin 
an difríocht, post a bhí ann agus ba chuma leob. Ní rabhadar féin cinnte. 
Níl mé ag rá nach bhfuil daoine áiride i TG4 – bhí agus tá – a raibh 
dílseacht faoi leith acu don Ghaeilge, tá sé sin fíor. Ach bhí lucht oifige 
Raidió na Gaeltachta chomh dílis don Ghaeilge is a bhí na craoltóirí. Ní 
raibh sé sin amhlaidh i TG4. Cé ar a bhí an locht sin, ar fostaíodh an 
dream mí-cheart? Níl ’s a’m. 
Notwithstanding this interviewee’s contention that those employed by TG4 who 
frequently spoke English were capable of speaking Irish but chose not to, it is 
often the case that those involved in the technical aspects of TG4’s productions 
simply do not know Irish, with many of these working for independent 
companies contracted by the station, including large numbers of camera 
operators (Ó Gairbhí, 2017: 332-4). A direct employee of the station told me 
that it is for this reason that Irish is used only about 50% of the time on the set 
of one of the station’s flagship shows. Indeed, during the course of this PhD I 
had numerous occasions to be on TG4 myself, and in all but one instance I 
was filmed by a cameraman unable to speak Irish, assisted by a reporter who 
talked to me in Irish before turning to the cameraman and repeating the 
substance of our conversation in English. 
With this being a longstanding issue, before the crash ÚnaG funded a higher 




Acadamh na hOllscolaíochta Gaeilge (the Irish-language division of the 
National University of Ireland, Galway), aiming to rectify the lack of Irish-
speaking workers with such skills. This course was delivered near the TG4 and 
RnaG headquarters in west Galway where work placements were available to 
students, but budgetary cuts have since led to ÚnaG discontinuing the paying 
of tuition fees for the course. Indeed, grants provided by ÚnaG for training and 
education were reduced massively between 2008-15, from €12,766,480 to 
€1,582,030 (Údarás na Gaeltachta, 2009b: 3; 2016b: 3). 
Although the Acadamh continues to teach similar courses, they are now fully 
fee charging and include fewer opportunities for work experience than are 
thought necessary, developments which have surely not helped resolve this 
shortage of Irish-speaking staff in TG4 (Oireachtas Éireann, 2017b: 143). 
Furthermore, between 2012-18 full-time student numbers in the Acadamh’s 
Gaeltacht centres fell by over 90%, from 248 to 20, with the 50% reduction in 
the institution’s budget since 2008 and the abolition of the grant formerly paid 
to students studying in the Gaeltacht adding to the difficulties caused by the 
discontinuation of ÚnaG support (RTÉ, 2018b). 
Further to the obviously problematic issue of language use by both TG4 staff 
and the station’s contractors, one of my interviewees, a man in his mid-20s 
who composes music used by TG4, told me of his frustration with the poor 
employment conditions he faces in the sector: 
F: [C]úpla lá ó shin chuir mé isteach ar obair, rud neacht a gheobhaim 
íocaíocht thart ar míle euro fána choinne. Agus dúirt siad liom, bhuel, 
internship atá anseo, like comhlacht atá ag iarraidh stuif a dhéanamh 
do TG4. So gan mise a bheith in ann taighde [tuarastal a bhí i gceist 
aige sílim] mar is ceart a fháil bhí siad ag iarraidh bullshit a íoc domh, 
€20 extra ar an dól, right. Agus ní hé go bhfuil mise just mar amateur, 
tá mé literally, chuaigh mise chuig an ollscoil, NUI, NUI fuckin Acadamh 
agus chuir mé lear obair isteach ann. So fá choinne duine atá [cáilithe] 
tá siad ag ráit domh, y’know, “fuck off”. Agus tá siadsan chun mo obair 
a úsáid chun fuckin lear airgead a dhéanamh. So tá just fadhbanna 
ansin. 
In light of the reduced income such companies receive from TG4 due to cuts 




– have adopted such internships as a way to lower overheads. The cuts have 
meant that TG4 pays these independent companies just 50% of the amount 
RTÉ pays its contractors, with employment in the sector falling accordingly 
(see consultation submissions from such contractors in Oireachtas Éireann, 
2017b: 70, 123, 161, 167, 247; also Olsberg SPI and Nordicity, 2017: 64; Mac  
Murchú, 2008; Mac Eachmharcaigh, 2008; Ó Gairbhí, 2017: 329-31). As 
several other interviewees observed, frustration with employment conditions 
of this nature often prompts people to emigrate, or at least to seek employment 
in sectors unrelated to Irish (see also Glynn et al., 2013: 41-3; Oireachtas 
Éireann, 2017b: 247). 
For all TG4’s continued popularity amongst many Irish speakers (TG4, 2018a: 
1), the last ten years have clearly seen it face very significant challenges. As 
with Irish-medium radio and print media, not only has the station had to 
contend with the rapidly changing nature of traditional media in the 21st 
century, but also with significant reductions to its budget. As the station’s 
director recently told an Oireachtas committee: 
[n]í leor an leibhéal reatha maoinithe le gur féidir le TG4 dul i ngleic leis 
an margadh atá ag síor-fhorbairt agus athrú. Gan bonn il-bhliana faoin 
maoiniú, is doiligh pleanáil agus forbairt [a dhéanamh] (Oireachtas 
Éireann, 2017d: 3). 
He also noted that without significant investment over the next several years 
the station risks becoming lost in the “digital jungle”, one of the 750+ channels 
available to the Irish public that attract less than 1% of viewers. Similar 
sentiments were expressed in the channel’s 2018 strategy document, which 
noted that “the recession caused major damage, not just to TG4, but also to 
Ireland’s creative economy” and that globalisation and the competition for 
audiences it brings has left the channel in great need of increased investment 
(TG4, 2018a: 2). In July 2018, however, the government finally announced that 
a most welcome additional €985,000 in funding was being made available for 
2018. Although it is unclear whether this increase will also be available in 
coming years, it will hopefully go some way to preventing further attrition of 




with RnaG, in light of the many benefits the station has provided the language, 
any further decline in its status would surely be an enormous loss to Irish 
speakers in both the Gaeltacht and Galltacht. 
4.2.8.3 Print media 
Unusually for a minoritised language of its size, print media in Irish has a 
relatively well-established history, with the first Irish-language periodical, An 
Gaodhal, being printed monthly from 1881-1904 (Delap, 2008: 153). Published 
bilingually by an Irish emigrant in New York, this publication was succeeded 
by more frequently published, all-Irish newspapers such as Fáinne an Lae and 
An tÉireannach, amongst many more. A highpoint for Irish-language print 
media was reached in the 1950s when Inniu was selling 20,000 copies a day 
(Foras na Gaeilge, 2013: 1). 
Despite having had over a century for the market to mature, by 2008 all extant 
publications in Irish were in receipt of significant state support. In line with their 
wider process of rationalisation which saw them abolish 13 of 19 voluntary 
Irish-language organisations (see 4.2.6), FnaG also greatly reduced the 
amount of print media it funded. The extent to which these media were 
dependent on official subvention is clearly seen in the fact that all of those 
which did not secure alternative funding arrangements became defunct once 
their grants were discontinued. 
In 2007, a daily paper called Lá Nua was founded as a successor to Lá, which 
had been in publication from 1984-2006. Although based primarily in Belfast, 
the paper also had an office in the Donegal Gaeltacht. It operated on a not-for-
profit basis and was controlled by the Preas an Phobail co-operative (Ó 
Murchú, 2008: 17). While partly financed by shareholder investors drawn 
primarily from Belfast’s Irish-speaking community, the paper received the 
majority of its funding from FnaG. As with its predecessor (whose average daily 
sales reached 4,404 during the second half of 2003), five editions of Lá Nua 
were published each week, although by 2008 daily sales averaged only 1,500 





The case of Foinse, a Conamara-based weekly paper founded in 1996, is 
similar to that of Lá Nua. Foinse saw sales reach 8,000 copies a week by the 
year 2000, only for them to decline to 3,746 by the end of 2008 (Ó Murchú, 
2014: 464). As with Lá Nua, FnaG ceased funding Foinse in 2009. Further to 
the general trend towards falling newspaper reading in any language, such a 
steady decline in sales has also been observed with Welsh-language 
newspapers, as readers apparently no longer see the novelty in minority 
language newsprint and tire of supporting an enterprise ar son na cúise (“for 
the cause”; Ó Murchú, 2014: 464). Again, in the wake of the budget cuts that 
FnaG faced from 2008 onwards and with sales having fallen so significantly, it 
is unsurprising that the organisation ceased subsidising these papers. 
Although it must be acknowledged that such defunding may well have 
occurred regardless of the events of 2008, the economic climate certainly 
made them all the more likely. Despite losing its core funding, beginning in 
2009 a shorter version of Foinse was published privately as a weekly 
supplement in the Irish Independent (Gaelport.com, 2011). The content of this 
iteration of the paper quickly came to focus on learners rather than fluent 
speakers, however, and the paper went online only in late-2013, before 
ceasing operations in 2015. The Irish Independent continues to publish a short 
weekly supplement in Irish, Seachtain, focusing primarily on the needs of 
learners and school students.  
Having defunded both Foinse and Lá Nua, FnaG issued a call for tender in 
2009 to establish a replacement publication under its Scéim Nuachtán 
Seachtainiúil (“Weekly Newspaper Scheme”). It eventually opted to fund 
Gaelscéal, whose first issue was published in January 2010. Although the 
paper was widely commended for its coverage of national and international 
affairs, in addition to its analysis of Irish-language issues, its weekly sales 
never surpassed 1,500 copies, and had fallen to 1,300 by the time the paper’s 
€400,000 annual subsidy was withdrawn in early 2013 (Gaelport.com, 2013). 
This decision to end Gaelscéal’s funding was taken on the grounds that these 
low sales did not warrant such expenditure in light of “an titim de 25% atá i 




aon le gearradh substaintiúil eile tuartha don bhliain seo chugainn” (Foras na 
Gaeilge, 2013: 1-2). 
Similar to the cases of RnaG and TG4 discussed in the previous sections, Lá 
Nua, Foinse and Gaelscéal all provided important language-based 
employment in the Gaeltacht, albeit on a smaller scale. While only employing 
small numbers of staff, Foinse and Gaelscéal each had their offices within ten 
miles of both the RnaG and TG4 headquarters, thereby contributing to 
maintaining the social density of Irish speakers and creating high-prestige 
employment, both essential ingredients for language maintenance in any 
community. 
The cuts to these newspapers were made despite a commitment in the 20-
Year Strategy to encourage the growth of print media in Irish, with one of my 
interviewees commenting as follows when describing the state’s general 
neglect of the Strategy: 
S: [B]hí sé ráite go soiléir . . . gurb é ceann de na rudaí a bhí i gceist ag 
an Stratéis ná iarracht a dhéanamh cur leis an méid ábhar clóite a 
bheadh á leamh sa nGaeilge. Agus céard a tharla? Cuireadh deireadh 
leis an bpáipéar, an nuachtán clóite! 
Although it does commit to promoting Irish-language publications, the Strategy 
also stipulates that print media will be supported on the basis of “reasonable 
and verifiable sales” (Government of Ireland, 2010: 26). Such a sentiment 
accords with the rationalisation rhetoric so common in light of the economic 
crisis and wider neoliberal reform, running counter to economic intervention 
principles popular before the neoliberal era, whereby states readily supported 
loss-making public institutions due to the wider benefits they provided 
(Chomsky, in Bakan, 2005: 194; Chang, 2007: 114). 
A number of smaller-scale news services also ceased publication during the 
period this thesis focuses on. Among these were Goitse (which was published 
independent of state support in and for the Donegal Gaeltacht between 2009-




existence for 25 years) and Nuacht24, a short-lived successor to Lá Nua in 
Belfast which was also self-financed (Ó Murchú, 2014: 458). 
In a further blow to the language’s status in the print media, as well as its 
visibility on a national scale, the Irish Times, Ireland’s main broadsheet and 
paper of record, reduced its Irish-language content from one full page weekly 
to a half page in July 2016. This decision was taken as part of a wider re-
organisation of the paper whereby it reduced its total page content in an 
attempt to maintain profitability despite steadily declining circulation. The 
development was criticised by many in the Irish-language media, who 
observed that it halved the opportunities for Irish-language journalists to be 
employed by the paper, which is notable for the above-average rates of 
remuneration its writers receive (Tuairisc.ie, 2016e). 
As well as the discontinuation of Irish-language newspapers, other print media 
and online news services previously funded by FnaG were also cut. Until June 
2014 the periodicals Feasta, An tUltach, An Timire, An Sagart and Nós were 
all in receipt of funding, as were the news websites Gaelport.com, Saol.ie and 
Beo.ie. By 2015, however, cutbacks meant that FnaG was only supporting the 
monthly literary journal Comhar, the newly founded online news service 
Tuairisc.ie (discussed below) and the now online-only culture magazine Nós, 
which had previously been available both online and as a quarterly printed 
magazine (Ó Murchú, 2014: 458). Although An tUltach had its funding 
discontinued, this deficit has been compensated for by Conradh na Gaeilge’s 
decision to finance it from their own internal budget, with the organisation 
having been reluctant to see an end to a magazine which has been in 
publication since 1924. 
In mid-2018 the book publisher Cois Life announced its intention to close come 
2019, citing amongst other reasons the decline in sales that the recession had 
seen (Cois Life, 2018). Commenting on this news, the CEO of FnaG stated 
that funding for their Irish-language books scheme had fallen by over €700,000 
between 2008-17, from €1.8 to €1.06m (Tuairisc.ie, 2018e), a development 




With traditional media in decline the world over due to the growth of the 
internet, it cannot be argued that the Great Recession is wholly responsible for 
the decline of print media in Irish. Similar to the cases of RnaG and TG4 
discussed above, however, the coinciding of the crisis with the broader 
challenges faced by legacy media created a deeply unfavourable situation for 
Irish-language publications after 2008. The lack of disposable income 
experienced by the majority of the population during the recession made it all 
the less likely people would regularly buy such publications purely to support 
the language. When combined with the straitened budgetary circumstances 
FnaG experienced in recent years which required them to rationalise 
operations to a degree unlikely to have otherwise occurred, it is unsurprising 
that the period under examination saw such a large reduction in the range of 
print media available in Irish. 
While the decrease in the availability of print media in Irish is notable, it has to 
a large degree been compensated for by the growth of vibrant online Irish-
language media, all of which are provided free of charge. Gaelscéal has been 
succeeded by popular news service Tuairisc.ie, which attracted a very 
significant 250,000 users in 2016 after receiving a four-year long grant of 
€1.6m (Foras Teanga, 2017: 24). Nós continues to be widely read in its online 
form, attracting 128,000 readers in 2016 (Foras Teanga, 2017: 24). There are 
also a number of smaller content providers such as Ulster-focused news site 
Meoneile.ie or portal site Peig.ie. These are certainly very positive 
developments that continue to provide language-based employment while 
reaching a far wider readership than the print publications discussed. It is 
notable, however that only one of these sites, Tuairisc.ie, has its office in the 
Gaeltacht, and, unlike Gaelscéal, Foinse, etc., even this is located in an area 
where Irish is very weak, less than five miles from Galway city centre. 
Furthermore, as discussed in section 5.10, the increased penetration of 
information technology into our daily lives is itself somewhat of a double-edged 





4.2.9 New Public Management: Irish in the public service  
Despite having been one of the main foci of the language revitalisation efforts 
of the Free State, the use of Irish in the public service has long since been a 
source of much contention. Senior civil servants who had been employed in 
the British administration resisted attempts to Gaelicise their departments after 
independence (Ó hIfearnáin, 2010: 547), leading Ernest Blythe, a Conradh na 
Gaeilge member and early Free State minister, to declare that “[i]f civil servants 
assemble . . . in great numbers in the Gaeltacht, they should be dispersed, if 
necessary, by machine guns” (in Kelly, 2002: 105). 
This tension exists to this day: a common discourse amongst the Irish-
speaking community claims that a significant element within the public service 
are “opposed” to Irish. Such narratives feature frequently in both media and 
academic commentary (e.g. Thejournal.ie, 2013a; Ó Giollagáin, 2014b: 102) 
and, indeed, the President of Ireland himself expressed concerns in 2016 that 
there was a “fadhb chultúrtha éigean ag cur srian ar an gcóras” (Tuairisc.ie, 
2016f; see also Tuairisc.ie, 2016g). This belief has been significantly 
strengthened by the reports and public declarations of both the current 
Coimisinéir Teanga and his predecessor. The first Coimisinéir, Seán Ó 
Cuirreáin, served from 2004 until 2014, when he unexpectedly resigned his 
position in protest at the widespread non-implementation of both the 20-Year 
Strategy and the language schemes required of public bodies under the 
Official Languages Act 2003. While Ó Cuirreáin himself, as will be seen, 
offered a more nuanced analysis than is often assumed, his successor has 
also expressed similar frustrations on numerous occasions (e.g. Oireachtas 
Éireann, 2016). 
Several of my interviewees voiced such reservations, charging public servants 
with antipathy towards official language policies, as seen in the following 
quotes: 
B: Níl mé ag iarraidh cur síos ar aon duine, but muna bhfuil an rialtas 
sásta govern – ‘cause again stáitseirbhíseach, cushy fuckin number, on 




mbeadh ort] cur isteach ar do chomhghleacaithe ‘cause my minister 
wants this so sorry, you’re gonna have to get off your fuckin arse [agus 
scéim teanga a chur i bhfeidhm]. 
A: Tá cumhacht thar na bearta ag na státseirbhísigh sin. Agus cuid 
mhaith den am ní bhíonn na hAirí rialtais nó cibé polaiteoir atá i bhfeighil 
ar an réimse sin sásta dul i ngleic leis ná dul in éadán moltaí nó tuairimí 
an státseirbhís . . . An dóigh a fheicim é ó thaobh an státseirbhís go 
bhfuil an cultúr ann faoi láthair gur cineál inconvenience atá sa Ghaeilg. 
Given the historical evidence that shows civil service obstruction of language 
revitalisation measures was widespread in the Free State, there is likely an 
element of truth to these beliefs (Ó hIfearnáin, 2010: 547-9). Here, however, I 
aim to propose an alternative explanation for the steady decrease in 
compliance in recent years with the language schemes required of public 
bodies, detailed by the Coimisinéir Teanga in successive reports (e.g. 
Coimisinéir Teanga, 2012; 2014; 2015). In opposition to the individualist 
explanation heard so often in popular discourse, I believe that a strong case 
can be made that this marginalisation of Irish is to a significant degree a 
product of the neoliberal managerial reforms that began in the 1970s, gathered 
pace in the 1990s and have become even more widespread since the 2008 
crash. 
This common belief that large numbers of Machiavellian public servants are 
“anti-Irish” and therefore operate to render state language policy ineffective for 
their own ends is, I believe, an overly simplistic explanation, unlikely to be the 
main reason for the recent marginalisation of Irish in the public service. This is 
not least due to the fact that all available data suggests that the majority of the 
population are sympathetic towards Irish (e.g. Mac Gréil and Rhatigan, 2009; 
Conradh na Gaeilge, 2015) and there is no obvious reason why this would not 
be at least broadly replicated amongst public servants, much less why it would 
have become a significantly more severe problem in recent years. Although, 
as Ó hIfearnáin notes, it is easy to express pro-Irish sentiments when you are 
not required to act on them in any way (2010: 547), a senior member in the 
office of the Coimisinéir Teanga told me that they do not generally find such 




B: An bhfuil an státseirbhís chomh naimhdeach sin in aghaidh na 
Gaeilge is a shíleanns go leor de phobal na Gaeilge? Agus tú ag plé 
leofa an bhfaigheann tú an dearcadh sin? 
G: Ní fhaighim. Feictear dom go mbraitheann go leor . . . go bhfuil rudaí 
suntasacha eile le bheith ag plé leob seachas an cheist seo. Éinne a 
labhraim leob agus cinnte agus mise ag labhairt leob trasna an bhoird 
bíonn siad ag rá liom go bhfuil meas acub ar an nGaeilge, go bhfuil cion 
acub ar an nGaeilge, so ní fhéadfainn sin a bhréagnú, má tá duine ag 
rá liom go bhfuil meas acub ar an nGaeilge. But ó thaobh céard atá an 
státseirbhís goil a dhéanamh ar son na Gaeilge, nuair a thagann sé go 
legislatively what are you going to do, cineál, agus ‘sé sin céard atá tú 
ag gealladh sa scéim teanga – so tá meas agat ar an nGaeilge, céard 
atá sa scéim teanga mar sin? Agus nuair a fheiceann muid na 
gealltanais atá á comhlíonadh, nó easpa gealltanais . . . is ansin atá an 
laigeacht le feiceáil. Now cén fáth a bhfuil sé sin ag tarlú? Aríst I dunno. 
Y’know it’s really, like it’s really, it’s ceist, I suppose, ceannaireachta 
really. 
It would appear clear from this experience, then, that the narrative of a large 
number of public administrators being opposed to Irish is indeed overly 
simplistic, with them instead seemingly having at least the passive goodwill 
towards the language that is typical of the Irish population. As will be seen, 
however, in the absence of a suitably supportive workplace environment, this 
banal positivity is insufficient to see significant efforts made towards language 
promotion. 
As noted in 1.4, in 1974 the Fine Gael-Labour coalition government 
discontinued the Irish-language requirement for entry to the civil service. While 
factors such as the rise of the anti-compulsory-Irish Language Freedom 
Movement surely contributed to this decision (Rowland, 2016), it is also of note 
that this move was made the year after Ireland joined the EEC and thereby 
came under the influence of international political and economic practices to a 
much greater degree than had previously been the case (Ó Tuathaigh, 2008: 
33). Furthermore, the early 1970s was a time of immense economic turmoil on 
a global scale, the stagflation crisis of this period being the first generalised 
crisis of capitalism to occur since the Great Depression (Gamble, 2009: 6). As 




late 70s states all across the developed west were beginning to undertake 
fundamental reforms of their public services. 
These “New Public Management” (NPM) reforms saw states endeavour to 
bring the logic of marketization and the practices of the private sector to bear 
on public sector institutions (Cairney, 2012: 12). NPM drew in particular on the 
ideas of game theory and public choice theory which were cornerstones of 
neoliberal policy (Blyth, 2013: 152-60), applying to the political sphere 
economic models of self-centred individuals eternally attempting to maximise 
their personal benefit. With politicians perpetually compelled to maximise 
votes, public choice theorists claimed they would invariably implement unwise 
economic interventions in the hope of appeasing the electorate in the short 
term, with the inevitable result of generating inflation, which neoliberalism had 
sought to overcome (Cairney, 2012: 152; Blyth, 2013: 152-8). Similarly, without 
an appropriate incentive structure, public servants would continually seek to 
minimise their workloads and place personal benefit above public good, 
leading to the sort of inefficiencies that NPM aimed to address (Niskansen, 
1971). 
NPM quickly gained popularity amongst policy makers, becoming “[o]ne of the 
key policy changes institutionalized across the Western world” in recent 
decades (Lynch, 2012: 89). In this context, it is of little surprise that the Fianna 
Fáil government who won a landslide victory in 1977 did not see fit to re-instate 
the language requirement for civil service recruitment, despite having 
promised to do so should they regain power (Ó hÉallaithe, 2004: 170). When 
combined with developments in public attitudes and the failure of the efforts of 
previous decades, the withdrawal of state commitment to Gaelicising the public 
service at this juncture appears to have been overdetermined by a confluence 
of factors both endogenous and exogenous to Irish society. 
Ostensibly, the New Public Management model aims to increase the efficiency 
of the public sector. This is done through introducing challenging performance 
indicators designed to incentivise productivity (with continued employment 




or “market-type mechanisms” and interdepartmental competition to secure 
resources, reframing citizens as customers or “service users”, and an 
increased reliance on outsourcing (Homburg et al., 2007: 4-5; Cairney, 2012: 
158-9). 
Despite its measures being promoted as a practical application of market logic, 
allowing for the “depoliticizing” of management practices, NPM is not simply a 
set of proposals for enhancing the efficiency of the increasingly large and 
complex bureaucracies that were required to manage capitalism under the 
post-war Keynesian consensus. Rather, as Lynch (2012: 89) points out, NPM 
is fundamentally a “management strategy for neoliberalism”, being a key way 
in which neoliberal reforms have been enacted in “not just the political 
economy of states but the public institutions where people received services 
and worked” (Ward, 2011: 206). 
It is therefore unsurprising that a state which neoliberalised as thoroughly as 
Ireland would have adopted NPM measures to a significant degree. An OECD 
report published on the eve of the crash in 2008 confirmed this to be the case, 
stating “Ireland has significantly advanced along a “New Public Management” 
continuum” (OECD, 2008: 18, original emphasis). As will be shown, the reform 
measures implemented in the years following this pronouncement saw Ireland 
move yet further along this continuum, thereby creating, I believe, an 
environment inhospitable to the promotion of Irish in the public sector. 
With “doing more with less” having been a central demand of NPM since its 
earliest years (Ward, 2011: 207), this approach gained even greater 
prominence in the wake of the 2008 crash, with far-reaching reforms being 
implemented across the Irish public service. As MacCarthaigh explains: 
Adopting a ‘never waste a crisis’ approach . . . a wide range of reform 
measures . . . left no part of the public service unaffected . . . the 2011-
16 period became one of unprecedented change for the Irish public 
service. The window of opportunity presented by the crisis was 
exploited by policy entrepreneurs from the political and administrative 





Similarly, Boyle has argued that “[a]usterity has caused major change in the 
public service”, with these measures amounting to “the biggest change to 
[Ireland’s] public services since the foundation of the state” (2017: 226). As 
Hyndman and Lapsley (2016) and Randma-Liiv and Kickert (2017) describe, 
major public service reforms were intensified not only in Ireland but across 
much of Europe after 2008, particularly in those countries effected most 
severely by the crisis. 
Guiding these reforms in Ireland was the 2011 Public Service Reform Plan. 
This plan contained a host of targets aimed at reducing state expenditure, 
including a 12% reduction of public service staff numbers by 37,500 to 282,500 
by 2015 (MacCarthaigh, 2017: 157). While this goal was not fully achieved, 
there was nonetheless a reduction of almost 10% during this period. As a 
senior member in the office of the Coimisinéir Teanga (which lost several 
employees due to such measures) told me when speaking about this time “bhí 
gach duine hanging on for dear life really, ó thaobh foirne”. 
One ÚnaG employee I interviewed noted that although they had significant 
impacts for Irish, these measures impacted the entire public service: 
É: [B]aineann sé le achan earnáil . . . Cur chuige nua a bhí ag an stát. 
Cur chuige nua atá ilnáisiúnta ar dhóigh . . . thoisigh Fianna Fáil é seo. 
Lean Fine Gael dó. Dúirt siad linne nach ndéanfadh siad é but lean siad 
dó, cos ar chos. Agus go minic fóireann sé do dhaoine atá i gceannas, 
cosúil le na daoine atá i gceannas ar roinn an rialtais agus tá siad ábalta 
smacht níos fearr a choinneáil ar rudaí . . . leis an rud “seo an méid atá 
agat le caitheamh don bhliain, seo an méid atá agat, caithfidh tú é a 
dhéanamh” . . . Ní shílim go mbaineann seo le Gaeilge amháin. Shíl mé 
sin go dtí gur thoisigh mé ag caint le daoine i rannóga rialtais eile, mar 
shampla páirceanna náisiúnta, córas oideachais, FÁS nó traenáil – 
rudaí céanna atá ann. Sílim gur sin rud a thiteann muid i gcónaí isteach 
ann, go bhfuil muid istigh sa súilín seo, bubble na Gaeilge, agus síleann 
muid go bhfuil achan rud… 
B: In ár n-aghaidh. 
É: Yeah. 
Further intensifying the implementation of NPM measures, in 2013 the 




oversaw the creation of a new system of measuring productivity. Under this 
system, all state departments are obliged to produce regular performance 
reports in order to improve “alignment of decisions on spending with policy 
outcomes” (MacCarthaigh, 2017: 155). As a result of these and many other 
similar reforms 
Irish public service managers reported a stronger deterioration with 
regard to citizen trust in government, the attractiveness of the public 
sector as an employer and staff motivation when compared with other 
states in the 2008-2014 period (MacCarthaigh, 2017: 161).  
At the time of writing the government was continuing to entrench NPM in the 
public service, “seeking major new productivity concessions”, including the 
outsourcing/privatising of yet further functions, biometric clock-in 
requirements, mandatory unpaid overtime, and potentially making Saturday a 
standard working day (Irish Times, 2017c; 2017d). 
In the wake of such reforms, the Coimisinéir Teanga found that by 31 
December 2016, of 113 public bodies with language schemes (see 1.5), 56 
had let their scheme expire, with six expired for seven or more years 
(Coimisinéir Teanga, 2017b: 3). Following a notable peak in the number of 
schemes that were lapsed between 2011-13 (Coimisinéir Teanga, 2017a: 25), 
there was an increase in recent years in the number of schemes accepted by 
the relevant minister, as all schemes must be for them to have force under the 
Official Languages Act 2003. Despite this seemingly positive development, the 
Coimisinéir’s office reported in 2017 that the majority of public bodies had 
reduced the provisions in their second and/or third schemes, with the usual 
response to an investigation into non-compliance with an aspect of a scheme 
simply being to remove the aggravating provision from subsequent iterations 
of the scheme (Coimisinéir Teanga, 2017b: 13). Consequently, although many 
public bodies have had their schemes accepted by the minister, they often 
contain very little of substance to provide for Irish speakers. When combined 
with the fact that Walsh (2011c; 2012b) reported that the original versions of 




rendered language revitalisation efforts in the public service almost worthless 
becomes apparent. 
In light of the enormous NPM restructuring of public bodies, however, these 
developments are hardly surprising. Such widespread reforms and the overall 
worsening of employment conditions they entail can hardly be seen as 
conducive to implementing language schemes, which are never likely to be 
amongst the most pressing of issues in an assessment of any public body’s 
duties. This is especially true due to the lack of powers available to the 
Coimisinéir Teanga to impose any significant penalties as a result of non-
compliance. Given the fact that all Irish speakers can also speak English and 
that the 2003 Act contains few clear, enforceable rights, the provision of Irish-
language services is unlikely to ever be seen as anything more than a symbolic 
gesture of good will, liable to be removed when budgetary and human resource 
contractions so require. 
Indeed, when faced with such heavy budgetary cuts and the compulsion to 
complete an ever-greater range of duties, public bodies adopted a range of 
evasive tactics such as the common refrain that their language schemes will 
be implemented “in so far as resources allow” (in much the same way that the 
Act itself does, see 1.5). In the following extract two senior employees in the 
Coimsinéir’s office discuss the Department of the Environment’s language 
scheme: 
A: Trí huaire déag bhí sé luaite go bhfuil sé ag brath ar acmhainní. 
Yeah. But tá sé sin ag tarlú go... 
G: Go rialta. 
A: B’fhéidir nach bhfuil sé chomh follasach anois, go bhfuiltear ag rá ag 
brath ar acmhainní... 
G: Yeah, yeah. 
A: Ach d’fhéadfadh sé a bheith curtha ar bhealach go bhfuil sé an-
deacair na gealltanais atá tugtha a bheith tomhaiste agus a bheith 




Further examples of this tendency were given in the Coimisinéir’s 2018 
Oireachtas statement (Oireachtas Éireann, 2018b). Indeed, in 2018 the 
Coimisinéir announced that such was the extent of non-compliance with these 
schemes and the lack of worthwhile provisions contained therein that his office 
was discontinuing monitoring their implementation, considering it to have 
become a waste of the “acmhainní teoranta” available to his office (Tuairisc.ie, 
2018f). 
One often-cited difficulty relating to the implementation of language schemes 
is the lack of Irish-speaking staff in the public service. As has repeatedly been 
stated by the Coimisinéir, the number of Irish speakers being recruited remains 
vastly inadequate to facilitate widespread implementation. Indeed, figures 
published by Tuairisc.ie in 2017 showed that just 15 of the 18,775 positions 
spread across 15 state departments have a specific Irish-language 
requirement – a minuscule 0.08% (Tuairisc.ie, 2017i). Despite Seán Kyne, 
then minister of state responsible for the Gaeltacht, announcing that he 
intended to take steps to rectify this, less than a week later the position of 
secretary of the DAHRRGA, the most senior civil servant with responsibility for 
the Gaeltacht, was given to a woman unable to conduct her duties through 
Irish (Tuairisc.ie, 2017i; 2017j). 
While often explained as an issue resulting purely from a lack of political will, 
this issue of recruitment can also be read as a consequence of the NPM model. 
In the same way that the private sector (fully aware of the limited market value 
of minoritised languages) remains extremely unlikely to employ someone due 
to their being a minoritised language speaker, a public service governed by 
NPM is not likely to pay much heed to such matters. In the absence of an 
ambitious recruitment policy favouring Irish, the NPM ideal of recruiting the 
“best” employees from either the public or private sector, nationally or 




speaker is slim.6 Relatedly, it was in the wider context of civil service reform 
described above that the decision was made in October 2013 to discontinue 
the awarding of bonus points to those who completed the civil service entrance 
exams in Irish, a positive discrimination measure that had been introduced 
after the compulsory Irish exam was abolished in 1974 (Conradh na Gaeilge, 
2013). 
With the programme for the “Government of National Recovery 2011-2016” 
committing to reviewing the Official Languages Act 2003 to “ensure 
expenditure on the language is best targeted” (Government of Ireland, 2011: 
59), the department responsible for the Gaeltacht conducted a public 
consultation on amending the Act in 2014. Based on the submissions to this 
consultation, the draft heads of the Official Languages (Amendment) Bill 2017 
were eventually released in 2017 and included a commitment to 
the overall objectives of 20% of new recruits to the public service being 
Irish speakers, of all public offices situated in Gaeltacht areas operating 
through the medium of Irish and of increasing the capacity of public 
bodies to provide public services through Irish (Government of Ireland, 
2017a: 15). 
Although appearing to mark a major change of direction, the confirmation by 
the head of Irish-language policy in the department that this commitment would 
not be including a deadline or time frame for its implementation led to 
widespread condemnation (Oireachtas Éireann, 2018c). Both language 
promotion bodies and the Coimisinéir Teanga stated that such a policy was all 
but meaningless without a delineated time frame, and was therefore surely set 
to be yet another failure (Coimisinéir Teanga, 2018; Oireachtas Éireann, 
2018d). In early 2019, eight years after amending the Act was first committed 
to, the minister responsible for language policy was forced to renege on his 
promise to update the legislation “as soon as possible”, announcing these 
 
6 The decision by the board of directors of the National University of Ireland, Galway to abolish the 
Irish-language requirement for the position of university president was made on the basis of such logic 




reforms were to be postponed yet again, this time due to the need to pass 
emergency legislation dealing with Brexit (Tuairisc.ie, 2019). 
Unlike other accounts about the position of Irish in the public sector, one well-
informed interviewee, when I asked to what extent he felt the recession 
provided an excuse for the state to withdraw from Irish-language provision, 
expressed some awareness of the wider structural context in which public 
servants operate: 
S: Domsa ag breathnú air, go fuarchúiseach, ní, ní cuid den chúlú 
eacnamaíochta é sin, ach cuid den chúlú atá gá dhéanamh ag na 
státseirbhísigh agus ag an stát ó bheith freagrach as rudaí iad féin agus 
é a chur ar ais ar dream éigeant eile. I mean cheapfainn go bhfuil 
saghas meon nua tagtha isteach sa státseirbhís go bhfuil muid ag 
seasamh siar ó aon rud a dhéanamh nó aon cinneachaí a dhéanamh, 
fágfaidh muid é sin ag rialatóirí agus é sin, regulators. Ach tá muid 
sábhailte, so ní féidir aon cheisteanna crua a chur orainn sa Dáil, mar 
“ó tá dream eile ag plé leis sin”. 
While not explicitly naming it or appreciating the extent to which this process 
was accelerated by the recession, his statement is nonetheless perceptive 
and, indeed, clearly describes the NPM approach. During the address to the 
Parliamentary Sub-committee on the 20-Year Strategy for the Irish Language 
at which he announced his resignation, the first Coimisinéir Teanga made a 
similar allusion: 
Creidim go bhfuil an teanga á ruaigeadh ar leataobh go leanúnach 
chuig imeall na sochaí, agus áirím anseo cuid mhaith den riarachán 
poiblí. Ní chreidim ar chor ar bith gur ar an aicme pholaitiúil is mo atá 
an locht ina leith seo ach feictear dom, cé go bhfuil daoine sa státchóras 
a thacaíonn go láidir leis an Ghaeilge, go bhfuil fórsaí níos láidre agus 
níos forleithne fós ann ar cuma leo ann nó as dár dteanga náisiúnta 
(Oireachtas Éireann, 2014). 
While not going any further to define what exactly was meant by “fórsaí níos 
láidre agus níos forleithne”, this comment nonetheless clearly implies that the 
issues faced by Irish are greater than just the apathy of public servants. In light 
of the evidence presented thus far, I believe it is clear that the neoliberal NPM 
paradigm is a key factor in this “ruaigeadh” (“expulsion”). Explanations of the 




an ngeilleagar, sin meon rialtais”, as one Irish-language activist put it to me, 
are, in my estimation, deficient. They fail to appreciate the extent to which an 
economic environment as challenging as the recession and the ideological 
hegemony that drives the Irish economy impact the organisational structures 
of the public service, and, therefore, the ability of the professional managerial 
class to implement language schemes and assorted measures. 
There is, of course, some amount of agency behind the side-lining of Irish in 
the public service, with at least some officials likely aware that their decisions 
to not implement language schemes – or to implement them only in part – are 
incompatible with the requirements of the 2003 Act (see Ó Flatharta et al., 
2014: 52 on the role of individual managers in implementing language 
policies). Nonetheless, this agency is clearly exercised under the restraints 
produced by NPM structures. Indeed, as one long-term civil servant told me 
“[f]eictear domhsa nach bhfuil ann ach pian sa tóin daofa” – one more issue to 
be dealt with on top of an already excessive workload. While top-down 
minoritised language policy implementation would surely remain challenging 
under a different managerial paradigm (as the experience of the civil service 
before the 1970s demonstrates (Ó Riagáin, 1997: 18-9)), NPM is most surely 
not an approach conducive to language revitalisation and provides a key 
structural obstacle which makes up part of the wider neoliberal paradigm that 
is discussed in the final section of this chapter. 
4.2.10 Neoliberalism as a structural impediment to
 effective language revitalisation policies  
4.2.10.1 Policy making under austerity 
As has been described, the impacts of the crisis and the ensuing policy reforms 
have significantly impacted the strength of Irish-language policy. While a 
number of these developments have already been documented in more detail 
than the length of this thesis permits (Ó Murchú, 2014), there has as yet been 
no detailed attempt to situate them in the wider ideological context that drove 




The problematic nature of this ideology for those involved in language planning 
can be clearly seen in the fact that Hayek’s Road to Serfdom, a foundational 
text in the development of neoliberalism, consists almost entirely of a diatribe 
against economic (and, by extension, social) planning, with the author 
contending that “planning leads to dictatorship because dictatorship is the 
most effective instrument of coercion and, as such, essential if central planning 
on a large scale is to be possible” (2006 [1944]: 74). Hayek reserves his 
greatest ire for those forms of economic planning which are redistributive in 
nature (2006 [1944]: 36), a position which raises significant difficulties for the 
sort of revitalisation programmes that are typically required to reverse 
language shift. While slightly different from the dynamic often critiqued by 
neoliberals in which a wealthy minority has their wealth expropriated to support 
a larger, less well-off group, revitalisation projects aimed at strengthening the 
position of minority groups require significant investment, and almost by 
definition, the transfer of resources from dominant to minority groups. 
Furthermore, such redistributive efforts are likely to be required for the long 
term: 
[i]f [revitalisation-oriented] language policies are to have any significant 
impact, they will require large resources on a scale which has not been 
hitherto realised. Effective language policies will and must affect all 
aspects of national life and will have to be sustained for decades, if not 
forever (Ó Riagáin, 1997: 283). 
While a large minority of Irish people have some knowledge of the language 
and are well disposed to it, the numbers who actually speak the language on 
a regular or semi-regular basis constitute only a miniscule percentage of the 
population (see 5.2.2 below). Those who do so in the Gaeltacht comprise an 
even smaller category, and can thus only be meaningfully understood as a 
minority group within Irish society. 
If minoritised languages like Irish are understood as inherently social goods, 
as Grin (2006: 81) and Ó Flatharta et al. (2014: 57) argue they should be, it 
becomes clear that they can only be effectively maintained through societal 




linguistic diversity, so that it is social policy rather than language policy that is 
needed to maintain it” (2004: 8). Similar points have been made by a great 
many other prominent writers in the field (e.g. Cooper, 1989: 1; Crystal, 2000: 
154; Fishman, 1991; Romaine, 2006: 456; Williams, 2014: 243). 
Neoliberalism, however, is a firmly individualist ideology (cf. Thatcher’s famous 
“there is no such thing as society” statement, itself based on Hayek, 1988: 112-
9) and is therefore contraindicated to the type of planning required for language 
revitalisation. As one of my interviewees – one of very few who explicitly 
mentioned neoliberalism – exclaimed: 
M: Sin an nualiobrálachas aríst – níl function ag an stát ach riar do lucht 
gnó. Níl dualgas sochaí ar an stát, agus tá an Ghaeltacht ina shochaí, 
agus is cuid de shochaí na tíre í an teanga. Ach . . . níl bocsa sa 
spreadsheet fá choinne seo, so níl baint acu leis. 
This ideological bias, coupled with the fact that Irish is the preserve of a 
minority of regular speakers which had little experience of collective political 
mobilisation in the years before the crash – and were thus unlikely to mount 
significant resistance (see, however, 5.6) – meant that language-related 
funding was disposed to receive very large cutbacks in recent years. Section 
5.2.3 discusses the tendency of austerity to target the poorest most severely 
– a further major challenge in light of the class composition of much of the 
Gaeltacht. 
In a telling example of the extent to which the language has been de-politicised 
in the Republic, despite the severity of the cuts to Irish language provision, 
language advocacy groups and activists have been reluctant to make an 
explicit connection between neoliberal ideology and these decisions. 
Particularly amongst state-funded language groups there was almost no 
concerted opposition to austerity, although this was the case for campaign 
groups in many sectors which are fully or partly funded by the public purse 
(Harvey, 2014; see also 5.6). Instead, similar to the discourses around the 
public service described in 4.2.9, the unambitious and underfunded language 
policy regime of recent years is widely understood to be the product of 




faoi leith . . . maidir leis an rialtas a bheith in aghaidh na Gaeilge” as one 
informant told me, a statement typical of many others I heard. 
As Ó Murchú has pointed out, however, “[r]ómhinic sa tír seo cuirtear an locht 
ar dhaoine nuair is cirte é a chur ar chóras nó ar choinníollacha” (2006: 27). 
With neoliberalism being the consensus ideology amongst Irish elites (Murphy, 
2014: 139-40), the strength of language policy is not predominantly an issue 
of how much individual politicians like or dislike Irish, but rather of a hegemony 
that is inherently averse to state investment in such an area. Indeed, during a 
large part of the period described in this thesis both the Taoiseach and the 
Tánaiste (Enda Kenny and Eamon Gilmore, in office 2011-17 and 2011-15 
respectively), were fluent Irish speakers, a very uncommon occurrence. Each 
was very willing to engage with Irish-language media and, seemingly, held 
positive sentiments towards the language. Such personal affiliation was clearly 
insufficient to prevent the severe cutting of Gaeltacht-focused schemes, 
however, with Irish coming low on the list of priorities for officials committed to 
implementing restructuring measures in a time of crisis. As one of my 
informants, a lobbyist with considerable experience discussing Irish-language 
policy with politicians, told me when asked about the widely held belief that the 
current political elite are opposed to Irish: 
M: Léiríonn sé nach raibh an Ghaeilge-Gaeltacht mar thosaíocht . . . Ní 
hé go bhfuil naimhdeas ann, ag an cuid is mó de pholaiteoirí in aghaidh 
na Gaeilge, ach nuair a bhí siad ag breathnú ar na fadhbanna a bhí acu 
le réiteach ní raibh an Ghaeilge-Gaeltacht mar chuid de sin. 
Another activist commented that, similar to the reforms of ÚnaG described 
above being part of a wider policy of public service reform, cuts to language 
planning were not due to animosity to Irish per se: “baineann sé le cinntí a 
ghlac an rialtas maidir le fiacha, seilbh a ghlacadh ar fiacha, nuair atá tú ag íoc 
ar ais an leibhéal fiacha is atá muid, gearrfar siar ar chuile rud”. Indeed, it is 
difficult to imagine a policy environment more inhospitable to Irish than that of 
the Great Recession, with massive cuts to state spending inevitably impacting 




As with the case of NPM, by emphasising the animosity of individual politicians 
or parties, popular non-structural assessments of language policy fail to accord 
adequate significance to the ideological paradigm which defines how states 
make social policy. This paradigm was promoted not just by the native political 
class post-2008, but by the Troika after they became involved in state finances 
in late 2010. While the depth of influence of such supranational constraints on 
policy is debatable, the role of the Troika during this time must be considered, 
not least due to their well-established reputations as institutions central to the 
propagation of neoliberalism internationally (Allen and O’Boyle, 2013: 13-20). 
Given that there were – as several authors have noted (e.g. Murphy and 
Dukelow, 2016: 322) – many similarities between the state’s National 
Recovery Plan 2011-2014 and the Memorandum of Understanding agreed 
with the Troika, it seems there was relatively little need for the external 
imposition of neoliberalism. Although this memorandum required punitive 
austerity measures and the marketization of public spheres previously 
insulated from such measures (Mercille and Murphy, 2015: 90-106), the extent 
to which the Irish elite were already committed to neoliberal ideology means 
that the Troika were largely “pushing an open door” (Dukelow, 2015). Then 
finance minister Brian Lenihan repeatedly insisted that the policies enacted in 
2010 were “ours alone” (BBC, 2010), a fairly plausible statement considering 
the neoliberal policies his government had long since pursued and the path 
dependent nature of such fundamental policy trajectories. Although it is 
typically almost impossible to measure the extent to which policies are adopted 
as a result of coercion (Cairney, 2012: 256), the Troika’s influence seems most 
visible in the pace and intensity of austerity measures, with policymakers “able 
to advance change without the domestic vetoes they might otherwise have 
expected” (Murphy and Dukelow, 2016a: 322). 
With Irish elites anxious to be seen as compliant from the earliest days of the 
bailout programme, it is therefore unlikely the Troika would have even had to 
mention the issue of reducing Gaeltacht funding. As Crenson explains in his 
influential work on agenda setting, the reputations of powerful institutions often 




power (1971: 125). The effective implementation of many of the language-
related policies discussed in this chapter would thus have been kept off the 
agenda purely by virtue of the reputations of these institutions, the exigencies 
of the crisis and the anxiousness of the Irish elite to end the recession as 
quickly as possible via budgetary contraction. The contributions of Bachrach 
and Baratz (1963) and Lukes (1974) to the community power debate – a 
seminal discussion in political science in the 1960s and 70s about the nature 
of political power (Cairney, 2012: 46-58) – are of great pertinence here. As 
these authors noted, the so-called “second face of power” (see also 1.4 and 
4.2.4) is often exercised primarily to keep issues off the political agenda and 
away from public attention, a point which tallies with Dye’s popular definition 
of public policy as “whatever governments chose to do or not do” (1972: 2). In 
the overall context of state expenditure the amount spent on LPP was 
admittedly a relatively small amount. Nonetheless, when the severity of the 
crisis and the presence of the Troika is combined with the requirements of 
small states under neoliberalism to compete with one another for FDI, to keep 
their investors happy and to not buck international trends (Cairney, 2012: 11, 
16), programmes focused on language maintenance in the marginal 
communities of the Gaeltacht stood little chance during the recession. 
4.2.10.2 Neoliberalism and the formation of social attitudes 
A further important issue regarding minority language policy under 
neoliberalism relates to the ways in which social attitudes are conditioned by 
the economic environment in which we live. While the extent to which language 
policy attempts to form rather than merely respond to public attitudes has long 
since been debated (CILAR, 1975: 289), there is little doubt that where 
significant public opposition to expenditure on the language exists, it is much 
less likely the political class will seek to dedicate resources to language 
revitalisation efforts. Neoliberal measures, however, decrease exactly the 
social solidarity which is required to ensure widespread public support for such 
expenditure.  As is well documented, neoliberalism and the Great Recession 
have led to massive, unprecedented levels of inequality (Piketty, 2014). 




[e]ven trust, the faith we have in our fellow citizens, corresponds 
negatively with differences in income: between 1983 and 2001, 
mistrustfulness increased markedly in the US, the UK and Ireland – 
three countries in which the dogma of unregulated individual self-
interest was most assiduously applied to public policy. In no other 
country was a comparable increase in mutual mistrust to be found (Judt, 
2010: 20). 
Even before the crash wealth distribution in Ireland was enormously unequal, 
with 1% of the population reported to own 34% of the wealth in 2007 (Bank of 
Ireland, 2007: 12). The extent to which the crisis has exacerbated this 
tendency can be inferred from the recent Irish Independent report which found 
that the richest 300 people in Ireland doubled their wealth between 2010-17, 
from €50 billion to €100 billion, giving them combined wealth significantly 
greater than that of the original bank bailout. The eleven richest people now 
have the same wealth as the top 300 had in 2010, a roughly 27 times greater 
concentration of wealth amongst the super-rich during the most severe 
economic crisis in the state’s history (Irish Independent, 2017). 
This inequality and its resultant decline in trust has considerable implications 
for social attitudes: “trusters tend to believe that everyone should be treated 
with respect and tolerance” (Pickett and Wilkinson, 2010: 56). “Respect and 
tolerance” are, of course, fundamental prerequisites for the kind of pluralist 
society which is supportive of minoritised language rights. With its commitment 
to individualism and survival-of-the-fittest competition, neoliberalism, then, 
quickly becomes “social Darwinism in an economic disguise” (Verhaeghe, 
2014: 119; see also Dorian, 1999: 10-2 regarding the effects of social 
Darwinism on minoritised languages). 
Relatedly, in polities with weak welfare provision, the population tends to be 
much more reluctant to accept radical policy changes (Chang, 2016), a fact 
which also has obvious implications for the political viability of policies requiring 
wide-scale redistributive investment in the Gaeltacht. Conversely, the 
presence of a significant social safety net makes policies of investment in 
peripheral locations seem much less threatening. While such measures may 




significant poverty or hardship for anyone, with state investment not being a 
zero-sum game consisting of an either/or Gaeltacht-Galltacht dichotomy 
whereby investment in the Gaeltacht likely means divestment from the 
Galltacht. Although the Irish welfare state was never as developed as others 
in western Europe, the recession saw it significantly weakened in a short 
period (Mercille and Murphy, 2015; Murphy and Dukelow, 2016b). In light of 
the perilous economic situation experienced by so much of the population in 
recent years and the hegemonic anti-collectivist sentiments that are 
fundamental to neoliberalism, it seems unlikely that there would be widespread 
acceptance of ambitious language revitalisation policies such as those 
proposed in the CLS (Ó Giollagáin et al., 2007b: 31-47), or by Ó Giollagáin 
and Ó Curnáin (2016: 59-68), thereby presenting a major challenge for those 
who espouse such policies. 
Similarly, people living pay cheque to pay cheque – as a significant percentage 
of the population have been since 2008 (Irish Examiner, 2013) – also have far 
less emotional energy and free time with which to be concerned about non-
essential issues such as the fate of the Irish language. As Putnam has pointed 
out  
[c]ontrary to expectations that unemployment would radicalize its 
victims, social psychologists found that the jobless became passive and 
withdrawn, socially as well as politically. As my economic situation 
becomes more dire my focus narrows to personal and family survival 
(Putnam, 2000: 193). 
While it is certainly true that the most ambitious revitalisation efforts in Ireland 
were made while the country was still chronically impoverished, this was the 
product of a unique set of historical circumstances, including the very 
significant influence romanticism and linguistic nationalism had on the early 
generations of Free State leaders (see 1.3). With such conditions not existing, 
as Putnam notes, people are unlikely to be involved in such “post-materialist” 
issues (see also Inglehart, 2018 for a detailed exploration of the decline of 




An employee of ÚnaG in Donegal noted the effects of this very phenomenon 
on concern for the language while we were discussing the local industrial 
estate: 
É: Chaill 950 [duine] jabanna anseo . . . but an rud a tharla faoin teanga, 
bhí sé iontach suimiúil because ghlac na postanna tús áite. Bhí sé 
iontach suimiúil. Bhí cruinniú poiblí againn dhá bhliain ansin faoi 
fhostaíocht agus níl dóigh ar bith sa dá bhliain go raibh duine ar bith 
chun teanga a lua. 
Similar to the constraints on policy makers at a macro-level, in times of 
economic distress, individuals and communities quite simply have more 
pressing issues facing them than language revitalisation.  
By both affecting the conditions which give rise to public support for post-
materialist issues and causing a move to a significantly more deregulated 
language policy regime since 2008, the neoliberal beliefs that dominate Irish 
politics have therefore made the maintenance of Irish significantly more 
challenging. They have also caused widespread social disruption on the micro, 
community level in the Gaeltacht, as the following chapter describes. 
4.3 Conclusion 
The discussion presented in this chapter has attempted to draw attention to 
the significant impact of the Great Recession on the formation and 
implementation of Irish-language policy. As Cairney has pointed out, however, 
all policy narratives are biased to view some indicators as more important than 
others, but this is not necessarily a disadvantage (Cairney, 2012: 29). While 
this present analysis offers but one of many possible readings of the recent 
language policy regime, analyses of this field have rarely engaged with wider 
politico-economic factors in detail, often falling into the trap of viewing “bilingual 
reproduction . . . as autonomous” (Ó Riagáin, 1996: 35). Other studies of this 
period using alternative lenses of policy analysis would surely offer valuable 
insights not given here, although in the timeframe in question the impact of the 
economic crisis on social policy of all types simply cannot be ignored, with the 




official policies. This assessment therefore offers a heuristic tool which allows 
us to gain a greater understanding of the intersection between macro-level 
economic forces and the policy decisions that can have such formative impacts 
on the vitality of Irish-speaking communities. 
Similar to the dramatic economic transformations of the 1970s, the Great 
recession, I believe, represents an example of punctuated equilibrium in 
language policy, with drastic reforms being implemented in a very short period. 
The neoliberal ideology driving these reforms is fundamentally opposed to 
state involvement in social planning or wealth redistribution of the type 
necessary for language revitalisation and creates social conditions and 
attitudes which are inimical to such efforts. As Grin has noted 
[s]heer market forces, in the unregulated context, apparently contain no 
built in mechanism that could help preserve them [“lesser used 
languages”]. This is not to say that market forces cannot be harnessed 
to this end; however, this is only possible in what I call the regulated 
context (Grin, 1999: 179). 
The 2008-18 period in Ireland is of particular interest as it offers an example of 
state policies shifting between the two poles identified by Grin. While the 
policies of the Celtic Tiger period were defective in many ways, the 
acceleration of neoliberalism following the crash led, as we have seen, to a 
significant shift towards the deregulation of the field. 
Although often maligned as being anti-Irish due to the widespread non-
implementation of the language schemes required under the Official 
Languages Act 2003, public servants have had their work conditions drastically 
rationalised by New Public Management reforms in recent years, and it is 
therefore unsurprising that they would have neglected all but the most 
essential of their duties. Despite its obvious significance for the implementation 
of language policy, however, NPM has not to date been considered in LPP 
literature – either in Ireland or internationally – as being of major relevance to 




Similarly, as expressed by several well-informed interviewees, the political 
class have no particular animosity towards the language, the crisis period 
simply left them with bigger problems to deal with. This fact, when coupled with 
their adherence to neoliberalism, the paradigmatic ideological force of Irish 
politics, meant that the urgency of the linguistic crisis of the Gaeltacht was 
given insufficient support during the period under study. When coupled with 
Irish being the preserve of a dispersed minority and Gaeltacht communities 
overwhelmingly being on the lower-end of the Irish class scale (see 5.2.3), this 
made language revitalisation programmes easy targets for politicians making 
dramatic cuts across many sectors. 
Providing somewhat of a natural conclusion to the 2008-18 period which this 
work focuses on, in 2018, as the National Development Plan was being 
launched to a backdrop of rapid economic expansion, Joe McHugh, then 
minister of state responsible for the Gaeltacht, announced that the “time of 
cuts” was over (Irish Times, 2018c). As described in 4.2.5, however, this does 
not mean that those cuts implemented post-2008 will be reversed, and indeed 
the proposals for Irish and the Gaeltacht included in the development plan will 
see expenditure on this area well below 2008 levels even come 2028. 
The duplicity that such figures belie notwithstanding, it is hard to not view this 
“end of the time of cuts” as being too little, too late, with the 2016 census results 
having clearly illustrated the extent of the damage done by the recession, as 
5.2.2 illustrates. Showing little understanding of the severity of the decline 
demonstrated by the census, Seán Kyne, the minister of state for the Gaeltacht 
at the time of the results’ publication in April 2017, told the Dáil that despite 
these figures the 20-Year Strategy was succeeding and would still achieve its 
targets (Tuairisc.ie, 2017k). The following chapter offers further detailed 
discussion of this decline and the social mechanisms which drove it. 
While ideological hegemonies such as that of neoliberalism are never 
monolithic, seamless or totally omnipotent, with people inevitably finding ways 
to contest and renegotiate such forces, it is nonetheless imperative that an 




the macro-level forces that shape all our daily lives. This chapter highlights 
fundamental tensions noted in a great deal of social science literature around 
agency and structure and the macro-micro dilemma of social causality, and as 
such can only hope to be but one part of a wider debate on these issues. 
While I believe this analysis offers a worthwhile elucidation of some of the 
macro-level factors restricting revitalisation-focused language policies in a 
neoliberal society, it is nonetheless of obvious importance that such theoretical 
discussion be accompanied by an understanding of the practical effects of this 
ideology on minoritised language communities. To this end the following 
chapter will detail the ethnographic findings that emerged from more than eight 
months of participant observation and over 50 interviews. Taken in tandem 
with the descriptive policy analysis approach offered in this chapter, I believe 
this will offer a detailed exposition of how exactly neoliberalism has impacted 






5. Neoliberalism and the Gaeltacht – an 
ethnographic study 
5.1 Introduction 
As explained in section 2.2, neoliberal theory contends that state intervention in social 
policy stifles the entrepreneurial impulses naturally present in homo economicus, 
thereby restricting profit maximisation, itself understood as an inherently moral act. 
Accordingly, the neoliberal era has seen a steady decrease in funding for a wide 
variety of welfare programmes, with economies worldwide being restructured to more 
closely serve the needs of capital (MacLeavy, 2012: 251). In a world in which the 
nation-state is the primary unit of political organisation, however, state support is 
typically very important for the maintenance of minoritised languages, thus leading to 
a fundamental tension between neoliberalism and minoritised language revitalisation. 
Building on the policy analysis presented in Chapter 4, this ethnographic study will 
explore some of the key ways in which this tension played out in Gaeltacht 
communities between 2008-18. The meso- and micro-level consequences of many of 
the macro-level reforms described in the previous chapter will be explored, providing 
an insight into the practical consequences of neoliberal restructuring for a minoritised 
language community. While not necessarily the result of reformed Gaeltacht policy per 
se, other repercussions of the crisis such as transformed patterns of population 
mobility and the decline of important economic sectors will also be examined in relation 
to their implications for the social, economic and linguistic vitality of the Gaeltacht. 
Given its immense significance, the full extent of the Great Recession’s impact on the 
Gaeltacht cannot be covered in a thesis of this length. Rather than offering an 
encyclopaedic account of the innumerable ways in which austerity measures impinged 
on Gaeltacht life, this chapter therefore presents an overview of the most salient points 
that emerged from my research, particularly those that illustrate broader patterns likely 
to resonate in other national and international contexts. After an overview of 
quantitative data regarding changes in demographic and language use patterns in 
recent years, as well as the class composition of the Gaeltacht, the remainder of the 
chapter will be based on data gathered via participant observation and semi-structured 
interviews. While an effort has been made to address various issues discussed herein 




interrelated” (Mackey, 2001: 68), there are thus numerous overlaps and interactions 
between the various topics discussed in this chapter. 
5.2 Quantitative background 
The fact that Ireland’s five-yearly census of population took place in 2006, 2011 and 
2016 allows for a convenient statistical analysis of the period on which this thesis 
focuses. The 2006 census took place as the Celtic Tiger approached its zenith, before 
there was mainstream acknowledgement of such growth being unsustainable in the 
long term. In 2011, by contrast, the country was suffering the full brunt of the second 
most severe crisis in the history of capitalism (Gamble, 2014). The 2016 census took 
place at a sufficient remove from 2008 to provide a reasonably long-term assessment 
of the effects of the crash, at a time when the Irish national economy had returned to 
growth. As will be seen, however, this recovery was far less visible in Gaeltacht 
communities – particularly the more peripheral ones – than in the urban core. In order 
to help contextualise the ethnographic findings presented in this chapter, this section 
will first give a brief overview of some of the relevant trends visible in census data for 
the 2006-16 period. 
5.2.1 Demographic change 2006-16 
Although the state’s population increased from 4,239,848 in 2006 to 4,588,252 in 2011 
and 4,757,956 in 2016 (Haase and Pratschke, 2017a: 10), this growth occurred 
primarily in the cities, particularly Dublin, which recovered relatively rapidly from the 
crash (Barry and Bergin, 2017: 82). Although the recession was severe by 2011, large 
numbers moved home during the 2006-9 period, before the full extent of the 
challenges facing the country were apparent, with the lagged effects of the crisis 
therefore often being more clearly marked in the 2016 figures than those from 2011. 
For much of the country, the demographic impact of the crisis was seen primarily in a 
growth rate much lower than that experienced during the Celtic Tiger, with intercensal 
population growth falling to its lowest level for twenty years between 2011-16 (CSO, 
2017a: 8). County Galway exemplified this trend, with its population growing by 2.4% 
between 2011-16, significantly less than the 10% increase between 2006-11 or the 
6.4% increase between 2002-06. As will be shown to have been the case for many 




1.2%. While this may seem relatively slight, it too is in marked contrast to the growth 
of 9.4% between 2006-11 or 4.2% from 2002-06 (Haase and Pratschke, 2017a: 10).  
Prior to the crash, the Celtic Tiger period had seen a reversal of the widespread 
population loss which had occurred throughout the Gaeltacht for much of the 20th 
century. Between 2006-11 there was a 5.2% increase in the population of the 
Gaeltacht over three years of age – from 91,862 to 96,628 (CSO, 2012a: 9). Although 
endogenous population growth is partly responsible for this increase (with families 
being more likely to have children during times of prosperity), much of it was due to in-
migration, particularly the return of previously departed migrants and their families. 
The fact that some 1,197 residents of the Galway Gaeltacht had been living outside of 
Ireland a year before the 2006 census was conducted gives some indication of the 
extent of this phenomenon. By 2011 this number had fallen by over 50%, to 564, and 
increased only slightly (to 711) in 2016 (CSO, 2007a, 2012b, 2017b). Donegal saw a 
similar pattern – having 380 such in-migrants in 2006, 212 in 2011 and only marginally 
more, 240, five years later (CSO, 2007b, 2012c, 2017c). 
Between 2011-16, the total Gaeltacht population over three years of age fell 
marginally, by 0.6%, from 96,628 to 96,090 (CSO, 2017a: 69). This small reduction 
conceals considerable regional variation, however, with those areas nearest Galway 
city experiencing modest population growth during this time, while more distant areas 
suffered significant decline (Pobal.ie, 2017). The extent of this disparate impact is 
perhaps best illustrated by reference to the islands, where, as Hindley observed, the 
“extremes of Gaeltacht ‘deprivation’” (1990: 69) are most evident. Despite some 
exceptions such as Inis Oírr and Inis Meáin where the population increased slightly, 
most of the strongly Irish-speaking island communities saw significant population loss 
between 2011-16, with decreases of 17.4% in Toraigh, 8.8% in Árainn Mhór (both in 
Donegal), 15.4% in Leitir Mealláin and 9.8% in Inis Mór, each of which are in Galway 
(CSO, 2017d). By contrast, Bearna/Cnoc na Cathrach, a peri-urban weak Gaeltacht 
area on the outskirts of Galway city, saw a small population increase between 2011-
16, from 11,164 to 11,696 (Department of Culture, Heritage and the Gaeltacht, 2017). 
Such growth was itself partly the result of population movements from more rural areas 




Although increases near the city meant that the population of the Galway Gaeltacht 
overall did not decline between 2006-16, similar to the picture at a national and county 
level, its growth did slow significantly, as shown in table 5.1. Donegal’s Gaeltacht area, 
however, saw a 5.7% drop in population between 2011-16 (table 5.2). There was also 
a notable decrease in the 20-34 age group in both the Donegal and Galway 
Gaeltachtaí during this time. In Galway this cohort numbered 10,972 in 2006, falling 
to 10,724 in 2011 and 9,339 in 2016 (-15% over ten years). In Donegal the same 
category fell from 3,805 in 2006 to 3,672 in 2011 and 2,833 in 2016 (-25.5% overall). 
As adults of this age are the most likely to form families and have children, such a 
decline is of particular concern for the continued domestic intergenerational language 
transmission that is so key to language maintenance. 
 Male Female Total Total 
change 
% change 
2006 22,524 22,528 45,052  --- --- 
2011 24,094 24,813 48,907  3,855 8.5% 
2016 24,801 25,769 50,570  1,163 3.4% 
Table 5.1 Population change in the Galway Gaeltacht 2006-16 (based on CSO, 2007a, 
2012b, 2017b) 
 Male Female Total Total 
change 
% change 
2006 12,165 11,618 23,783 --- --- 
2011 12,541 12,203 24,744  1,631 4.0% 
2016 11,748 11,598 23,346  -1,398 -5.7% 
Table 5.2 Population change in the Donegal Gaeltacht 2006-16 (based on CSO, 




5.2.2 Irish-speaking demographics 2006-16 
With the Gaeltacht having become ever more Anglicised over the last several 
decades, by 2011 66,238 of 96,628 (68.5%) Gaeltacht residents claimed Irish-
language ability. As with previous censuses, however, the number of daily speakers 
outside the education system was significantly lower, at 23,175 – just 24% (CSO, 
2012d: CD964, CD965). Five years later, 63,664 (66.3% of the total Gaeltacht 
population) claimed the ability to speak Irish, with 20,586 (21.4%) speaking Irish daily 
outside the education system (CSO, 2017e: EA055). This represented a drop of 2,589 
daily speakers (-11.2%) since 2011 – an alarmingly sharp decrease over such a short 
period. The dramatic nature of this decline becomes all the more apparent when 
contrasted with the 2006-11 period, which saw a 1.4% increase in the same category. 
  Speak Irish daily 
outside the 
education system 
Speak Irish daily inside 





2006 17,687 5,179 22,866 --- 
2011 17,955 5,220 23,175 1.4% 
2016 16,199 4,387 20,586 -11.2% 
Table 5.3 Daily speakers of Irish in the Gaeltacht, 2006-16 (based on CSO, 2007c: 87, 
92; 2012d: CD964, CD965; 2017e: EA055) 
As table 5.4 shows, on a nationwide basis (including the Gaeltacht), between 2006-11 
the number of daily Irish speakers outside of the education system grew by 7%, from 
72,148 to 77,185, before falling to 73,803 (-4.5%) between 2011-16. The figures for 
the state outwith the Gaeltacht show a similar pattern – growth from 2006-11 followed 
by decline from 2011-16. Daily speakers outside of the education system increased 
from 49,282 in 2006 to 54,010 in 2011, but fell to 53,217 in 2016 (CSO, 2007c: 61, 6; 
2012d: CD959, CD960; 2017e: EA055). 
As with population change, there are substantial regional differences in language use 
patterns in both the 2006-11 and the 2011-16 periods, with Donegal experiencing both 




recession than Galway. 2006-11 saw an increase of 5.2% in the number of daily Irish 
speakers outside the education system in the Galway Gaeltacht (10,394 to 10,932), 
while there was a decrease of 6.3% between 2011-16 – from 10,932 to 10,243 (CSO, 
2007a, 2012b, 2017b). In Donegal, the five-year period to 2011 also saw an increase 
in the number of daily Irish speakers, albeit a smaller one of 2.2% (7,012 to 7,166). 
2011-16, by contrast, saw a significant drop of 17.3% (1,237), to 5,929 (CSO, 2007b, 
2012c, 2017c). 




Speak Irish daily 









2006 53,471 18,677 72,148 49,282 
2011 55,554 21,631 77,185 54,010 
2016 53,162 20,641 73,803 53,217 
Table 5.4 Daily speakers of Irish on a national level, 2006-16 (based on CSO, 2007c: 
61, 66; 2012d: CD959, CD960; 2017e: EA055) 
Following the historical pattern described in 1.4 of stronger Gaeltacht areas 
experiencing shift at a slower rate than weaker communities bordering the Galltacht, 
within category A areas the overall decline was less than the 11.2% drop experienced 
by the Gaeltacht in its entirety. Nonetheless, even in these strongest areas the decline 
was also pronounced: between 2011-16 there was a loss of population of 3.4% and a 
decrease in daily users of Irish outside the education system of 8.4% in category A 
areas throughout the country (Ó hÉallaithe, 2017b). Again, however, there is a wide 
range of variation between districts, with Oileáin Árann, for instance, seeing an 11.4% 
fall in daily speakers, while An Cheathrú Rua (a comparatively well-developed town) 
was below the average, losing 5.3%. In the category A areas of north-west Donegal 
this trend was once more even greater – along with a population decrease of 6% there 
was a 14.5% reduction in the daily use of Irish outside the education system in these 




compared to the overall population decline is likely due to the deaths of elderly 
speakers who, as predicted by Ó Giollagáin et al. (2007a), are not being linguistically 
replaced by younger cohorts of daily Irish speakers, a long-term trend described in 
Chapter 1. 
5.2.3 Social class in the Gaeltacht 
The relatively high levels of deprivation in communities that have retained Irish as a 
vernacular have long since been noted in commentary on the fate of the language. 
The fact that the Congested Districts Board (founded in 1891 as a relief effort for the 
most impoverished areas of rural Ireland) included under its remit almost all those 
areas that make up the official Gaeltacht today gives some indication of the long-
standing nature of these difficulties (Hindley, 1990: 28-9). Despite several decades of 
ameliorative efforts by this board, the terms of reference of the 1926 Gaeltacht 
Commission observed that widespread poverty persisted in the Gaeltacht, with 
detrimental consequences for the future of Irish therein: 
[i]s eol dúinn gurb éinní amháin, geall leis, na ceanntair [Ghaeltachta] agus 
líomatáistí tuatha áirithe in Éirinn ina bhfuil fadhb chruaidh chasta 
economiochta le réiteach. Tá dlúth-bhaint ag ceist na Gaelge agus ag an gceist 
economiochta le n-a chéile agus iarrtar ar do Choimisiún-sa iad do bhreithniú i 
dteanta a chéile (Coimisiún na Gaeltachta, 1926: 2). 
These high levels of impoverishment continued well after the founding of the Free 
State, leading novelist and socialist activist Máirtín Ó Cadhain to claim that the native 
Irish-speaking community comprised the most impoverished class in the country. 
Referring to them as “an aicme is direóile agus is buailte den mhuintir seo againn in 
Éirinn”, Ó Cadhain claimed that the language couldn’t be saved without waging a class 
struggle aimed at alleviating the material deprivation of Gaeltacht residents (in 
Costigan and Ó Curraoin, 1987: 326). 
In contrast to an era when petty-bourgeois middle class individuals in the Gaeltacht 
(shopkeepers being an oft-cited example) were key in instigating language shift, the 
growth of Irish-language media and institutions such as ÚnaG helped with the 
development of a small but loyally Irish-speaking middle class in the Gaeltacht since 
the 1970s (Hindley, 1990: 175-7, 219-20). It was with the exceptional economic growth 
of the Celtic Tiger that the Gaeltacht’s history of impoverishment was most fully 




employment (Walsh, 2011a: 311). While more peripheral areas such as the island 
communities of Donegal continued to struggle with issues of structural unemployment 
even during the boom, this period undoubtedly saw a significant change in the 
Gaeltacht’s economic fortunes. As observed by several researchers, however, the in-
migration associated with this prosperity itself contributed to language shift in many 
cases (e.g. Ó hÉallaithe, 2004: 174-6; see also 5.3.4; 5.5). 
As it did nationally, the 2008 crash saw a return to unemployment and emigration from 
the Gaeltacht – phenomena discussed at length in 5.3 and 5.5.1 below. Unsurprisingly, 
analysis of the 2016 census results showed that almost all the stronger Irish-speaking 
areas in Galway and Donegal were classed as disadvantaged areas, with the few 
exceptions all being within a half hour’s drive of Galway city (Tuairisc.ie, 2017l). Like 
the Scottish typology of “fragile areas” characterised by “population loss, low incomes, 
limited employment opportunities, poor infrastructure and remoteness” (Phillips, 2017; 
see also HIE, 2015), the Pobal HP Deprivation Index for Small Areas combines various 
indices of deprivation such as unemployment, population loss, educational 
achievement and age dependency (Pobal.ie, 2017). This index offers a valuable 
insight into the current extent of disadvantage in the Gaeltacht: based on the 2016 
census results, the Abhainn Gabhla/Doire Iorrais area of west Galway, for instance, 
was 17% below the national average on this scale, and nearby areas such as Leitir 
Móir and Garmna were similarly disadvantaged (-16.9% and -16.5% respectively). 
Many of the “small areas” (subdivisions of larger electoral divisions) which are 
amongst the strongest of Irish-speaking communities suffer even higher levels of 
deprivation and are classed as “very disadvantaged”, with Leitir Mealláin (21% below 
the national average) and Ros Muc (-26%) in Conamara providing particularly stark 
examples (Tuairisc.ie, 2017l; Pobal.ie, 2017). The Donegal Gaeltacht also contains 
several equally deprived areas, including the only two full electoral divisions in the 
Gaeltacht classed as “very disadvantaged” (An Dúchoraidh and Árainn Mhór), 
although, as with Galway, several small areas within larger electoral divisions are also 
thus categorised, including strongly Irish-speaking Mín an Chladaigh (-26.5%) 
(Pobal.ie, 2017). The Donegal and Galway Gaeltachtaí contain five districts that 
appear on the CSO’s list of “unemployment blackspots” – the 79 electoral divisions (of 
3,440 total) wherein the unemployment rate is at or above 27%. Indeed, Scainimh in 




electoral divisions with the highest unemployment rates in the country – the only two 
rural areas on a list of otherwise urban districts, most of which are in Limerick city 
(CSO, 2017f: 117). 
Notably, almost all Gaeltacht areas in Munster were slightly above the national 
deprivation average (Tuairisc.ie, 2017l), an indication of the differential socioeconomic 
status of the mid- and north-west compared to the south and east of the country which 
was described in 3.2.2.1. 
While nowadays it would be incorrect to claim, as Ó Cadhain did in 1969, that native 
Irish speakers are the most impoverished group of Irish society, it is clear that much 
of the Gaeltacht retains a large number of inhabitants on the lower end of the class 
scale. In explaining the disproportionate rates of cutbacks suffered by Gaeltacht 
communities that were described above, it is worth recalling that it has been well 
documented both in Ireland and internationally that austerity has primarily impacted 
the most disadvantaged sections of society (Bisset, 2015: 175-7; Varoufakis, 2016). 
The lower socioeconomic standing of a great many of the Gaeltacht’s inhabitants and 
their dependence on state support thus left them susceptible to receiving severe 
cutbacks, a fact not hitherto addressed by Irish LPP literature published since the 
crash. Acknowledging this class bias of austerity and the inherently anti-neoliberal 
nature of language revitalisation measures (see 4.2.10; 5.1) is therefore key to 
explaining many of the developments discussed in this chapter, and provides 
significantly greater explanatory power than those analyses of Irish LPP and the 
Gaeltacht that ignore such fundamental traits of Irish society. 
5.3 Effects of the crisis on the Gaeltacht labour market   
As described above, the Celtic Tiger period saw significant growth in the Gaeltacht 
economy. Between 2008-12, however, Ireland’s workforce of two million suffered 
300,000 job losses (O’Connell, 2017: 232), with the Gaeltacht inevitably experiencing 
its share of this disruption. This section will discuss how labour market changes 
impacted the Gaeltacht, focusing on the main sectors in which significant shifts in 
employment patterns occurred, along with the implications of these changes for 




5.3.1 Construction  
As Harvey has explained, not only are property bubbles such as that which drove the 
latter years of the Celtic Tiger a recurrent feature in the history of capitalism, but they 
have become significantly more commonplace since neoliberal policies were widely 
adopted from the 1970s onwards (D. Harvey, 2012: 30-4). As such, Ireland’s property 
bubble in the run up to 2008 provided an example of a much wider trend in global 
capitalism. By 2007, when the Celtic Tiger was at its height, more than 20% of male 
workers were employed in construction and the sector comprised an enormous 25% 
of GNP (O’Connell, 2017: 239; Glynn et al., 2012: 38). 
In late 2008 when the sub-prime mortgage crisis forced Irish banks (which had 
invested heavily in the credit default swap market) to withdraw credit from property 
developers as a way to maintain the banking sector’s liquidity, there were predictably 
grave consequences for the construction industry. By 2012 it had shrunk to make up 
less than 6% of GNP (Glynn et al., 2012: 38) and employment in the sector had 
declined enormously – “[falling] by 163,000 between 2007 and 2012, a contraction of 
over 60 per cent” (O’Connell, 2017: 239). 
With much of the Gaeltacht suffering from the type of educational inequality that 
militates against workers being employed in “white collar” positions, as well as there 
being a lack of employment for those who do attain higher level qualifications, many 
males from Gaeltacht areas found employment in construction pre-2008 and were thus 
hit hard by its collapse. This trend was visible throughout rural Ireland, where, between 
2008-14, “[u]nemployment increased by double the rate of cities, at about 200%, 
largely as a result of the collapse of the construction sector” (O’Donoghue, 2014: 19). 
In line with other research on the matter (e.g. Glynn et al., 2013), the decline of 
construction was often cited during interviews as a key reason for emigration (see also 
5.5.1). As a 26-year-old male interviewee from Donegal told me 
S: [M]una chuaigh tú ag an ollscoil nó ag déanamh cúrsa nó rud neacht mar 
sin, chuaigh an chuid is mó de na daoine óga ag obair, ag tógáil tithe nó cibé a 
bhí le dhéanamh – ach d’fhág achan duine mar sin. 
A woman in her early 30s from Galway reported a similar pattern, seeing this sectoral 




G: Tá chuile dhuine san Astráil, na fir óga, abair an dream atá comhaois liomsa, 
a raibh mise ar an scoil leothab. Tá go leor acub imithe. Siod dream a bhí ag 
plé le siúinéireacht, ag obair ar shuíomhannaí tógála i nGaillimh agus rudaí den 
tsórt sin. Tá siad sin imithe. Tá leath de mo rang, déarfainn, san Astráil, nó i 
Meiriceá, nó i gCeanada nó áit eicínt. Agus tagann siad abhaile faoi Nollaig 
agus imíonn siad aríst . . . Ní dóigh liom go raibh éifeacht chomh mór sin ag 
cúrsaí ar na mrá. 
The statistical evidence bears out this informant’s instinct about male and female 
unemployment rates (although see Spillane, 2015 for an account of the disparate 
impact of austerity on females). On a national scale, the male unemployment rate rose 
from 5.2% in 2007 to 16.6% in 2012, falling to 10.4% in 2015. While overall female 
labour market participation rates remain lower in Ireland than for males, the rise in 
female unemployment, itself substantial, was notably less severe during this time – 
increasing from 3.9% to a high of 10.3% in 2013, before falling to 6.6% in 2015 
(O’Connell, 2017: 233). The decline of the manufacturing sector, discussed in the 
following section, also had a disproportionate effect on males, who were more likely 
to be employed therein, with females in Ireland more often working in the service 
sector (Share et al., 2007: 176). Consequently, by “2012, two in every three 
unemployed people were men and, among males, [long-term unemployment] 
accounted for 67 per cent of total unemployment, compared to 45 per cent of women” 
(O’Connell, 2017: 234). 
In light of the linguistic conservatism of males which often tends to make them more 
likely to maintain minoritised languages (Gal, 1979: 167; Labov, 2001: 292), such a 
differential impact and attendant rate of emigration had obvious implications for the 
vitality of Irish in the many Gaeltacht communities where construction had employed 
a large proportion of the workforce. Indeed, several of my informants who were 
apparently unaware of sociolinguistic principles commented on the greater propensity 
of males to speak Irish. “’Siad na leaids sin is mó a labhródh Gaeilge” as one young 
man, then a student in university, told me when talking about those from his home 
village in Conamara who had not pursued third-level education. Although language 
shift can undoubtedly be driven by men in situations where the nature of the job market 
makes their integration into networks outside the local community more likely (Holmes, 
2013: 61), in the Gaeltacht males are more often employed in domains which preserve 
Irish (see Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, 2003: 283-8 for discussion of this phenomenon 




2016 census figures to those from 2011 does indeed report that the number of male 
daily speakers fell at a greater rate than the number of females during this time – falling 
11.7% and 10.2% respectively (CSO, 2017g). Relatedly, Ó Giollagáin et al. have 
observed that in lower socioeconomic groups – who were most likely to be adversely 
affected by the recession – males were more likely to be daily speakers of Irish (2007: 
132-3). 
5.3.2 Deindustrialisation 
While not as dramatic as the collapse of the construction sector, Irish manufacturing 
industry was also seriously affected by the crash, with a 16.9% decrease in 
employment therein between 2007-12, followed by a partial recovery of 4.7% from 
2012-15 (O’Connell, 2017: 239). 
As described in 4.2.4, the crisis saw ÚnaG lose almost 75% of its budget, resulting in 
significant reductions in the amount of grant aid the agency was able to distribute. In 
2008 ÚnaG funded 490 projects, but by 2015 this had fallen by almost three quarters, 
to 124. Their total expenditure on capital grants in 2008 was €13,944,440, which fell 
to €3,001,968 in 2015 (Údarás na Gaeltachta, 2009: 3; 2016b: 3). 
Unsurprisingly, the numbers employed in the “client companies” supported by the 
agency fell as a consequence of this reduced aid and the difficult international market, 
which led many of these companies to relocate overseas, particularly, as an ÚnaG 
executive told me, “comhlachtaí déantúsaíochta, traidisiúnta . . . comhlachtaí teicstíle, 
comhlachtaí leictreonacha”. One ÚnaG employee linked this process of capital flight 
from the Gaeltacht to a wider national trend whereby much of what remained of 
Ireland’s manufacturing sector moved abroad during the crisis: 
É: [B]hog siad . . . na comhlachtaí, dhá chomhlacht bhog siad go Bulgáir, bhog 
comhlacht go dtí an tSín. Bhí míle jab á chailleadh sa stát sa tseachtain san am 
sin. Míle jab déantúsaíochta. Deireadh ré a bhí ann ar dhóigh. 
B: Deireadh ré na tionsclaíochta? 
É: Déantúsaíocht traidisiúnta. 
This process is, of course, itself a result of the ability of capital to relocate to areas with 




the neoliberal policies of institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Trade Organisation and the World Bank (Parenti, 2016). 
Another interviewee who works in the main ÚnaG-managed industrial estate in 
Donegal linked the estate’s decline (from 1,300 jobs in 2008 to 425 by 2016) to a 
change in the makeup of Ireland’s national economy, with manufacturing being 
replaced by the IT sector, which almost invariably locates in large cities: 
A: [A]n rud atá muid ag feiceáil anseo in Éirinn ná . . . ó thaobh morthionscadail 
de tá tú ag caint ar thionscadal, mar a deir siad, “eolas-bhunaithe” agus de 
ghnáth bíonn na tionscadail sin nó na monarchain nó na gnólachtaí sin, cé acu 
Google nó Yahoo nó Microsoft, bíonn siad lonnaithe i gceantair ina bhfuil ionaid, 
ina bhfuil ollscoileanna ollmhóra – tá tú ag caint ar Bhaile Átha Cliath, Gaillimh, 
Corcaigh, Luimneach. Agus níl ceantair tuaithe, fiú má tá ionaid beaga ollscoile, 
níl siad dul a bheith in ann cúpla céad duine a chur ar fáil ag an leibhéal céimithe 
agus rudaí mar sin, cineál éagsúlacht céimithe. So an rud atá muid ag feiceáil, 
sílim féin, ná deireadh leis an ré sin, áit a mbeadh níos mó ná caoga post á 
chur ar fáil in aon chomhlacht amháin in ceantar mar seo, nó go mbeidh muid 
ag amhanc ar thionscail bheaga, aríst b'fhéidir eolas-bhunaithe, ach ar scála i 
bhfad níos ísle. 
Another interviewee, a factory owner in Galway who employs approximately forty 
people within an hour’s drive west of the city, challenged this narrative of the decline 
of manufacturing in Ireland as being “seafóid”, however: 
M: [Tá sé] ceart go leor rudaí a chur amach go oirthear na hEorpa agus an tSín 
agus na háiteachaí sin ach de réir a chéile [tiocfaidh] feabhas ar na háiteachaí 
sin agus [ardófar] na rátaí pá. Agus tá sé tarlaí’. Agus ansin tá tú ag breathnú 
ar rud agus b’fhéidir nach bhfuil sé an oiread sin níos saoire ná rud a fháil 
déanta in Éirinn nó i Sasana ach go bhfuil an supply chain fada agus ní féidir 
brath air. Agus an rud eile atá tarlú ná an cineál digitisation den déantúsaíocht. 
Tá ceist scileannaí agus chuile shórt mar sin, agus automation agus chuile 
shórt . . . agus déarfainn gur mó an bagairt é sin [ná postanna ag dul thar sáile]. 
While there may well be merit to this argument, the 2008 crash nonetheless triggered 
a significant decline in the manufacturing sector, with overall employment in this field 
in 2015 remaining well below pre-crash levels, as described above. Furthermore, as 
Barry and Bergin describe, very little of the 2012-15 growth in the sector occurred in 
peripheral areas such as the Gaeltacht (2017: 81). 
Above all else, the peripherality of most of the Gaeltacht makes it unappealing to 




telling me that those areas in west Galway more than an hour’s drive from the city 
were generally too remote to be viable locations for industrial development: 
B: [C]éard é an pointe is faide siar atá indéantaí go mhonarcha? 
M: Tulach.  
B: Meas tú? 
M: Absolutely. TG4, Tulach. Chaith muide blianta [in áit níos faide thiar] agus 
bhí sé an-deacair orainn. Bhí sé rófhada ó chathair na Gaillimhe, an iomarca 
taistil . . . deacair ar chustaiméirí teacht ort agus chuile shórt mar sin. Héis, héis 
TG4 déarfainn gurb shin an pointe. Sin just le bheith réadúil faoi. 
Despite these apprehensions, even the most remote parts of the Galway Gaeltacht 
that this interviewee felt unsuitable for economic development are, as another 
informant from Conamara observed, less isolated than the Donegal Gaeltacht: 
R: [Ó] my God, ní hionann Gaoth Dobhair agus Conamara. Tá muid saibhir 
anseo i gcomparáid le muintir Ghaoth Dobhair . . . Tá siad an-scoite amach        
. . . Thabharfá faoi deara é, just níl fosaíocht mar a chéile ann. Ar bhealach is 
mar gheall ar an teorainn tá siad cineál gearrtha amach ón gcathair nádúrtha a 
bhíonn acu i nDoire agus tá siad an-fhada really, tá siad an-fhada ó thuaidh. I’d 
say go bhfuil siadsan buailte níos measa, mar ar laghad i gConamara, is cuma 
cén áit a bhfuil tú i gConamara, tá sé fós indéanta goil Gaillimh. Ach i nDún na 
nGall cá rachfá? 
An ÚnaG executive in Donegal confirmed this belief: 
B: Céard é an deacracht is mó atá agaibh agus sibh ag iarraidh comhlachtaí a 
mhealladh? 
É: Tá seo go hiomlán in éadan achan rud a deirim go poiblí ach, Tír Chonaill! 
B: Sin a shíl mé, iargúltacht? 
É: Iargúltacht. Jesus. Níl traein isteach sa chontae, tá muid scartha amach ón 
sé chontae eile le teorainn . . . Tá tú thuas ansin, tá sé deacair. Tá leathan 
bhanda millteanach tábhachtach fosta agus níl an tseirbhís cheart againn . . . 
Is míorúilt é go minic go bhfaigheann muid daoine isteach. 
Similarly, a businessman from Galway noted that locating his business in the 
Gaeltacht is not an economically sensible thing to do, being instead reflective of his 
personal commitment to the area: “[m]á tá tú ag iarraidh airgead a dhéanamh rachaidh 
tú go áiteachaí ar nós Bleá Cliath, áit go bhfuil daonra. Má tá tú ag iarraidh difríocht a 




The challenges of Gaeltacht peripherality are exacerbated by EU regulations that 
prevent the state from offering higher rates of support to businesses located in remote 
locations (Ó Cuaig, 2018a), an option which had been available to Gaeltarra Éireann, 
ÚnaG’s predecessor, before Ireland joined the EEC in 1973. As one former employee 
of Gaeltarra Éireann told me: 
S: [N]í féidir tuilleadh lucht tionsclaíochta a mhealladh le lonnú i gceantracha 
tuaithe atá scoite amach go mór ón infreastruchtúr, ón gcathair, ón gcoláiste 
agus mar sin de. So níl ag éirí leis an Údarás mórán monarchan a mhealladh 
taobh amuigh de 15 mhíle, 20 ciliméadar ó chathair na Gaillimhe. Agus feicfidh 
tú an rud atá tarlaí’ i nGaoth Dobhair, go bhfuil sé bánaí’ . . . Bhí uair amháin 
ann, abair aimsir Gaeltarra, bhí deontas i bhfad níos fearr le fáil má bhí tú sásta 
lonnú sa nGaeltacht. Bhí . . . Gaeltarra in ann a rá leob “bhuel tá lánfhostaíocht 
sa Spidéal so níl muid sásta tú a chur ansin. Cuirfidh muid siar ar an gCeathrú 
Rua thú nó cuirfidh muid siar i gCarna thú. Tá tú ag fáil deontas breise mar 
gheall air sin”. Agus bhí siad sásta é sin a dhéanamh. Bhuel ní féidir leob 
deontas breise, tá an deontas céanna ar fáil i gCathair na Gaillimhe is atá i 
gCarna . . . Agus deirtear – níl ’s agam an bhfuil sé fíor mar cuirtear an locht ar 
Eoraip faoi go leor rudaí nuair a fheileann sé do lucht eagraíochta agus 
polaiteoirí – ach deirtear gur mar gheall ar rialacha na hEorpa atá sé sin. 
While the facts of geography are obviously immutable, economic development policy 
is not. Although globalisation has often been heralded as seeing the “death of 
distance” due to the capacity of technological innovations to minimise the challenges 
faced by remote areas (Cairncross, 2001; although see also Massey, 2005: 90-103), 
in the absence of policies and resources aimed at providing high-speed internet and 
transport links to such regions, this trend does little to overcome the core-periphery 
dichotomy which is so fundamental to the capitalist model (Wallerstein, 2004). 
As a Galway entrepreneur told me regarding this dearth of infrastructural provision in 
the Gaeltacht: 
B: Tá polasaithe éagsúla an rialtais go láidir ag tabhairt tacaíocht 
d’eacnamaíocht lárnach in áit eacnamaíocht réigiúnach nó imeallacha. Bíodh 
sé go bhfuil siad á dhéanamh sin d’aon ghnó nó bíodh sé nach bhfuil ’s acu 
níos fearr nó píosa den dá rud. But tá sé ag tarlú agus níos measa atá sé ag 
fáil. 
The efforts of institutions such as ÚnaG notwithstanding, this tendency has certainly 
been aggravated by the policies pursued by the state in recent years. The lack of 
adequate internet provision in much of rural Ireland, for instance, is itself a product of 




founding in 1984, the national telecommunications provider Eircom was sold off in 
1999, a move which the Irish Congress of Trade Unions termed “the biggest single 
economic mistake made by an Irish Government – until the disastrous blanket bank 
guarantee of September, 2008” (ICTU, 2011: 1). Eircom has since been acquired by 
a French billionaire who has little incentive to invest in servicing the most remote 
communities, leaving much of the Gaeltacht to endure extremely slow internet which 
makes stimulating economic activity, industrial or otherwise, exceedingly challenging 
(Ó Cuaig, 2018). This poor connectivity also, I was told, disinclines third-level students 
to return home at weekends as they once did (cf. 5.3.3; 5.3.5.1). A 2016 report 
concluded that the Gaeltacht includes some of the worst areas in the country in terms 
of broadband provision (Tuairisc.ie, 2016i). 
The Galway factory owner I interviewed expressed his frustration at this: 
M: [C]heap muid go mbeadh infreastruchtúr maith thart ann . . . Héis 11 bliain 
ann mí ó shin fuair muid an leathan bhanda i gceart. 
B: Stop! 
M: Héis 11 bliain ann. Now dá gceapfadh muid go mbeadh sé mar sin 11 bliain 
ó shin ní chreidfeadh muid é . . . [A]g an am, cheap muide idir 2003 agus 2007 
nó 2008 go raibh an Údarás, go raibh neart maoin ag an Údarás agus go raibh 
siad in ann feabhas a chur ar rudaí. Agus bhí siad in ann agus cabhraigh linn 
agus rudaí mar sin ach . . . [le linn comhrialtas] Fianna Fáil agus na hUainigh, 
na Glasaigh, go mór mhór bhí an gearradh siar ar bhuiséad an Údaráis le 
feiscint agus ní raibh tada le fáil uathub . . . Ní raibh maoiniú ar bith le fáil ón 
Údarás agus bhí sé uilig ag brath ar an gcóras príobháideach. 
In light of the move from industrial manufacturing towards the “knowledge economy” 
discussed above, such infrastructural deficiencies and the profit motive militating 
against their resolution comprise a major challenge for Gaeltacht-based economic 
development. 
The following extract, from an interviewee heavily involved in the private sector in the 
Gaeltacht, describes the impact of the crisis on smaller-scale businesses in rural areas 
more generally: 
B: [N]aoi gcinn as chuile deich gcomhlacht beag a dhún síos idir 2006 agus 
2011 bhí siad lasmuigh de Bhleá Cliath. So bhí tionchar i bhfad níos mó ag an 
gcúlú eacnamaíocht . . . ar cheantrachaí lasmuigh de na príomhchathrachaí. 




eacnamaíochta idir 2006-11, thart ar 90% acub ní raibh oideachas tríú leibhéal 
acub . . . Mar formhór na comhlachtaí beaga tá siad lonnaithe lasmuigh de na 
cathracha móra, is beag comhlachtaí móra atá lonnaithe lasmuigh de na 
cathrachaí . . . Tá thart ar 20% d’eacnamaíocht Shasana lonnaithe timpeall ar 
Londain, London-based. Tá 40% d’eacnamaíocht na hÉireann timpeall ar 
Bhleá Cliath! . . . Agus cuireann sé as dom nuair a chloiseas tú na ESRI reports 
[faoin] méadú 26% ar an GDP, sin bullshit. Ach b’fhéidir méadú 4-5% ar an 
eacnamaíocht, agus tá sé sin fine – tá méadú go b’fhéidir 6-7% i gceantrachaí 
ar nós Bleá Cliath, Gaillimh, cathair na Gaillimhe agus mar sin de. But céard 
faoi Boyle i Ros Comáin? Y’know céard faoi Uachtar Ard? Céard faoi Ghaoth 
Dobhair? Céard faoi Acaill? Céard faoi Ballina fiú atá níos mó ná sin? Fíor, fíor 
bheagán. 
Further to the ideological bias towards privatisation, the state’s relative neglect of rural 
development is reflective of a long-established structural feature of capitalism, with the 
centripetal tendencies and uneven development thereby produced having been well 
demonstrated by sociologists and geographers alike (Lefebvre, 1970; Breathnach, 
1988; Harvey, 2008). Indeed, the suppression of rural life was central to the 
development of early industrial capitalism (Thompson, 1991), with urbanisation 
offering a way for capitalists to overcome “the barriers to continuous capital circulation 
and expansion”, therefore being a strategy for the absorption of surplus product, which 
in turn produces profit, the fundamental goal of capital (D. Harvey, 2012: 5-6). As seen 
in 5.5.1, this tendency towards urbanisation in capitalist economies is a key factor 
driving outmigration from the Gaeltacht, along with the linguistic assimilation such 
migration typically entails (Harrison, 2007: 14; Saarikivi and Marten, 2012: 2). While 
ÚnaG endeavours to promote the economic development of the Gaeltacht, not only is 
it doing so in the face of budgetary cuts and a state economic policy that favours major 
population centres, but in doing so it must also act against capitalism’s fundamental 
tendency towards centralisation. 
Although by 2017 job creation figures for ÚnaG were at their highest point since 2007, 
there was nonetheless much discussion around this time about the persistence of 
widespread structural unemployment in remote Gaeltacht areas (TG4, 2017; Irish 
Times, 2018d; Ó Catháin, 2018). Furthermore, an ÚnaG spokesperson warned that 
Brexit – itself largely a reaction to the 2008 crash and decades of neoliberalism 
(Powell, 2017) – “may well be one of the biggest challenges Gaeltacht companies will 
face in the years ahead” (Irish Times, 2018e). The statement by ÚnaG’s CEO that 




of €154 million, are to the United Kingdom” and that “nearly 60% (€224m) of client 
companies’ raw materials are imported through or from the UK” highlights the scale of 
this potential disruption (Connacht Tribune, 2017). 
5.3.3 The hospitality industry 
Many of my informants commented on the extent to which unemployment and the 
attendant drop in disposable income affected the social life of the communities I 
studied, particularly by reducing the vibrancy of local nightlife. Even before the crash, 
the frequenting of pubs in rural areas was in decline due to factors such as the smoking 
ban introduced in 2004, the increasingly stringent proscription of driving under the 
influence of alcohol and the high rates of tax on alcohol sold in pubs (Cabras and 
Mount, 2015). Like Irish-language media (see 4.2.8), this sector’s difficulties are 
therefore not entirely a consequence of the economic crisis, although the recession 
exacerbated their already challenging circumstances. Pub closures increased 
dramatically during the worst years of the crisis, with over 1,000 closing down 
nationally between 2007-14, reaching a rate of one a day in 2011 (Herald.ie, 2014; 
Thejournal.ie, 2014). A Drinks Industry Group of Ireland submission to an Oireachtas 
committee in 2014 showed that the west of the country was hit much more severely 
by such closures than the area around the capital (DIGI, 2014: 4). Large numbers of 
hotels also closed during the recession, including many built in rural areas due to their 
qualifying developers for tax breaks (Whelan, 2013: 28). Many of these were taken 
over by the National Asset Management Agency (“NAMA”, a state agency founded in 
2009 to take bad loans from property developers). Citing the “commercial sensitivity” 
of the issue, NAMA refused to release data on the number of hotels it was closing (The 
Guardian, 2011). A 2009 report for the Irish Hotels Federation, however, claimed that 
some 15,000 rooms needed to be removed from the market for the industry to remain 
viable (Bacon, 2009), although data as to what extent this eventually occurred are not 
publicly available. 
These closures impacted many Gaeltacht communities, with the loss of such 
establishments being lamented by many of my informants. Pubs in particular have 
long been central to the social life of rural areas where there are few other options for 
night-time socialising, and their loss was thus seen to have left a void in the social 




establishments was intimately linked to that of the construction and industrial sectors 
discussed above: 
L: [N]uair a bhí [an eastát tionsclaíochta] ag dul go maith bhí na hoibrithe ag fáil 
pá as agus an phá sin á caitheamh go háitiúil ar na seirbhísí áitiúil agus sna 
hóstáin, bhíodh daoine ann agus bhíodh siad amuigh oíche Dhéardaoin, oíche 
Aoine, oíche Shathairn agus oíche Dhomhnaigh – agus b’fhéidir even Oíche 
Luain fosta! . . . Bhí an áit chomh beo sin. Agus nach maith go raibh an t-airgead 
acu len é sin a dhéanamh. Bhí an fhostaíocht agus achan rud ag dul go maith! 
So tá an tóin tite as an eastát ansin, níl a dhath ar bith eile le ráit fá dtaobh de. 
The following extract from an interview I conducted in Donegal in 2015 describes the 
extent of hotel closures in the community, there now being one hotel open in an area 
that had six before the crisis: 
H: Shílfeá go bhfuil sé ag fáil níos measa achan bhliain, shílfeá nach raibh an 
rud is measa tagtha [sa gceantar] go fóill but níl ’s agam caidé eile atá le druid. 
I mean i mbliana nuair a dhruid Óstán Ghaoth Dobhair síos, bhuel dhruid Óstán 
Ghaoth Dobhair anuraidh. And then dhruid Seaview síos. I mean sin ceann eile, 
an teach is mó a bhí ag goil . . . Bhuel tá ceithre nó cúig teach ósta atá druidte 
le blianta, tá sin rud iontach like. And then dhruid Óstán Ghaoth Dobhair . . . 
druideadh Seaview, tá Tí Joe druidte le blianta, tá Dodge druidte. Y’know an 
teach a ba ghráth le daoine bheith ábalta fanacht ann. Níl óstán amháin fágtha. 
Ó! Na Foreland Heights, y’know – druidte fosta. Agus an t-am is measa nach 
raibh airgead sa tír, roimh an boom, bhfuil ’s agat, bhí an dá theach sin ag goil 
agus ag goil go láidir, y’know. Agus just cuireann sé isteach ar meon daoine      
. . . But jeepers, tá buailte go holc. Dá dtarlódh sé 4-5 bliain ó shin, but the fact 
that tá sé still ag tarlú – Seaview just i ndiaidh druid i mbliana like. Agus tá ’s 
agat féin nuair atá níos mó áiteanna foscailte tá níos mó daoine ag tarraingt 
isteach ann. Bhuel níl áit ar bith le fanacht anois ach teach Campbell, y’know 
níl óstán ar bith . . . Tá sin fiánta. 
 An employee of ÚnaG discussed the linguistic implications of such closures: 
B: [N]uair a dúnadh na hóstáin agus an t-infreastruchtúr sin uilig, ar chuir sé sin 
isteach ar an... 
É: Teanga? 
B: Sea. 
É: Chuir. Because sin na daoine uilig ag obair san áit, cuid iníonacha s’acu, 
cuid mac s’acu, bhí siad ag fáil jabannaí samhraidh ann. D’obair mé féin cúig 
bliana i gceann de na rudaí sin, ní raibh an nduine le Béarla. Sin go háirithe 





Another interviewee made a similar comment, referring to one of these closed hotels 
in particular, an imposing building which overlooks much of the surrounding 
community and now lies in a very visible state of dereliction: 
C: [B]hí an óstán sin beo beithíoch ar feadh tamaill agus bhíodh go leor 
cleamhnais déanta ann, deirtear, agus gur casadh daoine óga ar a chéile agus 
tá cúpla áit eile mar é ann. Agus castar ar a chéile iad istigh i Leitir Ceanainn 
[anois] agus b’fhéidir nach gcastar dhá Ghaeilgeoir ar a chéile . . . Tá briseadh 
síos ó thaobh cúrsaí teangeolaíoch ann. 
A local parent corroborated this sentiment, noting that such closures have led to his 
teenage daughter socialising outside the Gaeltacht in a way that had not previously 
been necessary: 
É: Tá iníon agamsa atá 17 bliain d’aois, caithfidh sí dul go Leitir Ceanainn chuig 
dioscó. Bhí muidinne ag dul síos an bealach chuig dioscó . . . bhí tú ag bualadh 
le daoine eile le Gaeilge. Bhí tú ag iarraidh a bheith sa cheantar, bhí sé maith 
le dul amach sa cheantar. 
A similar pattern pertains to those who have finished their schooling locally and are 
now at university, with not only the lack of broadband or summer jobs (see 5.3.2; 
5.3.5.1), but also the lack of opportunities to socialise reducing their inclination to 
return home during weekends or holidays. An interviewee from Donegal who divides 
his time between his home community and working in Dublin explained this as follows: 
C: [N]í théann daoine amach ar scor ar bith, ‘sé a mhalairt a bhí ann [le linn an 
Tíogair]. Bhí achan duine amuigh, go háirid ag deireadh na seachtaine. Bheadh 
na tithe leanna lán, nó lán go maith, cuid acu iontach lán. But tá sin ar shiúil. 
So níl beocht sóisialta ann. Na daoine óga, y’see tá cineál, sílim gur fáinne fí a 
bheireann siad air, na daoine óga, b’fhéidir go gcasfaí orm duine atá i mBaile 
Átha Cliath ar an choláiste. Agus bím ag ráit “an mbíonn tú [sa mbaile] go 
minic?” is déarfaidh siad leat níl mórán dúil acu i ndul abhaile mar nuair a 
théann siad abhaile fá choinne an deireadh seachtaine níl áit ar bith le goil 
amach aige. So b’fhearr leo ag deireadh na seachtaine a bheith i mBaile Átha 
Cliath nó cibé áit a bhfuil siad. So ní hamháin gur díbríodh ar shiúil iad, seo 
daoine óga atá ag obair fosta, gur díbríodh ar shiúil iad . . . Ach ansin a mhalairt 
– cionn is go bhfuil sé mar sin níl daoine ag iarraidh teacht ar ais [chuig a 
bpobail dhúchais], daoine óga go háiride. Ní raibh sé riamh mar sin, go dtí 
ceithre nó cúig bliana [ó shin]. 
While the tendency of rural pub closures to increase instances of social isolation 
amongst older people has been well documented (Cabras and Mount, 2017), it is clear 
that within the Gaeltacht such closures also have linguistic consequences, particularly 




have a significant impact on the language’s future. As the developer of the “Index of 
Isolation” which aims to address “the probability that a Welsh speaker will meet 
another speaker locally” points out 
when considering language transmission . . . the most important group of two 
is the two parents forming a family. These are usually comparatively young 
people. The most important spatial distributions, or networks, in that respect 
are those of young people (Jones, 2007: 28). 
The loss of much of the social infrastructure key to maintaining such networks due to 
the recession is thus far from conducive to Irish-language maintenance. 
5.3.4 Criticisms of the Foreign Direct Investment model 
As Kirby and Murphy explain, the neoliberal character of the Irish “competition state” 
sees its policies favour the requirements of international capital “over the needs of its 
own citizens”, with the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) model on which the Irish 
economy is based providing a clear example of this trend (2011: 21). While ÚnaG has 
been relatively successful at attracting enterprise to the Gaeltacht since its 
establishment (Walsh, 2011a: 310), the FDI approach they use was the subject of 
sharp criticism amongst many of my interviewees. Criticisms of the type of work made 
available through such investment and the attitude of client companies to the 
Gaeltacht were particularly common. 
Ireland’s comparatively low wages have been a key selling point through which the 
state has marketed the country to international capital for many decades (O’Toole, 
2010: 16), and high rates of unemployment in the Gaeltacht have typically ensured 
that a large pool of low-cost labour is available therein. This, in combination with the 
reduction in union density that Ireland has seen in recent decades (McDonough, 2010: 
452), means that a key attraction of the Gaeltacht to investors is the submissive nature 
of its workforce, with workers not only unlikely to be unionised, but also rarely having 
other employment options available. Indeed, several ÚnaG employees told me that 
they explicitly promote the Gaeltacht on this basis, as seen in these quotes: 
R: [T]á muidinne ag iomaíocht le ceantracha eile b’fhéidir in Albain nó i mór 
roinn na hEorpa nó cibé. So féachfaidh muid le cuir ina luí orthu go bhfuil fórsa 
oibre oilte ar fáil, gur ceantar taitneamhach é le do gró a dhéanamh, go bhfuil 




É: Ní hionann é agus daoine atá ag obair in déantúsaíocht i mBaile Átha Cliath 
atá ábalta dul isteach agus amach as post. Oibríonn daoine go hiontach maith 
anseo. 
In light of the impression such sentiments give, it is unsurprising that companies tend 
to make only limited efforts at language promotion, knowing that ÚnaG is unable to be 
overly assertive in insisting on the use of Irish by client companies. This issue was a 
common cause of complaint amongst interviewees, who frequently claimed that 
ÚnaG’s emphasis on employment creation did not pay sufficient heed to linguistic 
concerns. One interviewee from Galway told me that ÚnaG-supported factories in the 
area are often staffed by people who commute from outside the Gaeltacht:  
B: An bhfuil mórán ag teacht isteach ó Ghaillimh nó ón nGalltacht? 
N: An tríú cuid. Sin iad figiúirí an Údaráis iad féin . . . Deir siad nach bhfuil aon 
ról acu sa bpróiséas earcaíochta maidir leis na comhlachtaí seo. Is dóigh liom 
go mbreathnaíonn siad orthu féin mar IDA na Gaeltachta, agus go bhfuil siad 
in iomaíocht leis an IDA le postannaí a chruthú agus an slat tomhais atá acu ná 
cé mhéad post atá cruthaithe acu. Tá teanga agus cultúr i bhfad níos ísle ar 
liosta tosaíochtaí atá acub. 
This same interviewee also noted the potential for client companies operating through 
English to establish a pattern of speaking English amongst Irish speakers, particularly 
couples who first meet in the work place: 
N: B’fhéidir go ndéantar neamhaird freisin ar na himpleachtaí teangeolaíoch a 
bhaineann [le nósmhaireacht teanga i monarcha]. Mar go minic is san ionad 
oibre a thosaíonn fir agus mná ag siúl amach, nó fir agus fir ag siúl amach le 
chéile, nó mná agus mná! So tá impleachtaí aige sin, níl atmaisféar Gaelach i 
go leor de na monarchan. 
A woman formerly employed by a multinational corporation in Donegal – which has 
since relocated to the developing world – did indeed state that her workplace was 
dominated by English. Furthermore, in the absence of a workplace language policy 
favouring Irish, even fluent Irish speakers defaulted to English with co-workers not 
previously known to them, as speakers of minoritised languages typically do when 
meeting strangers: 
M: [N]a bainisteoirí uilig a bhí ann is Béarla a bhí acu. Ní raibh iarracht ar bith, 
muna raibh aithne agat ar an duine roimhe, bhí duine amháin ann agus bhí 
Gaeilg aige agus labhair mé Gaeilg leis, ach aríst, má bhí tú istigh ag cruinnithe 
Béarla a bhí sa...Daoine as an nGaeltacht a bhí ag obair san áit ach bhí daoine 




cáilíochtaí arda acu ó thaobh déileáil le caighdeán, déileáil le innealtóireacht 
agus stuif mar sin, chan daoine le Gaeilg a bhí acu. Ach bhí daoine [as bailte 
Gaeltachta eile] ag teacht isteach, b'fhéidir go raibh Gaeilg acu ach níor labhair 
siad é. Agus aríst, tá ’s agat an rud a bhí ann, má chastar strainséar ort 
labhróidh tú Béarla leo. 
Walsh (2011a: 317-35) similarly observes the resistance of client companies to Irish-
language promotion measures, with them seemingly being seen as an impediment to 
commercial success. Nonetheless, Walsh also details ÚnaG’s attempts at adopting a 
more language-focused policy direction in 2005. On the basis of my interviews, 
conducted a decade after this supposed re-orientation, it would appear that the effects 
of their reformed approach are not apparent to many Gaeltacht residents, however. 
Another interviewee, a man in his mid-20s from Donegal, was particularly frustrated 
that ÚnaG, in his estimation, funds businesses which function entirely through English 
but adopt Irish-language names to qualify for grants: 
F: [T]á fadhb millteanach in Údarás mar má úsáideann tú ainm Gaeilge ar do 
ghnó gheobhann tú deontas. 
B: Díreach má tá an t-ainm i nGaeilge? 
F: Sin é like. But níl tú ag déanamh fuck all le focal amháin isteach sa fuckin, I 
dunno, eiceolaíocht Gaeilge . . . Tá siad just ag úsáid mar uirlis fuckin airgead, 
bhfuil ’s agat. So nuair a amhancaim féin ar rudaí mar sin tá mé just a ráit liom 
féin “what the fuck?” . . . Like ba chóir daofa airgead Gaeilge a úsáid mar is 
ceart . . . Sin an fuckin fadhb atá ann . . . Tá an tÚdarás ag déanamh lear rudaí 
maith, right, lear rudaí maith. But shílim go bhfuil pollaí ann, y’know, pollaí 
fuckin bómánta . . . Like bhfuil tú ag iarraidh é a úsáid mar fuckin, just é a 
exploiteáil basically? Fuck off. 
Although perhaps overstated, such cynicism towards many ÚnaG developments was 
certainly a common theme during my fieldwork. Indeed, another interviewee from the 
same area commented that even the symbolic use of Irish was something adopted by 
a company she worked for only when they were forced to do so: 
M: [I]s cuimhin liom gur chuir siad comhartha mór amuigh ar an bhóthar agus 
bhí sé i mBéarla agus caithfidh go raibh gearrán inteacht déanta, b’fhéidir gur 
an Údarás iad féin a bhí ag gearrán, agus b’éigean daofa goil amach agus sin 
a athrú agus Gaeilg a chur air. Ach aríst, tá ’s agat, ní raibh an meon sin ann 
ar char ar bith, tá ’s agat, ó caithfidh muid é a dhéanamh i nGaeilg ar tús. Cha 
raibh riamh an meon sin ann. Agus . . . rudaí a bheifeá ag déanamh go deonach 




acu sa Ghaeilg [chun an teanga a chur chun cinn san áit] go haonarach, ní 
raibh tacaíocht ar bith ann dáiríre. 
Several interviewees did, however, acknowledge there had been a chronic need for 
employment in Gaeltacht areas before the FDI strategy had helped overcome this 
dearth, and in this regard ÚnaG’s efforts were to be welcomed: 
P: [A]r bhealach amháin rud iontach maith a bhí ann. Bhí sé ag coinneáil daoine 
sa bhaile, bhí fostaíocht cruthaithe sa bhaile agus bhí go leor daoine ábalta 
fanacht sa bhaile, daoine a raibh Gaeilg acu ar ndóiche, rud a bhí iontach, 
iontach maith. Bhí sé iontach tábhachtach agus riachtanach go ndéanfaí a 
leithéid. Ach . . . don chéad uair bhí cuid mhór daoine in san cheantar nár 
labhair Gaeilg . . . So bhí athrú an-mhór sóisialta ansin ó thaobh cúrsaí teangan 
. . . Sin an míbhuntáiste a bhain leis an fhostaíocht sin a chruthú . . . Tá ceist le 
cur ansin an raibh sé níos diúltaí ná níos dearfaí. 
When asked whether the increased pressures of creating employment post-2008 led 
them to be more lenient in terms of accepting companies regardless of the linguistic 
implications, an ÚnaG employee told me that this was not the case: 
É: Ní dhéanann sé difear ar bith . . . Scéal céanna é . . . achan chomhlacht a 
thagann isteach tá coinníollacha ann. Dúirt fear . . . “we’re not desperate”. We 
are but ní dhéanann muid sin. No, ní dheanann sé difear ar bith. 
He then proceeded to defend the agency’s job creation strategy by comparing a 
Gaeltacht area in Donegal that had been industrialised to one that had not: 
É: Tá daoine atá den bharúil, a mh’anam, go bhfuil cuid mhór comhlachtaí 
anseo a rinne dochar don teanga. Ní chreidimse sin agus níor chreid a riamh. 
An bun rud atá a dhíobháil ort ná cuid mhór fostaíochta le pobal a bheith agat, 
le dlús daonra a bheith agat, le pobal a bheith agat in áit a bhfuil an teanga 
muiníneach agus dóchasach inti féin. Sin an rud is tábhachtaí. Agus má 
amharcann tú ar an dóigh a mhair an teanga i dTír Chonaill, mhair an teanga, 
seo an áit, tá tú i do shuí san áit is mó a bhfuil teanga na Gaeilg á labhairt taobh 
amuigh de cheantar uirbeach in Éirinn, má amhancann tú ar dhaonáireamh 
2011. Cad tuige? Amhanc amach an fhuinneog! Mar tá an oiread daoine ann. 
Agus má amhancann tú ar cheantar anois cosúil le Fánaid áit a bhfuil an teanga 
anois íseal, an imirce a bhí ansin bhí sé buan, níor tháinig siad ar ais . . . Mar 
ní raibh na jabanna. Ní raibh a dhath ar bith le teacht aríst. Sin an dúshraith, an 
dúshraith eacnamaíochta – iontach tábhachtach le pobal mairstinn. 
While certainly valid points, it is nonetheless lamentable that this economic foundation 
was not developed in tandem with more forceful language policies. 
In contrast with the alleged loyalty of the workforce to ÚnaG’s client companies which 




Gaeltacht was another source of much frustration amongst many of my interviewees, 
as seen in the following quote from an interviewee in Donegal: 
M: [S]eo an rud a tharlaíonn – labhrann tú leis an IDA, aimsíonn siad sin 
comhlacht duit, labhrann tú leis an chomhlacht, tairgíonn tú margadh daofa, 
glacann siad leis an margadh, tagann siad, imíonn siad, back to square one – 
labhrann tú leis an IDA. Ní chreideann siad i bpobal na Gaeltachta, níl muinín 
ar bith acu as pobal na Gaeltachta. Dá mbeadh siad ag iarraidh rud neacht, 
difear buan a dhéanamh . . . níl sé sin goil a dhéanamh difear ar bith. In fact 
creidimse go bhfuil sé ag déanamh dochar mar tá sé ag bualadh seo aríst i 
gcloigne daoine, más mian leat jab a fháil caithfidh tú Béarla a bheith agat. “Seo 
na daoine, tá siad ag déanamh gar mór dhúinn ag teacht as Holland, nó 
Uzbekistan agus tá siad ag cur monarchan anseo agus ag cruthú fostaíochta. 
Now ná bígí ag déanamh rudaí amaideacha cosúil le bheith ag iarraidh Gaeilge 
a labhairt nó goil isteach i gceardchumainn, tá ’s againn céard a tharlós, 
imeoidh siad!” But tá ’s againne céard a tharlós anyway – imeoidh siad! Seo an 
dearcadh atá ag an Údarás, agus ní dearcadh ar bith é! 
When asked why he felt this model persisted, this interviewee – who was unusually 
informed politically – went on to explicitly mention neoliberalism, one of very few 
instances in my corpus of an interviewee doing so: 
M: Sin an nualiobrálachas. Neoliberalism, déanann sé sin do dhaoine. Má deir 
tú rud ar bith nach bhfuil ag cloí leis an nualiobrálachas tá tú as do mheabhair. 
Tá! . . . Tá sé anois chomh lonnaithe sin in sna daoine seo nach bhfuil rud ar 
bith, nach bhfuil féidearthacht ar bith eile ann ach neoliberalism. Gurb shin an 
t-aon dóigh le dul chun tosaigh sa saol. Agus bréag atá ann! Bréag atá ann ó 
thús go deireadh! Go dtig leat achan rud in san tsaol a bhriseadh síos go dtí 
bocsaí, bocsaí beaga istigh in spreadsheet agus luach a chur ar achan cheann. 
Agus ag deireadh an spreadsheet má tá positive value ann is fiú é, má tá 
negative value ann ní fiú é so déan ar shiúil leis. Ní mar sin atá an saol. Like tá 
an saol bunaithe ar phobail, society... 
While not generally so developed, similar opinions were widespread amongst my 
interviewees, with a young man from a neighbouring area in Donegal stating: “[n]í 
bhíonn riamh long-term ann. Ní chaitheann an gnó commitment a dhéanamh don áit, 
don cheantar, don pobal”. 
Furthermore, the type of industries that the FDI model most frequently succeeds in 
attracting often offer relatively poor-quality positions, as well as often being 
problematic from a language planning perspective. While there are certainly important 
exceptions to this trend, the opening of a call centre during the research of this thesis 
was illustrative of the type of development which many of my informants found 




company was to create 125 jobs in the Donegal industrial estate described above 
(Údarás na Gaeltachta, 2016c). In terms of creating employment in a community which 
had been hit hard by job losses in previous years, such a development was 
undoubtedly most welcome. Nonetheless, the work in question presented major 
challenges in terms of language policy. As has been observed elsewhere, it is difficult 
to imagine a more inappropriate industry to locate in such a linguistically sensitive area 
than one that quite literally pays people to speak English all day (Walsh, 2011a: 319). 
Furthermore, adhering to the tendency of such companies to lack any long-term 
interest in the Gaeltacht, in December 2017 – after just 18 months in operation – this 
same call-centre announced it was closing immediately, leading to the loss of the 30 
jobs it provided (RTÉ, 2017), which was itself less than 25% of the total they originally 
promised to create. 
As one interviewee, who had himself worked in another call centre in the same area 
quipped: “[t]á go leor de na call centres againn, níl ’s agam caidé an focal Gaeilg fá 
choinne an fhocal “call centre” ach bheinn níos sásta ag smaoineamh nach raibh focal 
againn ar an obair sin!” In line with this sentiment, these positions are very often of low 
prestige, with few parents I talked to wanting their children to take up work in such 
establishments upon finishing their education. On several occasions I observed that 
even the most language-conscious of parents have somewhat of a blind spot 
regarding their own children when it comes to employment and maintaining the 
population of their communities. One woman, a diligent Irish speaker who I have often 
heard complain about how few of those activists who are highly committed to the 
language in urban contexts see fit to relocate to the Gaeltacht, told me during a 
conversation about her young adult children “[b]’fhearr liom muna mbeadh siad fágtha 
thiar ar an [oileán] sin”. She then stated that they are better off in the cities due to the 
greater opportunities available there, and was apparently surprised when I brought up 
the linguistic implications of such migration. Another man, a former member of the 
Gaeltacht Civil Rights Movement who has been very involved in efforts to promote the 
vitality of his community, commented as follows in reference to his own children: 
D: [A]g cuimriú ar na gasúir sin a’m féin, níor mhaith liomsa dá mba thiar sa 
mbaile a gcaithfidís a n-óige ar fad. Chuaigh siad isteach go Gaillimh, chonaic 
siad rudaí eile, chas siad leis an bpobal a bhí istigh ann agus as contaetha eile 





Such attitudes highlight the depth of the economic challenges faced by the Gaeltacht, 
with even those parents most committed to the language not wishing to see their 
children involved in the type of employment that FDI has been most successful at 
creating. With the contrast between the “opportunity deprivation” (Haase and 
Pratschke, 2017b: 7) of the Gaeltacht and the aspirations now held by many young 
people and their parents being so great, the maintenance of vibrant Irish-speaking 
populations becomes increasingly challenging. This is likely to be especially true with 
regard to retaining populations which include the ambitious and socially mobile, who, 
as Holmes notes (2013: 61), are very often the first section of a community to shift to 
the dominant language as they integrate into the wider economy. Those who pursue 
higher education – an ever-increasing number of school leavers (Department of 
Education and Skills, 2015) – are even less likely to want to take up precarious, low-
paid positions, a fact not lost on parents such as those just quoted. It is worth noting, 
however, that it may be that the very class background which makes parents such as 
those quoted above more likely to be interested in language promotion (cf. Wright, 
1996: 43) also inclines them to have aspirations for their children which necessarily 
entail them leaving the Gaeltacht. Their opinions may therefore not be wholly 
representative of the wider Gaeltacht population. 
Suggesting intentions of adopting an approach not so dependent on FDI, in 2014 
ÚnaG published a development plan specifically aimed at restoring employment to the 
Donegal Gaeltacht in which they recognised 
go gcaithfear éiceachóras a fhorbairt le go bhféadfaidh fir agus mná áitiúla a 
ngnóthaí féin a bhunú ina bpobal agus go gcaithfidh comhlachtaí stáit tacú leis 
na daoine sin ina gcuid iarrachtaí trí thacaíochtaí cuí a chur ar fáil, cinn 
airgeadais agus neamhairgeadais araon, ar mhaithe le fiontraithe a bheith 
sásta dul sa seans lena ngnó féin a bhunú (Údarás na Gaeltachta, 2014: 18-
9). 
Despite these intentions, several of my interviewees in the area reported that they had 
received no such support for their plans to set up a co-operative initiative in an ÚnaG-
owned building. As one of those involved in this proposed scheme explained 
L: [C]honaic muid an easpa seort leapacha sa cheantar agus ag ráit, bhuel, 
caidé a thiocfadh linne a dhéanamh agus bhí muid ag amharc ar cheann de na 
seanmhonarchana . . . agus tá muid i mbun cainteanna leis an Údarás go 
bhfeicfeadh muid an bhfuil muid ábalta an foirgneamh a fháil, tá muid ag 




daoine ag foghlaim na Gaeilg agus b'fhéidir go dtiocfadh linn, go mbeadh sé 
forbartha go sásúil agus go caighdeán sásúil, áit a dtiocfadh le daoine stopadh, 
áit a mbeadh seomraí leapa nó cibé rud é agus . . . áit a dtiocfadh le campers 
stopadh agus luchtú suas ann. Agus ansin dá mbeadh ranganna Gaeilg agus 
gurb é sórt áit a bheadh ann a dtiocfadh le daoine teacht ag fáil eispéaras ar 
shaol na Gaeltachta. 
Being both explicitly language-focused and attempting to counteract the dearth of 
accommodation for tourists resulting from the closure of local hotels (see 5.3.3), such 
a project would appear most suitable for the area. There was a clear perception 
amongst several of my interviewees that ÚnaG’s strategy of job creation via the 
attraction of FDI has led to a bias against such local groups, however, with another 
interviewee involved in this plan expressing his immense dissatisfaction with ÚnaG’s 
attitude towards their efforts as follows: 
M: [T]á muid ag dul dhó le seacht mí, ocht mí. Agus coicís ó shin a fuair muid 
drawings den mhonarchan atá muid ag iarraidh seilbh a ghlacadh air. Sin ocht 
mí. Dá mbeadh Johann Klegg an t-ainm a bhí orm agus mé aniar as fuckin 
Antwerp ag rá gur mhaith liom teacht agus go gcruthóinn fostaíocht do 25 duine 
agus . . . go bhfaca mé an monarchan seo but look ba mhaith liom cruinniú a 
bheith agam libh Dé Máirt agus an dtiocfadh libh drawings a bheith agaibh ag 
an chruinniú, bheadh na drawings, bheadh siad seolta i ríomhphost ar maidin. 
Mar tá sé taobh istigh den líne bheag – “right seo é, we’ve got him, déan achan 
rud le cinntiú go bhfuil sin ann”. Má tá dream as an cheantar ag iarraidh rud a 
thoiseacht in sa cheantar, níl suim acu ann. Cuirfidh siad achan bhac os do 
chomhair . . . [T]á an monarchan sin ina luí folamh le cúig bliana, gan an nduine 
ag léiriú suime ar bith in san fhoirgneamh agus go tobann nuair a thosaíonn 
muidinne ag goil ag cruinnithe achan lá, go tobann tá an tÚdarás ag rá go bhfuil 
suim ag comhlacht ann . . . Fair plé daoibh but tá trí mhonarchan folamh [sa 
gceantar], tá monarchan folamh [i gceantar cóngarach eile], níl ’s agam cé 
mhéad [san eastát tionsclaíoch], bog isteach ansin! . . . Like b’fhéidir go bhfuil 
mé just éadóchasach faoi láthair, ach i rith an bhealaigh ó thosaigh muid ní 
bhfuair muid ariamh an mothú tá siad seo linn, tá siad ag tacú linn, tá siad, 
creideann siad gur féidir linn rud neacht a dhéanamh. Agus ní hé gur scaifte 
fuckin lunatics atá ag goil dhó seo – tá sagart ar an choiste, tá bean atá i 
gceannas ar choiste ionad pobail . . . Tá daoine anseo atá ag obair ar son an 
phobail agus a dtuigeann go dtig linn fostaíocht a chruthú a bheadh i nGaeilg 
amháin, a bheadh chun leas an phobail, a bheadh ag cruthú fostaíochta do 
dhaoine óga agus a bheadh ag dírigh ar riachtanais turasóireachta. Nuair atá 
na hóstáin uilig char a bheith druidte tá muidinne ag caint ar lóistín a chur ar fáil 
. . . áit fá choinne camper vans, cúrsaí a reáchtáil do thuismitheoirí 
Gaelscoilteacha. Agus bheadh seo uilig ag tarlú istigh i lár na Gaeltachta . . . 
agus tá siad ag cur achan fuckin bhac os ár gcomhair. 
Although the experience of this group seems to belie ÚnaG’s claims to be supportive 




industrial estate, an ÚnaG executive insisted that not only had they always supported 
smaller-scale indigenous enterprises, but that such companies had become even 
more important in light of the recent deindustrialisation of the area: 
É: Tá níos mó comhlachtaí dúchasach againn. Agus sin an treo is dóiche a 
bhfuil muid ag goil. Mar a deir an Béarla tá muid in denial le fada. Is dóiche 
nuair a [dhún na monarchana móra] go tubaisteach ansin . . . bíonn go leor 
daoine ag fanacht leis le teacht ar ais . . . cosúil leis an ghual sa Bhreatain 
Bheag . . . Níl sé ag teacht ar ais. [Ach] tá daoine chomh nimhneach amuigh 
sa phobal faoi nach bhfuil tú ag iarraidh é a rá. But tá an t-am é a rá agus tá an 
t-am a bheith ionraic. 
B: An rud maith é go bhfuil tuilleadh comhlachtaí Éireannacha ann anois? 
É: Bhí siad i gcónaí ann. See bhí an miotas seo ann fá Údarás na Gaeltachta 
nach raibh suim againn ach i gcomhlachtaí móra. Ag an am sin bhí 84% dár 
gcuid comhlachtaí dúchasach agus ní raibh ach duine go dtí cúigear fostai’ 
iontu. Bhí sé sin i gcónaí againn. 
Despite, then, the many criticisms made by my informants and the numerous 
challenges they face, ÚnaG does attract enterprise and generate employment on both 
a small and large scale which would not exist in the Gaeltacht without their support. 
Indeed, the factory owner whom I interviewed was adamant that ÚnaG was 
responsible for his own business being located in the Gaeltacht: 
M: [C]aithfear a rá nach mbeadh mórán fostaíocht tionscail i ndeisceart 
Chonamara murach Údarás na Gaeltachta . . . Níl dabht ar bith agam faoi sin. 
Agus déarfainn freisin nach mbeadh [siadsan lonnaithe san áit a bhfuil siad] 
murach Údarás na Gaeltachta. Gan aon dabht. 
ÚnaG’s approach to economic development has thus clearly been successful in 
creating employment and attracting investment that would otherwise not exist. The 
industries it attracts, however, often leave the Gaeltacht after a short period, and are 
generally unsupportive of Irish-language use, if not outright Anglicising in their effects. 
This leads to the common – if contestable – belief amongst my interviewees that ÚnaG 
offers less support to language vitality than such a specifically Gaeltacht-focused 




5.3.5 Further implications of the decline in employment 
opportunities 
5.3.5.1 Summer work for students 
As noted in 5.3.3, in both Donegal and the more westerly parts of Galway I was told 
that reduced employment opportunities meant that young adults studying in university 
no longer had a ready source of summer employment in their home communities, 
which many interviewees told me was customary before the crash: 
S: Gabh thuas, cúpla mí obair, agus ansin bhí an t-airgead agam le teacht ar 
ais go dtí an ollscoil. Agus an cíos a íoc nó cibé eile . . . Bhí sé iontach 
tábhachtach. Bhí go leor mic léinn ag obair ann. Agus anois níl sin ann ar char 
ar bith agus níl ’s agam caidé an dóigh atá ag tuismitheoirí . . . páistí s’acu a 
chur [chuig an ollscoil]. 
Prior to 2008 it was primarily those who had already graduated who were unlikely to 
return home for work. With such summer employment not being available to students 
during the recession, however, those who succeeded in getting seasonal jobs where 
they were studying or elsewhere outside their home communities had their 
connections to the Gaeltacht weakened even earlier than was previously the case. As 
with the unappealing social life discussed in 5.3.3 and the tendency for emigrants to 
break their link with the language discussed in 5.5.1, this decline in summer 
employment has thus contributed to the loss of a key demographic in the Gaeltacht. 
5.3.5.2 Community pride 
In November 2017 it was reported that of the 516 buildings ÚnaG owns, 106 were 
empty, with 81 of these having been vacated during the previous decade (Tuairisc.ie, 
2017m). 45 such units were in Donegal, where these “white elephants” – as radical 
architect Brian Anson warned of in his unimplemented Donegal Gaeltacht 
Development Plan (1982) – stand alongside the abandoned pubs and hotels described 
above, providing a very visible illustration of the effects of the recession on the 
community. As an interviewee in Donegal stated 
C: Má théann tú [thart] an ceantar seo timpeall, tá an oiread áiteachaí dúnta 
suas le feiceáil. Níl ann ach áit amháin i ndiaidh áit eile . . . Tá sé an-uaigneach 
ag breathnú agus . . . ní chuidíonn sé le beocht a chur in áit ar bith. 
Similar to the closures discussed in 5.3.3, this lack of social vitality makes the area 




explicitly told me that such dereliction has had a detrimental impact on community 
pride, as this quote from a language planner working in Donegal explains: 
D: [T]iomáin tríd [an baile ina mbíonn sé ag obair] agus tá dromchla uafásach 
ar an mbóthar  . . . Tá níl ‘s agam cén céatadán ach tá céatadán maith de na 
foirgnimh dúnta, le adhmaid ar na fuinneogaí . . . Tá tú in ann a fheiceáil gur 
druideadh iad, abraimis, taobh istigh de chúig nó b'fhéidir seacht mbliana 
anuas, bhfuil ’s agat. Déanann sin dochar do mhuinín an phobail agus do bhród 
an phobail. Bhfuil ’s agat ní baile mór atá ann agus leath de na foirgnimh sin 
dúnta  . . . Dá mba rud é go raibh mé in ann spreagadh a dhéanamh agus bród 
na ndaoine a ardú, sin freagra na ceiste. Má tá tú in ann bród na ndaoine – 
agus tá sé chomh simplí ach níl an réiteach simplí – bród na ndaoine a ardú. 
Ach arís ní, níl an teanga, níl réiteach na faidhbe cineál . . . in a bubble féin 
ansin. Tá daoine ag siúl na sráide, téann siad isteach i gcomhair 
siopadóireacht, feiceann siad leath den bhaile dúnta. Sin, déanann sin dochar. 
Agus spreagann sé sin, is fáinne fí atá ann, spreagann sé an seanadhearcadh 
den Ghaeilge, teanga an bhochtanais . . . Tá sé difriúil do dhaoine sa poblacht 
lasmuigh den Ghaeltacht . . . ach má chloiseann an páiste seanathair ag rá go 
bhfuil nasc idir an Ghaeilge agus an bochtanas agus ansin nuair a fheiceann 
an duine óg suíomh an bhaile . . . Istigh ansin san eastát tionsclaíochta like 
scoth na háiseanna, na n-áiseanna, atá ann, ach – folamh. Y’know? Níl ’s agam 
cén céatadán atá líonta ach ní mórán é. Níl daoine óga na linne seo tiubh, tá 
siad níos ciallmhara ná a bhí siad riamh, is dócha an ghlúin is ciallmhara ag an 
aois seo. Feiceann siad an stuif seo agus déanann siad na nascanna idir 
fíorscéal an bhaile agus an teanga atá ceaptha le bheith anseo. 
Dorian has similarly pointed out that community self-confidence is key for 
“withstand[ing] pressures for ancestral language abandonment”. Citing the cases of 
Wales and Catalonia in evidence, she claims that economic prosperity leads to the 
development of a middle class with the “social self-confidence to insist on traditional 
identity and heritage”, although also notes that this is precisely the sort of self-
confidence which minoritised language communities typically lack (1999: 12-3; see 
also Walsh, 2011a: 111-55). Having been impoverished and marginalised for so many 
years, such confidence levels were likely quite low in much of the Gaeltacht even pre-
2008, with this possibly being one reason why entrepreneurship remained so 
uncommon in these areas even when the national economy was growing rapidly (Ní 
Bhrádaigh, 2007). In line with the opinions of the interviewee quoted above, however, 
it would seem probable that the decline in material prosperity experienced post-2008 
further damaged the “social self-confidence” of those living in such communities, as 
well as their loyalty to the language. Section 5.4.4 offers evidence of this in the 




community dissent throughout the crisis has also contributed to this general sense of 
disempowerment. 
5.4 Tourism 
As Nelde et al. (1996: 8) have observed, many of the peripheral areas across Europe 
which are home to minoritised language communities depend heavily on tourism, a 
tendency which much of the Gaeltacht follows. This is part of a wider pattern which 
has seen tourism developed as a key industry throughout Ireland, with it being 
described as “the single most important industry in the west of Ireland” in recent 
academic literature (Anderson et el., 2015: 78). 
Although tourist numbers fell significantly post-2008 – by 18% in 2010 alone 
(Callaghan, 2013: 106) – by 2015 the sector was growing again, with total revenue 
from tourism for the year amounting to €7.7 billion. The CSO stated that 139,000 
people – 7.1% of the national workforce – were employed directly in “accommodation 
and food service activities”, although this percentage is much higher in some areas 
than others, particularly in Dublin. Fáilte Ireland, the national tourist board, claimed 
that in total 220,000 were employed in tourism in 2015 (Fáilte Ireland, 2016a). Hoping 
to expand on this market, one of the five pillars of the government’s recent Action Plan 
for Rural Development is “maximising rural tourism” (Government of Ireland, 2017b: 
39). One “key deliverable” of this plan is to increase overseas visitors by 12% between 
2017-20 (Government of Ireland, 2017b: 2), as too was the action point “to develop a 
Tourism Investment and Development Strategy for the Gaeltacht” during quarter one 
of 2017 (Government of Ireland, 2017b: 42). As of summer 2018, however, no such 
strategy had been forthcoming. 
Despite being a key industry in the Gaeltacht, as Herbert points out, the experience of 
the Celtic languages in general with tourism has historically been a rather unhappy 
one (2011: 419). Although typically only seasonal, large influxes of tourists inevitably 
alter the linguistic balance of minoritised languages’ heartland communities, 
increasing dominant language use significantly. As has been established in research 
from Wales, a key way in which such cultures are minoritised is through in-migration 
(see 5.5.2), and it is tourism which initially attracts the majority of immigrants to areas 
where minoritised languages are spoken (Phillips and Thomas, 2001: 75-6; see also 




It is unsurprising, then, that concerns regarding tourism’s cultural impact have long 
existed in the Gaeltacht. Well-known author Máirtín Ó Cadhain wrote in 1964 that Dún 
Chaoin in Kerry was at risk of becoming a tourist park rather than a community (Ó 
Cadhain, 1964) and later proclaimed, with typical rhetorical flair, that “[w]ith regard to 
tourism in the Gaeltacht, I would hang the first Bord Fáilte official that ventured west 
of Knocknacarragh from the nearest tree, or from the nearest sceach if a tree was not 
available” (in Ó Gadhra, 2000: 267). 
While not so combative in tone, much academic literature on tourism expresses similar 
reservations about its implications for indigenous cultures. Denvir, for instance, himself 
a long-time resident in the Galway Gaeltacht, contends that 
[t]ourism, by definition, is an invasive activity and not just in a linguistic or 
cultural sense. Community life in the Connemara Gaeltacht changes 
significantly during the tourist season. Those in the tourist sector and in related 
businesses work long hours, there are far greater numbers of people in the area 
and, while there is a hive of activity around, people in general are so busy that 
they do not socialize in the same way as during the rest of the year (Denvir, 
2002: 39). 
Although the expansion of the tourist sector was promoted as a way to overcome the 
effects of the recession – especially in areas which lost employment in construction or 
industry – several of my interviewees also expressed reservations about the potentially 
negative implications this could have for Gaeltacht culture: 
R: Athróidh sé an áit go mór, bhfuil ‘s a’d. Tá meon áirid ag baint leis an turasóir 
agus an meon sin, tá sé láidir le linn an tsamhraidh faoi láthair. Má bhíonn 
daoine ag tíocht i gcaitheamh na bliana, bhfuil ‘s a’d, is cinnte go bhfuil sé sin 
ag goil i gcionn ar mheon na ndaoine . . . Má bhíonn an oiread sin daoine ag 
tíocht i gcónaí . . . sa deireadh thiar, bhfuil ‘s a’d, feicfidh tú an sparán ag teacht 
seachas an duine. 
This same interviewee, from an island in Galway, was concerned that his community 
would steadily become more like a neighbouring island which receives much greater 
numbers of tourists, and is consequently Anglicised to a far greater degree: 
R: Feicim [ainm an oileáin béal dorais] agus cuireann sé isteach orm go mór, 
bhfuil ‘s a’d. Tá fógraí móra Béarla chuile áit – “bike hire”, “hotel”, “guided tours” 
– rudaí móra millteacha chuile áit agus, agus, ní raibh ‘s acu go raibh a leithéid 
de rud agus teanga Gaeilge ann. Agus turasóirí ag siúl thart, cineál, díomách 
b’fhéidir . . . “anomie” leis an bhfocal Fraincise a úsáid, an dtuigeann tú? Ansin 




siad] ag súil . . . leis an rud a chonaiceadar sa bhfógraíocht. Agus b’fhéidir go 
bhfuil sé sin le feiceáil ach caithfidh tú íoc isteach lena fheiceáil. Agus ní shin 
an cineál rud ba mhaith leat, bhfuil ‘s a’d, ba mhaith leat cineál eile oileáin, go 
mbeadh oileán ann a thaitneodh linn féin agus áit a bheadh folláin le 
maireachtáil ann agus le clann a thóigeáil ann. Agus níl ’s a’m ab é an bealach 
sin atá muid ag goil. 
A Donegal islander I talked to worried about a similar issue, saying “tá súileas agam 
go bhfuil mé ciotach ach ‘sé an dearcadh atá agam ó shin go bhfuil an t-oileán seo ag 
éirí cosúil le áit fá choinne cuairteoirí”. Important as tourism may be in economic terms, 
as an informant from the nearby mainland community stated bluntly: “ní shábhálfaidh 
turasóirí an teanga, tá siadsan ag fágáil”. 
Further to promoting the use of English in commercial sectors, tourism can also 
significantly affect language practices amongst local children. Indeed, on one 
memorable occasion I greeted a group of children in Irish while walking past them, 
only to have one of them (whose family, I subsequently found out, were holidaying 
there) scream “don’t speak that to me!” in response. With this being unlikely to be the 
only time this visitor expressed such sentiments, the linguistic consequences of 
spreading such extremely negative language attitudes amongst the area’s youngest 
Irish speakers are clear. 
Nonetheless, in the absence of other viable options, tourism has grown to provide the 
Gaeltacht with a key source of employment. Due to the deindustrialisation of much of 
the Gaeltacht post-2008 (5.3.2), one of my interviewees in Donegal felt that it was 
more important than ever that tourism be developed in the area: 
S: [S]ílim gur féidir le eacnamaíocht iarthar na hÉireann a fhorbairt an dóigh atá 
muid ag dul anois, cé go bhfuil sé fadálach. Níl aon réiteach ach cúrsaí 
iascaireachta, cúrsaí bia, cúrsaí biamhara, cúrsaí turasóireachta, cúrsaí 
spórtuisce. Agus nuair a amharcann tú síos ar Daingean agus siar ón Daingean 
[i gCiarraí] déarfaidh tú leat féin is eiseamláir millteanach maith é seo de 
cheantar atá beo agus atá bríomhar agus a bhfuil fuinneamh ann agus daoine 
ag teacht isteach ann . . . Tá go leor againn i nDún na nGall. So ab é gurb é 
cuid den réitiú ná an dóigh, na rudaí atá muid ag déanamh faoi láthair? Tá súil 
agam gurb ea. Mar caithfidh sé bheith préamhaithe sa timpeallacht agus sa 
teanga agus sa chultúr agus san fharraige, mar sin iad na buairimh atá againn. 
According with such sentiments, many of those I spoke to felt that the Wild Atlantic 




west coast, was a very positive development which could potentially be of great benefit 
to the Gaeltacht in years to come. 
In addition to obvious economic benefits, tourism can also be of psychological support 
to peripheral communities. As Brody explains, tourists can help validate rural ways of 
life for the locals themselves, offering “reassurance and approval” to populations that 
may otherwise feel disadvantaged and inferior compared to residents of the developed 
urban core (1974: 40). 
Such is the dependency on tourism in several of the areas in which I conducted my 
fieldwork, however, that numerous informants commented on the risk created by this 
lack of economic diversity. One woman in Galway explained the constitution of the 
local economy as follows: 
E: Is turasóireacht uilig cheapfainn a bhun agus a bharr anois . . . Scrios an 
tAontas Eorpach . . . an t-iascach. Agus i ndáiríre chuirfeadh sé faitíos ort dá 
ngabhfadh rud amháin mícheart ó thaobh na turasóireachta dhe… 
B: Bheadh sibh caillte? 
E: Go dona. 
In areas with such a low level of economic diversity, even a sustained period of bad 
weather during the tourist season can lead to a significant fall in visitor numbers, as 
too could international economic or political disruptions – Brexit, for instance. 
Accordingly, one of my interviewees in Donegal was very sceptical about over-reliance 
on tourism: “[a]n bomaite a stopann an turasóireacht, má tá na daoine bocht an chéad 
lá eile bhuel ní raibh fuck all ann really ar scar ar bith”. 
Despite the perhaps excessive level of dependence on this sector, tourism is 
extremely important to both the Galway and Donegal Gaeltachtaí, as explained in the 
following sections. As will be seen, however, there are significant contrasts between 
the two counties, with this distinction being largely the product of geographical 
centrality/peripherality. 
5.4.1 Tourism in Galway  
With Galway city being heavily integrated into the national tourist trail, it receives a 




considerable knock-on benefit to some of the areas west of the city, much of the 
Gaeltacht, particularly more remote areas, sees relatively few tourists. As an 
interviewee from one of the strongest Irish-speaking areas on the west coast told me: 
D: Tá go leor den turasóireacht i dtuaisceart Chonamara, sa gceantar Béarla    
. . . mar séard a tharlaíonn go dtéann na busannaí siar . . . as Gaillimh agus 
téann siad go Kylemore abbey [taobh amuigh den Ghaeltacht] agus ansin ólann 
siad an cupán caifé agus bíonn siad ar ais [sa gcathair] in am le haghaidh 
dinnéir, dinnéar tráthnóna. Sin nó téann siad go Ros a’ Mhíl agus téann siad 
amach ar thuras go hÁrann. An turasóireacht atá againne níl sé mór ach tá sé 
roinnte níos fearr, agus sin na coláistí Gaeilge . . . [Ach] fiú ann féin, ní 
shábhálfaidh an turasóireacht ceantar ar bith, an dtuigeann tú, ann féin. Is 
cúnamh é ceart go leor. 
The summer Irish colleges referred to in this extract are discussed in 5.4.3.1 below. 
As alluded to by this informant, the Oileáin Árann receive huge numbers of visitors 
each year. These islands have a much higher profile in the national consciousness 
than any of the islands in Donegal – largely due to their proximity to other major tourist 
attractions, but also the literary heritage associated with the area. Such is the strength 
of Oileáin Árann’s tourist industry that it left them better off than much of the mainland 
Gaeltacht during the recession, despite them being more difficult to reach. As is 
pointed out in the Galway County Council Gaeltacht Local Area Plan 2008-2018: 
[t]he decline in the traditional occupations of fishing and agriculture, and the 
dramatic rise in year round tourism have been the significant factors influencing 
the island community in recent years. The general decline in population has not 
been as dramatic as some western districts of the Conamara Gaeltacht and the 
improved transport services of the ferry companies and [the air service have] 
made access to mainland facilities, including national and international travel 
routes [possible] (Galway County Council, 2008, revised 2013: 48). 
While a certain number of tourists visit throughout the year – as the above quote 
mentions – during winter and autumn these are almost all day trippers, with most 
accommodation being closed at this time. The tourist season on these islands, I was 
often told, begins in March and continues until late September. Although numbers tend 
to be low in the early part of the season, during a visit to one of these islands in April 
2016 I observed a definite increase in the number of tourists arriving compared to my 
previous visit in December 2015. By mid-summer numbers swell enormously. While I 
was staying on one of these islands in July 2016 there was up to 2,000 people visiting 




with a population of well under 300. Indeed, there was discussion on RnaG during my 
stay about there possibly being “too many” tourists visiting the island, with local 
infrastructure at risk of being overwhelmed. 
As described by a woman who runs a small tourist-focused business on the island I 
stayed on, the surge in tourism during the summer sustains the island financially for 
the rest of the year, when very few visit the area, and meant that the effects of the 
recession were not felt too severely there: 
C: Ar an gcarraig, tá sé sin coinní’ sách réasúnta. Tá sórt forbairt inmharthana 
ansin ar bhealach mar gheall ar an séasúr turasóireachta agus cuidíonn an 
turasóireacht go mór leis an áit a choinneáil mar atá sé. 
Indeed, such is the amount of work available during the summer that migrant workers 
come to the island. While these are often from other parts of Ireland (friends or 
relatives of the business owners), eastern European workers have also availed of 
these opportunities, with many of the islands’ businesses functioning through English 
in order to accommodate non-local workers. 
While on this same island in Galway over successive summers I also witnessed young 
adults who were home from university for the summer being asked to work multiple 
jobs simultaneously, with several finishing a day’s work in one establishment before 
going straight to work in another. The manager of a local arts centre described the 
summer employment situation for young people as follows: “an beagán acu atá fágtha 
bíonn muid uilig ag iarraidh orthu rudaí difriúla a dhéanamh, so faigheann siad achan 
seort jab”. 
This was a striking counterpoint to national youth employment trends, which showed 
the unemployment rate amongst young adults to be double the national average at the 
time of these interviews in 2015: 
[o]verall employment is rising, even if it is patchy. But not for young people. For 
young people, the jobs recession continues apace . . . Employment grew by 2.2 
percent overall. But for young people – between 20 and 34 years – it fell by 1.5 
percent. Among older groups – over 50s – employment grew by 5 percent. 
Since the crisis began, employment has fallen by 10 percent. However, for 
those aged 20-34, employment fell by a third. For other age groups, 
employment has recovered and increased – with employment among 50s and 




While tourism provides vital opportunities for the local population, this seasonal 
engagement, when combined with the social welfare payments collected during the 
off-season, provides an adequate income and means people are often reluctant to 
work in other sectors of the economy. “Déanann roinnt . . . a gcuid airgead sa 
samhradh agus téann siad a chodladh sa ngímhreadh”, as a local business owner told 
me. 
Similarly, another informant discussed a part-time, minimum wage job with the local 
co-operative that was being advertised at the time of our interview: 
E: Ach ní gheobh’ tú duine, sin é an fhadhb eile atá a’ainn . . . Tá chuile dhuine 
chomh tógtha suas. Mar tá tú in ann a bheith ag tarraingt leasa sóisialaigh . . . 
agus ag obair sa tionscal turasóireacht. Ach is dóigh go ndúnann an Roinn 
[Leasa Shóisialaigh] a súile leis sin mar muna ndéanfadh bheadh an t-oileán 
go dona agus is amhlaidh go mbeadh sé ag costú níos mó ar an stát ar 
deireadh. 
Although I heard that the recession did lead to a decline in tourists coming from 
abroad, it saw an increase in tourists visiting from within Ireland, as financial 
constraints meant that Irish people, having grown accustomed to holidaying abroad 
during the Celtic Tiger, began to holiday at home more. A woman who works in a craft 
shop explained this “staycationing” phenomenon: 
E: Ní dhéarfainnse go bhfuil an oiread sin Meiriceánaigh ag teacht le cúpla 
bliain . . . Ar bhealach an bhliain a raibh siad ag rá linn go raibh an tír an-dona 
b’shin é ceann de na blianta is fearr a bhí againn. Ó thaobh na háite ag díol 
ceardaíochta de b’shin í an bhliain ab fhearr í. Agus ó shin tá sé ag feabhsú, 
ach roimhe sin bhí muid ag díol fíorbheagán. Bhí sé ar nós go raibh Éireannaigh 
ag rá siod í an tír s’a’ainn féin agus tá muid le goil ar thuras in Éirinn. 
While dependence on tourism undoubtedly leaves local economies at the mercy of 
external shocks that could lead to a decline in visitor numbers, the prosperity brought 
to those areas which receive large numbers of visitors is undoubtedly most important. 
Furthermore, although often linguistically problematic for the reasons discussed 
above, tourism in Galway has stimulated investment in infrastructure that has not 
happened in Donegal, particularly on those islands I visited. A small fleet of relatively 
large and modern boats owned by two different companies service the Oileáin Árann 
with as many as eight trips a day from two different mainland locations during the 
summer. While one of these companies is in receipt of state subsidy, the other is run 




each year. As the following section describes, such provision is in stark contrast to the 
service available to the Donegal island where I conducted some of my fieldwork. 
Significantly, despite the largest of the Oileáin Árann receiving some 100,000 visitors 
per year (Galway County Council, 2013: 8), it experienced a 9.8% population loss 
during the 2011-16 period. While certainly better than it not existing at all, the tourist 
sector is typically characterised by poor quality and low-paid employment (Eurostat, 
2015), with such a decline highlighting the importance of creating attractive 
employment which adheres to the conceptions of success that many people nowadays 
hold (see 5.3.4 and 5.5.1). 
5.4.2 Tourism in Donegal 
Although seaside towns such as Bundoran in the south of Donegal are well-known as 
popular tourist destinations, the county in general, particularly the Gaeltacht in the 
north, is further removed from typical tourist routes than any part of Galway. In 2015 
some 289,000 overseas tourists went to Donegal, far less than the 1,354,000 who 
visited Galway (Fáilte Ireland, 2016b: 2). One of my interviewees from Donegal 
commented on this trend, noting that while tourism was important to his community, it 
is not sufficient to maintain the local population: 
S: Níl sé ar an route turasóireachta, téann siad isteach go Baile Átha Cliath, 
thíos Corcaigh, Ciarraí, thuas go Gaillimh b’fhéidir, Cliffs of Moher agus ansin 
imíonn siad aríst. Ní théann mórán suas go dtí an taobh sin den tír, agus má 
théann stopann siad i mBun Dobhráin. Ní théann siad thuas go dtí [an 
Ghaeltacht] an chuid is mó den am. No like bíonn, tá, muna raibh na turasóirí 
ann sa samhradh ní bheadh mórán saoil ansin níos mó ar char ar bith, so tá sé 
ann ach níl sé róláidir ag an am céanna. Ní bheadh sé láidir go leor le daoine 
a choinneáil in san áit. Tá cúpla mí obair sa samhradh, sin an méid. 
When I asked another interviewee why he felt his area gets so many fewer tourists 
than the Galway Gaeltacht, I was told that its underdeveloped infrastructure makes it 
much more difficult to attract tourists: 
L: [T]á na háiseanna ann, tá an lóistín ann, tá cibé rud é . . . tá achan rud [i 
nGaillimh]. Ach ó thaobh an taobh seo tá infheistíocht shuntasach dáiríre le 
déanamh . . . Má tá muid ag caint ar dhaoine a mhealladh . . . caithfidh an 
infreastruchtúr a bheith ann . . . Ach aríst tagann sé ar ais ag easpa airgid. Tá 
iarratas ag dul isteach chuig Roinn na Gaeltachta agus níl an roinn ag ceadú 
airgid ná cibé rud é. So tá sé náireach nuair a smaointíonn tú air . . . Tá dream 
anseo go háitiúil agus tá fochoiste turasóireachta acu, tá mé féin ar an 




atá ag iarraidh an ceantar a chur chun tosaigh ach in amanna bheadh sé chomh 
maith agat caint leis an bhalla ansin. Nuair a théann tú go dtí na húdaráisí sin 
agus deir siad yeah tá sin fís ghalánta agus achan rud ar pháipéar but easpa 
creidim airgead nó easpa cibé rud atá ann. 
Several other interviewees in the area echoed this sentiment, with one woman noting 
the chicken-and-egg nature of the problem, whereby tourists are not only attracted to 
areas with adequate infrastructural provision, but also help ensure its development: 
“[t]á sé an-deacair turasóirí a mhealladh muna bhfuil an t-infreastruchtúr agat, cineál 
fáinne fí atá ansin”. 
As with my time in Galway, while conducting fieldwork in Donegal I had the opportunity 
to spend time on a strongly Irish-speaking island. Unlike the Galway island which I 
visited at various times of the year, my time on the Donegal island was all during the 
middle of the tourist season. As in Galway, tourism provides a key source of income 
to the islanders. The difference with my experience in Galway was quite dramatic, 
however. Unlike the crowds that can be seen on the island pier in Galway on a good 
day in the summer, there was typically only a handful of tourists arriving on the 
Donegal island daily – an amount very similar, in fact, to that which I witnessed visiting 
the Galway island during the off season. Indeed, in 2017 visitors to the island 
numbered just 8,688 (RTÉ, 2018c) – with the similarly-sized Galway island receiving 
an equal amount every few days during the summer. 
Unlike in Galway, none of my interviewees in this area observed an increased number 
of Irish tourists during the recession. Indeed, an owner of tourist accommodation told 
me that increased unemployment on the nearby mainland meant people were less 
likely to visit for the weekend as had been the case before the crash, something 
several other interviewees confirmed: 
O: [C]rowds used to come here for weekends who’d be working in places 
locally. And that seems to have diminished considerably . . . They would all 
have to go away then, maybe to England, Scotland . . . Canada or Australia, 
which has happened. 
The decline in tourists visiting the mainland Gaeltacht in Donegal was also severe. As 
5.3.3 described, five out of six hotels in one community closed between 2010-15, with 




area. As another interviewee observed, these closures make the development of 
tourism in the area very challenging: 
C: [F]áinne fí ann, cionn is go raibh rudaí go holc dhruid na hóstáin síos, agus 
níl an saol sóisialta go maith . . . Níl ach teach ósta amháin ann. So dá mbeadh 
dream mór ann ní fhéadfadh muid iad a choinneáilt . . . Níl áit ar bith le stopadh 
acu. 
Similarly, the hotel on the island I visited closed in 2010. It was immediately put on the 
market but remained unsold for three years. Seeing one of the island’s most prominent 
buildings left boarded up while awaiting a sale had a significant impact on community 
pride, I was told: 
H: [M]á tá sé foscailte cuireann sé cuma beo ar an áit. Bhí bliain ansin nuair a 
bhí an úinéir deireanach, y’know, nuair a bhí sé ag díol suas, [nuair] nach raibh 
sé foscailte agus bhí sé fiánta don oileán . . . Nuair a dhruideann rudaí síos 
cuireann sé cuma olc ar áit. 
Section 5.3.5.2 discusses the consequences of such closures and the attendant 
reduction in community pride for linguistic reproduction. 
Although the mainland hotels remain closed, the island hotel was eventually bought in 
2013 by a well-off retired couple who now open it for three months during the summer. 
While not locals or Irish speakers themselves, they have an affinity for the area and 
run the hotel in an attempt “to improve life on the island”, as one of them told me. 
Despite employing approximately ten people – mostly islanders but also some family 
members – the business does not have a sufficient turnover for them to pay 
themselves for their work there, with them keeping the hotel open “as a service to the 
island” rather than for financial gain. 
Unlike Galway’s Oileáin Árann, the Donegal island does not have an aeroplane 
service, despite being further away from the mainland. The one boat that serves the 
island (which is smaller and older than any boat serving the Galway islands) is often 
cancelled due to bad weather, even in the summer, with islanders occasionally having 
to call the coastguard to bring them necessities by helicopter after they have been cut 




This underdeveloped infrastructure is a source of considerable frustration to many of 
the islanders. As with inhabitants of the nearby mainland, they often told me that this 
is the main reason tourism has not flourished as it has in Galway: 
D: Muna fhaigheann muid an bád [nua], ní bheidh sé, ní bheidh an forbairt ceart 
ar fáil, ní bheidh an líon turasóirí ag teacht . . . Agus ní hamháin an bád ceart 
ach tá muid ag iarraidh an sórt céanna bád farantóireachta atá ag freastail ar 
[na hOileáin Árann]. Níos faide, níos compordaí… 
While this statement was made in 2015, as section 5.6.3.2 describes, 2018 saw a 
different company granted the tender to service this island. Far from improving the 
service the way the islanders had been demanding, however, this change saw a 
decline in its suitability, with a ferry which was widely decried as being even less 
appropriate than its predecessor taking over the route. 
While the low numbers of visitors going to Donegal is likely one of the area’s biggest 
draws for a certain class of visitor (Denvir, 2002: 28), its peripherality means it is 
difficult to envision the relative prosperity seen in parts of Galway emerging in such a 
remote location in the near future. As discussed in the next section, however, the 
promotion of linguistic tourism may offer the stronger Irish-speaking areas of Donegal 
an option for expanding their tourist sector in coming years. 
5.4.3 Linguistic Tourism 
As Ó Laoire explains, state efforts to promote linguistic tourism to the Gaeltacht have 
existed for many years (2008: 210; see also Údarás na Gaeltachta, 2008). The 
recently published Action Plan for Rural Development includes amongst its Irish-
language-related aims “[c]ontinue to develop Irish language based tourism in the 
Gaeltacht”, and the section titled Promoting the Irish language as a key resource 
commits to “[c]ontinu[ing] to support the development of cultural tourism in the 
Gaeltacht by administering the Irish Language Learners [sic] scheme” (Government 
of Ireland, 2017b: 42, 52). 
Despite these laudable goals, with the significant exception of the coláistí samhraidh 
(see 5.4.3.1) focusing on teenagers, linguistic tourism currently makes up only a small 
proportion of the overall total. While now dated, an unpublished study commissioned 
by ÚnaG in 1999 stated that linguistic tourism to Conamara comprises only 3% of total 




– I was repeatedly told in both Galway and Donegal that adult linguistic tourists are 
not at all common. One interviewee in Donegal said the following to me regarding the 
use of Irish with tourists: 
S: Thiocfadh leat “conas tá tú?” [mar a bheadh ag daoine le Gaeilge na scoile] 
a rá le 300 duine ag teacht isteach ón mbád sin agus is ar éigean go dtuigfeadh 
cúigear thú, níos lú arís má tá tú ag ráit “caidé mar atá tú?” [an leagan atá sa 
gcanúint áitiúil]. 
He went on to state that “mothaíonn tú mar amadán má labhrann tú Gaeilg agus muna 
dtuigeann daoine thú”. As well as illustrating attitudes towards Irish amongst tourists 
that visit the island commonly referred to as the strongest Irish-speaking community 
in Donegal, this rather downhearted sentiment is also very indicative of the language’s 
standing vis-à-vis English, the lingua franca of tourism and, therefore, economic 
prosperity. 
5.4.3.1 Summer language schools 
While few adults visit the Gaeltacht for linguistic purposes, one area in which linguistic 
tourism does indeed flourish in much of the Gaeltacht is in the provision of summer 
courses for teenagers. For over one hundred years coláistí samhraidh (“summer 
colleges”) have brought large numbers of secondary school students to Gaeltacht 
communities and provided a significant source of income thereto, particularly to 
women, who are otherwise marginalised by the traditional economic structure of rural 
Ireland (Denvir, 2002: 48). 
Those who attend such courses, which are far from inexpensive, are likely to have 
parents or guardians with above-average incomes and as a result they constitute a 
valuable target market for Gaeltacht communities to capitalise on. Fees for a three-
week long course including accommodation with a local family generally cost in the 
region of €1,000. As well as these fees and the money students spend in local 
businesses during their stay, it is commonplace for parents to come and visit at 
weekends, often staying overnight in local accommodation, thereby contributing 
further to what is typically an otherwise depressed local economy. 
Many of my interviewees commented on the importance of these courses to their 




G: Murach na Gaeilgeoirí [.i. lucht freastail na gcoláistí] ní bheadh tada [sa 
gceantar]. Aisteach go maith, tá sé sin suimiúil, bhí mé ag caint air, bhí mé thiar 
Dé Domhnaigh ag geallta bád seoil agus bhí seanleaids, gang ina suí ar chlaí 
agus ag breathnú amach ar na báid. Ach bhí [ainm coláiste] díreach anseo ach 
bhí tuismitheoirí na nGaeilgeoirí á mbailiú le goil abhaile, is dóigh go raibh an 
cúrsa críochnaí’. Agus bhí siad ag rá murach na Gaeilgeoirí nach mbeadh tada 
san áit. Agus tá an ceart acub . . . Thiocfadh corrthurasóir ach níl an 
turasóireacht [mór]. 
A language planner in Galway claimed the industry is worth some €20m to the 
Gaeltacht per annum, a figure also given by Conradh na Gaeilge (2017: 6-7): 
N: Is fiú, cheapfainn féin, thart ar €20 milliún in aghaidh na bliana. Is 11,500 
gasúr a thagann ag na coláistí Gaeilge, taobh amuigh den Acadamh agus na 
rudaí [do dhaoine fásta]. D’fhéadfadh muid a rá go bhfuil luach thart ar 2,500 in 
aghaidh an ghasúir. Íocann siadsan 900, íocann an Roinn as an lóistín, so tá 
ráta in aghaidh na hoíche ann. Déarfainn go bhfuil thart ar 2,000 an pháiste 
[agus na tuismitheorí a thagann ar cuairt] ag fanacht i lóistín, ag ceannach 
peitril, ag ithe béile leis an ngasúr. Tá sé éascaí na sumannaí a dhéanamh. 
11,500 méadaí ar 2,000. Ar a laghad 20 milliún. 
Indeed, one woman felt that the income available from these courses is so significant 
that it means there is little incentive to develop other aspects of the tourist industry in 
the way that has happened in nearby English-speaking areas: 
R: Bhíodh mise ag cur ceist ar dhaoine cén fáth nach bhfuil cúrsaí 
turasóireachta forbartha go mór sa nGaeltacht anseo i gConamara Theas i 
gcomparáid mar shampla leis an gClochán nó áiteacha ó thuaidh. Agus fear as 
Conamara a bhí ag obair liom dúirt sé “sure cén fáth a ndéanfadh siad é sin 
nuair atá siad in ann 20 nó 30,000 a dhéanamh leis na Gaeilgeoirí sa 
samhradh?” Agus dúirt mé “an bhfuil siad i ndáiríre in ann an oiread sin airgid 
a dhéanamh?!” Agus dúirt sé “tá”. 
While the economic benefit of such colleges is clearly most significant, their linguistic 
consequences are also of immense importance: 
S: [N]í hamháin go dtugann sé airgead isteach ach tugann sé spreagadh freisin 
ó thaobh na Gaeilge dhó. Clann atá ag coinneáil gasúr, mar a déarfá, tuigeann 
siad sin go bhfuil buntáiste ann go bhfuil Gaeilge sa gceantar, agus Gaeilge 
acub féin. 
The recession led to a significant decline in attendance at these colleges, however. I 
had the opportunity to interview an employee of the organisation which oversees the 




B: Céard faoi na coláistí samhraidh mar sin, raibh aon athrú ar na huimhreachaí 
nó ar leagan amach na gcoláistí? 
P: Caithfidh mé a rá go raibh. Feictear dom go raibh titim thubaisteach, dáiríre. 
Agus ar bhealach go raibh an earnáil seo i mbaol in áiteachaí éagsúla. Is minic 
a bhímse ag caint le lucht coláistí eile agus feicim go mbíonn na fadhbanna 
céanna le sonrú ag chuile dhuine. Nuair a iarann tú is dóigh idir 800 agus 
€1,000 ar dhuine le freastal ar chúrsaí trí seachtainí, nuair a thit an tóin as an 
tír b’shin é an chéad rud a thit as pócaí na ndaoine . . . Bhí muid buailte go 
tubaisteach. 
This decrease created significant difficulty for communities that had grown largely 
dependent on this income. The overall reduction of 25% in attendance nationally 
between 2008-14 masks an even greater rate of decline in certain areas – with the 
drop of 37% in Donegal, for instance, being significantly higher, possibly due to the 
county’s peripherality making it costlier to travel to (Tuairisc.ie, 2014b). After such a 
dramatic fall during the worst years of the recession, attendance figures for 2016, while 
improving on those of recent years, were still, on average, 7% below 2008 levels 
(Tuairisc.ie, 2017n). 
Despite these courses being the most successful language-based industry in the 
Gaeltacht, they are still heavily dependent on state support. The mná tí (“housewives”) 
who host students receive a subvention from the department responsible for the 
Gaeltacht. This allowance, Scéim na bhFoghlaimeoirí Gaeilge (“Irish-learners’ 
scheme”), is paid per pupil per night and increased in accordance with inflation from 
1997-2007, at which point it remained stable at €10.50 per student per night until 2010. 
It was cut to €10.00 in 2010 and then to €9.50 in 2011, the rate recommended by An 
Bord Snip Nua (see 4.2.1). It was frozen at €9.50 for six years, but was increased for 
the first time in a decade to €10.00 in April 2017, although a return to pre-recession 
levels was ruled out in 2018 (Tuairisc.ie, 2017n, 2018g). These reductions, coupled 
with the substantial drop in student attendance at the colleges, saved the State over 
€2m per annum, but were reported to have cost the Gaeltacht in the region of €10m 
when the decline in associated spending by students and parents was included 
(Tuairisc.ie, 2014b). While further cuts to the sector were recommended by An Bord 





Although providing one of the only significant sources of tourism in many Gaeltacht 
communities, on the Galway island I visited, which receives huge numbers of visitors 
regardless, the island’s one summer college for teenagers has a less visible – although 
still not negligible – impact. On the Donegal island no such college exists, a fact that 
frustrates local business owners, who feel a valuable market is not being capitalised 
on. 
Despite such frustrations, no steps have been taken to establish such a college on the 
island – which is somewhat surprising considering the nearby mainland has colleges 
that are over a century old. A narrative I regularly heard regarding summer colleges in 
various parts of the Gaeltacht, however, was that they were not originally founded by 
locals, but rather by university lecturers, teachers or Irish-language groups from 
elsewhere in the country. As noted by Deprez, writing about a Gaeltacht island in 
Donegal, “the initiative [there] comes from the outside” (2000: 470). Furthermore, the 
teachers in these colleges are rarely locals, although it is still not clear why 
revitalisation advocates ignored this island and not other areas nearby. While this is 
quite probably a sector that could be developed on the island, it would take someone 
with a strong entrepreneurial drive, something that has historically been slow to 
emerge in the Gaeltacht (Ní Bhrádaigh and Murray, 2006). Such an individual would 
also have to be very confident in their level of Irish, particularly its written form – which 
not many Gaeltacht residents are, according to all accounts I have heard. Low rates 
of literacy in Irish amongst Gaeltacht residents are well reported in the literature and 
have long been noted as a challenge to revitalisation efforts (Ní Mhianáin, 2003). 
As such, it seems unlikely that an enterprise of this sort will be developed on a 
significant scale on the Donegal island I spent time on. Nonetheless, in 2015 and 2016 
the local co-operative did indeed provide the impetus for a week-long course directed 
at fluent adult speakers in which I took part, and which has continued to occur each 
year since. Notably, however, the course was organised by a language school based 
elsewhere in Donegal, which had been invited to run the course at the request of the 
co-operative in order to bring visitors to the island. While this presumably meant that 
much of the profit from the course itself left the island, it was nonetheless successful 
in attracting more than 20 diligent Irish speakers who contributed to the local economy 




almost negligible. While islanders led several afternoon activities, none of the teachers 
were from the island. 
On the much busier Galway island the impact of the courses for adult learners that I 
have taught each year since beginning this PhD is far less visible. As with the 
teenagers attending similar courses, those adults visiting the island for explicitly 
linguistic purposes get submerged in the greater throng of non-linguistic tourists. Here 
too almost all of those involved in teaching were not islanders. While having 30 Irish 
learners spending a week on an island with a small population is not insignificant, this 
number becomes much less striking when there are some 2,000 visitors arriving daily. 
With such a large majority of tourists seemingly having little interest in Irish (see 5.4.3), 
it is unsurprising that the dynamics of local, tourist-dependent economies would 
quickly become associated with the use of English. 
5.4.4 The linguistic landscape – shifting terrain 
One area in which the linguistic consequences of both tourism and, it would seem, the 
recession, were particularly clear is the “linguistic landscape” (Gorter, 2006) of some 
of the communities in which I conducted my fieldwork, with notable changes having 
occurred therein in recent years. Despite the relative strength of Irish in these 
communities, and despite legal stipulations requiring many official signs to be 
monolingually Irish in the Gaeltacht (Government of Ireland, 2003), the linguistic 
landscape of most of these areas is dominated by English. This in itself is not overly 
surprising, with minoritised languages – even in their “heartlands” – often being 
excluded from those symbolic spaces associated with higher and commercial 
registers. Of particular interest in the context of this thesis, however, are the clear 
moves towards the bottom-up Anglicisation of this domain which were visible 
throughout the duration of my fieldwork, and which were reported by several 
informants to have accelerated as a direct result of the recession. 
The example in figure 5.1 of a hotel photographed in Galway in 2015 and again in 
2016 provides a particularly clear example of this process. As can be seen, this 
establishment, which is one of the main sources of accommodation for visitors in the 
area, went from displaying a sign which was almost entirely in Irish in 2015, to a 
monolingual English one by the time I returned to the island in 2016. Even the owner’s 




have often heard committed native Irish speakers using both the English and Irish 
versions of their names, the depth of such a symbolic move is nonetheless quite 
striking. 
Figure 5.1 A hotel in Galway, photographed first in 2015 and then again in 2016 
Figure 5.2 A restaurant in Galway, bilingual in 2012 but English only in 2014 (photos 
taken from Tripadvisor.com) 
Figure 5.2 displays a restaurant, also in Galway. The owners, a married couple, one 
of whom married into the community many years ago and has not learned Irish, are 
heavily involved in community development initiatives. Despite the Irish-speaking 
partner being familiar with the Gaeltacht Act 2012 and criticising it heavily in casual 
conversation with me, they rebranded their formerly bilingual restaurant name in 
English only in recent years – something I was told about by a friend of mine from the 




One of my interviewees claimed that this development was something which began 
during the recession and was linked to tourism: 
B: Cén fáth an bhfuil ‘s agat gurb é Béarla ar fad atá [ar na comharthaí go léir]?  
P: Tá sé tosaithe anseo anois fiú sna daoine atá ag iarraidh Gaeilge a 
choinneáil. Feicim iad ag cur suas anois – thosaigh sé ag tarlú le cúig bliana 
anois go díreach – ag cur suas fógraí i mBéarla amháin agus go bhfuil sé níos 
éifeachtaí, gur Béarla atá ag cuid is mó de na cuairteoirí nó go bhfuil sé níos 
fusa. Tá siad ag ceapadh nach bhfuil sé ag déanamh aon dochar agus go bhfuil 
siad ag cur dallamullóg orthub féin nó ag ceapadh go, nach bhfuil an teanga i 
mbaol dáiríre agus níl i gceist ach an samhradh dáiríre, nach raibh sí a’ainn i 
gcónaí ariamh agus nach raibh roinnt Béarla san áit i gcónaí ariamh agu- agus 
cén dochar agus, is dóigh. Ach goileann sé orm. 
As noted in 5.4, the link between tourism and English is particularly evident on one of 
the other islands in Galway that sees an enormous flow of tourists. The main village 
on this island, probably the most developed settlement of any Gaeltacht island, 
contains many large and seemingly prosperous businesses, although Irish is hardly 
more visible there than it would be in any small town elsewhere in Ireland. 
With tourism being so central to the economy of many Gaeltacht communities, it is 
unsurprising that locals felt the need to facilitate visitors in whatever way possible in 
light of the tumultuous economic situation of recent years, as an employee of a state-
funded language promotion body suggested: 
P: Tá sé brónach ar bhealach mar is cuimhneach liomsa a bheith ann agus 
bhíodh Gaeilge ar chuile rud agus chuile chineál comhartha siopa is i nGaeilge 
a bhí sé, ach le linn dom bheith cineál ag taisteal [tríd an gceantar] just thug mé 
faoi deara go bhfuil go leor comharthaíocht Bhéarla ann. Agus, y’know, bhí sé 
an-, bhí sé uaigneach agus brónach ar bhealach, an dtuigeann tú, gur tharla sé 
de léim . . . taobh istigh de deich mbliana. 
B: Céard is cúis leis sin meas tú? 
J: Bhuel feictear dom, y’know, go gceapann daoine, go bhfuil sé dírithe ar na 
turasóirí agus orthu féin. B’fhéidir go bhfuil easpa misnigh nó mórtais nó muinín 
atá ann agus go gceapann siad go gcaithfidh siad cineál iad féin a dhíol trí 
Bhéarla. See nuair a thit an tóin ar bhealach as na Gaeilgeoirí a bheith ag goil 
[go dtí na coláistí samhraidh] . . . bhí an cineál t-athrú seo ag teacht isteach i 
gcloigeann na ndaoine. 
B: Caithfidh muid rud eicintí a dhéanamh. 
J: Yeah, yeah. Agus níl lucht Gaeilge ag teacht chugainn níos mó, níl na 




dhaoine, cinnte téann sé i bhfeidhm ar dhaoine. Y’know tá go leor de na 
dreamannaí agus go leor de na siopaí sin, tá ’s agam go bhfuil Gaeilge ag lucht 
an tsiopa agus is Gaeilge a labhrann go leor acu. Níl mé ag rá gur Gaeilge a 
labhrann chuile dhuine acu ach tá ’s agam gur Gaeilge a labhrann go leor acub 
sa mbaile. Tá mé ag ceapadh go bhfuil sé psych-, sa psyche is dóigh ar 
bhealach. 
As this interviewee notes, the combination of the dramatic decrease in income from 
the summer colleges (see 5.4.3.1) and the decline of the ÚnaG-supported industrial 
sector (see 5.3.2), saw the economic basis of many Gaeltacht communities removed. 
This disruption, it seems, contributed to a sense of Irish not having a significant impact 
on local economic welfare and therefore prompted, at least in part, this turn away from 
the promotion of the language in such clearly visible ways. 
While language activism in the Gaeltacht over the last fifty years has often included 
painting over English-language signs (TG4, 2004), figure 5.3, taken on a Donegal 
island, provides an example of English being added unofficially to the linguistic 
landscape. 
Significantly, the handwriting in which this DIY-Anglicisation is done is unmistakably 
that of the elected local community representative on this island. This same individual 
is extremely pro-Irish in his rhetoric, regularly being heard in the Irish-language media 
and attending events related to the language. As well as being a vocal proponent of 
Irish, he is also very forceful in his views regarding island development, feeling that 
his island has been neglected by the authorities. He frequently discusses the need for 
improved infrastructure and comments on the lack of employment as being an issue 




of major concern. As a result of these beliefs, it is perhaps less surprising that he would 
attempt to facilitate tourists as much as possible through making such a sign intelligible 
to non-Irish speakers, even though the lighthouse mentioned is clearly visible from 
almost everywhere on the island. 
It would seem unlikely that this marginalisation of Irish in the linguistic landscape 
concurs with the desires of tourists, at least some of whom are surely attracted to 
these areas due to their perceived cultural “otherness” and indigeneity, of which the 
language is a key component (Denvir, 2002: 28). Such changes, however, reflect the 
long-established link between commerce and English. This oft-referenced association 
has been a key factor in driving language shift over several centuries: 
[t]he conviction that Irish was a badge of backwardness and poverty, or, at 
least, that English had certain economic advantages over it, which seized a 
great part of Gaelic-speaking Ireland in the 19th century has never been 
completely eradicated and remains to some extent in the Gaeltacht today (Ó 
Huallacháin, 1991: 124). 
While the impact of symbolic actions such as these on community language use is a 
matter for debate, they nonetheless provide a vivid example of the ongoing 
minoritisation of Irish in even its strongest communities. They also afford us an insight 
into an ideology which clearly has a certain currency in these communities and sees 
Irish and commercial enterprise as being contraindicated. This ideology was 
apparently strengthened due to the recent crisis – a finding which starkly contrasts 
with Brennan and Costa’s (2016) discussion of the use of Irish as part of a strategy of 
“de-homogenisation” outside of the Gaeltacht during the recession. 
5.5 Migration 
With population mobility being a fundamental trait of globalisation (Appadurai, 2005: 
3; Gibson, 2012: 475-6) and economic disruptions being known to intensify this 
mobility, it is unsurprising that Ireland saw extremely high rates of outmigration in the 
wake of the crash. Examining national patterns post-2008, Glynn and O’Connell state 
that “[w]hereas 245,900 people left the country in the eight years between 2000 and 
2007, nearly 610,000 departed between 2008 and 2015” (2017: 299). As Glynn et al. 
(2013: 29-30) have explained, the distribution of emigrants’ origins during the 
recession was heavily skewed towards rural areas such as the Gaeltacht. When one 




of both out- and in-migration is often cited as a major factor contributing to language 
shift (e.g. Krauss, 1992: 6), the potential for this development to negatively impact the 
vitality of Irish becomes apparent. This section will explore how this has been the case 
in the years since the crash occurred. 
5.5.1 Outmigration  
Since the earliest days of the Free State, chronic underdevelopment meant that 
emigration was a fundamental fact of rural Irish life (Ó Riagáin, 1997: 217). This 
phenomenon was particularly prevalent in the Gaeltacht, its constituent communities 
being amongst the most peripheral in the country. Indeed, throughout the 1950s and 
60s over two thirds of young people in na Gleannta, an Irish-speaking area in Donegal, 
had emigrated before they reached their thirties (Glynn et al., 2013: 7). Many other 
Gaeltacht areas were similarly depopulated at this time (Ó hÉallaithe, 2004: 174). 
Faced with such a massive haemorrhage of population, and in accordance with the 
national move away from the protectionist policies of earlier decades, Gaeltarra 
Éireann (succeeded by ÚnaG in 1979) set about a programme of “saving the Gaeltacht 
by industrialisation” (Ó hÉallaithe, 2004: 174). As has been well attested in the 
literature, however, such efforts ultimately impacted negatively on language use. 
Further to encouraging both the in-migration and commuting of people from outside 
the Gaeltacht who were also searching for employment, there was also a significant 
amount of return-migration of people who had left in earlier years and who often 
brought non-Irish-speaking partners and children with them on their return (Ó Murchú, 
1993; Walsh, 2010; 5.3.4). 
Emigration from the Gaeltacht, then, is long-established, and during the recession this 
legacy led to the rekindling of chain migration patterns. The chain migration 
phenomenon has been observed by migration scholars for many years, with it being 
claimed that “so long as there are people to emigrate the principle cause of emigration 
is prior emigration” (Peterson, cited in Brody, 1974: 7). Being such a central part of life 
for generations of Gaeltacht people, this pattern means that many (if not most) of those 
in the Gaeltacht today already have family connections in more economically dynamic 
areas of the world, thus making moving abroad an appealing option during challenging 




S: D’imeodh daoine ar imirce an-éasca. Tá sé i bhfad níos éasca do dhaoine 
as an áit seo dul ar imirce go Meiriceá mar gheall go bhfuil gaolta acub thall 
ann – col ceathrachaí, uncalachaí, aintíní – níl siad ag dul go áit nach bhfuil 
aithne acub ar éinne, mar a déarfá. Agus de ghnáth má théann siad ann 
b’fhéidir go bhfuil uncail leob a bheadh in ann post a thabhairt dhóib, nó a bhfuil 
aithne aige ar dhuine éigeant . . . Tá go leor imithe ag an Astráil chomh maith, 
ach Meiriceá tá sé an-éascaí. 
A young woman from Galway observed a similar phenomenon, albeit in an intra- rather 
than inter-cohort fashion: 
G: [A]n patrún a chonaic mise ansin ná abair dá n-imeodh duine amháin don 
Astráil agus ansin ghlaofadh sé ar na cairde a bhí sa mbaile agus gan iad ag 
déanamh tada agus déarfadh sé goilligí uathub anseo, craic go maith, tá an t-
airgead go maith, goilligí anonn. So is grúpaí a chuaigh anonn. 
It is of little surprise, then, that the recent recession led to a significant increase in 
outmigration from the Gaeltacht. The vast majority of my informants explicitly linked 
this to the search for employment – “[tá siad] in Abu Dhabi, go New Zealand, sa 
Ghearmáin, sa Fhrainc, Sasain, Albain, Stáit Aontaithe. Agus there’s no doubt dá 
mbeadh obair ar an ghealach bheadh siad fán ghealach fosta”, as one Donegal man 
told me. While informants invariably mentioned unemployment as driving such 
departures, other research suggests that emigrants are more likely to be 
underemployed and/or over-qualified for their work at the time of emigration, rather 
than being unemployed outright (Glynn et al., 2013: 9). This is likely due to the fact 
that a significant initial outlay is typically required to emigrate, making it a prohibitively 
costly option for poorer sections of society. Trends in recent years are for people to go 
far afield when emigrating, to Australia for instance, which makes the move particularly 
expensive – especially when visa requirements necessitate having a significant bank 
balance as a minimum requirement for entry. This, I was told, led to a two-stage 
process of emigration, whereby people first moved to Britain in order to work and save 
the money to then move further afield, with Britain’s proximity and non-requirement of 
visas for Irish citizens making this initial step much more affordable. As one 26-year-
old in Donegal explained when discussing migration patterns amongst his peer group: 
S: [T]á go leor acu ag obair thuas in Aberdeen fosta. 
B: Céard a dhéanann siad ansin? 




B: Tá, ola. 
S: So yeah bhí dream ollmhór as [a bhaile] ag obair thuas ansin ach sílim gur 
stad an obair thuas ansin fosta so bhogann siad go Sasain. Agus just yeah 
daoine a bhí ag obair thall in Sasain fá choinne bliain le faigh an airgead le dul 
go dtí an Astráil . . . Mar níl siad ábalta an airgead faigh sa bhaile le dul ag an 
Astráil anois. Agus na daoine atá fágtha sa bhaile, níl siad ábalta ag imeacht 
áit ar bith muna bhfuil airgead ag an teaghlach nó b’fhéidir ag uncail nó aunt le 
rá alright sure cuidigh muid leat, níl tú ábalta post a fháil anois le sábháilt an 
méid a bheadh de dhíth ort le dul. 
Similar to Glynn et al.’s observations on recent emigration being more severe in the 
“most remote areas in Ireland” (2015: 7), and in line with the differential economic 
status of more peripheral Gaeltacht areas described in 5.2.3, I repeatedly heard that 
the most rural areas suffered the highest rates of emigration: 
A: Tá ráta an-ard imirce agus ‘sé is faide a théann tú siar ‘sé is airde atá an ráta 
imirce . . . Má théann tú siar [go hiarthar na Gaeltachta], tá an áit bánaithe ar 
fad. Is beag duine óg atá fágtha . . . Aon duine singil, óg tá siad bailithe as an 
áit . . . Níl na ceantracha níos giorra go Gaillimh baileach chomh dona, y’know, 
mar tá roinnt oibre sa gcathair ag daoine. Ach fós féin tá cuid mhaith daoine 
imithe. 
As is well documented, these areas furthest west are almost always the most strongly 
Irish-speaking communities (Ó Giollagáin and Charlton, 2015a). As another 
interviewee stated: “fós is fíor na háiteacha is mó Gaeilge, ‘siad na háiteacha is lú 
rachmais”. 
Those I spoke to frequently lamented such high rates of emigration as being extremely 
detrimental to the vibrancy of their communities, as the following quote – typical of 
many others – explains: 
L: [N]uair a imíonn daoine tá tú ag sú nó ag tarraingt anam amach as pobal        
. . . Pobal a raibh creidim láidir in am . . . nuair a bhí obair agus fostaíocht agus 
achan rud ag dul ar aghaidh . . . Achan duine a imíonn bheireann siad píosa 
den phobal leotha . . . achan duine a fhágann is buille marfach don phobal atá 
ann, sílim. Agus an rud atá ann, tá tú ag cur le bánú na tuaithe. I mean nuair a 
fheiceann tú go díreach na háiteacha atá druidte . . . an méid tithe, chan amháin 
tithe ach áiteacha a raibh fostaíocht iontu san am a chuaigh thart. Má tá tú ag 
tomaint thart agus má fheiceann tú na háiteacha atá fágtha fuar, fann, folamh 
a raibh beocht agus solas agus b’fhéidir toit ann am amháin, déarfá leat féin 
nach mór an trua . . . ach mór an náire é fosta. 
Beyond the search for employment, a further important factor contributing to 




noted by Deprez (2000: 464), television – and the internet, one must now add – 
bombards people in peripheral locations with (often exaggerated) images of all that 
they are missing out on in urban life, thereby luring them away from their home 
communities. As Brody explained, these increased aspirations can have very 
detrimental consequences for rural communities, ultimately meaning that “life in 
Inishkillane can no longer provide what the Inishkillane people want” (1974: 15). 
Emigration, then, becomes the natural choice for individuals living in communities 
which they have “lost faith in”, to use Brody’s terminology (1974: 16). The increased 
information flows which are responsible for such expanded conceptions of success 
are, of course, themselves a fundamental characteristic of globalisation (Held et al., 
1999; Castells, 2000; Giddens, 2002), as too is the trend towards urbanisation which 
is depopulating rural areas worldwide (OECD, 2015). 
Relatedly, on several occasions during my fieldwork I noted the social conservatism 
prevalent in some rural communities and how it contrasts with many of the more 
progressive images presented to young people in the media. On an island in Donegal 
I was struck by the large piece of graffiti in the main village reading “[name of the 
island] SAY NO”, a reference – in English – to the marriage equality referendum which 
had just been passed by overwhelming majority, although this island voted strongly 
against it. In the wake of such a historical vote on a national scale, such attitudes 
seemed all the more outdated, a fact which, I suspect, would not be lost on younger 
islanders, a number of whom were preparing to go to university in the autumn. 
Several informants commented on the tendency for personal aspiration to prompt 
people to emigrate, saying that the recession was not the sole reason for emigration: 
“[s]in sórt caoga faoin gcéad economic. Tá daoine ag iarraidh bogadh thart anyway”. 
While “the lure of modernity in urban centres” (Mufwene, 2016: 134) is certainly an 
important factor in driving the depopulation of minority language community 
heartlands, the overwhelming majority of my informants nonetheless felt the recession 
had greatly accelerated this pattern, a contention which other research confirms 
(Glynn et al., 2013: 38; Glynn and O’Connell, 2017). 
Despite high rates of emigration, many young people whom I interviewed had positive 
attitudes to their communities, with one young woman proffering the following praise 




M: Tá mise ag ceapadh go bhfuil saol maith anseo. Tá chuile rud atá uainn 
a’ainn anseo. Like is aoibhinn liomsa sa ngímhreadh nach bhfuil takeaways 
agus rudaí mar sin ann, caithfidh tú bheith sláintiúil, caithfidh tú do rud féin a 
dhéanamh. Tá mise ag ceapadh go bhfuil sin chomh maith . . . Tá na seirbhísí 
a’ainn, tá an siopa ann, tá an dochtúir a’ainn, tá na scoileannaí a’ainn, tá an 
páirc peile a’ainn, tá ionad liathróid láimhe a’ainn . . . Níl mé in ann cuimriú ar 
rud ar bith atá ag teastáil uainn. 
It is telling, however, that in spite of this recommendation, both she and her two 
siblings, also young adults, have all “voted with their feet” and moved to cities. It is 
therefore difficult not to read such a comment more as an example of the parochial 
pride typical of the west of Ireland and of the nostalgic gaze of someone who now 
spends most of her time in the city, rather than as a serious personal commitment to 
life in a rural community. 
Although the nostalgia of departed emigrants can in some cases provoke a newfound 
affection for Irish among those who emigrate, as Herbert points out (2011: 409), such 
a positive effect is unlikely to outweigh the damage done through the reduction in the 
social density of speakers in the language’s core communities. With those aged 20-
34 having comprised 70% of emigrants during the recession (Glynn et al., 2013: 34), 
the loss of this cohort most likely to form families and so bring up the next generation 
of Irish speakers can only be seen as most detrimental for the long-term future of Irish 
in the Gaeltacht (see also 5.3.3). As one interviewee bluntly observed: “[ó] thaobh na 
teanga dhó, mairfidh sé sin an teanga, muna bhfuil daoine óga, cainteoirí dúchais, ag 
fanacht sa bhaile, sin deireadh”. 
I also was told on many occasions of the tendency for the primary breadwinner in a 
family to migrate (either in a conventional sense or as “commuter migrants” who spend 
extended periods working in cities (Glynn et al., 2013: 31)), with partners often being 
left at home to raise their children alone: 
A: [T]á muid ag feiceáil freisin go leor baintrí, baintrí déine go bhféadfaí a rá 
leob. Mná atá fanta anseo agus a gcuid gasúr, agus na fir imithe ag obair in 
áiteachaí eile. Bhí col ceathar liom féin ar an mbunú sin, go raibh sí féin fanta 
anseo . . . agus gur imigh a fear go New Zealand ar feadh bliana mar gheall 
nach raibh aon obair eile aigesan le coinneáil ag imeacht. Agus bhí sé féin ag 
cur an t-airgead abhaile, tá sé ar nós na seanlaethanta, nuair a bhíodh na 
seanleaids . . . ag obair i Sasana. So tá go leor dhó sin ag tarlú. Tá roinnt daoine 
atá ag commutáil, atá ag dul anonn is anall go Sasana, agus go dtí an Eoraip 





An informant in Donegal commented on this phenomenon in a very impassioned 
manner, being visibly moved while discussing it: 
L: Chan dóigh ar bith é sin ag teaghlaigh ar bith . . . nó athair clainne a bheith, 
atá thar sáile nó cibé rud é. Agus ag caint le daoine ar an ghuthán nó cibé rud 
é. Tá teaghlaigh atá buailte go láidir ag easpa oibre agus bheifeá ag ráit leat 
féin níl sin go maith do phobal ar bith. Agus tá sé, cuireann sé corraigh ort ar 
dhóigh, ach briseann sé do chroí fosta ar dhóigh eile. 
As well as the obvious reduction in language input resulting from one parent 
emigrating seasonally or commuting long distances – with long-distance commuting 
having greatly increased since 2008 (Western Development Commission, 2018) – 
parents who remain at home are likely to have less time to spend with their children 
as they attend to daily chores on their own. Similarly, those parents who have to work 
overtime and/or without holidays in order to compensate for a loss in their 
organisation’s budget (see 5.9.1) or to be able to pay bills are all the more likely to 
delegate childminding duties to the sort of technologies described by many of my 
informants as being central to the propagation of English amongst Gaeltacht children 
(see 5.10). Furthermore, it is well attested in sociolinguistic literature that those who 
emigrate or even commute long distances are most likely to be drivers of language 
shift on returning to their home communities (Tabouret-Keller, 1972). 
While academic literature on emigration post-2008 invariably mentions employment 
as having been a key factor in prompting an individual to migrate (e.g. Glynn and 
O’Connell, 2017), the issue of debt repayment is rarely addressed. On many 
occasions I was told of people having to emigrate to ensure they could service debts, 
as the following quote describes: 
A: [T]hug mé faoi deara an méid tithe a bhí dúnta, dochreidte. Tithe nú amach 
as an bpíosa. Yeah go leor, leor, leor [in iarthar Chonamara]. Bheifeá ag goil 
thart agus d’fheicfeá teach a bhí nú as a bpíosa agus dúnta agus geata glasáilte 
agus nuair a chuirfeá ceist cé a bhí anseo is dream óg a thóg an teach b’fhéidir 
agus a bhfuil riaráistí morgáiste orthu nó a thuig gurb é an t-aon bhealach a bhí 
acub le morgáiste a íoc ná imeacht agus goil ag obair in áit éicínt agus tá siad 
ag íoc as teach atá folamh. 
As described in 5.3.1, property bubbles are a fundamental feature of neoliberal 
economics, as are ever-increasing levels of indebtedness, with debt being used to 
compensate for the low or stagnant wages that neoliberalism offers the majority of the 




emigration are therefore themselves intimately connected to the macro-economic 
forces that brought about the 2008 crash, forces which ultimately left people with no 
choice but to emigrate in order to keep their homes from being repossessed by 
recently bailed-out banks. 
The immense social cost of mass emigration, and the damage caused to linguistic 
vitality by such a disruption, is, then, intrinsically linked to neoliberalism in multiple 
intersectional ways. Several interviewees also linked outmigration to educational 
achievement, as the following section describes. 
5.5.1.1 Education and outmigration 
While typical narratives about emigration focus on the search for work, outmigration 
of young people from the Gaeltacht in the 21st century is also, I was told, very likely to 
be initially brought about by the requirements of gaining a third-level education. As 
with many developed nations, higher-level education is increasingly seen as a basic 
requirement for most employment in Ireland’s “knowledge economy” (OLRS, 2014), a 
point made by an interviewee in Donegal: 
L: [F]ágann siad an mheánscoil anseo agus téann siad ‘un an choláiste nó na 
hollscoile agus ansin imíonn siad amach as an cheantar. Faigheann siad a 
gcuid oideachais agus ansin le fostaíocht a fháil, bhuel, b’fhéidir go rachaidh 
siad go dtí an BA ach caithfidh tú máistreacht a bheith agat nó dochtúireacht 
sa lá atá inniu ann go díreach le goil isteach áit ar bith. 
This trend of education leading young people away from their home communities is 
one that Hindley observed in his 1990 work, although at that time it was primarily 
islanders pursuing secondary schooling on the nearby mainland that were forced to 
leave home for such reasons (1990: 69). Secondary level education is now available 
on all the Gaeltacht islands on which I conducted fieldwork, which is a source of great 
satisfaction amongst older islanders who remember having to leave at a very young 
age for boarding schools on the mainland. 
The increase in numbers studying at third-level during the recession (Department of 
Education and Skills, 2012: 4) meant, however, that greater numbers of school leavers 
than ever were likely to leave their home communities in order to obtain an education 




As was true when Hindley was writing, Gaeltacht natives who go on to get a higher 
level of education are unlikely to find satisfactory employment in their home 
communities. As one educated woman in her mid-20s from Galway explained when I 
asked her if she would like to live in the area she was brought up in: “[n]í bheinn sásta 
leis an bhfostaíocht atá ansin, ní bheadh aon rud ansin, bhuel níl ’s agam go deo, ach 
faoi láthair níl aon jab ann a bheadh suim agam ann”. 
An 18-year-old from the same area who had recently finished school and was 
considering going to university at the time of our interview echoed this sentiment: “níl 
tú goil cúrsa a dhéanamh, níl tú goil fáil le bheith i do chócaire agus teacht amach 
anseo agus goil ag cócaireacht agus pá uafásach”. 
The tendency for large numbers of young people to pursue higher education – which 
predates but was intensified by the recession – means that it is most likely to be those 
who do not have such educational achievements who are left in the remote rural 
communities that comprise most of the category A Gaeltacht (CEDRA, 2014: 30). As 
pointed out to me by a well-informed interviewee in Galway, this less-educated group 
were significantly more likely to be employed in those sectors most severely hit by the 
recession – with many working either in construction (which all but ceased during the 
recession), in small businesses (a high percentage of which closed down, particularly 
in rural areas), or in manufacturing plants (a great many of which moved overseas). 
The decline of these sectors is discussed in full in 5.3. As a result of such closures, 
much of the younger population of the Gaeltacht who had not already left their 
communities to gain higher education were forced to leave to find work elsewhere in 
the wake of the crash – meaning that both those with and without higher level 
qualifications have left these areas in recent years. 
Historically, in both Ireland and Scotland the self-confidence and assertiveness gained 
through higher-level education by native Irish or Gaelic speakers has had an important 
role in driving revitalisation efforts (TG4, 2004; MacDonald, 1997: 60). Such 
developments are, however, dependent on there being suitable employment to entice 
these individuals back to Gaeltacht communities, something which is not currently the 
case in the majority of the areas where my fieldwork took place, with long established 





As noted above, increased population mobility is a fundamental characteristic of 
globalisation. Consequently, the converse of the huge outmigration seen in Ireland 
since 2008 is a simultaneous in-migration, predominantly of people coming from 
significantly more deprived countries (Healy, 2015). While the number of immigrants 
from such areas that settle in the Gaeltacht is extremely low, it is not unusual for people 
to migrate from the Galltacht to the Gaeltacht, and the issue of in-migration as a 
counterpoint to wide-scale emigration is therefore one that must be addressed. 
As mentioned in 5.4.1, on several occasions in both Donegal and Galway I was told 
of business owners in strongly Irish-speaking communities employing eastern 
European immigrants due to the fact that they were willing to work for relatively low 
pay: 
G: [S]in an cineál duine a thiocfas amach anseo [tá siad ag iarraidh] ciúnas, 
introversion sórt, nó Lithuanians le goil ag obair sa hotel. 
B: An bhfuil mórán Lithuanians san óstán? 
G: Chuile bhliain tiocann daoine nú amach. 
B: Muise, agus cén fáth nach bhfaigheann siad muintir an oileáin? 
G: Mar tá siad in ann iad a íoc go dona agus tá siad in ann goil ag béiceacht 
orthu. 
While the numbers of economic immigrants in such areas is low, in many Gaeltacht 
communities there is a relatively large number of people who have relocated there as 
a lifestyle choice, as mentioned in the above extract (see also Smith-Christmas, 2014). 
This trend is often a by-product of the tourist sector, with immigrants of this type very 
frequently having initially visited these communities as tourists (Phillips and Thomas, 
2001: 75-6; section 5.4). 
As explained in 5.2.3, unemployment in much of the Gaeltacht is significantly higher 
than the national average. This fact, when combined with both the low incomes of 
many of those who are employed and the overinflated price of housing throughout 
Ireland (itself typical of neoliberal economies – see 5.3.1), means that locals are often 




people from outside the community. The following extract from an interview with a 
businessman in Galway explains this phenomenon: 
P: Tá teach ansin thiar . . . Agus bhí mo dhuine ag ceapadh, an auctioneer, go 
bhfaigheadh sé 145,000-150,000 ar an teach . . . Agus dúirt [an t-úinéir] cuir 
isteach 170,000, tá mé ag iarraidh 170,000. Díoladh é ar 270,000. Agus daoine 
áitiúla ní raibh an t-airgead acub lena cheannacht. ‘Sé a cheannaigh é ná beirt 
as Gaillimh, cé go raibh dhá theach acub agus dhíol siad an dá theach. So an 
rud atá ag tarlú ná níl daoine áitiúla in ann cead pleanála a fháil so níl siad in 
ann teach a thógáil ar thalamh atá acub féin agus ansin nuair a théann siad le 
teach a cheannacht tá an praghas ró-ard because ní féidir pleanáil a fháil ar an 
suíomh atá acub agus teach a thóigeáil. Agus ansin tá an demand chomh mór, 
mar gheall gur mhéadaigh luachannaí tithe sa gcathair i nGaillimh chomh méid 
sin, má tá teach a’d i nGaillimh, agus go háirid má cheannaigh tú ag an am 
ceart é… 
B: Déanfaidh tú meall.  
P: Déanfaidh tú…exactly! Agus ciallaíonn sé go bhfuil na daoine áitiúla, go leor 
acub atá as obair cheana féin, diabhal mórán seans acub. 
B: Tá siad ag fágáil dá bharr? 
P: Bhuel níl aon rogha acub. Níl siad ag iarraidh fágáil. Tá mise breá 
compordach le daoine atá ag iarraidh imeacht ar feadh roinnt blianta agus 
cheapfainn gur rud maith é sin . . . Ach má tá siad ag iarraidh teacht ar ais go 
mbeadh deis acub sin a dhéanamh. Agus má tá siad ag iarraidh fanacht sa 
chéad áit gan imeacht thar sáile go mbeadh sin acub chomh maith céanna. 
Through this process the structural issues that militate against the creation of well-
paid employment in the Gaeltacht mean that what available housing there is often 
comes to be owned by well-off migrants, retirees, etc. who are statistically unlikely to 
speak Irish (Fóram Chois Fharraige um Pleanáil Teanga, 2016: 7). Williams (2014: 
244) describes a similar phenomenon in Welsh-speaking areas. 
Another cause for someone to move to the Gaeltacht is exogamy, itself very often a 
consequence of economic restructuring (Nelde et al., 1996: 6). This was frequently 
noted by informants as a factor contributing to the decline of Irish in recent years, as 
seen in this quote from a middle-aged interviewee on an island in Donegal: 
S: Tá an teanga, seans go bhfuil sí ag fáil bháis, nó go bhfuil sí ag imeacht. 
Because tháinig strainséirí, tháinig cúpla duine, phós bean s’agam as Albain     
. . . tháinig cúpla duine mar a deirim, bean as an Rúis, tá cúpla, bean as an 
Fhrainc, tá traidhfil daoine a phós ar an oileán . . . Agus tá, tá – ‘dé an dóigh a 




Relatedly, Holmes has observed that “[m]arriage to a majority group member is the 
quickest way of ensuring shift to the majority group language for the children” (2013: 
65). 
Despite saying that Irish was the language of her peer group, when asked whether 
this was the case for younger age cohorts one woman in her mid-twenties on an island 
in Galway also noted the Anglicising effect of in-migration: 
S: [A]nois go bhfuil níos mó daoine is dóigh ón mórthír hréis bogadh isteach ar 
an oileán go bhfuil níos mó páistí ann agus Béarla an teanga dhúchais atá acu 
. . . Agus in áit a bheith ag cur iachall ar na páistí sin Gaeilge a labhairt 
iompraíonn na páistí [áitiúla] ar an mBéarla, is dóigh le rudaí a dhéanamh níos 
éasca dóibh. 
In a community in Galway that is popular with tourists I was also told that English 
speakers who moved into the area and have not learned Irish, even after many years, 
make up a relatively significant portion of the community. As in Donegal, these are 
often people who have married someone from the area and who allegedly intended to 
learn Irish, but as time passed and the community became accustomed to interacting 
with them in English their dedication started to wane. One woman described this 
challenging situation to me as follows: 
E: Tá duine eicínt i gclann chuile dhuine ag an bpointe seo goil a phósadh duine 
gan a bheith sórt láidir faoin nGaeilge agus, abair, ansin an chéad rud a déarfar 
leat “céard faoin duine sa teach a’d féin?” Tá ’s a’d. Níl mórán ar féidir leat a 
dhéanamh faoi . . . Ach ansin bíonn an rud pearsanta freisin, mar má phósann 
mac nó iníon le duine gan Ghaeilge, tá an-jab ag an duine sa mbaile a bhéas 
orthu a rá caithfidh tusa Gaeilge a labhairt . . . Caithfidh tú sórt am a thabhairt 
dhóib – sin deich mbliana, agus má chaithfidh tú 10 mbliana a thabhairt do – ar 
a laghad 10 mbliana – má chaithfidh 10 mbliana a thabhairt do chuile dhuine 
bhfuil ’s a’d le í a fhoghlaim...Ach níl ’s a’m. Is dóigh dá mbeadh plean ann. Go 
leor de na daoine a thagann isteach go dtí an áit – siod anois b’fhéidir nach 
dream a mbaineann go díreach le muintir an oileáin ach go leor acub tiocandar 
isteach agus ar dtús cheapfadar go bhfuileadar an-dáiríre faoi agus 
breathnaíonn sé go mbíonn agus beidheadar ag goil chuig ranganna. Ach 
taobh istigh de dó nó trí de bhlianta, fiú ann dhá bhliain, beidh sé sin caite san 
aer – “tá muid istigh anois agus tá muid glactha leis agus is cuma”. Agus ní 
bhíonn a fhios a’d an é muid féin is ciontach leis, go ndeireann muid “á sure tá 
sibh alright”. Sórt ar dtús beidh tú ag rá “bhfuil tú ag foghlaim Gaeilge?” agus 
ansin tar éis scaithimh déanann tú dearmad, is beag nach bhfuil an oiread sin 
cleachtadh a’d ag labhairt Béarla leob nach gcuimhneoidh tú air. 
Despite there being some provision of Irish classes for such incomers in many areas 




funded by ÚnaG, in accordance with other recent research I was often told that very 
few of those who moved to the Gaeltacht ever attain fluency in Irish – in Cois Fharraige 
the figure is just 20% (Fóram Chois Fharraige um Pleanáil Teanga, 2016: 6, 27). In 
this way, in-migration creates a steadily increasing pool of non-Irish speakers in even 
the strongest remaining Gaeltacht areas. 
The high levels of emigration seen since 2008 have the potential for greatly 
exacerbating this trend in coming years. As mentioned in 5.3.4 and 5.5.1, emigrants 
who returned during previous periods of prosperity and brought English-speaking 
families often contributed to the Anglicisation of the Gaeltacht. Nonetheless, many of 
the children of migrants who returned in previous decades and who found themselves 
living in an Irish-dominant community ultimately became Irish speakers themselves. 
Were a similar phenomenon to occur again in coming years, however, it is unlikely 
that there is any community where Irish is strong enough to be able to assimilate 
incomers in this fashion. As one of my interviewees observed: 
É: Má imíonn siad tamallt fada agus má phósann siad daoine ansin má bhíonn 
siad thart anseo níl an t-infreastruchtúr ann le cuidiú leo ó thaobh na teanga – 
rud nach raibh ann sna seachtóidí, ach an difear atá ann anois go bhfuil i bhfad 
níos lú cainteoirí aonteangacha [agus] pobail láidre ann is a bhí sna seachtóidí. 
So tá sé cosúil leis an seanrud . . . who’s immersing whom? 
Rather than being able to linguistically integrate the families of returned immigrants, it 
would seem likely that without significant provision to address this issue, such an influx 
will spur local children to speak English even more than they already do (see 5.10). 
“Má thig siad ar ais beidh impleachtaí tromchúiseacha don teanga. Ceist ollmhór atá 
ann” as another interviewee stated. Despite a welcome upturn in the economy in 
recent years, thus far there has been no public discourse about this “ceist ollmhór”, or 
attempts to plan for the eventuality of large numbers of emigrants possibly returning 
home in coming years. Although a significant risk, none of those language plans which 
have thus far been completed in accordance with the Gaeltacht Act 2012 (see 5.8) 
make any provisions for dealing with such a possibility – for instance by recommending 
an integration model similar to that in use in Wales (Ní Thuairisg, 2012). 
5.6 Organised opposition to state policies 
Shortly after the first austerity budgets were implemented, many in the Irish media 




immediately following the crash this apparent passivity led to the emergence of an oft-
repeated assertion that “the Irish don’t protest” (Magill, 2013; Thejournal.ie, 2013b). 
Despite the lack of more militant actions of the type seen elsewhere in the EU at the 
time, by 2009 there had nonetheless been several significant mobilizations opposing 
the cuts, including marches of more than 100,000 people and a one-day strike of over 
250,000 public servants. Various sectors of civil society mobilised in defence of their 
interests during this period, including pensioners, students and the parents and staff 
of DEIS schools for the disadvantaged. Building on an earlier failed boycott of the 
household tax that took place between 2011-13, during the research of this PhD a 
mass civil disobedience campaign defeated the imposition of water charges, which 
were widely understood as stealth taxes designed to facilitate later privatisation of the 
water infrastructure. 
Despite this, resistance to state policies was undeniably more muted in Ireland than 
elsewhere in Europe during this period, never escalating to the point of large-scale 
riots or property destruction. Conservative commentators attributed popular 
impassiveness to the widespread acceptance of the need for fiscal restraint, combined 
with the legacy of Catholic deference (Irish Independent, 2012). 
As Grasso and Giugni explain, however, “neoliberal contexts tend to be characterised 
by more individualised understandings of poverty, thus depressing protest action” 
(2016: 667). Furthermore, as Allen and Boyle note, “political responses to an economic 
crisis are shaped by the manner in which the mass of people entered it – their 
experience of prior struggles and the existence or non-existence of substantial left 
minorities” (2013: 128). The conditions in which the Irish working class entered the 
crisis, however, did not in any way prepare them for the challenges of combating 
austerity. The social partnership model of industrial relations that came to prominence 
throughout the Celtic Tiger saw a decline in large-scale industrial action, as disputes 
were dealt with by a professional managerial class employed by the trade unions. 
Concomitant to the adoption of this conservative, clientelist model of negotiation by 
the union leadership, union density more than halved between 1980 and 2007 
(McDonough, 2010: 452). Combined, these developments resulted in the annual 
average of work days lost per 1,000 salaried employees falling enormously from 501 




by 2008 the vast majority of the Irish working class had little experience of collective 
action or mobilisations in defence of common causes (Allen and Boyle, 2013: 134-43), 
meaning the only way to create effective resistance “was to start from the ground up” 
(Bisset, 2015: 178), a time-consuming process, albeit one which eventually culminated 
in the successful water charges campaign. 
Although they never had a place at the social partnership negotiating table (unlike 
other organisations in the voluntary and community development sectors – see Ó 
Murchú, 2003), Irish-language organisations nonetheless adopted a managerial 
lobbying strategy throughout the 1990s. They were thus arguably in an even weaker 
position than other sectors to defend their interests when faced with the drastic cuts 
described in Chapter 4. While the post-2008 period did see some important 
mobilisations of the Irish-speaking community, these, as will be seen, made no attempt 
at connecting their sectional struggles with the wider anti-austerity movements that 
emerged during this time. 
Despite various academic commentators calling for Irish-language activists to link their 
efforts with those of other social justice and environmental movements (see 2.6), such 
an approach remained very much a minority position throughout this time, as it did 
before the crisis. One organisation that attempted to resist the sectionalism of 
mainstream language groups was Misneach, of which I am an active member. Due, 
however, to my personal involvement in this group, space constraints, and Misneach 
being a relatively small group primarily confined to the cities, this organisation will not 
be discussed in further detail. 
While language issues remained relatively marginal, many of the national campaigns 
against austerity had a notable presence in Gaeltacht areas, including the anti-water 
charges campaign, which began in the Donegal Gaeltacht, as locals often proudly told 
me. There was also important localised resistance during the early years of the crisis 
(against the closure of post offices and health service cuts in Donegal, for instance), 
although the majority of these single-issue campaigns occurred before I began 
researching this PhD and I have only limited second-hand knowledge of them. As this 
thesis is premised on the interconnectedness of language vitality and wider 
socioeconomic issues, I am reluctant to present an overly “linguacentric” view of 




following sections will focus largely on those campaigns that specifically aimed at 
maintaining language-focused supports, namely Guth na Gaeltachta and Dearg le 
Fearg. I will also discuss campaigns regarding transport links for the Árann and 
Toraigh islands in which I was a participant-observer. While not explicitly linked to 
austerity, such developments are intimately connected to the public procurement 
regulations of the EU, which, as Kunzlik (2013) demonstrates, are themselves deeply 
neoliberal, and as such are worthy of attention. 
5.6.1 Guth na Gaeltachta  
The Guth na Gaeltachta (“Voice of the Gaeltacht”) group, active 2009-13, was founded 
in Donegal in response to the recommendations of An Bord Snip Nua (see 4.2.1), 
which proposed extremely severe cuts to Gaeltacht funding. Guth na Gaeltachta 
explicitly aimed to resist these recommendations, although it also campaigned on the 
position of the language in the education system and on other language-related 
issues. 
The group drew attention to the severity of the Bord Snip’s recommendations 
regarding the Gaeltacht, regularly appearing in the Irish-language media and 
organising information stalls and meetings in Donegal, Galway and Dublin (although 
not, to my knowledge, anywhere in Munster). In co-operation with Conradh na Gaeilge, 
they organised a series of lobbying days which were attended by several dozen 
politicians and explained the implications of the proposals to abolish ÚnaG, the 
department responsible for the Gaeltacht and related measures discussed in Chapter 
4 (Politics.ie, 2011). 
Several of my interviewees spoke of Guth na Gaeltachta with great enthusiasm, as 
seen in the following extract: 
L: Bhí fís ar dóigh ag Guth na Gaeltachta. Bhí tábhacht millteanach ag baint 
leo. An rud a bhí ann bhí guth aontaithe a bhí ansin . . . [N]a daoine a thoisigh 
é bhí siad ceannródach, chonaic siad sin an gá a bhí le grúpa a d’ardódh guth 
ar son cearta mhuintir na Gaeltachta agus le seirbhísí a choinneáil in san 
cheantar anseo. Rinne siad obair fiánta, obair mhór mhaith . . . [B]a feachtas ar 
dóigh a bhí ann, feachtas tras-phobail, tras-pháirtí, ní raibh baint ar bith ag 
páirtithe polaitíochta ann. Ón bhun aníos a tháinig sé agus bhí sé dírithe ar 
scoilteacha Gaeltachta agus achan rud agus bhí ionaid phobail agus bhí mná 
tí [ann]. Fiú cuid de na cruinnithe a raibh mé aige . . . bhí scaifte istigh agus bhí 




i do shuí istigh in seomra. Agus in amantaí bhí díospóireacht te teasaí ag dul 
ar aghaidh agus bhí daoine ag tabhairt amach, ach é sin ar leataobh bhí sé go 
maith díreach go raibh comhluadar ann agus daoine ann agus an fhís 
chomónta seo acu. Agus bhí daoine ag ráit, bhuel, tá muid anseo le chéile, 
y’know ar scáth a chéile a mhaireann na daoine, bhfuil ’s agat an tseanfhocal? 
Agus tá ceann eile ansin “ní neart go cur le chéile” – má tá muid aontaithe tá 
an láidreacht sin ann . . . [Bhí muid] ag cur in éadan an Bord Snip . . . ag ráit 
druid seo is seo is an t-iomlán dearg! 
The group was thus clearly a valuable development for the Gaeltacht during a very 
difficult time. As with the Dearg le Fearg movement discussed in the following section 
and the state-funded language organisations, in their anxiousness to declare 
themselves a “non-political campaign” to avoid the influence of party politics, Guth na 
Gaeltachta eschewed links with comparable organisations which could have aided in 
building a broad-based campaign of resistance to austerity in general. This 
sectionalism is typical of other areas of civil society in Ireland, with there being few 
instances of groups that attempted to draw links between the multitude of single-issue 
campaigns each expressing their individual grievances (Allen and O’Boyle, 2013: 
128). One former participant explained his frustration with this position as follows: 
M: [C]hreid mé go mór i nGuth na Gaeltachta. Ach ag cúpla cruinniú d’ardaigh 
mé an cheist, bhí siadsan in éadan ciorraithe in sa Ghaeltacht, right, in earnáil 
na Gaeltachta. Ach . . . thóg mise an rud gur chóir do Ghuth na Gaeltachta 
fanacht mar Ghuth na Gaeltachta ach a bheith páirteach sa rud níos leithne in 
éadan cúrsaí déine agus ciorraithe . . . [B]hí mórshiúl mór i Sligeach, agus bhí 
bratach mór acu, rud slachtmhar. . . [A]gus ag an chruinniú dúirt mé gur chóir 
go mbeadh ionadaí ó Ghuth na Gaeltachta i láthair ag an mhórshiúil. Agus dúirt 
siad “ó no, no, níl baint aige sin leis an Ghaeltacht, níl baint aige sin leis an 
Ghaeilg”. Agus dúirt mé no but tá baint aige le…Y’know tá lucht na Gaeilge 
iontach maith ag rá caithfidh daoine seasamh linn, agus aontaím leo, ba chóir 
go seasfadh daoine leis an teanga, ach nuair nach bhfuil lucht na teangan sásta 
seasamh le daoine eile, then tuigim do na daoine eile fosta: “caidé a rinn lucht 
na Gaeilg dúinn?” So an rud a bhí mise ag rá just bíodh bratach linn agus 
siúlfaidh muid agus look tá mise ag dul go Sligeach anyway, an bhfuil cead 
agam duine inteacht eile a fháil agus iompróidh an bheirt an bratach? No. 
As well as reflecting the general tendency towards the sectionalisation of social 
movements in Ireland, this reluctance to be seen as overtly political may result from 
the belief occasionally expressed by commentators that the politicisation of Irish 
(particularly in the North of Ireland) has been to its detriment. The fact that Guth na 
Gaeltachta began in Ulster, and in an area frequented by republicans seeking respite 




Despite their sectional approach and very moderate tactics, Guth na Gaeltachta was 
nonetheless clearly seen as a threat by the state. Their first spokesperson, who was 
employed as a gardener in a national park which is under the management of a state 
body, received a letter from the department responsible for the Gaeltacht threatening 
him with dismissal from his job if he did not refrain from publicly criticising state policy. 
This threat proved effective, leading him to resign his role with the organisation. His 
successor too was similarly threatened into silence: 
S: [T]á an chuma air gurb éard a tharla ná mar gheall go raibh an 
cheannasaíocht ag obair le Acadamh na hOllscolaíochta Gaeltachta more or 
less gur dúradh leob bígí ciúin, tá muid ag brath ar Roinn na Gaeltachta agus 
ar Údarás na Gaeltachta ar airgead so tá bhur bpostanna i mbaol anseo so níl 
aon chead a bheith ag caitheamh anuas ar [pholasaithe stáit]. 
Despite these threats being reported in both English- and Irish-language national 
media (Gaelport.com, 2012; Gaelscéal, 2013: 2), they provoked no opposition from 
either the wider Irish-language or trade union movements. While perhaps somewhat 
hyperbolic in his sentiments, one of my interviewees pointed out that the small amount 
of attention this case received was not proportionate to its significance: 
M: [N]uair a chuir siad an litir chuig [an chéad urlabhraí] ag bagairt é a bhriseadh 
amach as a phost, léirigh sé sin cé chomh imeallach is atá an Ghaeilg agus 
ceist na Gaeltachta in saol polaitiúil na tíre. Dá dtarlódh a leithéid in Ros Comáin 
nó Ballydehob, áit ar bith, go mbeadh urlabhraí grúpa pobail a bhí ag iarraidh 
an pobal a eagrú in éadan ciorraithe rialtais . . . de thairbhe go raibh sé fostaithe 
mar ghairdinéir ag an OPW, gur bhagair siad é a bhriseadh as a phost, dá 
dtarlódh sé sin in áit ar bith eile sa tír, bheadh na ceardchumainn, bheadh an 
eite chlé, bheadh na páipéirí lán le altannaí, bheadh David Norris fiú, bheadh 
ráiteas aige! But tharla sé! D’éirigh sé as! Agus an té a ceapadh mar urlabhraí 
ina dhiaidh, cé go ndearna sé é gan ainm, bagraíodh eisean a bhriseadh as a 
phost . . . Agus cuireadh deireadh le Guth na Gaeltachta. 
This lack of solidarity from the wider Irish-language movement highlights the 
apprehensiveness of the state-funded language organisations to take a 
confrontational position at a time when they too were facing extreme rationalisation 
measures (see 4.2.6), and ensured the state was easily able to control a key 
opposition movement in the Gaeltacht during the recession. 
Such fearfulness of those with careers and incomes at risk is, of course, far from 
unique to the Irish-language sector. The precarious nature of the employment market 




with a social safety net which has been greatly reduced in recent years, make it much 
less likely that people will risk their livelihoods by challenging state policies (Grasso 
and Giugni, 2016). Further to being fundamental to the emergence of nation-states 
and capitalism more generally (Thompson, 1991), the suppression of dissent has been 
a central requirement of neoliberalism since its inception as a political project (Klein, 
2007), and was notably intensified post-2008 (Bruff, 2016), including in the Gaeltacht 
and elsewhere in the Irish state. 
The fact that many of those involved in Irish-language campaigning are employed by 
state-funded institutions made it particularly straightforward to limit Guth na 
Gaeltachta’s efforts. While it is from the ranks of the middle classes often employed in 
the public sector that the impetus for language revitalisation has typically come (Jones, 
1998: 314; MacNamara, 1971: 85; Wright, 1996: 43), such individuals – teachers, for 
instance – are also easily silenced when their demands come into conflict with state 
policies. The fact that the implementation of neoliberal measures requires the 
suppression of dissent therefore sees it inflict a double blow on areas such as the 
Gaeltacht: it both weakens the supports on which marginal communities so often 
depend and simultaneously punishes attempts to resist this attrition. 
Containing as it did many individuals committed to the maintenance of the Gaeltacht 
as a distinct linguistic community, Guth na Gaeltachta may seem to fit the standard 
description of a post-materialist “new social movement” (Touraine, 1981; Melucci, 
1989). Due to the state’s economic support for the Gaeltacht, however, the group also 
included many participants who are materially dependent on the vitality of Irish in the 
Gaeltacht, including those who host attendees at Irish-language summer colleges or 
who teach Irish in third-level institutions. As such Guth na Gaeltachta could perhaps 
more accurately be defined as a materialist, “survival” cause rather than one of “self-
expression”, to use Inglehart’s well-known typology (1997). 
As well as seeing issues that communities felt worth raising at the political level totally 
ignored, such a response from the state destroys the sort of community initiative and 
self-confidence that is essential for language revitalisation (see 5.3.5.2). This was 
evident in the opinions of several of my interviewees, who noted the general sense of 




C: Is aisteach liomsa gur tharla Cearta Sibhialta na Gaeltachta ariamh ag 
inseacht na fírinne dhuit, nuair a bhreathnaím ar an meon atá i gConamara 
anois. Airím go bhfuil an troid imí’ astu uilig uilig. Cibé cén sórt, céard a bhuail 
na daoine óga an t-am sin, tá ’s agam nach raibh mórán acub [ach] bíonn go 
leor [den phobal] sórt ag glacadh le rudaí mar thá le fada an lá. 
I was told of a similar state of disempowerment in Donegal: 
B: [S]ílim go bhfuil an troid cineál imithe in sa phobal, níl troid ar bith iontu . . . 
Sílim díreach go bhfuil, bhfuil ’s agat, an pobal cineál tinn de bheith ag troid i 
gcónaí. Is dócha nuair a dhéantar dearmad ar – tá sin cineál drámatúil – ach 
nuair a dhéantar dearmad ar cheantar cad chuige a mbeadh siad ag iarraidh a 
bheith ag troid faoi na táillí uisce nó fiú an lá Dearg le Fearg? 
Similarly, during the writing of this chapter a RnaG presenter prompted much 
discussion in the Irish-language media by claiming that the people of the Gaeltacht 
were utterly “cloíte” (“defeated”), accepting of every insult and disregard from the state 
(Tuairisc.ie, 2018h). Although historical experiences of underdevelopment meant that 
Gaeltacht communities were probably already somewhat disempowered before the 
crash, as Cheshire and Lawrence (2005) and Harris (2014) have shown, 
neoliberalism, and the effects of recent austerity measures, have further 
disenfranchised groups that were historically marginalised. As with many issues 
described in this chapter, disempowerment of Gaeltacht communities has numerous 
causes, with the recession having exacerbated previously existing tendencies. Such 
disempowerment, however, clearly links to the decline in community pride described 
in 5.3.5.2 and the wider trend towards social atomisation that has become so profound 
in recent years, a phenomenon itself due in no small part to austerity and the inequality 
that is a fundamental trait of neoliberalism (Lancee and Werfhorst, 2011; Scharf, 
2015). 
It is ironic that at the same time as the state was threatening members of Guth na 
Gaeltachta, an autonomous Gaeltacht initiative to maintain Gaeltacht communities, 
the Gaeltacht Act 2012, which is predicated on voluntary community activism, was 
being enacted. As a former member of Guth na Gaeltachta told me: 
A: An teachtaireacht atá muid ag fáil ná déanaigí na rudaí seo [leis an bpleanáil 
teanga] ach ná bígí ag súil le aon cheannasaíocht nó aon rud uainne. In fact, 
b’fhéidir gur bagairt a bhfaighfeá. Sin teachtaireacht iontach láidir mar léiríonn 
sé do dhaoine níl an stát dul a sheasamh leat. Tá sé deacair go leor bheith mar 
cheannasaí . . . teanga, sílim féin. Tuigeann muid uilig é sin. ‘Cause fiú sa 




daoine atá ag breathnú amach ar son na teanga, breathnaíonn daoine orainn, 
in ionad a bheith ag breathnú orainn mar dhaoine atá fadradharcach agus atá 
ag déanamh an rud ceart . . . breathnaíonn daoine orainn mar cranks! Agus níl 
sin dul a chuidiú leis an mheon sin a athrú. Cén incentive atá ann do ghrúpaí 
pobail, nó do dhaoine aonara seasamh suas don teanga? 
The bitterness engendered by the suppression of Guth na Gaeltachta was clearly far 
from conducive to promoting the voluntarism the state claims to want, and which is 
necessary for language revitalisation, and is perhaps one further reason why an ÚnaG 
executive claimed that recruiting volunteers has been the most challenging aspect of 
the language planning process described in 5.8 below. 
5.6.2 Dearg le Fearg 
An important development during the period covered by this thesis was the emergence 
of the Dearg le Fearg (“Red with Anger”) movement in early 2014. Organised primarily 
by the state-funded lobby group Conradh na Gaeilge, Dearg le Fearg began in 
response to the unexpected resignation of the Coimisinéir Teanga in protest at the 
state’s inadequate implementation of the Official Languages Act 2003 and the 20-Year 
Strategy for the Irish Language (see 4.2.2; 4.2.9). After a series of large organisational 
meetings, the first of several marches, titled Lá Mór na Gaeilge, took place in Dublin 
in February 2014. With some 6,000 attendees, this was the first language-related 
march on this scale in almost a decade. Being largely a product of the language 
movement outside the Gaeltacht, Dearg le Fearg at times struggled to ensure the 
participation of Gaeltacht residents, as described below. Nonetheless, a subsequent 
march which took place in the Galway Gaeltacht was the largest protest in any 
Gaeltacht area in many years, having some 1,000 attendees (Gaelport.com, 2014). 
The Dublin march officially aimed to oppose the merger of the office of the Coimisinéir 
Teanga with that of the Ombudsman, but also served as an opportunity for those long 
since dissatisfied with state language policy to voice their frustration. The merger of 
these two offices, first proposed in 2011 as part of wider public service rationalisation 
measures (Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 2011, Appendix 2: 7; see 
also 4.2.9), ultimately did not take place, with a Seanad debate on the matter noting 
that it would not reduce expenditure, instead being likely to increase costs to the state 




following the Dublin protest a similar demonstration took place in Belfast, where the 
focus was on the demand for a language act for the North of Ireland. 
Despite the obvious connection between this proposed merger and the public service 
reform that took place in response to the recession, it is notable that the Dearg le 
Fearg campaign did not link its demands to the wider economic context being 
experienced by the country at the time. In early 2014, eight months before I began this 
PhD, I attended the large day-long gathering organised by Conradh na Gaeilge at 
which the Dearg le Fearg march was first proposed. Not one of the invited speakers, 
nor any of the dozens of questions and comments from the floor made any connection 
between the recession or austerity, then still severe, and the plight of the language. 
Instead, as with the attitudes towards the use of Irish in the civil service discussed in 
4.2.9, language policy reforms were framed as attacks on Irish-qua-Irish, the result of 
those in power allegedly being personally ill-disposed to the language. The Coimisinéir 
himself, however, did note during his resignation speech that his office was severely 
under-resourced and under-staffed, their budget having been cut by 45% since 2008 
(Oireachtas Éireann, 2013b). 
One of my interviewees described the disconnect between the demands of the Irish-
language movement and the issues facing Irish society more generally as follows: 
M: [T]á an caidreamh atá ann idir an Ghaeltacht agus an chuid eile d’Éirinn, tá 
sé aisteach mar na heagraíochtaí a roghnaíonn muid le hamharc i ndiaidh na 
Gaeltachta, is cuma leotha faoin chuid eile den tír. Agus is cuma leis an chuid 
eile den tír fán Ghaeltacht. So tá cineál symbiotic relationship ansin, tá siad ag 
déanamh neamhaird ar a chéile! 
As with the case of Guth na Gaeltachta described above, the sectional, de-politicised 
analysis of the language movement highlights the degree to which Irish is understood 
as an individual, sectoral pursuit, not something to be fought for as part of a broader 
struggle to resist the individualisation of public goods. This apolitical approach is likely 
also connected to Conradh na Gaeilge’s dependence on state funding, which ensures 
it will never be particularly confrontational, for fear of meeting a fate similar to that of 
groups like Pléaráca (see 5.9.2). 
Foreshadowing the discussion of the lack of participation in the language planning 




at length with me the difficulties faced in mobilising people to attend the Dearg le Fearg 
marches. This difficulty was, she said, particularly pronounced in her home community 
in west Galway, with many seeing little need to protest for language rights: 
U: [N]íl mé ag iarraidh a bheith i mo negative Nancy faoi chuile shórt ach nuair 
a bhí muid ag plé leotha, go háirid leis an gcéad cheann, Lá Mór na Gaeilge, 
mother of God! I think go raibh daoine ag iarraidh orainn goil thart, iad a 
thóigeáil ón leaba, an bricfeasta a réiteach dhótha, agus iad a chrochadh ar do 
dhroim ar feadh an mórshiúil. ‘Cause bhí muid ag cur busanna saor in aisce ar 
fáil. Ba chuma linne cé mhéad busanna a bhí ann. Ar a laghad, y’know, dúirt 
muid gheobhaidh muid an t-airgead . . . Cuirfidh muid imeachtaí ar siúil [le 
hairgead a bhailiú], but just faigh na daoine. 
The failure of the language movement to impress upon people the extent of the 
language shift currently taking place and to promote the potential of effective language 
planning interventions to benefit Gaeltacht communities as communities, regardless 
of the language issue, was also obvious in her sentiments, which very much accord 
with my own experiences at the time: 
U: [B]hí muide . . . goil i dteangmháil le an oiread daoine agus just níor thuig 
siad cén fáth a raibh muid dhá dhéanamh. Níor thuig siad, níor thuig siad go 
raibh baint ar bith acu lena saol féin. Mar gheall bhí siad ag rá “cén sórt cearta 
daonna? Tá muid ag labhairt na Gaeilge! Níl siad ag baint uainn an teanga” 
agus rudaí mar sin. Ní fheiceann siad, mura gcuireann sé isteach orthu ón 
nóiméad a éiríonn siad ar maidin go dtí an nóiméad a théann siad a chodladh 
san oíche ní fheiceann siad é . . . Bhí duine de na mná tí ag tabhairt amach 
yeah faoin gcaoi nach bhfuil airgead dhá chaitheamh sna Gaeltachtaí . . . Agus 
like mar a deir [a máthair] “bhuel nuair a bhí agai’ a bheith ag an mórshiúil níor 
sheas sib’”. Agus ‘sé an freagra ceart. Ach an freagra a thug sí ar ais ná “sure 
níor thuig mé cén fáth a raibh sib’ dhá dhéanamh”. 
This disjoint between the minority involved in language activism and the wider 
community of Irish speakers in the Gaeltacht is a fundamental challenge facing 
revitalisation efforts. As Fennell (1981a) argued, so long as the majority of the 
population of the Gaeltacht lacks a strong commitment to revitalisation, the best efforts 
of (typically urbanite) language activists are likely to have little impact on the fate of 
the Gaeltacht as a distinct linguistic area. With Irish no longer being the unmarked 
vernacular of the majority of the Gaeltacht (Ó Giollagáin and Charlton, 2015a), there 
is certainly merit to this sentiment. While originally referring to the situation of the 
Gaeltacht in the 1970s, when applied in the present-day Fennell’s argument 
nonetheless raises the greater question of what is preventing the development of such 




shift people’s concern from post-materialist issues such as language to the realm of 
material survival is well established in the sociological literature on both civic 
engagement and attitude formation (Putnam, 2001: 189-203; Voicu et al., 2016). The 
tendency for crises in neoliberal states to often discourage participation in protest 
movements rather than radicalise populations into action is also well documented 
(Grasso and Giugni, 2016). 
Although the momentum behind Dearg le Fearg eventually petered out over the course 
of 2014, “An Dream Dearg”, the vibrant campaign group which emerged in 2016 with 
the goal of securing a language act for the North of Ireland, has, nevertheless, taken 
many of its cues (at least in terms of branding) from the Dearg le Fearg campaign. 
Assessing their impact retrospectively, many of my interviewees who attended the 
2014 marches had rather lukewarm evaluations of their success: 
M: [N]íl ’s agam cé mhéad bus a bhí le goil go Bleá Cliath, agus go Béal Feirste 
tamallt ina dhiaidh. Caidé a tharla? Fuck all. Fuair muid cúpla péas a bhfuil 
Gaeilg acu, sin é – cúpla Garda a bhfuil Gaeilg acu. But níor tharla rud ar bith 
mór. 
While not quite as negative, a Conradh na Gaeilge organiser also expressed mixed 
feelings regarding the marches: 
B: Tá sé deacair a rá, I mean nuair a fheiceann tú an rud atá ag tarlú le Aer 
Árann [see 5.6.3.1] caithfear ceist a chur. Cheapfainn go raibh éisteacht áiride 
ann, fiú an cinneadh a bhí ann oifig an Choimisinéara Teanga a fhágáil 
neamhspleách, bhí sin an-tábhachtach. Fiú ó thaobh cheapachán an 
choimisinéara nua . . . d’fhéadfadh siad duine i bhfad níos laige a cheapadh, 
bhí ionadh orm go raibh ceapachán mar sin ann. So like, tá sé deacair a rá cén 
éisteacht a bhí ann. 
A senior employee in the office of the Coimisinéir Teanga told me himself that Dearg 
le Fearg was an important development, which, while perhaps not making specific 
gains, at least helped raise the profile of his office and show the state the support they 
have from the Irish-speaking community: 
A: [Ó] thaobh seasamh na hoifige, I think gur chuidigh sé go mór le láidreacht 
na hoifige seo, go bhfuil tuiscint ann go bhfuil glór ag an oifig seo, go bhfuil lucht 
labhairt na Gaeilge ag éisteacht leis an méid atá an oifig seo ag rá, agus go 
bhfuil tuiscint ag an oifig seo ar céard atá ag teastáil . . . [S]ílim go bhfuil tuiscint 




Despite this, since his appointment a great many of the second Coimisinéir’s 
statements have echoed those of his predecessor, with him frequently claiming that 
his office is being systematically disregarded and undermined (see 4.2.9). 
While its results were far from decisive, then, and although such small marches in 
isolation are easily ignored by the state, Dearg le Fearg was still a high point for the 
language movement during the period discussed in this thesis. Indeed, the intervening 
years have seen calls by activists for such protests to be repeated, especially in light 
of Bliain na Gaeilge, a “yearlong celebration of Irish” organised in 2018 to coincide 
with the 125th anniversary of the founding of Conradh na Gaeilge (Tuairisc.ie, 2018i). 
5.6.3 Reform of island transport links 
Due to the historical progression of English from core to periphery, those islands with 
Gaeltacht status are generally amongst the strongest remaining Irish-speaking 
communities. The disruptions to life on several such islands caused by reforms 
proposed in recent years were therefore most unwelcome developments which were 
unconducive to the maintenance of these core Gaeltacht communities. 
5.6.3.1 The Oileáin Árann air service 
Amongst these proposals was the suggested discontinuation of the aeroplane service 
which flies several times daily from Conamara to each of the three Oileáin Árann. 
Unsurprisingly, this proposal was opposed by a sustained community campaign when 
it was first made public in summer 2015. Despite this service being in place since 
1970, the outcome of the DAHRRGA 2015 call for tender sought to change this long-
established arrangement. The department intended to replace the aeroplane service 
from Conamara with a helicopter route that would depart from the other side of Galway 
city, thereby making it very difficult – if not impossible – for people to get the boat in 
the event of inclement weather preventing flying, as happens on occasion. 
Protesting this decision, a large public meeting with several hundred attendees took 
place in September 2015 in Conamara, followed by a march to the nearby DAHRRGA 
office. This action was followed in the ensuing weeks and months by various pickets, 
lobbying trips to Dublin, etc. Receiving support from all local opposition politicians, the 




as discussed in 5.9.1, resisting such proposals detracts significantly from the work that 
community development groups are meant to be engaged in. 
Publicly, the Department’s decision to not renew the contract of the airline that has 
been serving the islands for many years was stated to be the outcome of fair 
competition in the call for tender (Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht, 
2015). Several of my informants, however, claimed that the proposed helicopter 
provision was simply a method of cutting all air provision for the islands by stealth. A 
number of interviewees contended that by offering such an unsuitable and undesired 
helicopter service, which was likely to be a commercial failure, it would ultimately be 
easier in coming years for the state to discontinue all air provision for these islands, 
which are exceptional amongst Irish islands in having a regular air service. One 
employee in the Irish-language sector who was involved in the community’s protests 
explained this logic to me as follows: 
B: Sin é mo thuairimse hréis a bheith ag caint le lucht an oileáin inné, le roinnt 
insiders, le Ó Cuív agus na polaiteoirí ar fad. Agus chun an ceart a thabhairt do 
na polaiteoirí ar fad, chuile pháirtí agus na TDs, tá siad go hiomlán taobh thiar 
de mhuintir an oileáin. But sin an rud, tuigeann siadsan. B’shin an tuairim láidir 
atá acu féin, just feiceann siad na comharthaí sóirt . . . Sin mo thuairimse den 
seirbhís aeir agus gur sábhailt airgid é ‘cause is cuimhin liom . . . bhí lá 
stocaireachta againn thart ar an am céanna i mBuswells [óstán gar don Dáil], 
agus bhí mé ag plé le Michael Ring [Aire Spóirt agus Turasóireachta na linne] 
agus bhí seisean ag rá go macánta liom “I said to Dinny [McGinley, an t-iarAire 
Gaeltachta] just do it, take one big hit and that’s it, it’ll be forgotten about then”. 
So sin an t-aon feckin dearcadh atá acu, one big hit, it’ll be off your plate. Ba 
chuma faoin fuckin dochar a bhí á dhéanamh, ba chuma faoi na hoileáin. Just 
breathnaigh: that’ll save you money. You’ll take one bit hit, it’ll be forgotten 
about and you won’t have to be worried about other people then, you’ll have 
enough to cover it. You’ll take one big hit, it’ll be forgotten about. 
In an interview with an employee of the company which provides the current air 
service, he talked at length about the difficulties of working with civil servants who 
were, by his account, simply not interested in finding a solution to this controversy: 
T: An fáth nach bhfuil siad ag iarraidh seirbhís aeir, tá siad den tuairim go bhfuil 
an bád sách maith go hOileáin Árann. Agus is seirbhís bád atá ann don chuid 
is mó de na hoileáin ar chósta na hÉireann agus cén fáth a mbeadh seirbhís 
aeir ann . . . [T]á siad ag ceapadh gur cur amú airgid é. Muintir Árann, tá an 
iomarca faighte acub cheana agus bíonn siad ag gearán i gcónaí and to hell 




This is one of very few examples in my data where several interviewees explicitly 
claimed that there was a covert policy agenda which was linked to budgetary 
constrictions. When compared to the Toraigh case discussed in the following section, 
it is very possible that if not for the huge amount of tourism to these islands, which 
gives their populations a certain amount of sway at the political level, that the service 
would already have been removed. 
The 2015 protests were ultimately successful in getting the government to abandon 
the proposed helicopter service. While local opposition was clearly important, it must 
also be noted that during the public commotion over the new helicopter route, 
DAHRRGA officials became aware that Galway County Council intended to close the 
airport from which the helicopter was to run just six months after the service began. 
This fact was not, apparently, factored into the original decision to grant the tender to 
the company proposing to run its service therefrom (Irish Times, 2015a). 
While these protests were an important success story for community mobilisation 
against state policy, resistance to the re-structuring of the air service in Galway 
remained a highly localised issue. Similar to the Dearg le Fearg movement described 
in 5.6.2, at no point that I am aware of in any of the public discourse on the issue – 
either at public meetings, rallies, or in the media – was the matter explicitly linked to 
wider issues surrounding reduced state support for the Gaeltacht. 
Although aeroplane services continued throughout 2016-17, in mid-2018 Aer Árann, 
the company running the service, announced it was intending to surrender its contract 
and discontinue services at the end of the year. They claimed this was due to their 
dissatisfaction with the excessive fees which are being imposed on them by the 
department responsible for the Gaeltacht (RTÉ, 2018d). Although a last-minute 
compromise was eventually reached which will see services continue for another year 
(Tuairisc.ie, 2018j), in early 2019 the minister responsible for the Gaeltacht announced 
that the state was still considering replacing the aeroplane service with a helicopter 
one (Dáil Éireann, 2019). 
The potential loss of the aeroplane service takes on even greater significance when 
one considers that in early December 2016 the ferry service to one of these islands 




significant increase in the fee they charged the ferry company to land on the island 
(Tuairisc.ie, 2016j). While the County Council was adamant that the fee previously 
being charged was too low, it is easy to see this proposed change as an attempt by 
the council to increase their own revenue in the face of the severe cutbacks they too 
faced. As a co-op manager said to me when talking about the Council: 
H: [F]eicimse an Chomhairle Contae, Jesus, bheifeá ag tarraingt amach do 
ghruaig ag plé leotha sin! “Níl muid ábalta seo a dhéanamh, níl airgead ar bith 
againn, níl airgead ar bith againn, níl airgead ar bith againn…” 
Although it is hard to imagine that it could come to pass that islanders would ever be 
left stranded for even a short time for want of either sea or air services, such events 
nonetheless illustrate some of the difficulties faced by island communities in recent 
years. 
5.6.3.2 The Toraigh ferry service 
While space does not permit a detailed discussion of the matter, the reform of the ferry 
service to Oileán Thoraí in Donegal in 2018 provides another important example of 
community wishes being ignored. Despite the community frequently complaining 
before 2018 that their ferry was too old and unfit for purpose, tender was granted to a 
company proposing to use an even older and less suitable boat, with the authorities 
apparently feeling that it was more important to demonstrate a commitment to free 
market competition processes than the maintenance of island communities. 
Despite well-supported protests in Dublin and Galway (where a main office of the 
department responsible for the Gaeltacht is located), as well as several families stating 
the new service would prompt them to leave the island, the community were ultimately 
forced to accept a service which many of them were unhappy with, a severe blow for 
an island that lost 17.4% of its population between 2011-16 (see 5.2.1). 
FOI requests by news site Tuairisc.ie showed that although the National Development 
Plan launched at the time of this controversy included a commitment to build a new 
ferry for the island sometime before 2027 (Government of Ireland, 2018b: 51), this 
commitment was added just days before the plan’s publication, seemingly in response 
to protests which were ongoing at the time. Furthermore, the Department of Public 
Expenditure agreed to the inclusion of this point “on the strict understanding that the 




funding to be made available for the building of such a vessel (Tuairisc.ie, 2018k). As 
with the funding for language plans being taken from Gaeltacht road maintenance 
budgets (see 4.2.3; 5.8), this case thus offers yet another illustration of the problematic 
attitude state institutions hold towards the provision of fundamental community 
infrastructure in the Gaeltacht. 
5.7 “Corporate Social Responsibility” and the Gaeltacht – 
fighting neoliberalism with neoliberalism? 
In addition to the oppositional movements detailed in 5.6, during my fieldwork I noted 
several instances of communities attempting to overcome the difficulties caused by 
decreased state subventions via recourse to unorthodox means, including turning to 
non-state actors and corporate sources of funding in order to finance important local 
infrastructure. 
During my stay in one Donegal community in summer 2016 I was enthusiastically told 
by several locals that a new pre-school was to be opened come September. Shortly 
after I left the area, an online crowdfunding campaign was started by the local co-op 
to fund this initiative. Being in some ways a 21st century variation of the long-
established tradition of getting financial and material aid from those who have 
emigrated, this effort could be seen as having significant cultural precedent. 
Traditionally, clothing packages were sent home by departed relatives, as were so-
called “American letters” – which often included money to pay the emigration passage 
of younger relatives (Brody, 1974: 84; Corrigan, 1992: 151). 
As opposed to aiding immediate family members, however, this crowdfunding 
campaign was attempting to finance important infrastructure for the whole community, 
a service which one would expect to have been eligible for state funding. Nonetheless, 
this approach clearly indicates that those who started the campaign have an 
awareness that it is, to a degree, up to themselves to seek out unorthodox funding 
methods in order to fund such initiatives in light of the greatly reduced budget for the 
Gaeltacht. It is also, I believe, indicative of the extent to which the neoliberal 
understanding of state functions has been internalised by these populations. Despite 
initially garnering attention on both social and traditional media, over six months after 
the campaign was launched only a little over a sixth of the target had been reached, 




Similarly, several schools have recently had to resort to asking parents to pay for the 
recruitment of an additional teacher to ensure that a new Gaeltacht education policy 
can be effectively implemented, a process which has been made particularly 
challenging due to the cuts to staff numbers in small rural schools since 2008 
(Tuairisc.ie, 2017o). 
An even more striking example of the neoliberalisation of the financing of public 
infrastructure occurred in summer 2015 in Inis Meáin in Co. Galway. A change in the 
Department of Education’s policy regarding student-staff ratios – itself allowing for 
expenditure on rural schools to be cut (Irish Times, 2011b) – left Inis Meáin’s school, 
with under twenty pupils, no longer eligible for a second teacher. This decision led to 
a community campaign to have this second teacher re-instated, involving public 
meetings and lobbying sessions in Dublin (Irish Times, 2015b). The issue was 
ultimately resolved when Zurich Insurance Group, which as of 2017 was the 127th 
largest company in the world (Forbes, 2017), committed to funding the second 
teacher’s position for two years. As part of their “investing in communities” programme, 
Zurich claimed they were anxious to fund the school due to the fact that “Inis Meáin is 
a stronghold of the Irish language. The language, and the very sustainability of the 
island, is under threat if families there cannot avail of a good level of education for their 
children” (Irish Times, 2015n). In light of their involvement in the hedge fund scandals 
(Reuters, 2007) that ultimately helped precipitate the global crash which led the Irish 
state to cut funding for small rural schools, it is not without irony that Zurich have seized 
on the Inis Meáin case as a way to bolster their image. Indeed, one newspaper at the 
time described them as a “white knight” riding in to save the Gaeltacht (Connacht 
Tribune, 2015). Fortunately, however, an increase in pupil numbers after this two-year 
period of funding was concluded saw the Department of Education concede to funding 
the second teacher’s position once more. 
Similarly, in a language school in Galway I heard management discuss applying for 
grants from corporations such as Google under their corporate social responsibility 
schemes. While there was also discussion of applying for support from ÚnaG, it was 
observed that the cuts meant they had very little left to give to small businesses. 
The fact that corporate and other unorthodox funding was being discussed so widely 




neoliberalism has framed the concerns of such peripheral communities as an issue for 
charitable schemes by corporations seeking good publicity, rather than the 
responsibility of the state which governs these areas. While there is undoubtedly 
potential for short-term gain for Gaeltacht communities by adopting such strategies, 
as Watson has observed, it is the policy legacy of the earlier protectionist and liberal 
eras (c. 1922-1980) that continues to support Irish. The neoliberal era that has 
emerged since the 1980s, on the other hand, has seen this support steadily dismantled 
(Watson, 2016: 71). As such, by engaging with the neoliberal project on its own terms 
and conceding, perhaps, that it is not necessarily the responsibility of the state to 
provide important community infrastructure, minority language communities potentially 
sow the seeds of their own destruction. Through such actions, the neoliberal vision of 
society gradually becomes normalised on a micro-level, with states largely absolved 
of their previously existing responsibilities to the periphery. 
5.8 The Language Planning Process required by the 
Gaeltacht Act 2012 
As described in 4.2.3, a key provision of the Gaeltacht Act 2012 sees the responsibility 
for language planning in the Gaeltacht historically associated with the state transferred 
in large part to voluntary community groups. As was explained, the content of this act 
was heavily conditioned by the economic situation of the country at the time of its 
introduction, and its provisions have been understood as a way for the state to 
withdraw from much of its long-standing commitment to language revitalisation (Ó 
Giollagáin, 2014b: 107-15). The implementation of this process began in 2014 in some 
of the strongest Gaeltacht areas (Corca Dhuibhne in Kerry, Cois Fharraige in Galway 
and Gaoth Dobhair/Íochtar na Rosann in Donegal), with other LPAs undertaking the 
writing of plans in more recent years. During my fieldwork these efforts were ongoing 
in many of the communities I studied, giving me the opportunity to observe how this 
macro-level policy of state withdrawal has played out at the local level. Several of my 
interviewees were involved in this process, including members of voluntary 
committees and a number of language planning consultants working full-time on its 
implementation. 
During my first visit to the ÚnaG regional office in Donegal a staff member, upon 




the most significant challenge for this process was enticing people to join the voluntary 
committees to whom much of the work has been delegated. This challenge is 
unsurprising in light of falling rates of voluntarism in the developed west (Putnam, 
2001), the fact that for much of the 20th century Ireland had an uncommonly weak 
culture of civic engagement (Mac Cormaic, 2011: 21), and that the neoliberal period 
that began in Ireland in the late 1980s has seen voluntary participation atrophy further 
(Khoo, 2006; Neville, 2015). While there are no comparable studies of Ireland, 
Laurence and Lim (2015) have also demonstrated that the economic crisis reduced 
volunteering levels in the United States and the United Kingdom (see also 4.2.10.2; 
Clarke and Heath, 2014). As such, this greatest difficulty noted by the ÚnaG executive 
was very likely exacerbated by the material uncertainty brought about by the 
recession. As one of my interviewees stated “[r]oimh an phleanáil teanga caithfidh 
díon a bheith os do chionn agus caithfidh jab a bheith agat!” 
Government policy explicitly predicated on community voluntarism in a time of 
economic turmoil thus requires substantial efforts towards encouraging participation, 
even more so than during less testing periods. Financial constraints, however, have 
prevented a co-ordinated publicity campaign being implemented for the language 
planning process. This need to promote community involvement and ownership 
(cornerstones of any language revitalisation project) was raised by an attendee at a 
training day for language planning committees that I attended in 2015. The 
chairperson of ÚnaG responded that it was a “ceist airgid”, with them simply not being 
able to afford a publicity campaign, it consequently being the duty of local committees 
to promote awareness of the process’s importance for ensuring Irish continues to be 
spoken in the Gaeltacht. 
A language planner I interviewed further highlighted the need for Gaeltacht-wide 
awareness raising efforts, noting that public cynicism resulting from the failure of 
previous revitalisation attempts and the widespread ignorance of what language 
planning involves each comprise major challenges for the process: 
N: [T]á an phleanáil teanga ag tosú amach in áit go bhfuil soiniciúlacht ag an 
bpobal faoi, mar rinneadh iarrachtaí cheana. Chomh maith leis sin ní thuigeann 
siad céard atá i gceist. Ní raibh cead pleanála maidir le tithe tá mé ag ceapadh 
go dtí na 60idí, bhí daoine ag ceapadh “céard sa diabhal é seo, tá cead agam 




pleanáil fhisiciúil. Tógfaidh sé am ar dhaoine agus tá mé ag ceapadh go bhfuil 
gá le feachtas mór...Ní mistéir é, ach is coincheap nua don ghnáthphobal [é]. 
Echoing this sentiment, a diligent Irish speaker who teaches the language in a 
university context noted the disdain with which her community currently holds the 
process: 
G: Bhí mé sa mbaile ag caint le mo thuismitheoirí agus bhí siad ag rá y’know 
“céard é seo, níl mise ag iarraidh goil síos ag an halla ag caint ar an nGaeilge”. 
Níl ’s a’m an dtuigeann [an pobal] cén sprioc atá leis, cén aidhm atá leis. Bíonn 
chuile shórt a bhaineann leis cineál acadúil agus níl aon duine…Tá sé an-
deacair do chuid tuairimí a chur in iúl agus tú ag plé [le ceistneoirí]. Tá tú ag cur 
tic i mbosca. Tá an ghráin ag daoine orthub, tá an ghráin a’m féin orthub. Agus 
muna bhfuil tú ag obair le Gaeilge, níl ’s a’m an dtuigeann daoine an tsáinn ina 
bhfuil muid. 
Throughout my fieldwork I regularly heard disparaging comments about language 
planning, in private as well as public contexts, including during interviews: 
R: Caithfidh mé a admháil, agus b’fhéidir nár chóir domsa é seo a rá ach níl 
mórán measa agamsa ar an bpleanáil teanga. Now sin ráite níl tada mórán léite 
agam faoi so I suppose go bhfuil mé aineolach sa gcaoi sin. 
As soon as I mentioned the term “pleanáil teanga” to a man I had just met in Galway 
he similarly made his opinion clear: 
B: Bhfuil ’s agat an rud seo ar a mbíonn siad ag caint, an phleanáil teanga – 
S: Seafóid! B’fhéidir nár chóir dom sin a rá… 
Furthermore, as one individual, who himself does an enormous amount to promote a 
vibrant social life through Irish in the Gaeltacht, stated: 
P: Bhfuil ’s agat, a Bhen, níl eolas ar bith agam [ar an bpróiseas seo]. Cuireann 
na rudaí sin cineál depression orm so just fanaim ar shiúil uaidh. B’fhearr liom 
mo rud féin a dhéanamh . . . Caidé, caithfidh an pobal plean a chur le chéile? 
Is dóiche gur rud maith é sin. Ach níl an pobal á dhéanamh, níl suim ar bith ag 
99% den phobal. 
The imposition of what is allegedly meant to be an empowering and participatory 
process in this fashion, with little attempt to explain why exactly it is important or what 
value it adds to communities has, then, been deeply ineffective in promoting public 
enthusiasm. Widespread disinterest in or cynicism towards state policies is, of course, 




2012 is, however, somewhat peculiar from a public policy perspective. The fact that it 
is based on community participation but nonetheless saw all but no extra resources 
devoted to promoting such engagement is clearly indicative of the extent of state 
“rollback” from language promotion efforts in recent years. 
A comparison with the resources afforded to publicising LPP measures during the 
Celtic Tiger highlights once again the degree to which the cuts have affected the 
functionality of Irish-language institutions. Writing before the 2008 crisis about the 
Official Languages Act 2003, Walsh and McLeod explained that “[t]he Department of 
Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs ran language awareness campaigns in 2004 
and 2005 but the total budget for these was a mere €500,000” (2008: 42). In 
comparison with the non-existence of any such campaign during a much more 
substantial policy reform, occurring at a critical point for the language’s future, this 
“mere €500,000” seems very substantial indeed. It is, in fact, more than the total made 
available for the implementation of the language planning process in any single year 
between 2012-16, and five times the annual budget that LPAs will receive for 
implementing their plans once they have been completed. Further details regarding 
funding for this process are given in 4.2.3. 
Despite the lack of publicity around the issue, as of the time of writing the majority of 
LPAs have a voluntary committee of some description working on their area’s 
language plan, although I was often told that these were small and had a handful of 
people doing much more than the lion’s share of the work. It is also notable that the 
age group perhaps most important for the success of this process, young adults, tend 
to be absent from such committees. This is likely a result of various other structural 
issues discussed in this chapter, many of which disproportionately affect younger 
people – including outmigration, precarious employment conditions, income inequality 
and the general decline in civic engagement these factors produce (Putnam, 2001; 
Steger 2002; Paskov and Dewilde, 2012). One long-term ÚnaG employee, however, 
explained this tendency as follows: 
É: Agus an téarma seo . . . “pleanáil teanga” – smaointigh tusa, Ben, gur tusa 
leaid óg thíos an baile ag ól piontaí agus tá girseach deas agat agus dá 
ndéarfadh duine leat “ar mhaith leat dul chuig cruinniú faoin phleanáil teanga? 
Ar mhaith leat dul chuig cruinniú fá choinne pleanáil tithíochta?” Déarfá “fuckin 




He then proceeded to tell me that those involved in this process are the same people 
who were already active in other forms of community development, but that they have 
now had a further significant duty imposed upon them: 
É: An deacracht is mó atá sna Gaeltachtaí, creid nó ná creid é . . . ná go bhfuil 
na daoine atá ag déanamh an obair uilig sna pobail, obair forbartha, go bhfuil 
an rud seo caite ina mullach agus go mothaíonn siad é iontach trom agus go 
bhfuil siad iontach beag . . . Tá siad ag mothú an brú seo uilig faoin phleanáil 
teanga, an rud casta seo agus tá orthu ag an am céanna le rudaí forbartha 
pobail a dhéanamh, le féilte a reáchtáil… 
As another interviewee put it “‘[s]é an dream céanna a thaganns ag chuile shórt agus 
ní shin ionadaíocht ar son an phobail”. A language planning consultant involved in the 
process noted similar challenges: 
D: [T]á sé thar a bheith deacair orthu mar tá ualach na hoibre sin curtha ar a 
ghualainn, like ag deireadh an lae muna n-éiríonn linn an plean seo a chur le 
chéile . . . cailleann siad a stádas Gaeltachta, agus is ana-ualach é sin le bheith 
ar aon choiste . . . [T]á cúraimí eile ag na daoine seo agus níl, bhuel, mar a deir 
mé, níl ’s ag éinne céard atá ar siúl, ach níl saineolas acu, ach tá siadsan ag 
streachailt agus ag déanamh a dhícheall, agus tá sé iontach doiligh orthu. 
In order to compensate for their own lack of expertise, many committees have used 
the funding made available for preparing their plans to procure the assistance of an 
outside consultant to assist with this work. It has, however, been difficult or impossible 
for many communities to find a suitably qualified person for this position. Not only is 
there a relatively small number of people with the requisite qualifications, but the short-
term, low pay nature of the contracts offered do little to make it an appealing 
proposition to those qualified for this work. As I was told by an interviewee who has 
moved county four times in two years pursuing temporary contracts writing several of 
these plans: 
A: [É]inne leis na cáilíochtaí céanna is a bhí agamsa . . . má bhí post fiú ann 
leath-réasúnta faighte ag na daoine sin ní raibh siad á thabhairt suas le goil ag 
obair ar phlean teanga. Tá tú ag caint ar chonradh gearr-thréimhseach, gan 
aon chinnteacht. Níl tú ag caint ar airgead an-mhaith . . . Agus tá sé an-
uaigneach mar obair, sin an rud ba mhó a chur isteach ormsa . . . Is obair chrua 
atá ann . . . D’fhág sé rian ar mo shláinte fiú ann, an strus a bhaineann leis . . . 
I mo chonradh-sa . . . bhí sé curtha in iúl nach obair lán-aimseartha a bhí ann 
[ach] bhí sé lán-aimseartha agus tuilleadh. Bhí mé ag obair cúig lá sa tseachtain 
[agus] ag tarraingt ar an deireadh, seacht lá sa tseachtain. Bheinn ag éirí ag a 
seacht, goil ag obair, críochnú ag meán oíche . . . Mar gheall nach raibh an t-




déanamh jabanna beaga eile [freisin] . . . Níl sé inbhuanaithe ní dóigh liom do 
dhuine. 
The emergence of such undesirable, “atypical” working conditions (which are, of 
course, becoming ever more typical) and the so-called “precariat” class under 
neoliberalism is well documented in socioeconomic literature, as are the extremely 
detrimental consequences of such conditions on workers’ physical and mental health 
(Standing, 2014; Sparke, 2016). The outsourcing of positions formerly occupied by 
relatively well-paid public servants is also a key feature of the neoliberal New Public 
Management measures discussed in 4.2.9: 
outsourcing support[s] a casualization and peripherization of labor that treat[s] 
certain jobs within the organization as temporary or “as needed”, and allows for 
readier workforce control and reduced costs to the state (Ward, 2011: 208-9). 
While the level of education required to work in this sector means such consultants 
would not be classed as members of the precariat, it does place them in the category 
of “emergent service workers” – an emergent class better off than the precariat 
primarily by virtue of their higher levels of social and cultural capital (Savage, 2015: 
169-75). 
Indeed, during the writing of this chapter, while in my fourth year of this study, I myself 
have been employed part-time as a consultant for an LPA in Donegal. Although this 
work was obviously not part of my PhD research and included its own stipulations 
regarding anonymity and the ownership of the research conducted for the purpose of 
writing the plan, it has nonetheless provided me with much first-hand experience of 
this process which accords with the findings of the ethnographic work conducted 
specifically for this thesis. 
Another consultant I interviewed felt that while they had sufficient resources to prepare 
their plan, the uncertainty surrounding funding for the plans’ implementation provided 
significant cause for concern: 
B: An bhfuil an maoiniú sásúil leis an obair a dhéanamh? 
N: Déarfainn féin go bhfuil, ach an faitíos amháin atá ann ná nach mbeidh 
maoiniú ann leis an bplean a chur i bhfeidhm. Ansin beidh soiniciúlacht ag baint 
leis sin aríst agus beidh muid níos faide siar ná a bhí muid ariamh má tharlaíonn 
sé sin. Iarracht eile cineál nár éirigh leis. Is dainseár an-mhór, sin é an dainséar 




Indeed, while the first several plans were being prepared, the state refused to give any 
indication of what, if any, resources would be made available for their implementation 
– making it very difficult to make recommendations in the plans, as I often heard. 
During my fieldwork I had the opportunity to challenge the minister then responsible 
for the Gaeltacht, Seán Kyne, on this issue at a public meeting in Conamara. When 
asked if he was willing to confirm that adequate funding would indeed be made 
available for the plans’ implementation he stated simply “níl mé sásta aon rud a 
gheallúint, Ben”. 
Although arguably a politically sensible position to adopt, such a response certainly 
does not suggest that the state is fully supportive of these communities’ efforts and 
does little to encourage people to devote their free time to the process. A member of 
a language planning committee in Galway noted that such uncertainty and frustration 
was likely to be a further obstacle to promoting community engagement: 
B: Tá sé ag cothú soiniciúlacht aisteach. Agus cheapfainn gurb shin an dochar 
is mó atá á dhéanamh, mar tá tú ag cur lagmhisneach...Agus tá ’s agam tá sé 
deacair daoine a fháil amach, bhí ariamh, ach tá sé níos measa anois . . . tá tú 
in ann suí sa mbaile agus pé rud, tá caoga satellite, pé rud is mian leat. So tá 
sé deacair daoine a fháil atá sásta gníomhú. Tá na daoine sin fíorluachmhar 
agus caithfidh tú iad a chothú. An rud atá ar siúl . . . [tá] tú ag cur lagmhisneach 
ar dhaoine, ag baint míúsáid as na daoine sin. Agus caithfidh mé a rá, an faitíos 
atá orm ó thaobh na pobal seo, go mbeidh daoine just ag rá y’know “fuck it! 
Just tá mo dhóthain agam, ní fiú é”. 
In line with this sentiment, on more than one occasion I saw people withdraw from 
language planning committees because of their understandable dissatisfaction with 
the process. 
As another professional language planner observed in relation to the uncertainty 
regarding funding for the plans’ implementation: 
D: [T]á ’s agam nach féidir le rialtas ar bith a bheith 100% cinnte ach, bhfuil ’s 
agat, is féidir leo a bheith cinnte faoi rudaí eile a bhaineann le buiséidí. Y’know 
má tá siad ag labhairt leis an IDA is féidir leo a rá, bhuel, beidh an ráta cáin 
corparáideach seo i bhfeidhm go ceann cé mhéad bliain, beidh an ráta úis seo 
i bhfeidhm go dtí cibé...Feictear dom go bhfuil sé, ní greannmhar an focal ceart, 
ach spéisiúil gur féidir leo a bheith cinnte ó thaobh go leor rudaí eile . . . An 
tacaíocht atá ag teastáil . . . ná an chinnteacht, leagtha amach go soiléir céard 
a tharlóidh. An mbeidh pota airgead ann? An mbeidh airgead cineál ringfenced 




With the publication of the 2018 budget, it finally became clear that some funding – 
€100,000 per plan per annum – would be made available for the implementation phase 
of the process. As noted in 4.2.3, the minister then responsible for the Gaeltacht stated 
repeatedly in the Dáil, however, that making this money available would require the 
discontinuation of the scheme that had previously financed the maintenance of many 
of the roads in the Gaeltacht (Tuairisc.ie, 2016k; Dáil Éireann, 2017). Such decisions 
represent an extremely flawed view of language revitalisation, an unhelpful dichotomy 
that implies there is no connection between language vitality and the provision of basic 
community infrastructure such as adequately surfaced roads. 
Furthermore, this funding is significantly less than required for those LPAs that have 
many thousands of residents, being under half of that required based on the costings 
provided in the plan prepared in the Cois Fharraige area, for instance, which has a 
population of circa 6,500. During the writing of this chapter, the first three plans to be 
completed were officially launched. While it did not ultimately occur, one of my 
interviewees told me that their committee seriously contemplated boycotting the official 
launch in protest at this funding, which was also insufficient for their plan’s 
requirements. The issue was discussed at length in the media, with Professor Dónall 
Ó Baoill – who co-wrote a plan in Donegal (Ní Dhoimhín and Ó Baoill, 2016) – stating 
that such inadequate budgets ensure that the plans will fail (Tuairisc.ie, 2017p). 
As one of the planners I spoke to said: 
A: [M]á bhí aon mhuinín ann riamh, tá an muinín sin caillte sa bpróiseas . . . 
[Tá] pleananna ag dul faoi bhráid an aire Gaeltachta agus tá sé ag ceadú na 
bpleananna sin, tá sé á síneadh, ach níl sé ag ceadú na n-acmhainní atá ag 
teastáil leis na pleananna sin a chur i bhfeidhm . . . Ní dhéanann sé aon chiall 
dhomsa plean a cheadú nuair nach mbeidh acmhainní ann dhó. B’fhearr i bhfad 
dul ar ais agus ath-dhréachtú a dhéanamh [agus] an plean a mhúnlú sa gcaoi 
go mbeidh siad inchurtha i bhfeidhm ar an airgead sin . . . Na hoifigigh seo a 
bheas ag cur i bhfeidhm na bpleananna . . . níl bealach ar bith go n-éireoidh leo 
an méid atá sa bplean a bhaint amach . . . Feictear dom go bhfuil fadhb 
loighiciúil ansin. 
This process has thus seen voluntary groups work for several years in the hope that 
their efforts would be rewarded with adequate state support for their plans’ 





In response to the announcement of such inadequate funding, two of the first three 
committees to launch their plans (Cois Fharraige and Gaoth Dobhair/Íochtar na 
Rosann) announced in late 2017 that they were refusing to accept the €100,000 
offered, demanding instead the amount requested, €250,000 and €150,000 
respectively. The Cois Fharraige committee went as far as to announce its intention 
to disband if their requests went unanswered. Despite this being a cause of much 
discussion in the Irish-language media, the department responsible for the Gaeltacht 
maintained that there would be no increase, but that groups involved in the process 
could apply for other support schemes offered by the department (Tuairisc.ie, 2017q). 
This was seen by one planner as being a very problematic solution, however: 
A: [Ba] chóir an idirbheartaíocht sin a láimhseáil ag leibhéal an rialtais mar má 
tá ar an gcoiste nó ar an oifigeach teanga . . . cur isteach ar dheontais, ar 
scéimeanna agus seo, siúd agus eile – níl ’s agam an bhfaca tú aon cheann de 
na foirmeachaí sin a riamh ach tá siad fada, tá siad trom . . . Má bhíonn orthu 
sin a dhéanamh le fanacht ar snámh, mar a déarfá, ní bheidh an t-am acu a 
gcuid oibre a dhéanamh i gceart, ní bheidh an t-am acu a bheith amuigh sna 
pobail. 
A third committee in Corca Dhuibhne also announced their intention to boycott this 
inadequate funding upon completing their plan (Tuairisc.ie, 2017r). Such 
developments marked a considerable escalation of tensions between these 
communities and the state, and while it remains to be seen how events will proceed, 
in December 2017 €50,000 extra was offered to the committees involved in the boycott 
(Tuairisc.ie, 2017s). The Cois Fharraige committee maintained this is nonetheless 
€100,000 less than is needed, and was still considering dissolving itself at the time of 
writing. 
Despite the country officially having recovered from the crisis, funding for these plans 
is still enormously difficult to secure, requiring boycotts to gain resources to implement 
state policy. As Taft (2018) explains, public spending is unlikely to return to pre-crisis 
levels until 2023, 15 years after the crisis began, although as of 2018 it is 90% of what 
it was in 2008. Nonetheless, as 4.2.4 described, capital investment for the Gaeltacht 
and islands in 2017 was less than one seventh of what it was before the crash (Byrne, 
2018), a stark illustration of the extent to which the sector has been reformed since 




In addition to the various difficulties regarding community participation and funding, 
the state has refused to commit to ensuring its own activities in the Gaeltacht are 
conducted through Irish, with experts consequently feeling the planning process is 
unlikely to succeed (Tuairisc.ie, 2017t). As an employee in the Coimisinéir Teanga’s 
office told me: 
G: Beidh rath ar an bpleanáil teanga má bhíonn nasc ag an stát ann. Mura 
bhfuil nasc ag an stát ann ní féidir leis na pobail é a dhéanamh astu féin. So ní 
féidir a rá go dtí go bhfeiceann muid iad “in action” as they say. But like mura 
bhfuil an stát chun seasamh leob, agus by that I mean muna bhfuil an stát chun 
geallúint a thabhairt faoi seirbhisí stáit sa nGaeltacht, mar shampla, go mbeidh 
siad ar fáil trí Ghaeilge, tá sé really lopsided i dtreo an phobail agus níl sé sin 
ceart. So ní fheicim, muna bhfuil an stát chun dá lámh a chur leis an roth ar 
bhealach agus é a bhrú iad féin, tá sé deacair a fheiceáil cén chaoi ar féidir leis 
an bpobal é a dhéanamh iad féin. 
Despite the obvious need for such support, in November 2017, the Department of 
Agriculture advertised a managerial position based in Ros a’ Mhíl in Galway which did 
not include Irish-language competency as a requirement for employment (Tuairisc.ie, 
2017u), even though this area contains the only electoral division in the country where 
Irish remains the dominant language of communication for those aged under-18 (Ó 
Giollagáin and Charlton, 2015a: 9; see also 4.2.9). 
In light of the manner in which the state has implemented the 2012 Act, it is not 
surprising that even those heavily involved in the language planning process 
frequently described it as a ploy to open the way for further state withdrawal from 
language revitalization efforts. Indeed, one long-term employee of the department 
responsible for Gaeltacht policy explicitly suggested to me that the 2012 Act was a 
trick (“cleas”) to 
P: [F]áil réití’ leis an chúram. Agus ansin má thiteann an tóin amach as an rud 
uilig . . . beidh siadsan ábalta a rá, bhuel, níl an locht orainne, thug muidinne 
an cúram sin do na pobail agus má lig siadsan dó . . . is ar na pobail atá an 
locht. 
While, as Chapter 4 described, neoliberal policy conventions are clearly visible in 
much Irish-language policy produced in recent years, the language planning process 
laid out in the Gaeltacht Act 2012 is perhaps one of the clearest examples that this 
sector provides of the neoliberal “rollback” of the state famously described by Peck 




cynicism and disdain and done far less than required to foster the community support 
and participation necessary for language revitalisation, factors all the more crucial at 
a time when all available evidence shows the Gaeltacht to be facing sociolinguistic 
crisis. 
5.9 Cuts to other community projects 
Further to those already discussed, many other Gaeltacht support structures not 
addressed above also experienced heavy cuts in recent years. While the full extent of 
state withdrawal of such provisions is too great to cover systematically in a thesis of 
this length, two further examples that are worthy of attention and illustrative of wider 
patterns will be discussed in this section, those of local co-operatives and the 
community group Pléaráca. 
5.9.1 Community co-operatives 
Having first emerged in the 1960s and 70s as a grassroots reaction to the failure of 
state-sponsored efforts at Gaeltacht development (Breathnach, 1986: 80), community 
co-operatives (hereafter “co-ops”) have since become central to the socioeconomic 
life of many Gaeltacht communities. Serving primarily as local development agencies, 
co-ops typically oversee community services such as waste collection, day-care 
centres for the elderly, pre-school groups, employment schemes, etc. In most cases it 
is to the local co-op that responsibility for the language planning process required by 
the Gaeltacht Act 2012 has been delegated, with them overseeing the voluntary 
committees (see 4.2.3; 5.8). While initially financed by subscriptions from local 
households, the co-ops are now funded by the state through ÚnaG. Co-ops are widely 
understood to be very important for community life in the Gaeltacht, as described by 
this interviewee, who herself worked in a co-op for many years: 
R: [P]léann siad le cúrsaí naíonra, cúrsaí turasóireachta, cúrsaí teanga, chuile 
rud. Anois caithfidh siad an plean teanga a chur i bhfeidhm so tá siad uafásach, 
uafásach lárnach i bhforbairt pobail agus forbairt eacnamaíochta. 
Referring to the problematic nature of employment based on Foreign Direct 
Investment, which typically leaves the Gaeltacht once an end comes to ÚnaG-supplied 
grants (see 5.3.4), another interviewee commented on the value for money co-ops 





M: [D]á n-éireodh le trian de na comharchumainn, gheobhadh siad luach a 
gcaiteachais. ‘Cause níl comharchumainn ag bogadh áit ar bith. Níl siad goil a 
rá right cibé téarmaí a fuair muid cúig bliana ó shin, tá deireadh leis sin, cibé 
cuidiú a thug sibh don chomhlacht seo . . . that’s us, we’re off. Mar tá siad 
lonnaithe anseo, tá siad ina gcónaí anseo, cuid den phobal iad! 
Although ostensibly based on local democratic empowerment, I repeatedly heard that 
only a small number of people play an active role in these co-ops: 
R: Tá comharchumann ann agus tá sé go maith agus b’fhéidir ceann de na cinn 
is fearr sa tír . . . Ag an am céanna má théann tú ag an gcruinniú cinn bhliana 
ní bheidh ann ach b’fhéidir deichniúr, cúig-, cúig dhuine dhéag, mar sin níl sé   
. . . mar ba mhaith leat é a bheith, ‘sé sin chuile dhuine páirteach agus ag 
coinneáil súil ar a bhfuil ag tarlú agus feictear dom gur, bhfuil ‘s a’d, gur 
beagnach, d’fhéadfá a rá gur eagraíocht de chuid an státa atá ann agus atá 
coinnithe ag imeacht ag airgead an státa agus, agus gur ó, gurb shin é an 
dearcadh atá ag daoine. 
As well as echoing common discourses around the problematic nature of the 
professionalization of what were previously voluntary sectors, this lack of significant 
community “co-operation” with so many co-ops is reflective of the wider breakdown of 
civic engagement in developed western cultures over recent decades (see 5.8). 
Similar to the language planning committees, it appears that this tendency has also 
affected Gaeltacht co-ops. With the state now funding full-time employees, other 
community members seemingly feel they no longer have a personal duty towards 
these institutions, and that all related work should be done by those supposedly paid 
to do it – a particularly problematic situation in light of the cutbacks to staff funding 
described below. 
In interviews with the managers of co-ops in Galway and Donegal, they commented 
at length about the severity of the cutbacks to their budgets. These budgets are 
provided by ÚnaG, which lost almost three quarters of its funding between 2008-15 
(see 4.2.4), a reduction which was in part passed on to the co-ops in the form of a 
40% cut to their budget. A manager in Galway discussed this with me: 
C: B’fhéidir le cúpla bliain a tharla sé, y’know ní scaipthe ar fad sna blianta, 
tharla sé saghas tapa, cuirfidh mé mar sin é. So an chéad rud a chaill muid ná 
an bainisteoir cabhartha . . . Chaill muid an duine sin ar dtús agus an chéad rud 
eile ghearr siad freisin an deontas reáchtála féin, an dtuigeann tú? So ghearr 
siad chuile áit é níl aon dabht, ní muide amháin . . . Ghearr siad é agus ní raibh 
aon bhealach ag Údarás ach buiséid a ghearradh. Bhí siad ag gearradh chuile 




A manager in Donegal also reported heavy reductions: “gheobhann muid deontas 
reáchtála ó Údarás na Gaeltachta, so sin 85,000 sa bhliain. Now ba ghnáth linn bheith 
suas ag 125,000. Sin sna laethibh maithe!” 
While such cuts are undoubtedly significant, in both Galway and Donegal I was told 
that rather than discontinuing essential services, this reduction in funding was 
absorbed on a personal basis by staff members – foregoing holidays, working an 
unpaid day every week, etc.: 
C: [C]huir sé an-bhrú orm féin, like I mean ní bhínn ag tógáil saoire nó tada, 
níor thóg mé saoire le blianta . . . Sin an cineál duine mé féin is cuma liom sa 
diabhal ach . . . ag an am céanna níl sin do chuile dhuine, sin drochstaid, an 
duine a thiocfas i mo dhiaidh ní bheidheadar ag iarraidh an saol sin agus beidh 
an ceart acu . . . Thug mise gearradh pá dom féin. Fiú ann bliain amháin, 
cuirfidh mé mar sin é, bhí mé sásta pá le ceithre lá agus ansin lá saor a 
dhéanamh don chomharchumann . . . Dúirt mé caithfidh muid rud eicínt a 
dhéanamh . . . mar tá an comharchumann fíorthábhachtach don [phobal]. 
Again, the manager in Donegal experienced similar difficulties: 
B: So tigeann sé sin as mo phostsa fosta. Ó wow, but ní fhéadfá a bheith thíos 
le achan rud . . . Buíochas le Dia níor ghearr siad é le dhá bhliain, tá sé ag 
fanacht ag 85,000. So tá súileas nach rachaidh sé síos mar bhí sé doiligh, bhí 
cinnte. Caithfidh tú amhanc ansin i ndiaidh rudaí fá choinne gearradh agus níl 
mé ag iarraidh sin . . . But ó thosaigh muid níor tharraing muid aon rud, agus tá 
mé bródúil as sin. Anois b’fhéidir gur chóir go mbeadh cúpla rud stopaithe 
‘cause tá siad ag cailleadh airgid but seirbhísí tábhachtacha atá ann don 
[cheantar]. So I mean dá dtiontódh siad thart amárach is a ráit abraíonn an 
cuntasóir níl cead agat a dhath ar bith a chaitheamh muna bhfuil tú ag fáil an 
airgid ar ais déarfainn alright an bhfuil muid goil druid síos an ionad lae [do 
sheandaoine]? 
While undoubtedly very altruistic responses to the crisis, this personal absorption of 
the cutbacks is perhaps partly a pragmatic response to life in small communities. 
Rather than turning the community against them due to the collapse of vital services 
that are under their direction, these managers may have simply found it easier to 
accept such personal tribulations as the price of satisfying their communities. 
Beyond the negative effects for local socioeconomic development, cuts to staffing in 
co-ops has a very direct link to weakening the standing of Irish in these communities. 
Unlike the majority of state-supported employment in the Gaeltacht (see 5.3.4), co-




the default language, and as such they play an important part in ensuring the 
dominance of the language in domains beyond the home and educational contexts. 
The worsening of conditions in the sector makes what was traditionally one of the 
better paid and more stable jobs in many Gaeltacht communities much less appealing 
to those who might otherwise be interested in working in this area. Somewhat 
unsurprisingly, since this interview was done, the co-op manager who I interviewed on 
an island in Donegal resigned to take up work unrelated to the Gaeltacht. Although a 
replacement has now been found, this process took some time and there was less 
interest in the position than might once have been expected. Indeed, despite 
unemployment being the main issue raised by locals when asked about the challenges 
of island life, when the manager’s position was eventually filled it was by someone 
from the mainland. 
As well as the financial difficulties of continuing to fund important services on a day-
to-day basis despite budget cuts, I was also told that these austerity measures have 
impinged on the time that co-ops have to focus on local development. While quite 
possibly only ever announced as part of a project of political “kite-flying” to make the 
cuts that were implemented seem more reasonable, the proposed discontinuation of 
many other services in these communities has meant that a great deal of staff time in 
recent years was spent trying to resist even more severe cuts: 
C: [B]hí mé ar nós fear tine . . . Chuile chruinniú a bhí mé ag goil bhí mé ag 
iarraidh an tine seo a mhúchadh seachas ag déanamh forbairt pobail . . . So 
bhí go leor den bhliain seo caite ag goil ag cruinneachaí, troid, troid, troid, mar 
a bhíonn tú, ag rá le daoine, y’know, tá sé goil an-dochar a dhéanamh don 
[phobal] má leanann sibh ar aghaidh leis seo . . . Dá gcuirfeadh sé aon rud i 
gcoinne dream óg a bheith ag maireachtáil [san áit]… 
Further to the co-ops’ role in providing critical local infrastructure, the delegation of 
much of the language planning duties in the Gaeltacht Act 2012 to such groups has 
seen them receive a very significant extra duty. As with the other institutions charged 
with implementing this Act (see 5.8), in apparent indifference to the already 
overworked and under-resourced nature of the co-ops, this duty has been imposed on 
them at the same time as their budgets were significantly reduced. 
By 2016, the average budget a Gaeltacht co-op received was €54,000, significantly 




Programmes outside the Gaeltacht. An umbrella group for the co-ops consequently 
demanded total funding be increased by €600,000 in the 2018 budget (CCCP, 2017). 
Despite the department responsible for the Gaeltacht also requesting significantly 
increased funding (Tuairisc.ie, 2018c), in 2018 the minister responsible for Gaeltacht 
policy confirmed during Dáil questions that the funding increase for 2018 was just 
€100,000. When divided amongst all 32 Gaeltacht co-ops, the average budget 
increase was therefore just €3,125 – a meagre amount compared to the extent of the 
cuts received since the recession began (Dáil Éireann, 2018b). 
5.9.2 Pléaráca 
Conamara-based Pléaráca began as a voluntary initiative in the early 1990s, receiving 
state funding in 1996 which allowed for the employment of two full-time staff. While 
primarily an arts and culture group, Pléaráca also explicitly aimed to combat social 
exclusion and the above-average levels of deprivation prevalent in much of the 
Conamara Gaeltacht (see 5.2.3). As well as providing opportunities for adults likely to 
be socioeconomically disadvantaged, Pléaráca conducted a wide range of youth 
outreach work, including summer camps, book festivals, drama and writing 
workshops, and generally played an important part in the social life of the Conamara 
Gaeltacht (Tuairisc.ie, 2015b). For many years the group organised a festival of “sean 
nós singing, dancing, poetry readings, plays, community art, and sporting and 
children’s activities” which was held in September “when all the tourists are gone . . . 
[as] a celebration of selfhood, of personal and community identity, and not [as] a 
contrived pseudo-cultural show put on to satisfy the tourist gaze” (Denvir, 2002: 40). 
Furthermore, “[a] festival such as Pléaráca illustrates that the Gaeltacht has not (or 
not yet, at least) gone the moribund touristic route of the staged folkloric or pseudo-
traditional event” (Denvir, 2002: 40). While primarily based in Conamara, Pléaráca 
regularly toured many of their events to other Gaeltachtaí, and indeed, to Wales and 
the Gàidhealtachd islands of Scotland as well. 
Many of my informants in Galway spoke very fondly of Pléaráca, often commenting on 
its importance to the community as a whole. The following quote from a woman in her 
early thirties is typical of such accounts: 
G: Nuair a bhí mise óg . . . bhíodh mé ag dul ag an bPléaráca, bhíodh an 




comórtais filíochta. Tháinig Louis de Paor . . . rinne sé ceardlann 
scríbhneoireachta linn. Agus ag cuimriú siar, níor thuig muid é ag an am, ach, 
bhfuil ’s agat, rudaí den tsórt sin – tháinig Ríonach Ní Néill, rinne sí ceardlann 
drámaíochta linn. Tháinig Diarmuid de Faoite, rinne sé rudaí linn. Tháinig, bhí 
an oiread ag tíocht, bhí an oiread deiseannaí a’ainn nuair a bhí mise ag an 
meánscoil . . . Agus an rud a thaitnigh liomsa faoi sin, Pléaráca, mar shampla, 
bhí idir shean agus óg páirteach ann, ghabhfadh sean agus óg ag na comórtais. 
Bhíodh ceolchoirmeachaí acub. Is cuimhneach liom go raibh ceolchoirm acub 
ar an gCeathrú Rua. Bhí mise óg go maith, rud ollmhór. Tháinig daoine as 
chuile áit . . . Thóg sé an pobal uilig le chéile . . . Cineál Glastonbury na 
Gaeltachta is dóigh! 
The organisation, then, was clearly of great importance to the vitality of the Galway 
Gaeltacht, with there being obvious positive linguistic implications to bringing the 
generations together, as described by this interviewee, as well as great social value in 
their work reaching out to the most underprivileged members of the community. Like 
a great number of the “community sector” groups involved in fighting social exclusion 
(Bisset, 2015), however, Pléaráca had its funding drastically reduced post-2008. 
Amongst the recommendations of An Bord Snip Nua (see 4.2.1) was the proposal to 
save €44m by cutting both the Local Development Social Inclusion Programme and 
the Community Development Programme, the schemes which funded groups such as 
Pléaráca. Noting that “these programmes aim to counter disadvantage [with] projects 
funded includ[ing] adult education courses, support for local enterprise initiatives and 
information provision for target groups”, An Bord Snip claimed that “[t]here is little 
evidence of positive outcomes for these initiatives” and as such they could be cut with 
minimal adverse effect (McCarthy et al., 2009b: 38). 
With their funding severely reduced, Pléaráca’s directors took the decision in April 
2015 to disband the organisation rather than continue in a substandard fashion, stating 
that their decreased budget meant that the organisation’s continued existence was no 
longer tenable (RnaG, 2015). 
As with the discontinuation of other community development projects throughout the 
country (Bisset, 2015), the liquidation of Pléaráca has had a significant detrimental 
effect on the community, as a parent of two young adults brought up during Pléaráca’s 
heyday described: 
C: Ó tá bearna an-mhór fágtha, tá. An bearna is measa ar fad atá fágtha . . . ná 




le scríbhneoireacht agus le filíocht . . . Go mór mór san idirbhliain bhíodh cúrsaí 
ar siúl acu agus bhí sé fíormhaith don dream a bhfuil spéis acu sa scríobh mar 
bhíodh siad ag scríobh drámaí nó filíocht nó prós. Bhíodar ag déanamh an-
obair ar fad agus tá sé sin ar fad imithe. Tá an fhéile imithe, tá rudaí eile imithe 
freisin. 
Further to being engaged in such important development of young people’s linguistic 
repertoires, the multiplier effect of groups such as Pléaráca for local businesses was 
noted by another Conamara resident: 
A: ‘[S]éard atá déanta ansin ná tá an infreastruchtúr pobal bainte óna chéile       
. . . agus caithfidh tú cuimhniú go, cuid mhaith den infreastruchtúr sin bhí rudaí 
eile crochta air. So abair na heagraíochtaí cosúil le MFG [Meitheal Forbartha 
na Gaeltachta], Cumas, Pléaráca – ní hamháin go raibh siad ag comhlíonadh 
na ndualgais a bhain leis an scéim áirithe a bhí siad ag fáil maoiniú uaidh, ach 
bhíodar ag cur isteach ar scéimeanna eile agus ag déanamh obair eile chomh 
maith sa bpobal. So, y’know, bhíodar, bhí daoine fostaithe, bhí siad ag 
déanamh tograí a bhí ag fostú daoine eile agus bhí airgead ag goil thart sa 
bpobal, bhí sé ag coinneáil siopaí oscailte. 
One of my other informants, who himself was involved in founding Pléaráca, 
contended that the creation of an unfavourable environment for such groups was a 
result of the then government being anti-community empowerment, rather than being 
connected to budgetary restrictions: 
S: [R]inne an rialtas sin scrios ar an earnáil dheonach . . . Baineann sé le idé-
eolaíocht i ndáiríre, ní bhaineann sé le airgead. Baineann sé le idé-eolaíocht 
mar bhí na dreamannaí seo róchriticiúil faoi pholasaí poiblí maidir le cúrsaí 
bochtanais i ndáiríre. Níor thaithnigh sé sin leis an rial[tas]...An tAire a bhí i 
gceannas ar chuid mhaith de na cúrsaí sin ag an am, Éamon Ó Cuív, níor 
thaithnigh sé sin leis. Agus rinne siad scrios i ndáiríre ar an earnáil . . . Bhí 
Pléaráca ar cheann de na heagraíochtaí a bhí pobalbhunaithe . . . Ach 
baineadh amach é as cúram faoin Roinn Coimirce Sóisialta, agus is ansin a 
thosaigh sé i dtosach báire. Agus, mar a déarfá, ba chuid den brief a bhí aige 
ná déileáil le cúrsaí bochtanais agus social exclusion . . . Agus de bharr Éamon 
Ó Cuív, cuireadh isteach é faoi Roinn na Gaeltachta agus Údarás na 
Gaeltachta agus ní raibh spéis dá laghad acu san agenda sin, mar a déarfá. 
Agus sa deireadh ní raibh siad sásta airgeadú a dhéanamh ar an rud agus sa 
deireadh dúirt siad “bhuel, look, muna bhfuil sibh sásta airgeadú a dhéanamh 
ar rud cén fáth a bhacfadh muide leis?” Agus thit an rud as a chéile. Agus bhí 
sé sin ag déanamh go leor maitheas ó thaobh na Gaeilge . . . [N]í dóigh liom 
gur thit sé sin as a chéile mar gheall ar chúrsaí airgeadais. 
This distinction between ideology and economics is overly simplistic, however: further 
to ignoring the significant financial savings resulting from cutting such programmes, 




to quash dissent and grassroots community empowerment are ultimately two sides of 
the same coin, as discussed in 5.6.1. A 2014 report on “government funding and social 
justice advocacy” (also referred to in 4.2.7 and 4.2.10.1) does, nonetheless, confirm 
the belief that the suppression of subversive voices was indeed a key factor in the 
cutting of funding for groups such as Pléaráca: 
there was a compelling body of evidence of the manner in which the state had 
suppressed or actively prohibited advocacy, crossing the border from inhibition 
to an element of deliberation. The prime example was the Community 
Development Programme [which funded Pléaráca], where detailed 
documentation and case studies pointed to dissent as the most convincing 
explanation for its closure . . . It was evident that some issues were especially 
sensitive, such as development, education, women, childcare and corruption, 
with examples of organizations that had spoken out of turn having to repay 
grants (Harvey, 2014: 4). 
While ultimately tracing the origins of this approach to before the onset of the crisis, 
the report goes on to detail a great number of strategies that were adopted by the state 
in recent years to silence oppositional groups (see also 5.6.1). In times of crisis the 
suppression of organised dissent is particularly crucial to the maintenance of the status 
quo, and the dramatic restructuring of the community sector is just one more example 
of the way in which the state used the 2008 crash as an opportunity to remake Irish 
society by deepening the hold of neoliberalism thereon. In doing so it has, as Bisset 
argues, “maintain[ed] the power and privilege of some while extending and deepening 
the suffering of others” (2015: 175; see also Mercille and Murphy, 2015). 
The informant who noted the link between Pléaráca’s social justice work and its 
defunding went on to explain that such restructuring has led to a reduction of 
community ownership of other groups similar to Pléaráca: 
S: [A]n rud atá tarlaithe ar bhealach le cuid mhaith de na heagraíochtaí seo tá 
siad bainte ar ais ón bpobal. Bhíodh siad . . . i bhfad níos pobalbhunaithe ná 
atá anois. Tá siad curtha faoin gComhairle Contae, agus tá córas coistí ag an 
gComhairle Contae atá ag breathnú daonlathach ach tá rud chomh bloody 
casta, fiú ann mise, abair, agus tá spéiseanna agamsa sna rudaí sin, ní thuigim 
fós cén chaoi a n-oibríonn sé sin! . . . [T]á an oiread coistí anois éagsúil ag an 
gComhairle Contae agus tá na coistí sin mar buffer zone idir an Chomhairle 
Contae agus an pobal. 
As described in 4.2.4 regarding the abolition of the ÚnaG election, this increasing of 




to manage the implementation of austerity. The removal of local level democratic 
accountability and the abolition of groups such as Pléaráca is thus readily interpreted 
as yet another example of the broader trend of neoliberalisation described throughout 
this thesis. 
Fishman’s sceptical attitude towards cultural festivals in which participants have such 
a good time that they forget afterwards that nothing much has changed in terms of the 
language’s wider prospects is well known (1991: 91, 110, 398). As Fettes has noted, 
however, while surely insufficient in themselves, groups like Pléaráca and the events 
they organise are a key part of language revitalisation efforts, ensuring that the 
language is no longer “heard only at funerals” (1997: 315). By operating primarily in 
Conamara, Pléaráca also contributed significantly to the area’s socioeconomic vitality, 
itself key to language maintenance. The group’s dissolution, however, surely marked 
a low point for community vitality, and many of my informants hoped that a similar 
group will emerge in coming years. Like the case of the inner-city Community 
Development Programmes described by Bisset, “in a community where educational 
equality is extreme, the removal of such infrastructure has significant consequences” 
for all age groups (2015: 177). Groups like Pléaráca, as the Irish Congress of Trade 
Unions report on the rationalisation of the community sector described, “[b]uild social 
capital, active citizenship and participation in a democratic society” (B. Harvey, 2012: 
9) and as such their suppression provides yet another example of the detrimental 
consequences of austerity not just for the Gaeltacht, but for Irish society as a whole. 
5.10 Further observations on language use 
In addition to the numerous factors detailed thus far, during my fieldwork I made 
various other observations regarding language use that are also worthy of mention. 
As described in 3.2.2, detailed quantitative work published in recent years identifies 
the strongest remaining Irish-speaking areas where over 67% of the population speak 
Irish daily outside of the education system (Ó Giollagáin et al., 2007a; Ó Giollagáin 
and Charlton, 2015a), and it was in such category A communities that this research 
was conducted. While previous quantitative studies undoubtedly offer important 
insights into language practices in the Gaeltacht, ethnographic research adds a further 
degree of granularity to our understanding of this area, complementing statistical work 




The quantitative data (which cannot be directly referenced here due to ethical 
constraints requiring anonymity) show that in almost all the areas I studied over 50% 
of those aged 3-18 speak Irish daily outside the education system, which, from my 
own observations, does not seem implausible. Based on all my experiences, however, 
it is beyond doubt that it is overwhelmingly to their elders that children and teenagers 
speak Irish when outside of school. Amongst themselves, English is clearly the socially 
dominant language (see also Ó Giollagáin et al., 2007a: 321-38). While several 
informants told me that at least some members of this age cohort speak Irish together 
in the absence of older people, throughout the entire duration of my fieldwork I did not 
see a single peer-to-peer interaction in Irish amongst the under-18 age group when 
they were not in the company of an older person. Coughlan’s ethnographic work on 
Irish-medium education in the Gaeltacht does, however, document peer group 
interactions through Irish in the absence of authority figures, although reports these to 
be the exception rather than the norm (Coughlan, forthcoming). 
While Ó Giollagáin et al. described the dominance of English amongst young people 
even in category A areas in 2007, it is significant that language shift seems to have 
taken place very rapidly in recent years, as the following data illustrate. In Galway I 
was fortunate enough to be able to interview three siblings in one family, all young 
adults, in whose home I was staying. This first interview extract is from the oldest 
sibling, a 25-year old woman who lives and works in a city away from the Gaeltacht, 
but returns periodically: 
B: Céard faoin dream a bhí ar scoil leatsa, an labhrann sibh Gaeilge lena chéile 
nó an mbeadh níos mó Béarla ann? 
S: Ó Gaeilge i gcónaí, yeah Gaeilge i gcónaí . . . Tá sé an-nádúrtha againn 
Gaeilge a labhairt lena chéile mar sin an chaoi a d’fhás muid suas. 
This response accords with my own observations of informal social interactions in the 
area, with it not being unusual for me to see those in their mid-to-late twenties speak 
Irish to each other. 
The middle sibling, a woman aged 20 who also spends most of the year working in an 
urban environment, answered a similar question as follows: 





M: Labhraim Gaeilge leis na leaids. 
Although the term “lads” is often used in Ireland to refer to mixed-gender groups, the 
interviewee confirmed that she did indeed mean that Irish was more common amongst 
the males in her peer group. In the relatively small age gap between this woman and 
her older sister, it would thus appear that females in this community have tended to 
shift away from Irish – a point on which this interviewee later elaborated. When 
discussing one of her female peers who is particularly reluctant to speak Irish she said 
M: [N]uair atá an cailín seo ann ní labhrann muid Gaeilge mar ní labhróidh sí 
linn é. Agus tá sé chomh aisteach mar tá an Ghaeilge aici. Bheadh cúpla lá 
labhródh muid cúpla focal Gaeilge léi . . . ach ní labhródh sí linne é unless go 
gcuirfeadh muid brú uirthi . . . Níor thaitin sé léi riamh, “níl mé ag iarraidh é a 
fhoghlaim, tá mé ag iarraidh Béarla a labhairt, níl sé goil tada a dhéanamh 
dhom, labhrann chuile dhuine Béarla, ní labhrann mórán daoine Gaeilge”, an 
sórt sin rud. 
Despite being a significant difference in comparison to the answer of her older sister, 
this gendered pattern of linguistic use is not overly surprising due to the well-known 
tendency for males to generally be more linguistically conservative and therefore often 
slower to shift to the dominant language (Gal, 1979: 167; Labov, 2001: 292; see also 
5.3.1). 
The third and youngest sibling, a man aged 18, told me that his peer group on the 
island was entirely English-speaking during in-group interactions: 
B: Nuair atá tú ag caitheamh ama le do chuid cairde thíos ag imirt pool san 
óstán, an labhrann sibh Gaeilge? 
G: Á Béarla i gcónaí. 
As above, this response tallies with all my own observations – including talking to 
others in his peer group, seeing them socialise on a regular basis, asking their parents, 
etc. While based on data from only one family, we can nonetheless see a dramatic 
shift in both reported and observed language use within a very short time frame, one 
which accords with both statistical evidence for ongoing language shift in the Gaeltacht 
and wider sociolinguistic axioms. Within a space of seven years, to judge from the age 
gap between these informants, Irish appears to have gone from being the unmarked 
language spoken by even the youngest adults, to no longer being used peer-to-peer 




(see also Ó Curnáin 2012b: 107). Further research on this topic with a larger sample 
size would undoubtedly be productive. 
This same young man elaborated on the language dynamics of the local pub where 
he socialises regularly: 
G: Labhródh na seandaoine Gaeilge amongst themselves agus dá mbeadh ‘s 
acu gur muide atá ann agus tá ’s acu go bhfuil Gaeilge againn, ansin caithfidh 
tú b’fhéidir dhá nóiméad ag caint Gaeilge leo agus cúpla soicind small talk agus 
imíonn tú, sin é, sin an t-aon Ghaeilge a labhrós tú agus ar ais ar an mBéarla. 
This youngest sibling went on to describe at some length his perceived reasoning for 
this shift amongst his age group. Several distinct but mutually reinforcing points 
emerged from this dialogue which are worth reflecting on, and which were also 
mentioned by many other informants. 
First, a greater use of technology amongst his peers as they were growing up was 
mentioned: 
G: [T]á teilifís i mBéarla, tá idirlíon i mBéarla, má tá tú ag iarraidh goil ar 
Facebook, tá na posts ar fad i mBéarla . . . Bhí mé ar an X-bosca agus ag 
labhairt i mBéarla le chuile dhuine air sin. So bhí, chaill mise an Ghaeilge níos 
luaithe ná [a dheirfiúracha]. Chaill mise é nuair a bhí mé timpeall 13 – stop mise 
á labhairt den chuid is mó. Tháinig an teicneolaíocht isteach i mo shaol… 
It is of note that while his older siblings claimed to use Irish with at least some of their 
peers, when asked about the use of Irish on social media they both conceded that they 
only used English thereon. As more and more social interaction takes place via such 
platforms, this development has obvious consequences for minoritised language use. 
Similarly, a father in Donegal recounted the conversation he had with his five-year-old 
upon hearing her advanced level of English for the first time during a family holiday in 
England: 
P: “Cá háit a d’fhoghlaim tú do chuid Béarla? Ní raibh ’s agamsa go bhfuil 
Béarla mar sin agat!” “Á a dheaide, tá scoil bheag Béarla agamsa mé féin thíos 
i mo sheomra leapan ag coimhead Netflix”. 
Several other informants also made such observations regarding technology, 




D: Feicim na gasúir atá ag [iníon an fhir seo], Béarla acub ó bhí siad dhá bhliain 
d’aois. Agus gur Gaeilge uilig a labhrann sí leob sa mbaile agus an t-athair 
freisin. Agus ina dhiaidh sin tá…Mar chuile nóiméad a fhaigheann siad deis tá 
siad ag breathnú ar video eicínt nó tá siad ar an ríomhaire. 
While the increased use of technology was sure to have occurred regardless of the 
economic crash, it is of note that, as many other studies have shown (e.g. Warren, 
2005; Rideout and Hamel, 2006; Piotrowski et al., 2015: 169, Domoff et al., 2017: 
279), over-worked parents and those in lower income households are much more 
likely to use television and computers as “surrogate child minders”, thereby exposing 
their children to more of the very technologies which are charged with being such key 
drivers of language shift (see also 5.5.1). 
A second factor proposed by the young male sibling from Galway as an explanation 
for his age group’s language shift was their greater communicative competence in 
English: 
G: [T]á Gaeilge sórt briste ag go leor acu, go leor acub. 
B: Muise? D’aoisghrúpa? 
G: Yeah, I mean breathnaigh ar mo chaighdeán. 
B: Níl caill ar bith ort a mh’anam! 
G: Níl mé in ann sentence a chuir le chéile gan focal Béarla ann [gáire]. 
B: Agus an mbeifeá ar chomhchaighdeán leis an dream eile? 
G: Ó bheadh caighdeán níos measa ag go leor acub! 
B: Muise? 
G: Yeah i bhfad níos measa. 
This interviewee’s standard of Irish is indeed lower than his older sisters, with a much 
greater use of functional codeswitching and grammatical errors not made by his 
siblings, a code reminiscent of the “reduced Irish” described by Ó Curnáin (2012a; see 
also Lenoach, 2012; Ó Giollagáin et al., 2007a: 300-20). The interviewee’s twenty-
year-old sister also described her use of English as being a product of her greater 
fluency therein. While discussing the tendency of many of her peers to predominantly 




M: Ach see déanaim féin é amantaí . . . Ach is maith liom an Ghaeilge, táim ag 
iarraidh, nuair a bheas páistí a’m, táim ag iarraidh iad a thógáil le Gaeilge. Ach 
braithim orm féin go n-athraím ar an mBéarla cuid den am. Fiú ann ag caint 
cuid den am bím ag caitheamh isteach focla Béarla ar nós nach n-úsáidim mo 
chloigeann ag soláthar an focal Gaeilge mar tá sé a’m i mBéarla. Tá sé 
aisteach. 
The breakdown of Irish as a distinctive marker of identity amongst young adults was 
another factor mentioned by the youngest of the three siblings I interviewed. He 
explained in considerable detail that when he was younger there was a group of young 
adults who aspired to seem older than they were, as young adults are wont to do. He 
told me that they demonstrated this by being diligently Irish-speaking, as the use of 
Irish was seen as characteristic of older community members: 
G: Ní gheobhfadh tú [é] ach ó na daoine a bhí idir, idir 18-24 agus a bhí ag 
iarraidh a bheith ag breathnú sórt, a bhí ag iarraidh a bheith níos mó ar nós 
[daoine níos sine] so bhíodar i gcónaí ag cur béim ar an nGaeilge mar bheadh 
Gaeilge i gcónaí á labhairt [acusan] le chéile, agus bhíodar ag iarraidh go 
mbeadh chuile dhuine sórt níos cosúil [leis an seandream]. 
I asked others in the area about this phenomenon and they corroborated it – indeed, 
I was told they even had a nickname for such individuals, na seanleaids óga: “the 
young old lads”. When pressed as to whether any of his peer group had such a mind-
set he replied as follows: 
B: Agus an bhfuil éinne atá, abair, 18 anois a bheadh mar sin? 
G: No, níl níos mó. 
B: Bhfuil sé sin imithe? 
G: Bhuel is mise an generation anois atá 18, níl muide mar sin ar chor ar bith, 
tá sórt... 
B: Éinne? 
G: Nah, not duine. 
Lenoach (2012: 23) convincingly argues that such a breakdown in the use of a 
minoritised language as a strong marker of identity is inherently linked to the lack of 
communicative ability such individuals have in the language. This renegotiation of 
youth identities in recent years is also reminiscent of Giddens’ work on reflexive 
identity construction as a trait of globalised modernity, with increased information flows 




in new ways, particularly via consumerism (Giddens, 1991; see also O’Rourke and 
Walsh, 2015, however, on ways in which new speakers can be attracted to Irish as 
part of such a project of identity construction). 
While sometimes dismissed as being merely a product of the oppositional nature of 
teenage identity, the same pattern of English dominance is also clear amongst much 
younger children. During my stay on an island in Donegal I would get a lift every day 
from the local minibus driver, who would often have his two-year-old son with him. 
Despite living on the far side of a remote island with a majority Irish-speaking 
population and having two local parents who speak Irish to each other, this young boy 
would invariably respond to his father’s Irish – and to mine – in English. His father 
seemed unconcerned by this, stating nonchalantly that his son will learn Irish at school, 
and that it was from television he learned English, because, as the father claimed, “níl 
teilifís ar bith i nGaeilg”. This striking pattern of behaviour brought to mind Harrison’s 
description of the youngest speakers in a minoritised language community acting as 
“tiny social barometers” which gauge the value of the languages they hear around 
them and tailor their linguistic behaviour accordingly (2007: 8). 
In accordance with Ó Curnáin’s (2012a, 2015) assessment of those born post-1960 
as being speakers of “non-traditional” Irish, this bus driver, who was in his 30s, told 
me that his parents’ generation had a much wider vocabulary and used far less English 
while speaking Irish. Similar opinions were expressed by others in his peer group in 
different settings. Again according with Ó Curnáin’s assessment, it is unsurprising to 
see the children of such post-traditional speakers having a significantly reduced 
competency in Irish themselves, or shifting outright to English as the bus driver’s 
young son appears to have done. 
Every day while walking past the playground on this same island I would hear only 
English, something which the co-op manager verified as being the normal state of 
affairs and linked to the presence of in-migrants in the community (see also 5.5.2): 
B: An gceapann tú go labhrann páistí an oileáin Gaeilge lena chéile? 
M: Labhrann siad ar an scoil. But bím ag éisteacht leofa amuigh san ionad 
súgradh agus ó! . . . Bhfuil ’s agat nuair a bhogann teaghlach istigh agus Béarla 
acu, aistríonn na páistí uilig achan áit go Béarla in áit iad sin a bheith ag caint i 




suas cúig teanga, y’know, nuair a bhogann siad sin isteach…Agus tá an scoil 
iontach maith, Gaeilg go hiomlán a bhíonn ann agus caithfidh mé a ráit tá 
caighdeán iontach sa scoil acu. Ach just chíonn muid iad ag teacht amach 
geata na scoile agus bíonn siad ag caint i mBéarla! 
While much of the information presented here is indicative of long-established patterns 
of language shift and it is unlikely that the data would be vastly different if not for the 
recession, it is of significance that this shift seems to have taken place very rapidly in 
recent years. Indeed, most of my youngest informants’ formative teenage years 
coincided directly with the recession. While this time frame should not, perhaps, be 
afforded undue salience, it is nonetheless an interesting point, especially considering 
the well-attested tendency for macro-level economic changes to impact people’s 
ideologies, even on an unconscious level (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Inglehart, 
2018; see also the discussion of psychology’s “impressionable years hypothesis” and 
recessionary periods in Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014). Further to the cuts and social 
disruption described above, this awareness of the recession and its implications for 
such marginal communities may well help explain Ó Giollagáin and Charlton’s finding 
in their 2015 update to the 2007 CLS study that language shift has occurred at an 
even more rapid rate than the 2007 study predicted (2015a: 2). 
Through weakening the all-important home-family-neighbourhood-community nexus 
(Fishman, 1991: 95) in which Irish survives, the recession clearly contributed to the 
decline of Irish in the Gaeltacht. The 2016 census results illustrated this starkly, with 
the 11.2% decrease in the number of daily speakers of Irish outside the education 
system in the Gaeltacht being in dramatic contrast with the modest growth seen for 
the same category during the Celtic Tiger (see 5.2.2). While significant reductions in 
coming years were predicted by the CLS in 2007 (Ó Giollagáin et al., 2007a), the Great 
Recession that began the following year exacerbated these trends by removing or 
diminishing much of the support infrastructure on which the Gaeltacht had come to 
depend. In light of all that has been described in this and the previous chapter, it can 
hardly be a surprise that the standing of Irish in the Gaeltacht went from bad in 2008, 
to much worse by 2018. 
5.11 Conclusion 
Striking as they may appear, the issues described in this chapter are but a microcosm 




the last decade. Although much of the literature on neoliberalism conceptualises it as 
the hollowing out of the state (cf. Weller et al., 1997), as has been seen, in reality its 
effects often amount to the hollowing out of society, with a great many of the social 
structures key to the vibrancy of Gaeltacht (and other) communities having been 
eroded considerably in recent years. 
In Reversing Language Shift Fishman stated that “[f]ostering small-scale community 
life is difficult but crucial for RLS” (1991: 6). Many other well-known authors in the field 
have made similar statements, including Romaine’s observation that “arguments in 
favor of doing something to reverse language death are ultimately about preserving 
and sustaining viable communities” (2006: 456; see also Crystal, 2000: 154; Mac 
Donnacha, 2000: 19; Spolsky, 2004: 8; Valiquette, 1998: 107; Williams, 2014: 243; 
etc.). 
As has been demonstrated in this chapter, however, the Great Recession and the 
intensification of neoliberal policies that accompanied it had the exact opposite effect 
on the Gaeltacht, negatively impacting the “home-family-neighbourhood-community” 
nexus (Fishman, 1991: 95) so key to language maintenance in a huge variety of ways, 
some of the most notable of which have been discussed here. While explicitly 
language-focused revitalisation programmes were adversely affected since 2008, so 
too were many of the supports for the wider community vitality called for by Fishman, 
Romaine, et al., thereby presenting enormous challenges for sustaining Irish-speaking 
communities in the coming years. 
Commenting on the difficulties of creating environments suitable for the maintenance 
of threatened languages such as Irish, Mufwene has recently observed that 
[l]inguists and language teachers have no control over the conditions that 
sustain a language, despite their expertise. That is, revitalization efforts should 
also address the nonlinguistic factors that produced the socioeconomic 
ecologies that are disadvantageous to the relevant languages. Just think how 
unproductive it would be if environmentalists only provided food to an 
endangered species while keeping it in the same deleterious ecosystem 
(Mufwene, 2017: e308). 
Although greatly improved by being informed by the expertise of linguists of various 
types, as has been shown, language revitalisation policies (like so much of public 




chapter has explored how the tension between these interests and minoritised 
language promotion has recently played out in Ireland, a country which is supposedly 
committed to revitalising its “first national language”, but which has readily adapted 
itself to become a prototypical “competition state” which serves the needs of capital 
above those of its inhabitants (Kirby and Murphy, 2011). It is hoped that this chapter, 
by drawing attention to the mutually constitutive nature of the local and global factors 
affecting language vitality, has helped provide evidence for the position expressed by 
Mufwene and others, and illustrated some of the social mechanisms through which 
the neoliberal hegemony that is enacted by competition states impacts threatened 







In attempting to address important deficits in LPP research to date, this thesis 
set out to answer the following research questions: 
• What is the relationship between the economic ideology of 
neoliberalism and the Gaeltacht? 
• How did the Great Recession which began in 2008 affect Gaeltacht 
areas in Galway and Donegal in socioeconomic and sociolinguistic 
terms? 
• In a country in which the state is ostensibly committed to language 
revitalisation, how are language policies shaped by dominant economic 
orthodoxies and why did these result in such severe cuts to Irish-
language provision in the wake of the 2008 crash? 
This conclusion will offer an overview of the key findings that emerged from 
this research. It will reflect on the implications of these findings for language 
revitalisation in Ireland and offer some more general thoughts on the 
intersection of language loss and economic forces in a time of immense social, 
political and economic upheaval. 
6.2 Summary of research findings 
Writing five years after the onset of the Great Recession, Williams stated that 
the question to be asked is whether or not such minority language 
groups are experiencing disproportionally more cutbacks and more than 
their due share of pain at the expense of collective gain. That is, is there 
anything particular about the nature of language policies and 
programmes that make them particularly vulnerable to the fiscal 
demands of austerity and budget reduction (Williams, 2013: 10). 
This thesis has taken up Williams’ challenge and endeavoured to address this 
issue by examining the ways in which the fallout from the 2008 crash resulted 
in significant reforms of both overt and covert Irish-language policy, and how 
the socioeconomic disruptions of this period affected Irish-speaking 




With Chapters 2 and 3 having presented a discussion on the nature of 
neoliberalism and the 2008 crash, along with a review of pertinent literature 
and my ethnographic methodology, Chapter 4 proceeded to explore how and 
why language revitalisation policies in Ireland underwent such an intense 
process of neoliberalisation post-2008. Although having initially proposed 
many of the key reforms that were ultimately implemented in Irish-language 
policy since 2008, the report of An Bord Snip Nua – the main roadmap for the 
state’s austerity policies – has previously received very little attention in 
discussions of Irish LPP. This report and the Memorandum of Understanding 
agreed with the IMF-ECB-EC “Troika” which supervised the running of the Irish 
economy between 2010-13 fundamentally informed the content of subsequent 
LPP developments. Indeed, two of the most significant reforms of Irish-
language policy in the last several decades – the 20-Year Strategy for the Irish 
language 2010-2030 and the Gaeltacht Act 2012 – were both introduced while 
the economy was under the direction of the Troika, a fact which even literature 
most critical of these policies fails to address (e.g. Ó Giollagáin, 2014b). 
These trying economic circumstances clearly affected both the content and 
implementation of these and other policies – with the 20-Year Strategy being 
largely unimplemented since its introduction and the Gaeltacht Act being voted 
through the Dáil by the governing coalition despite significant opposition from 
both language groups and opposition parties. Although over 150 amendments 
were proposed to the Gaeltacht Act, all of these were rejected by the 
government. Given that this legislation constituted an official response to the 
well-documented sociolinguistic crisis facing the Gaeltacht, the lack of 
engagement with such proposals does not bode well for the long-term viability 
of the language in its heartland communities, particularly when combined with 
the fraught nature of the Act’s implementation, an ethnographic account of 
which was offered in 5.8. 
Such challenges regarding “overt” language policy have been exacerbated by 
developments in “covert” policy (Shohamy, 2006), such as the severe, 




including the Gaeltacht development authority ÚnaG, which lost 73.7% of its 
budget between 2008-15. Tellingly, comparable non-Gaeltacht institutions 
such as Enterprise Ireland and the IDA were not targeted in anything like the 
same manner during this time. Austerity also left its mark on numerous other 
language support structures, seeing the closure of 16 of 19 voluntary sector 
language promotion groups and cuts to Irish-language media funding. Overall, 
by 2017 capital expenditure on the Gaeltacht and islands was €10.9m, having 
fallen from €75.7m in 2008. This was the case despite overall public 
expenditure having reached 90% of its 2008 level by 2018. Furthermore, as 
section 4.2.4 described, proposed expenditure in this area for 2018-27 is only 
slightly more than half the 2006-16 spend, the severe post-2008 cuts that 
occurred during this time notwithstanding. Irish, however, continues to be 
taught as a compulsory subject in schools throughout the country and it must 
be noted that this aspect of language revitalisation policy did not involve 
significant cutbacks. Nonetheless, figures regarding Gaeltacht-specific 
expenditure clearly highlight the extent of state “rollback” in the field of 
language policy in Ireland, a development eminently characteristic of 
neoliberal policy regimes (Peck and Tickell, 2002). 
Another area in which the Great Recession was seen to have had indirect, but 
very significant implications for top-down language policies is in public service 
reform. In recent years an oft-repeated discourse amongst Irish speakers is 
that significant numbers of public servants are “opposed” to Irish and thus work 
to render top-down language policies ineffective. Such opinions are expressed 
in both journalistic and academic commentary (e.g. Thejournal.ie, 2013a; Ó 
Giollagáin, 2014b: 102). Challenging this belief as being overly simplistic, a 
detailed study of the neoliberal “New Public Management” rationalisation 
measures implemented in the public sector since 2008 was offered in 4.2.9. In 
contrast to popular, individualist accounts, this “unprecedented change for the 
Irish public service” (MacCarthaigh, 2017: 161) was proposed as being a much 
likelier, structural explanation for the failure of policies such as the Official 
Languages Act 2003. The non-implementation of the 2003 Act has increased 




increased workloads and reduced resources meaning public servants simply 
have more pressing concerns than implementing Irish-language schemes. 
With neoliberalism being a hegemonic ideological force conditioning behaviour 
at both the individual and state level, Chapter 4 concluded with some 
observations on how this ideology directly contradicts key requirements of 
language revitalisation measures. Not only is neoliberalism fundamentally 
opposed to social planning (cf. Hayek, 2006 [1944]), of which language 
planning is, of course, a form, but it actively dismantles the sort of redistributive 
economic policies that are invariably necessary to sustain linguistic minorities. 
Furthermore, the precarious living conditions neoliberalism generates for so 
much of the world’s population serve to turn people away from the pluralist 
values that are fundamental to arguments in favour of defending cultural 
diversity, a point well documented in sociological and political science literature 
on attitude formation (e.g. Inglehart, 2018). 
Building on Chapter 4’s policy analysis, the results of extensive ethnographic 
research, including 52 interviews, conducted in 2015 and 2016 in some of the 
strongest remaining “category A” Gaeltacht areas in Galway and Donegal were 
presented in Chapter 5. In addition to examining the micro-level consequences 
of many of the macro-level policy reforms documented in the previous chapter, 
various socioeconomic consequences of the crisis not related to language 
policy per se, but with distinct implications for language vitality, were 
discussed. Chief amongst these, perhaps, were transformations in the labour 
market, particularly the collapse of the construction sector, deindustrialisation 
and the closure of businesses in the hospitality industry, an issue which was 
particularly pronounced in Donegal. In addition to the rise in unemployment 
caused by such developments, the closure of pubs and hotels has led to an 
increase in young people socialising outside the Gaeltacht, with detrimental 
implications for language reproduction, not least due to likely increasing rates 
of linguistic exogamy. The tourist industry was also hit particularly hard by the 
recession, with attendance at summer language colleges in particular falling 




which suggests that the recent increase in the use of English in the “linguistic 
landscape” of various Gaeltacht communities was connected to attempts at 
attracting tourists in light of reduced employment opportunities in other sectors. 
With emigration having increased enormously throughout Ireland as a result of 
the recession, particularly in rural areas, peripheral communities such as the 
Gaeltacht areas of Galway and Donegal inevitably experienced significant 
population loss post-2008. The extent and consequences of this were 
discussed, with the disproportionate emigration of the young adult cohort 
which is most likely to form families (making them crucial for continued 
intergenerational transmission of Irish) being noted as another particularly 
detrimental consequence of the recession in terms of community and linguistic 
vitality. 
While drastic, the reduction of support for the Gaeltacht did not go 
unchallenged during this time. Many communities attempted to resist state 
policies through the anti-austerity campaigns of groups such as Guth na 
Gaeltachta, described in 5.6.1. Although met with some success, the state was 
quick to clamp down on such efforts and the organisation was thus relatively 
short-lived. Furthermore, Guth na Gaeltachta received very little solidarity from 
official Irish-language promotion groups who, in a classic example of divide 
and rule tactics, were fearful of being abolished under the process of 
rationalisation they were undergoing at the same time (see 4.2.6). The 
disbanding of the Pléaráca arts and social outreach group (5.9.2) was a further 
example of how dissent against official policy measures was treated in the 
Gaeltacht during the crisis – a phenomenon echoed throughout many other 
areas of Irish society during this time (Harvey, 2014). 
With state support for the Gaeltacht having fallen so severely post-2008, it is 
unsurprising that many communities and groups I witnessed attempted to 
overcome the difficulties this caused via recourse to unorthodox measures 
such as “Corporate Social Responsibility” grants and crowdfunding 
campaigns. Despite being another way in which community agency was 




to neoliberal notions of the role of the state and seeing the maintenance of 
rural communities as a matter for corporate charity, not concerted state policy, 
this tendency potentially sees communities sow the seeds of their own 
destruction. 
According with the widespread disruption detailed in this thesis, the 2016 
census reported an 11.2% decrease in daily speakers of Irish in the Gaeltacht 
outside the education system since 2011, a drop which dramatically contrasts 
with the moderate growth in the same category shown in the previous census. 
While this decline in the vitality of Irish is to a large degree the continuation of 
centuries of marginalisation, the immense disruption caused by the recession 
in a short time frame clearly exacerbated this trend. This period, as was shown, 
proved particularly detrimental to the “home-family-neighbourhood-
community” nexus which Fishman has argued is of crucial importance to 
language maintenance (1991: 95), with the 2016 figures providing quantitative 
demonstration of this fact. 
As noted above, throughout this thesis the argument has been made that the 
disproportionate nature of the cuts visited upon the Gaeltacht since the crash 
was largely a result of the inherent antipathy of neoliberalism towards both 
social planning and redistributive economic policies. Although the vast majority 
of Irish society suffered under austerity during this time, so extensive were the 
cuts to Gaeltacht support schemes that Machiavelli's infamous advice that 
“injuries should be done all together” is brought to mind (2003: 38). Referring 
to work by Klein (2007), Mirowski (2013) and Krugman (2015), it was argued 
that the crisis presented an instance of “punctuated equilibrium” whereby the 
state had the opportunity to radically intensify an incrementalist process of 
withdrawal from the sphere of language revitalisation which had been taking 
place over the preceding decades. While the reduction in support for the 
Gaeltacht was both severe and rapid, rather than demonstrating any 
particularly anti-Irish sentiment on behalf of the political class, it has been 
argued that these cuts reflect the extent of neoliberal hegemony both in Ireland 




2011) having little interest in such “culturalist” spheres. The fact that much of 
the Gaeltacht population, particularly in stronger Irish-speaking areas, is on 
the lower end of the class scale made them all the more likely to be affected 
disproportionately by the cuts, with research both in Ireland and internationally 
showing austerity hits more vulnerable sections of society hardest (Bisset, 
2015: 175-7; Varoufakis, 2016). The Irish case thus clearly illustrates the 
precarious position that minoritised languages that are dependent on state 
support can find themselves in during times of fiscal crisis (see also Williams, 
2013; Wilson et al., 2015: 266). 
Although much literature on Irish-language revitalisation in the last ten years 
has focused on linguistic issues (e.g. Ó Murchadha, 2012; Péterváry et al., 
2014; Ó hIfearnáin and Walsh, 2018), as Edwards has stated: “failure to fully 
come to grips with external facts, pressures and attitudes is tantamount to 
treating language in isolation – the cardinal sin committed in so many 
treatments [of LPP]” (2007: 116). With the greatest economic crisis in the 
history of the Irish state – and the second most severe in the history of 
industrial capitalism – occurring during this past decade, this thesis has 
attempted to move away from the tendency to look at Irish-language policy “in 
isolation” and examine the wider structural issues that are of crucial 
importance to the success of almost all efforts to reverse language shift. In 
doing so, I have sought to avoid what Beck et al. have termed “methodological 
nationalism”, defined as an “insistence on interpreting every social 
phenomenon within . . . the frame of reference of the nation-state” (2003: 28). 
While attention has been drawn to the role of transnational economic forces in 
determining the success or failure of language revitalisation efforts, this is not 
to imply a totally deterministic reading of the sociology of language. As is well-
documented, the success of language revitalisation efforts invariably depends 
on a multitude of factors (Fettes, 1997). This work does, however, add 
empirical weight to the great many allusions in LPP literature to the centrality 
of economic forces in driving language loss and extinction, some of which were 




it is not, as people try here and there conveniently to imagine, that the 
economic position produces an automatic effect. Men make their history 
themselves, only in given surroundings which condition it and on the 
basis of actual relations already existing, among which the economic 
relations, however much they may be influenced by the other political 
and ideological ones, are still ultimately the decisive ones (Engels, 
1894). 
While the success of Irish-language policy is most undeniably dependent on a 
host of various factors, in light of the findings demonstrated in this work, 
Engels’ position would appear to be of distinct relevance to the field of LPP in 
Ireland. 
6.3 The loss of the Gaeltacht and the threat of the next 
recession 
Irish, as Fishman noted (1991: 122), is in many ways exceptional for a 
language of its size, having an institutional support network that few other 
minoritised languages could hope for. 2008-18 saw an immense weakening of 
these supports, however, as the Irish state moved ever closer to the laissez-
faire disinterest which characterises most nation-states’ attitudes to the fate of 
linguistic minorities within their territories. Nonetheless, despite the 
extensiveness of recent reforms, Irish still has an array of supports that leave 
it in a stronger position than many other languages with similarly sized speaker 
populations. If the neoliberalisation of Irish-language policy which was 
explored in this thesis continues, however, Irish may be an exceptional case 
no longer, becoming instead yet another example of the inability of so many 
nation-states to adequately support endangered language communities (cf. 
Fishman, 1991: 3). 
While the Irish economy was growing rapidly at the time of writing, the 
structural challenges which recently caused such disruption for Irish-language 
revitalisation continue to loom large over this field. Indeed, the continuation of 
the trend towards state rollback from supporting revitalisation measures is 
almost certainly set to be the case. Further to proposed expenditure on the 
Gaeltacht for 2018-27 being much lower than the amount spent between 2006-




cuts to state expenditure on social policy. Whenever this next economic 
downturn occurs – and it is well-established in economics that another major 
crash will undoubtedly occur in due course – further cuts to institutions such 
as ÚnaG or the department responsible for the Gaeltacht could well leave them 
essentially defunct, being that they are now so much weaker than they were 
in 2007. The magnitude of this threat is heightened by the fact that throughout 
2018 fears were expressed by the IMF that the world may well be heading 
towards another crash, as protectionist trade policies take effect globally and 
the increase in consumer debt that helped overcome the Great Recession 
approaches unsustainable levels (IMF, 2018). Furthermore, with language 
shift continuing apace, were another economic crisis to befall the Irish state, 
cuts to Gaeltacht expenditure will be all the easier to justify as we approach a 
“post-Gaeltacht” era in which such communities are not significantly distinct 
linguistically from the rest of Ireland. 
Nonetheless, despite the extent of the forces which minoritised the language 
historically and the magnitude of the threats currently stacked against it, Irish 
continues to be transmitted within its heartland communities, albeit tenuously. 
Moreover, there are still thousands of “new speakers” of the language 
throughout the remainder of the country. As Hindley has noted, however, 
“much of the romantic appeal for learning Irish will die with the Gaeltacht” 
(1990: 253).7 Further to the end of such “romantic appeal”, the loss of these 
distinct ethno-linguistic communities will see a key source of opportunities to 
learn the language outside of the classroom setting disappear, an experience 
which has been vital to the creation of tens of thousands of new speakers of 
Irish over the last century, this author included. With there being few examples 
internationally of languages that continue to be transmitted once they are no 
longer spoken as a vernacular in any bounded territorial community, the long-
term prospects for Irish can therefore hardly be seen as bright. 
 
7 While broadly supporting Hindley’s contention, recent research on new speakers shows that while 
the Gaeltacht is highly valorised by many, it is not universally seen as essential (Walsh, O’Rourke and 




6.4 Conclusion: language revitalisation in a time of 
crises 
The vast extent of language loss occurring throughout the 21st century which 
was discussed in 1.1 is, of course, far from the only drastic challenge facing 
humanity at this juncture. Indeed, we currently face enormous, existential 
threats to the very future of our species – with runaway climate change, loss 
of biodiversity, soil erosion and the risk of nuclear armageddon ranking high 
amongst these in the estimation of many analysts and international bodies. 
Although the triumphalist ascendency of neoliberal capitalism was seriously 
challenged by the 2008 crash, it remains dominant, albeit in an increasingly 
“zombified” form (Green and Lavery, 2017: 79). International political 
developments since 2016, including Brexit and the resurgence of various 
nativist and fascist movements across the planet, have led commentators such 
as Blyth and Matthijs (2017: 218-9) to interpret the political crisis currently 
befalling neoliberalism as the lagged response to the economic crisis of 2008. 
Indeed, the resultant tension between the economic compulsion of capitalism 
to globalise (cf. Friedman’s “golden straitjacket” (2000: 101-11)) and the 
political compulsion towards “neo-nationalism” which is currently present in 
many states (Blyth and Matthijs, 2017: 222) is emerging as a fundamental 
conflict of our age. As many authors have described, the political turmoil 
resulting from this conflict is inherently linked not just to the Great Recession, 
but to the wider emergence of neoliberalism as a global hegemony over the 
last four decades (Blyth, 2016; Inglehart, 2018). 
In the face of challenges of such immense proportions, the most powerful 
argument for being involved in language revitalisation is now surely that it 
requires us to challenge the “runaway civilization” (Fettes, 1997; see also 
Giddens, 2002) that is responsible for so many of the difficulties humanity 
currently faces. Without developing large-scale systemic solutions to our 
current crises as a matter of urgency, we face not just the continued loss of 
linguistic and biological diversity on an extraordinary scale, but potentially the 




While a discussion of the sort of alternative political and economic models that 
may help overcome these major, totalising catastrophes as well as the 
challenges faced by speakers of minoritised languages has been beyond the 
scope of this work, examples such as the “democratic confederalism” of the 
Rojava revolution in Kurdistan offer a glimpse of what a society based on direct 
democracy, environmentalism, feminism and explicit protection for linguistic 
minorities may look like (Jones, 2018). In light of the findings of this study, it is 
clear that this topic is ripe for future research. 
Although language revitalisation is certainly a worthy cause in and of itself, as 
Audre Lorde reminds us “[t]here is no such thing as a single-issue struggle 
because we do not live single-issue lives” (2007 [1982]: 138), and so attempts 
to secure justice and recognition in the field of LPP will necessarily intersect 
with other areas of progressive social struggle. Indeed, without engaging with 
such wider struggles, as this thesis has attempted to show, the best efforts of 
language revitalisation advocates can have little hope of being effective long-
term. Language revitalisation is thus best understood as a “good problem” 
(Fishman, 1991: 6), one whose resolution can contribute to solving the many 
other challenges we face. Without recognising this fact and acting accordingly, 
activist efforts at reversing language shift can only be destined to remain a 
hopelessly peripheral endeavour in an age of such enormous, intersectional 
crises, meaning that the mass extinction of linguistic diversity will thus come to 











It is high time to clearly acknowledge that the revival of Irish will involve significant 
expenditure, expenditure which cannot be avoided if we want the language to survive. 
It is not enough to intend to save Irish unless there is another intention, equally 
determined, to provide the financial assistance that this requires (An Coimisiún um 
Athbheochan na Gaeilge, 1963: 85). 
 
p. 13:  
English is of great value as an international language in matters of communication, 
trade and tourism and as a medium of participation in affairs all over the world 
(Government of Ireland, 1965: 11).  
 
p. 19: 
P: I think that it was a major backwards step in ’93 when the Department of the 
Gaeltacht was abolished. And the strangest thing about it was there wasn’t much 
opposition to it from Irish speakers at the time. And that meant that up until 1993 there 
was a department of state in the country that was working and operating entirely 
through Irish. The only one. That was abolished when arts and heritage and those 
things were brought in. And now we’re only a small part of the department, that’s 
operating through Irish. I dunno how many people work for the department, 300 







M: There was a recommendation if you go back to the recommendations that Colm 
McCarthy and the second Bord Snip had, to get rid of the department and to get rid of 
Údarás na Gaeltachta and get rid of y’know almost every institution that had to do with 
Irish. So they were under pressure, they were under attack, but a decision was made 
to keep them and to keep Údarás and others but it’s like that’s the present – “here you 
can keep them but we’re going to destroy them”  
 
p. 88 (passage 1): 
like a corpse 
p. 88 (passage 2): 
more marginalised than ever in the civil service 
 
p. 92: 
M: Both of those things came in but no extra resources were made available really to 
do that work. In any other government policy they’d understand that there’d be a cost 
associated with implementing a policy as big as that and as widespread as that and 
extra resources would be made available. Y’know it’s the opposite of that – they took 
money from the two biggest institutions connected to it, regarding funding . . . So 




B: Looking at it historically, if you go back maybe 15 years or whatever, we achieved, 
the Irish-speaking community achieved certain victories, with a struggle, as you don’t 
achieve anything without a struggle. But there were things like TG4, for example, the 




but they were there. And we got a language commissioner, and particularly that we 
got a language commissioner that was that strong. My own opinion is that that scared 
certain people and that scared the civil service . . . They weren’t used to dealing with 
the likes of Seán Ó Cuirreáin [the first commissioner] and that they had to accept this, 
be serious about it. And it was clear that some of this [the Gaeltacht Act] was a counter 
attack . . . That’s the natural result of that counter attack, it was extremely weak. It was 
incredibly weak with regards to the political system that they weren’t even willing to 
accept even one amendment. 
 
p. 96: 
A: With regard to the Údarás, you were talking about a capital budget of up to twenty, 
twenty-five million or something like that and that’s now down to six million. So there’s, 
y’know, an enormous decrease in that that budget and if you compare that to, for 
example, Enterprise Ireland and the IDA, there’s no doubt but there’s, as you might 
say, a certain message there. 
 
p. 96-7: 
S: There’s a huge connection or link between an organisation’s budget and . . . the 
results they have. The difference I saw, when I started out we’d have a capital budget 
of 26 million. The executives were able to go out and be confident in themselves that 
if they met an investor or if an investor was making inquiries they could be strong and 
say “we can help you, we can help you”. Now there’s no question about that and let 
there be no question. So when the capital budget falls to six or eight million, maybe 









É: You’re not a player anymore. People don’t talk about us, we aren’t talking on the 
radio, people think we’ve lost the battle. That’s all to do with the catastrophic cut backs 
we had. And the other thing is, now there’s such close monitoring of everything we do. 
And the thing they say about neoliberalism, reductive, reductivism . . . reductivity. 
Everything is cut back. There’s huge monitoring of everything. There’s more 
monitoring of everything because the budgets are so tight.  
 
p. 98 (first passage): 
M: Up to 2008, 2009 maybe, they were effective. It was great, you were able to go in 
and have a meeting with Pádraig Ó hAoláin [the then chief executive] or Jim Keogh 
who was in charge of employment and industry. But after the budgets were cut, and 
that’s what happened with the Údarás, and this is significant too . . . When people 
were in the Údarás, they’d started out with Gaeltarra Éireann and were approaching 
retirement age in 2008-9. And the big packages came . . . Some of them only got two 
weeks’ notice and the gun was put to their heads and they were told if you leave by 
the end of the month you’ll be on the old pension, if you don’t you’ll be on the new 
pension. It was a no brainer for all the boys. And they lost a whole swathe of people. 
And that really hurt the Údarás. It was an accident, seen as Gaeltarra Éireann was 
founded [at that time] and the leadership of the whole thing was lost. 
p. 98 (second passage): 
É: But the big difference now, Ben, is that there are 21 companies in the estate 
employing 430. There were 21 companies in 1998 employing 1,300. So the companies 
that we have now are employing less people. 
 
p. 98-9: 
É: The companies that left were mostly traditional manufacturing companies . . . That 




one, they moved. That’s the important thing, they moved. Because you can get 20 
workers in India for the pay one worker here gets. 
 
p. 100 (first passage): 
A: I think if you go out and ask people on the street they’ll say it didn’t bother them one 
way or the other. 
p. 100 (second passage): 
C: The people of this area wouldn’t be thinking of Údarás na Gaeltachta. They know 
that they’re connected to the business park, but the average person, that’s all they’d 
know. 
p. 100 (third passage): 
G: I remember long ago the Údarás election and oh, it would cause such a stir. Oh, 
there’d be so much talk about it! And people would be pulling down posters and putting 
posters up and down . . . And say if you wanted planning permission for your house – 
as it’s so hard to get planning permission – say if you’d spoken to some politician and 
they’d say “oh I’ll be able to help you with that”. Oh, it’d be some craic. And when they 
came to the door you’d give it to them! There was more interest, I have to say, in the 
Údarás election than in the national election. As you knew these people, you’d see 
them everywhere. And, y’know, you’d be saying “I’ll give you my vote if you mend that 
road. And until I see a lorry pulling in here beside the house [you won’t get it] . . . And 
that’s how you got things done. Now right or [wrong], I dunno – that’s how it worked. 
Yeah, it’s terrible it doesn’t exist anymore.  
 
p. 100-1: 
M: Fine Gael and Labour changed that and they got rid of the election and now people 
are appointed to the management board of the Údarás and the standard of people 




people they’re appointing to the board of Údarás na Gaeltachta in charge of that fuckin 
hen house. 
B: Really?  
M: Yeah. Timeservers. They can’t get a place on the County Council. They stand for 
that and they fail. So local people aren’t willing to elect them to the County Council so 
the parties say we’ll put you up for appointment to the management board of Údarás 
na Gaeltachta, you’re so fuckin shite at everything else, we’ll put you on the fuckin 
management board of Údarás na Gaeltachta. 
B: [laughs] 
M: But that’s the truth! . . . Even when there was an election, what did Fianna Fáil do 
in fuckin county Galway – a man who couldn’t speak Irish?! And he got in! . . . See 
down in the pub, so long as there was no one from the Údarás there everyone would 
agree with me. 
 
p. 101: 
S: If there weren’t things to do with me, I wouldn’t speak. [Another board member] said 
to me a few times “hey are you listening to this?! We’re talking about your area!” And 
there was me asleep! [laughs] 
 
p. 102-3: 
B: What about morale in the organisation . . .? 
É: [points his finger down to the floor to show it’s low] 
B: Really? 
É: Very bad. 




É: 100% accurate. Things are worse than that even. 
B: Really? And when did that start? 
É: Three or four years ago. 
B: Because of…? 
É: Rationalisation. 
B: Work conditions and so on? 
É: Yes. A third of the staff are gone, when someone leaves we’re not allowed to recruit 
someone new. Much more work to do with less people, people at the top, pressure 
from the department trying to narrow the whole thing in, they don’t want to implement 
this or that. They have the challenge and they’re on a fifth of the budget they were ten 
years ago. They have 30% less staff, the staff they have are old. No one new is coming 
in. They fell out with the trade union. They want to push these things forward without 
any partnership, without any consultation. The management have lost two votes of 




B: Basically the Department of the Gaeltacht is saying we’re responsible so they are 
saying to Údarás na Gaeltachta “you have to implement this or we’ll cut your funding” 
and Údarás na Gaeltachta says to the community “you have to implement this or we’ll 
cut your funding”. And I’m central to this process myself, on the receiving end, and 
that’s what’s happening. 
 
p. 106 (first passage): 





p. 106 (second passage): 
this office could be anywhere now, it isn’t to do with the Gaeltacht  
p. 106 (third passage): 
the Department of the Gaeltacht 
p. 106 (fourth passage): 
P: They wanted to put an end to us altogether, didn’t they? Well, they didn’t want the 
department to have any connection to work on the ground, that that would all be given 
to the Údarás and we’d only be kind of policy makers. And I suppose that’s what 
happened to a large degree . . . it didn’t happen completely, we still have the learners’ 
scheme, but we have no connection to infrastructure anymore. 
 
p. 107: 
A: Recommendations were made, y’know, to improve [the Irish speaking scheme] and 
Guth na Gaeltachta, Tuismitheoirí na Gaeltachta, we made recommendations to 
improve the scheme. But we all recommended it shouldn’t be abolished. But it was 
abolished, and nothing was put in its place! So what I’m saying is that the opportunity 
was used to abolish a lot of things. For example, one of the other things that was 
abolished was the Gaeltacht scholarship scheme, y’know, for second-level students. 
So you were kind of giving an incentive for people to do their education through Irish. 
That was abolished. What was put in its place? Nothing! 
 
p. 109: 
B: [Conradh na Gaeilge], Glór na nGael, Comhluadar, an tOireachtas and a couple of 
other groups [were working together to ensure different organisations were not doing 
the same sort of work]. There’d been a lot of work done on this, we’d put a plan 
together, to say that we’d come together to share resources . . . Still every group can 




refused to engage with that, really they were annoyed we were doing it, as again, it’s 
the same thing with regards some of these things . . . with the civil service and going 
back to Aer Árann [see 4.2.9; 5.6.3.1], the Foras had a plan, they wanted to put it 
through, my way or the highway . . . If you were in charge of a company or business     
. . . and you had to make a huge change, you wouldn’t go about it in the way Foras na 
Gaeilge did . . . There was no risk assessment of any description done.  
 
p. 110: 
K: The opinion I have with most board meetings, if you see in any organisation, it’s not 
the board that makes the policies, it’s the civil servants, y’know, they present the policy 
to the board and the board say “oh yeah, grand”. Maybe there’ll be a small change or 
two but usually they just go along with it . . . If the [government] department says you 
have to do this, you have to do it. 
 
p. 110-1: 
D: We did huge work then when that was taking place, we sent letters and got in 
contact with every TD in the 26 counties. Any of us who were working full time we met 
with TDs in our constituencies and y’know anyone with kind of political power. We 
were in Leinster House and I suppose on one hand people were saying that [the 
informant’s organisation] would be ok . . . that they’d be selected. But at the same time 
no one knew and . . . it did damage to [the organisation’s] work at the time because 
no group like that has huge resources, youth groups in particular. So we were 
spending a big percentage of our time sorting out things like that instead of focusing 
on youth work and instead of focusing on the work we were meant to do we had to be 
politicians . . . We definitely had difficulties as staff dealing with it. And I know that the 
other groups and lead organisations spent a lot of time, they didn’t exactly waste it, 
but definitely spent a lot of their time dealing with this instead of focusing on things. 
And it’s us, we and five other groups achieved that status. There were 19 groups doing 
the exact same lobbying . . . There were lots of difficulties and it created tension 




like Comhdháil Náisiúnta na Gaeilge that were in existence since the 1940s, they just 
disappeared. That question of funding certainly caused difficulties.  
 
p. 111: 
nobody has an ounce of respect for Foras na Gaeilge. 
 
p. 113: 
adhering to current practice means accepting in practical terms the decline of the 
minority language in the Gaeltacht (Ó Giollagáin and Charlton, 2015a: 11). 
 
p. 114 (first passage):  
M: It’s the department that objected to them, isn’t  it, the recommendations, the Údarás 
didn’t ask for them . . . The department was too worried about being connected to 
recommendations that were coming from the experts because, I suppose, they’re not 
implementing the 20-Year Strategy properly, they’re not making the resources 
available to for the Gaeltacht Act and the likes so I suppose it goes back to that, to 
that approach, yeah to marginalise Irish and to do a certain amount but not do much.  
p. 114 (second passage):  
if you were the minister responsible for Gaeltacht matters would you be wanting to 
spread that information? I dunno! 
p. 114 (third passage): 








P: There’s no sense to it . . . our huge lack of staff and the amount we have to do. But 
you have to accept it. The way we work, for example I’m working on a daily radio 
programme and I’m presenting and producing myself. There’s no one else, no 
researcher, no producer, there’s fuck all, right. If that was in RTÉ there’d be six, seven 
working on the programme and they’d have a much bigger programme . . . This is a 
good point for you . . . employees of RTÉ Raidió na Gaeltachta are second class 
citizens withing the organisation . . . we’re on much lower pay, much lower [with 
emphasis] than everyone who does the same work in RTÉ. 
B: And what excuse is there for that? 
P: There is no excuse, it’s just that we didn’t . . . Y’know they’re always talking about 
it, saying we should fight it, but we never did. We should take a case to fuckin...But 
we’re not doing it . . . We should set the law on them, to fuckin Europe, fuckin sue 
them like. We should. But we’re not doing it . . . But maybe people were scared, there 
was a recession and you didn’t want people to think “oh that’s that group looking for 




D: I see that often, because you’re working with Irish it’s clear that people think you’re 
doing it “for the cause” . . . people don’t see it – and when I say people I mean 
authorities, governments, powerful people – they don’t see Irish and community 
development as proper work. Like people don’t get proper pay for a job, even though 
they’re doing a job . . . Now I understand . . . we’re doing these things because we like 
them and we’re particularly interested in them, but y’know the pay and recognition 
should be the same as for any other group. But that’s often the case, anything to do 
with community development, Irish or English, it’s assumed it will happen, instead of 
giving acknowledgement. Like if you pay someone you get – or you’d assume you get 






E: I think at this point that RnaG is a waste of time. It’s only, I think, they’re only talking 
about death notices . . . It doesn’t have programmes like it used to . . . They’re just 
putting in the time now, as you might say, on the programmes.  
 
p. 120: 
great deficit that existed until now that we did not have accurate research with regards 
to the listenership of RTÉ Raidió na Gaeltachta 
 
p. 122: 
S: Certainly one of the biggest things that happened in the area in the last twenty years 
was the founding of TG4. And that made a huge difference, there’s no doubt about 
that. Now it was established at a time when . . . the economy was starting to grow . . . 
It kept a lot of people working in the area, people who are very, maybe very creative, 
artistic, who’d otherwise have left. And there’s a certain generation and there’s, I 
suppose, a couple of hundred people, say, who were kept in the area or who were 
brought in and who are sympathetic to Irish. I mean that’s important, aside from the 
influence of television itself, it’s important for the area, y’know, as a lot of these people 
live in the area, they’re raising children by now, a lot of them. That helped the area a 
lot and it gave a certain status to Irish amongst local business people. I noticed that – 
business people, they were changing their view of the language. Maybe they used to 
be kind of negative about the language, they started thinking, well, maybe . . . Irish 
has status now, the status of television and I think that was important for the image of 
Irish in the Gaeltacht itself. 
 
p. 125 (first passage): 
C: Maybe TG4 has faults, and it does, but there are lots of other companies that have 




and with regard to employment that’s good. But the thing about it, as you might say, 
is that they’re not permanent jobs . . . And most of them would be through English.  
p. 125 (second passage): 
C: There was a big fault with TG4 that the people working there were speaking English. 
Now not everyone was . . . I remember going into an office and it was all English being 
spoken there. That’s something that didn’t happen with Raidió na Gaeltachta. Y’see 
that’s because the people were very serious, they fought to make Raidió na Gaeltachta 
available, they fought for Irish, and for those working in TG4 it was just a job for them. 
That’s the difference, it was a job and they didn’t care. They weren’t certain 
themselves. I’m not saying that there aren’t certain people in TG4 – there were and 
there are – who had a particular loyalty to Irish, that’s true. But the office workers of 
Raidió na Gaeltachta were as loyal to Irish as the broadcasters were. That wasn’t so 
in TG4. Who was to blame for that, were the wrong people employed? I don’t know. 
 
p. 126: 
F: A couple of days ago I applied for work, something I get paid about a thousand euro 
for. And they said to me, well, this is an internship, like a company that wants to make 
stuff for TG4. So without me being able to get a proper research [this seems to be a 
mistake, with the informant confusing the word for research with that for salary – these 
words are similar in Irish], they wanted to pay me bullshit, €20 extra on top of the dole, 
right. And it’s not like I’m just an amateur, I literally, I went to university, NUI, the fuckin 
Acadamh in NUI, and I put in loads of work. So for someone who’s [qualified] they’re 
saying to me, y’know, “fuck off”. And they want to use my work to make a fuckin load 
of money. So there are just problems there. 
 
p. 127:  
The current level of funding is not sufficient for TG4 to engage with a market that is 
constantly developing and changing. Without a multi-year basis for funding, it is difficult 





the 25% fall in Foras na Gaeilge’s budget in the last five years, as well as another 
substantial cut predicted for next year (Foras na Gaeilge, 2013: 1-2). 
 
p. 130: 
S: It was stated clearly . . . that one of the things the Strategy planned to do was to 
attempt to increase the amount of print media being read in Irish. And what happened? 
The paper was discontinued, the printed newspaper!  
 
p. 133: 
some cultural problem placing a restriction on the system 
 
p. 133-4: 
B: I don’t want to be complaining about anyone, but if the government isn’t willing to 
govern – ‘cause again, civil servant, cushy fuckin number, on your fuckin flexitime, do 
the same thing, or even worse again, [if you had to] annoy your colleagues cause my 
minister wants this so sorry, you’re gonna have to get off your fuckin arse [and 
implement a language scheme]. 
 
p. 134: 
A: Those civil servants have enormous power. And a lot of the time government 
ministers or whatever politician is in charge of that area isn’t willing to engage with or 
go against the recommendations or opinions of the civil service. The way I see it is 
that with regard to the civil service there’s a kind of a culture at the moment that Irish 






p. 135:  
B: Is the civil service as opposed to Irish as much of the Irish-speaking community 
thinks? When dealing with them is that the impression you get? 
G: It’s not. It seems to me that many feel . . . that they have better things to do than be 
involved with than this issue. Anyone I speak to, and certainly when I’m sat across the 
table from them, they tell me they respect Irish, they like Irish. So I can’t dispute that, 
if someone tells me they have respect for Irish. But in terms of what the civil service 
are going to do for Irish, when it comes to legislatively what are you going to do, kind 
of, and that’s what are you promising in the language scheme – so you respect Irish, 
what’s in the language scheme, then? And when we see the commitments being 
fulfilled, or the lack of commitments . . . that’s when the weakness is to be seen. Now 
why is that happening? Again, I dunno. Y’know it’s really, it’s a question of, I suppose, 
leadership, really. 
 
p. 138 (first passage): 
everyone was hanging on for dear life really, with regards to staff. 
p. 138 (second passage): 
É: It’s happening in every sector . . . A new approach that the state had. A new 
approach that’s international in a way . . . Fianna Fáil started this. Fine Gael followed 
it. They told us that they wouldn’t but they followed it, step by step. And often it suits 
those who are in charge, like the people who are in charge of government 
departments, they’re able to keep better control of things . . . with this thing that “this 
is what you’ve got to spend for the year, this is all you have, you’ve got to do it” . . . I 
don’t think it’s only to do with Irish. I thought that until I started talking to people in other 
government departments, for example national parks, health, FÁS or training – it’s the 
same thing. I think that that’s something we always fall into, that we’re in this bubble, 
the Irish bubble, and we think that everything is… 







A: Thirteen times it was mentioned that it was dependent on resources. Yeah. But 
that’s happening… 
G: Often.  
A: Maybe it’s not that transparent, that they say dependent on resources… 
G: Yeah, yeah. 
A: But it could be put in a way that means it’s very difficult to assess the commitments 
made or have them presented in a way that ensures they achieve results. 
 
p. 141: 
limited resources  
 
p. 143 (first passage): 
S: For me looking at it objectively, that’s not part of the recession, it’s part of this 
rollback of civil servants and the state from being responsible for anything themselves 
and farming it out to some other group. I mean I think that there’s a kind of new attitude 
now in the civil service that we’re standing back from doing anything or making any 
decisions, we’ll leave that to regulators. But we’re safe, so you can’t ask us any difficult 
questions in the Dáil because “oh some other group is in charge of that”. 
p. 143 (second passage): 
I believe the language is being driven to the margins of society continually, and I 
include here much of the public administration. I don’t believe at all that the blame for 
this is primarily on the political class, but it appears to me that although there are 
people in the civil service who strongly support Irish, there are stronger and more 
widespread forces that do not care whether our national language lives or dies 
(Oireachtas Éireann, 2014). 
p. 143 (third passage): 




p. 143-4:  
that’s not to do with the economy, that’s the government’s attitude 
 
p. 144: 
it appears to me that it’s just a pain in the ass for them 
 
p. 146: 
M: That’s neoliberalism again – the state has no function except as an administrator 
for business people. It has no duty towards society, and the Gaeltacht is a society, 
and the language is part of the country’s society. But . . . there’s no box in the 
spreadsheet for that, so they have nothing to do with it. 
 
p. 146-7: 
there’s a specific attitude . . . with the government being against Irish 
 
p. 147 (first passage): 
too often in this country the blame is placed on people when it is more correct to place 
in on a system or conditions (Ó Murchú, 2006: 27). 
p. 147 (second passage): 
M: It shows that Irish and the Gaeltacht were not priorities . . . It’s not that there’s 
animosity amongst most politicians against Irish, but when they were looking at the 
problems they had to solve Irish and the Gaeltacht were not part of that.  
p. 147 (third passage): 
it’s to do with decisions the government took regarding debt, to take ownership of debt, 






É: 950 [people] lost their jobs here . . . but the thing that happened with regard to the 
language, it was very interesting because jobs took primacy. It was very interesting. 
Two years we had public meetings about employment and there is no way in those 
two years that anyone was going to mention language. 
 
p. 163 (first passage): 
These districts are known to coincide more or less with areas of rural Ireland which 
present an economic problem of the greatest difficulty and complexity. The language 
problem and the economic problem are in close relation to each other, and your 
Commission is asked to consider both together. (Coimisiún na Gaeltachta, 1926: in 
Irish on p. 2, with this English translation given on p. 3). 
p. 163 (second passage): 
the most wretched and oppressed class of all our people in Ireland 
 
p. 166: 
S: If you didn’t go to university or doing a course or something like that, most of the 
young people went working, building houses or whatever there was to do – but 
everyone like that left. 
 
p. 166 (first passage): 
G: Everyone is in Australia, the young men, say the group who are the same age as 
me, who I was at school with. Lots of them are gone. This is the group who were 
working as carpenters, working on building sites in Galway and things like that. They’re 
gone. Half of my class, I’d say, are in Australia, or America, or Canada, or somewhere. 
And they come home at Christmas and they leave again . . . I don’t think things had 





p. 166 (second passage): 
It’s those lads most of all who’d speak Irish 
 
p. 168 (first passage): 
traditional manufacturing companies . . . textile companies, electronics companies 
p. 168 (second passage): 
É: They moved . . . the companies, two companies moved to Bulgaria, a company 
moved to China. There were a thousand jobs a week being lost in the state at that 
time. A thousand manufacturing jobs. It was the end of an era in a way. 
B: The end of the era of industry? 
É: Traditional manufacturing. 
 
p. 169 (first passage): 
A: The thing that we’re seeing here in Ireland is . . . with regard to big industries you’re 
talking about industries that are “information based” as they say, and usually those 
industries or factories or businesses, whether it’s Google or Yahoo or Microsoft, 
they’re based in areas where there are big universities – you’re talking about Dublin, 
Galway, Cork, Limerick. And rural areas, even if they have small university centres, 
they’re not going to be able to supply hundreds of graduates and things like that, 
different types of graduates. So the thing we’re seeing, I think, is an end to that era, 
where there’d be more than fifty jobs in any one company in an area like this, instead 
we’re looking at small industries, again maybe information based, but on a much 
smaller scale. 
p. 169 (second passage): 
M: [It’s] alright sending things out to eastern Europe and China and those places but 
over time these places will improve and pay will rise. And it’s happened. And then 
you’re looking at something and maybe it’s not that much cheaper than getting 
something made in Ireland or in England but that the supply chain is long and you 




manufacturing. There’s a question of skills and everything like that, and automation 
and everything . . . and I’d say that’s more of a threat [than jobs going overseas]. 
 
p. 170 (first passage): 
B: What is the most westerly point that is viable for factories? 
M: Tulach. 
B: Do you think? 
M: Absolutely. TG4, Tulach. We spent years [somewhere further west] and it was very 
difficult for us. It was too far from Galway city, too much travel . . . difficult for customers 
to find you and everything like that. After, after TG4, I’d say that’s the point. That’s just 
to be realistic about it. 
p. 170 (second passage): 
R: Oh my God Gaoth Dobhair and Conamara are not the same. We’re rich here 
compared to the people of Gaoth Dobhair . . . They’re very cut off . . . You’d notice it, 
there’s just not the same employment there. In a way it’s because of the border, they’re 
kind of cut off from their natural city, Derry, and they’re very far really, they’re very far 
north. I’d say they’re hit worse, because at least in Conamara, it doesn’t matter where 
you are in Conamara, it’s still possible to go to Galway. But in Donegal where would 
you go? 
p. 170 (third passage): 
B: What is the biggest difficulty you have when trying to get companies to locate here? 
É: This is completely against everything I say publicly, but Donegal! 
B: That’s what I thought, remoteness? 
É: Remoteness. Jesus. There’s no train into the county, we’re separated from the six 
counties by a border . . . You’re up there, it’s difficult. Broadband is extremely important 






p. 170 (fourth passage): 
If you want to make money you’ll go to places like Dublin, where there’s a population. 
If you want to make a difference to your community, to your area, you’ll stay in the 
countryside. 
 
p. 171 (first passage): 
S: You can no longer convince industries to locate in rural areas that are far away from 
infrastructure, from the city, from the college and so on. So the Údarás isn’t managing 
to attract many factories more than 15 miles, 20 kilometres from Galway city. And you 
see what’s happening in Gaoth Dobhair, that it’s abandoned . . . There was a time, say 
at the time of Gaeltarra, there was a better grant if you were willing to locate in the 
Gaeltacht. Gaeltarra were able to say “well there’s full employment in Spidéal so we’re 
not willing to put you there. We’ll put you in Ceathrú Rua or in Carna. You’re getting 
an extra grant because of that”. And they were willing to do it. Well they can’t do that, 
you get the same grant in Galway city as you do in Carna . . . And they say – I dunno 
is it true as Europe is blamed for a lot of things when it suits organisations and 
politicians – but they say that that’s because of the European rules. 
p. 171 (second passage): 
B: The various policies the government has are strongly supporting the central 
economy instead of the regional or marginal economy. Whether that’s being done 
intentionally or whether it’s just that they know no better, or a bit of both. But it’s 
happening and it’s getting worse. 
 
p. 172: 
M: We thought there’d be good infrastructure around . . . After 11 years a month ago 
we got proper broadband. 
B: Stop! 
M: After 11 years. Now if we thought that it’d be like that 11 years ago, we wouldn’t 




that the Údarás had lots of wealth and they were able to improve things. And they 
were and they helped us and things like that but . . . [during the coalition government 
of] Fianna Fáil and the Greens especially the cut to the Údarás’ budget could be seen 
and you couldn’t get anything off them . . . There was no funding available from the 
Údarás and it was all dependent on the private sector. 
 
p. 172-3: 
B: Nine out of every ten small companies that closed between 2006 and 2011 were 
outside of Dublin. So the recession had a much bigger impact . . . on areas outside of 
the main cities. If you look at the amount of people who lost jobs in the recession 
between 2006-11, around 90% of them didn’t have third level education . . . Because 
most of the small companies are based outside of the big cities, there are few big 
companies based outside the cities . . . Around 20% of the English economy is based 
around London, London-based. 40% of Ireland’s economy is based around Dublin!       
. . . And it annoys me when you hear ESRI reports about the 26% increase in GDP, 
that’s bullshit. But maybe an increase of 4-5% in the economy, and that’s fine – there’s 
maybe a 6-7% increase in areas like Dublin, Galway, Galway city and so on. But what 
about Boyle in Roscommon? Y’know what about Oughterard? What about Gaoth 
Dobhair? What about Acaill? What about Ballina even that’s bigger than that? Very, 
very little. 
 
p. 175 (first passage):  
L: When the [industrial estate] was going well and the workers were getting pay from 
it and that pay was being spent locally on local services and in the hotels, there used 
to be people and they’d be out on Thursday night, Friday night, Saturday night and 
Sunday night – and maybe even Monday night too! . . . The place was so lively. And 
wasn’t it good that they had the money to do that. Employment and everything was 






p. 175 (second passage):  
H: You’d think it was getting worse every year, you’d think the worst hadn’t yet come 
[in the area] but I don’t know what else is left to close. I mean this year when the Gaoth 
Dobhair Hotel closed down, well the Gaoth Dobhair Hotel closed last year. And then 
Seaview closed down. I mean that’s another one, the most popular place there was    
. . . Well there are four or five pubs that closed in [recent] years, that’s a big deal like. 
And then the Gaoth Dobhair Hotel closed . . . Seaview was closed, Tí Joe is closed 
for years, Dodge is closed. Y’know the place that people used to be able to stay. 
There’s not one hotel left. Oh! The Foreland Heights, y’know – closed as well. And the 
worst times when there was no money in the country, before the boom, y’know, those 
two places were doing great, y’know. And it just effects people’s mood . . . But jeepers, 
it’s hit badly. If it happened 4-5 years ago, but the fact that it’s still happening – Seaview 
just closed this year like. And y’know yourself when there are more places open there 
are more people stopping by. Well now there’s nowhere to stay except Campbell’s, 
y’know there’s no hotel . . . That’s awful. 
p. 175 (third passage): 
B: When the hotels and all that infrastructure closed, did that affect the… 
É: Language? 
B: Yeah. 
É: It did. Because the people who were working in the place, their daughters, their 
sons, they were getting summer jobs there. I worked in one of those things myself for 
five years, there was nobody speaking English. That in particular was infrastructure 
that was extremely traditional and important with regards to the language. 
 
p. 176 (first passage):  
C: That hotel was very busy for a while and it’s said that lots of matchmaking was done 
there, and that young people met each other and there’s a few other places like it. And 
[now] they meet each other in Letterkenny and maybe two Irish speakers won’t meet 





p. 176 (second passage): 
É: I have a daughter who’s 17 years old, she needs to go to Letterkenny for discos. 
We used to go down the road to the disco . . . you were meeting with other people who 
spoke Irish. You wanted to be in the area, it was good to go out in the area. 
p. 176 (third passage): 
C: People don’t go out anymore, it was the opposite [during the Celtic Tiger]. 
Everybody was out, especially at the weekend. The pubs would be full, some of them 
very full. But that’s gone. So there isn’t the social vibrancy. The young people, y’see 
there’s kind of, I think it’s a vicious circle they call it, the young people, maybe I meet 
a person who’s at university in Dublin. And I say “do you get home often?” and they’ll 
say to you that they don’t really like going home for the weekend as there’s nowhere 
to go out there. So they’d prefer to be in Dublin or wherever they are at the weekend. 
So not only were they driven away, this is people who are working too, they were 
driven away . . . But then the opposite – because it’s like that the young people aren’t 
coming back [to their native communities], young people in particular. It never used to 
be like that, until four or five years [ago]. 
 
p. 177: 
R: We’re in competition with other areas maybe in Scotland or in Europe or wherever. 
So we’ll try to let them know that there’s a skilled workforce available, that it’s a nice 
area to do business in, that the staff are loyal to their employer. 
 
p. 178 (first passage): 
É: It’s not the same as people working in manufacturing in Dublin who are able to go 
in and out of jobs. People work very well here. 
p. 178 (second passage): 
B: Are there many coming here from Galway [city] or the Galltacht? 
N: A third. That’s the figure from the Údarás itself . . . They say they have no role in 




themselves as the IDA for the Gaeltacht, and that they’re in competition with the IDA 
to create jobs and the yardstick they have for themselves is how many jobs they’ve 
created. Language and culture are much lower on their list of priorities.  
p. 178 (third passage): 
N: Maybe the linguistic implications [of language use in factories] are ignored as well. 
As often it’s in the workplace that men and women start going out, or men and men, 
or women and women! So that has implications, there isn’t an Irish-speaking 
atmosphere in lots of these factories.  
 
p. 178-9: 
M: All the managers there spoke English. There was no effort, unless you knew 
somebody beforehand, there was one person who knew Irish and I spoke Irish to him, 
but again, if you were at meetings it was English…It was people from the Gaeltacht 
working there but there were also other people coming in from elsewhere as well, 
especially those with high level qualifications for dealing with quality, dealing with 
engineering and things like that, these weren’t people who spoke Irish. But there were 
people from [other Gaeltacht towns] coming in, maybe they knew Irish but they didn’t 




F: There’s a huge problem in the Údarás that if you use a name in Irish for your 
business you get a grant. 
B: Just if the name is in Irish? 
F: That’s it like. But you’re not doing fuck all with one word in the fuckin, I dunno, Irish 
ecology . . . They’re just using it as a fuckin tool for money, y’know. So when I look at 
things like that I’m just saying to myself “what the fuck?” . . . Like they should use 
money for Irish properly . . . That’s the fuckin problem . . . The Údarás is doing lots of 
good things, right, lots of good things. But I think there are holes, y’know, stupid fuckin 





M: I remember they put a big sign out on the road and it was in English and there must 
have been some complaint made, maybe it was the Údarás itself that complained, and 
they had to go out and change it and put Irish on it. And again, y’know, there was 
never that attitude that oh we have to do it in Irish at first. There was never that attitude. 
And . . . things that you were doing voluntarily yourself, if was left to the people who 
were focused on Irish, or who were interested in Irish [to promote the language in the 
place] individually, there wasn’t any support at all really. 
 
p. 180 (first passage): 
P: In one way it was a great thing. It was keeping people at home, there was 
employment created at home and lots of people were able to stay at home, Irish 
speakers of course, which was brilliant, really good. It was very important and 
necessary that the likes of that was done. But . . . for the first time there were a lot of 
people in the area who didn’t speak Irish . . . So there was a very big social change 
with regards to language . . . That’s the disadvantage to do with creating that 
employment . . . There’s a question to be asked whether it was more positive than 
negative.  
p: 180 (second passage):  
É: It doesn’t make any difference . . . It’s all the same . . . every company that comes 
has conditions attached to it. A man said . . . “we’re not desperate”. We are but we 
don’t do that. No, it doesn’t make any difference. 
p. 180 (third passage): 
É: God, there are people that think that there are lots of companies here that did 
damage to the language. I don’t believe that and I never did. The basic thing you need 
is a lot of employment in order to have a community, to have population density, a 
place where the language is confident and hopeful in itself. That’s the most important 
thing. And if you look at the way Irish survived in Donegal, the language survived, this 
is the place, you’re sitting in the place where the most Irish is spoken outside of an 




Because there are so many people here. And if you look at an area like Fánaid where 
the language is now weak, the emigration there was permanent, they didn’t come back 
. . . because there weren’t the jobs. There was nothing to come back for. That’s the 
foundation, the economic foundation – very important for a community to survive.  
 
p. 181 (first passage): 
M: This is what happens – you talk to the IDA, they find a company for you, you talk 
to the company, you make them an offer, they accept the offer, they come, they go, 
back to square one – you talk to the IDA. They don’t believe in the Gaeltacht 
community, they have no confidence in the Gaeltacht community. If they wanted 
something, to make a permanent change . . . that’s not going to make any difference. 
In fact, I believe it’s doing damage as it’s hammering home to people again that if you 
want a job you need English. “These are the people, they’re doing us a big favour 
coming here from Holland, or Uzbekistan and they’re putting a factory here and 
creating employment. Now don’t do anything stupid like trying to speak Irish or join a 
trade union, you know what will happen, they’ll leave!” But we know what’s going to 
happen anyway – they’ll leave! This is the view of the Údarás, and it’s no view at all!  
p. 181 (second passage): 
M: That’s neoliberalism, it does that to people. If you say anything at all that doesn’t 
adhere to neoliberalism you’re out of your mind! You are! . . .  It’s now so ingrained in 
people that there’s nothing else, there’s no other possibility except neoliberalism. That 
that’s the only way to make progress in life. And it’s a lie! A lie from start to finish! That 
you can break everything in life down to boxes, little boxes in a spreadsheet and put 
a value on every one of them. And at the end of the spreadsheet if there’s a positive 
value it’s worth it, if there’s a negative value it’s not so get rid of it. Life isn’t like that. 
Like life is based on communities, society... 
p. 181 (third passage): 
there’s never a long term. The business doesn’t have to make a commitment to the 





p. 182 (first passage): 
we have lots of the call centres, I dunno what the Irish word for “call centre” is but I’d 
be happier thinking we didn’t have a word for that type of work! 
p. 182 (second passage): 
I’d prefer if they weren’t left back on that [island]. 
p. 182 (third passage): 
D: Thinking of my own children, I wouldn’t like if they spent all their youth at home. 
They went to Galway, they saw other groups, they met the community that was there 
and from other counties . . . Instead of a little group of them out west talking to 
themselves. Talking to the seagulls!  
 
p. 183: 
that an ecosystem must be developed so that local men and women can start their 
own businesses in their community and that state companies must support those 
people in their efforts through making suitable supports available, both financial and 
non-financial, in order that local entrepreneurs be willing to take the chance of founding 
their own companies (Údarás na Gaeltachta, 2014: 18-9). 
 
p. 183-4: 
L: We saw the sort of lack of beds in the area and were saying well what could we do 
and we were looking at one of the old factories . . . and we’re in talks with the Údarás 
to see if we’d be able to get the building, we want to develop it . . . Irish is so strong in 
this area and people come learning Irish and maybe we could, that it could be 
developed satisfactorily [as] a place where people could stay, where there’d be beds 
or whatever and . . . a place where campers could stop and charge up. And then if 
there were Irish classes and it’d be the sort of place where people could come getting 






p. 184 (first passage): 
M: We’ve been doing this for seven months, eight months. And a fortnight ago we got 
the drawings of the factory we want to use. That’s eight months. If my name was 
Johann Klegg and I from fucking Antwerp and saying that I wanted to come and I’d 
create employment for 25 people and . . . that I saw this factory but look I’d like to have 
a meeting with you on Tuesday and could you have the drawings at the meeting, the 
drawings would be sent by email in the morning. Because it’s within their parameters 
– “right, this is it, we’ve got him, do everything to make sure we have that”. If a group 
from the area want to start something in the area, they’re not interested. They’ll put 
every obstacle in your way . . . That factory is lying empty for five years, with no one 
showing any interest in it and suddenly when we start going to meetings every day, 
suddenly the Údarás says a company is interested in it . . . Fair play to them but there 
are three factories [in the area], there’s an empty factory [in a nearby area], I dunno 
how many [in the industrial estate], move in there! . . . Like maybe I’m just feeling 
hopeless at the moment, but all through the process since we started, we never got 
the feeling that these are on our side, they support us, they, they believe we can do 
something. And it’s not that we’re a gang of fuckin lunatics who are involved in this – 
there’s a priest on the committee, there’s a woman who’s in charge of a committee for 
a community centre . . . There are people here who are working for the community 
and who understand that we can create employment which would be entirely through 
Irish, which would be good for the community, which would be creating employment 
with young people and which would focus on the needs of tourism. When the hotels 
are almost all closed down, we’re talking about making accommodation available . . . 
a place for camper vans, organising courses for parents whose children are in Irish-
medium schools. And this would all be happening in the middle of the Gaeltacht . . . 
and they’re putting every obstacle in front of us. 








p. 185 (first passage): 
É: We have more native companies. And that I suppose is the direction we’re going. 
As they say in English we’ve been in denial for a long time. I suppose when [the big 
factories closed] catastrophically there . . . lots of people are waiting for them to come 
back . . . like the coal in Wales . . . It’s not coming back. [But] people out in the 
community are so bitter about it that you don’t want to say it. But it’s time to say it and 
time to be honest. 
B: Is it a good thing that there are now more Irish companies? 
É: They were always there. See there’s this myth about Údarás na Gaeltachta that we 
were only interested in big companies. At that time 84% of our companies were native 
and there was only one to five people employed in them. We always had that.  
p. 185 (second passage): 
M: It must be said that there wouldn’t be much industrial employment in south 
Conamara without Údarás na Gaeltachta . . . I have no doubt about that. And I’d say 
as well that [his factory wouldn’t be located where it is] without Údarás na Gaeltachta. 
Without any doubt. 
 
p. 186 (first passage): 
S: Go up, a couple of months work, and then I had to money to come back to university. 
And pay the rent or whatever else . . . It was very important. There were lots of students 
working there. And now that’s not there at all and I don’t know how parents will be able 
to . . . send their children [to university]. 
p. 186 (second passage): 
C: If you go [around] this area, you see so many places that are closed up. It’s just 
one place after another . . . It looks very forlorn and . . . it doesn’t help to breathe life 








D: Drive through [the town in which the interviewee works] and there’s a terrible 
surface on the road . . . There’s I dunno what percentage but a good percentage of 
the buildings closed, with wood on the windows . . . You can see that they were closed, 
let’s say, in the last five or seven years, y’know. It damages the community’s 
confidence and pride. Y’know it’s not a big town half of those buildings closed up . . . 
If I could inspire the community and increase their sense of pride, that’s the answer to 
the question. If you can increase their sense of pride – it’s so simple but the solution 
to that issue isn’t simple. But again the, the language isn’t, the solution to the problem 
isn’t . . . in its own bubble. People are walking down the road, they go in to do the 
shopping, they see half of the town closed. That, that does damage. And it 
encourages, it’s a vicious circle, it encourages the old view of Irish as the language of 
poverty . . . It’s different for people in the Republic outside of the Gaeltacht . . . but if a 
child hears their grandfather saying that there’s a link between Irish and poverty and 
then when the young person sees the state of the town . . . In there in the industrial 
estate like [there are] the best of facilities, but – empty. Y’know? I dunno what 
percentage are filled but it’s not much. Young people today aren’t stupid, they’re 
cleverer than ever, maybe the cleverest generation for their age. They see this stuff 
and they make the links between the true story of the town and the language that’s 
meant to be here. 
 
p. 189: 
R: It’ll change the place a lot, y’know. There’s a certain attitude connected to tourists 
and that attitude, it’s strong during the summer at the moment. If people are coming 
all year, y’know, that’s certainly having an impact on people’s attitudes . . . If there are 
that many people coming all the time . . . in the end, y’know, you see the purse coming 
instead of the person. 
 
p. 189-90: 
R: I see [the neighbouring island] and it annoys me a lot, y’know. There are big English 




and you’d never know that the Irish language existed. And tourists walking around, 
kind of, disappointed maybe . . . “anomie” to use the French word, y’know? Then they 
don’t know exactly where they are or why and, and [they were] expecting . . . what 
they saw in the ads. And maybe you can see that, but you have to pay to do so. And 
that’s not the kind of thing you’d like, y’know, you’d like another type of island, an island 
we’d like and which would be healthy to live on to raise a family on. And I dunno is that 
the way that we’re going. 
 
p. 190 (first passage): 
I hope I’m wrong but it seems to me that this island is becoming like a place for tourists. 
p. 190 (second passage): 
tourists won’t save the language, they’re leaving! 
p. 190 (third passage): 
S: I think that the west of Ireland’s economy can be developed in the way we’re going 
now, although it’s slow. There’s no solution other than fishing, food, seafood, tourism, 
water sports. And when you look down at an Daingean and west of an Daingean [in 
Kerry] you’ll say to yourself this is an amazing example of an area that is thriving and 
where there’s energy and people visiting . . . We have a lot in Donegal. So, is it that 
some of the solution is the way, the things we’re doing now? I hope so. Because you’ve 
got to be rooted in the environment and the language and culture and the ocean, as 
they are the concerns we have.  
 
p. 191 (first passage): 
E: It’s all tourism now from start to finish . . . The European Union destroyed . . . the 
fishing. And really, it’d scare you that if anything went wrong with the tourism… 
B: You’d be sunk? 





p. 191 (second passage): 
the minute the tourism stops, if the people are poor the next day well there was really 
fuck all there anyway. 
 
p. 192: 
D: There’s lots of tourism in north Conamara, in the English speaking area . . . what 
happens is that buses go west . . . from Galway and they go to Kylemore Abbey 
[outside of the Gaeltacht] and then they drink a cup of coffee and they’re back [in the 
city] in time for dinner, dinner in the evening. That or they go to Ros a’ Mhíl and they 
go out on a tour to Árann. The tourism we have isn’t big but it’s shared better, that’s 
the Irish summer colleges . . . [But] even on its own, tourism won’t save any area, 
y’know. It’s a help alright.  
 
p. 193 (first passage): 
C: On the rock [i.e. island] things are half decent. There’s a kind of sustainable 
development there in a way because of the tourist season and the tourism helps a lot 
in keeping the place as it is.  
p. 193 (second passage): 
the small number of them that are left we want to do different things, so they get every 
type of job. 
 
p. 194 (first passage): 
Some make . . . their money in the summer and they go to sleep for the winter 
p. 194 (second passage): 
E: But you won’t find anyone, that’s the other problem we have . . . Everyone is so 
busy. Because you can draw social welfare and work in the tourist industry. But I 
suppose the Department [of Social Protection] close their eyes to it as if they didn’t the 




p. 194 (third passage): 
E: I wouldn’t say that there are as many Americans coming in the last few years . . . In 
a way the year they were saying that the country was in a bad state was the best year 
we had. With regard to this place selling crafts it was the best year. And since then it’s 
improving but before then we were selling very little. It was like Irish people were 
saying this is our own country and we’re going to go on holiday in Ireland. 
 
p. 195: 
S: It’s not on the tourist route, they go into Dublin, down to Cork, Kerry, maybe up to 
Galway, Cliffs of Moher and then they leave again. Not many go up to that part of the 
country and if they do, they stop in Bundoran. They don’t go up to [the Gaeltacht] most 
of the time. No, like, there are…if not for the tourists in the summer there wouldn’t be 
much life there at all anymore, so it does exist but it’s not too strong at the same time. 
It wouldn’t be strong enough to keep people in the area. There’s a few months’ work 
in the summer, that’s it. 
 
p. 195-6: 
L: There are the facilities, there’s accommodation, there’s whatever . . . there’s 
everything [in Galway]. But with regard to this area there is still significant investment 
to be made . . . If we’re talking about attracting people . . . the infrastructure needs to 
exist . . . But again, it comes back to a lack of money. There’s an application going in 
to the Department of the Gaeltacht and the department isn’t granting the money or 
whatever. So it’s shameful when you think of it . . . There’s a group here locally and 
they have a tourism subcommittee, I’m on that subcommittee too and trying to develop 
bits and pieces . . . There are groups that are trying to promote this area and 
sometimes you’d be as well off talking to that wall there. When you go to the authorities 
and they say yeah that’s a lovely vision and everything on paper but a lack of money 







it’s very difficult to attract tourists if you don’t have the infrastructure, it’s a kind of a 
vicious circle.  
 
p. 197 (first passage): 
C: It’s a vicious circle, because things were bad the hotels closed and the social life 
isn’t good . . . There’s only one pub. So if a large group did come, we’d have nowhere 
for them to stay.  
p. 197 (second passage): 
H: If it’s open it makes the place seem alive. There was a year there when the last 
owner, y’know, when they were selling it, when it wasn’t open and it was awful for the 
island . . . when things close it makes the place look bad. 
 
p. 198: 
D: If we don’t get a [new] boat, it won’t, we won’t have proper development, tourists 
won’t come . . . And not only the correct boat but we want the same type of ferry that 
goes to [Oileáin Árann in Galway]. Longer, more comfortable… 
 
p. 199 (first passage): 
S: You could say “conas atá tú?” [the form of “how are you” that people who learned 
Irish at school would be most likely know] to 300 people coming in off that boat and 
barely five would understand you, less again if you are saying “caidé mar atá tú?” [the 
form of “how are you” used in the local dialect] 
p. 199 (second passage): 





p. 200 (first passage): 
G: Without the Irish learners [i.e. attendees at the summer colleges] there’d be nothing 
[in the area]. Funnily enough, that’s interesting, I was talking about, I was at a regatta 
on Sunday and there was a gang of old lads sitting on a ditch looking out at the boats. 
But [a summer college] was just here and the parents of the attendees were collecting 
them to go home, I guess the course was finished. And they were saying without them 
there’d be nothing in the area. And they were right . . . The odd tourist would come but 
tourism isn’t [big]. 
p. 200 (second passage): 
N: It’s worth, I’d think, around €20 million a year. 11,500 come to the colleges, outside 
of the Acadamh and courses [for adults]. We could say that each teenager is worth 
around 2,500. They pay 900, the Department pays for the accommodation, so there’s 
a nightly rate. I’d say around 2,000 per child [and the parents who come to visit], eating 
a meal with the child. It’s easy to do the sums. 11,500 by 2,000. At least 20 million. 
p. 200 (third passage): 
R: I used to ask people why isn’t tourism really developed here in the Gaeltacht in 
south Conamara compared to Clifden or places to the north. And a Conamara man 
who was working with me said “sure why would they do that when they can make 20 
or 30,000 in the summer with the Irish learners?” And I said “can they really make that 
much money?!” And he said “yes”. 
p. 200 (fourth passage): 
S: Not only does it bring money in but it also gives an incentive with regards to Irish. 
A family that keeps students, y’know, they understand that there is an advantage to 
Irish being spoken in the area, and due to them speaking Irish themselves.  
 
p. 201: 
B: What about the summer colleges, was there any change in numbers or the layout 




P: I have to say that there was. I saw a catastrophic decline, really. And in a way that 
the sector was at risk in different areas. I often talk to people in other colleges and I 
see that everyone has the same problems. When you charge I suppose between 800 
and €1,000 for a three-week course, when the country collapsed that was the first 
thing people stopped paying for . . . We were hit catastrophically.  
 
p. 205:  
B: Why is it English [that’s on all the signs] do you know? 
P: It’s started here even with the people who want to keep Irish. I see them putting up 
– it started within the last five years – putting up signs that are only in English and that 
it’s more effective, that it’s mostly English that the tourists speak, or that it’s easier. 
They think it’s not doing any damage and they’re deceiving themselves and thinking 
that the language isn’t really in danger and it’s only the summer really, wasn’t it always 
like this and wasn’t there always some English in the place, and, and what harm, I 
suppose. But it upsets me. 
 
p. 205-6: 
P: It’s sad in a way as I remember being there and there used to be Irish on everything 
and every kind of shop sign it was in Irish, but while I was travelling through the area I 
just noticed that there are lots of signs in English there. And y’know it was very, it was 
sad to see in a way, y’know, that it happened suddenly . . . within ten years.  
B: Why is that do you think? 
J: Well it seems to me, y’know, that people think, it’s focused on tourists and on 
themselves. Maybe there’s a lack of confidence or pride and that they think that they 
need to sell themselves through English. See when the learners stopped going [to the 
summer colleges] . . . there was a kind of change in people’s minds. 




J: Yeah, yeah. And the Irish-language people aren’t coming to us anymore, there 
aren’t the jobs...And y’know it’s kind of abstract but . . . it influences people, definitely 
it influences people. Y’know there are lots of those groups and shops and I know that 
the shop owners speak Irish. I’m not saying that every single one of them speaks Irish 
but I know that a lot of them speak Irish at home. I think it’s psych-, in the psyche in a 
way. 
 
p. 209 (first passage): 
S: People would emigrate very easily. It’s much easier for people from here to emigrate 
to America because they have relations over there – cousins, uncles, aunts – they’re 
not going somewhere where they don’t know anyone, y’know. And usually if they go 
maybe they have an uncle who could give them a job, or who knows someone . . . 
There are lots gone to Australia too, but America is very easy. 
p. 209 (second passage): 
G: The pattern I saw then was say if one person went to Australia then he’d ring his 
mates who were at home doing nothing and he’d say come out here, the craic is good, 
the money is good, come on. So it’s groups that went there. 
p. 209 (third passage): 
They’re in Abu Dhabi, to New Zealand, in Germany, France, England, Scotland, the 




S: Lots of them are working up in Aberdeen too.  
B: What do they do there? 
S: Is there oil or gas up there? 




S: So yeah there was a huge group [from his town] working up there but I think the 
work there stopped too so they moved to England. And yeah just people who were 
working in England for a year to get the money to go to Australia . . . Because they 
can’t get the money at home to go to Australia. And the people who are left at home, 
they can’t go anywhere if their family doesn’t have money, or maybe an uncle or aunt 
to say alright sure we’ll help you, you can’t get a job to save the amount you’d need to 
go there.  
 
p. 210 (first passage): 
A: There’s a very high rate of emigration and the further west you go the higher it gets 
. . . If you go back [to the west of the Gaeltacht] the place is totally abandoned. There 
are hardly any young people left . . . Anyone single, young, they’ve left the place . . . 
The areas nearer to Galway aren’t quite as bad, y’know, as there’s still some work in 
the city for people. But still there’s a lot of people gone. 
p. 210 (second passage): 
Still it’s the case that the strongest Irish-speaking places are the poorest. 
p. 210 (third passage): 
L: When people emigrate, you are sucking the soul out of the community . . . A 
community that was once strong . . . when the work and employment and everything 
was going well . . . Everyone who leaves takes a part of the community with them . . . 
everyone who leaves is a fatal blow for the community, I think. And the thing is, it’s 
adding to the abandonment of the countryside. I mean when you see just the places 
closed . . . the number of houses, not just houses but places where there was 
employment in the past. If you drive around and see the places left cold, idle, 
abandoned – places that once had life and light and smoke, you say to yourself isn’t it 







that’s about 50% economic. People want to move around anyway.  
 
p. 212 (first passage): 
M: I think life is good there. We have everything we want. Like I love that in winter 
there are no takeaways or things like that, you have to be healthy, you have to make 
your own thing. I think that’s so good . . . We have services, there’s a shop, we have 
a doctor, we have schools, we have the football pitch, we have a handball alley . . . I 
can’t think of anything else we’d want. 
p. 212 (second passage): 
with regards to the language, that’ll kill the language, if young people, native speakers, 
aren’t staying at home, that’s the end. 
p. 212 (third passage): 
A: We’re also seeing a lot of widows, austerity widows you could call them. Women 
that are left here with their children while the men are gone away to work in other 
places. I had a cousin like that, she was left here . . . and her husband went to New 
Zealand for a year because he had no other work to keep him going. And he was 
sending the money home, it’s like the old days, when the old lads would be . . . working 
in England. So, there’s lots of that happening. There are some people commuting, 
going back and forth to England and to Europe even, and they’ll stay a couple of weeks 
over there and then come back. 
 
p. 213 (first passage): 
L: That’s no way for any family to be . . . or for a father to be, gone abroad or what 
have you. And talking to people on the phone or whatever. There are families that are 
hit hard by a lack of work and you’d be saying to yourself that’s not good for any 




p. 213 (second passage): 
A: I noticed the number of houses closed up, unbelievable. Brand new houses. Yeah, 
lots and lots and lots [in west Conamara]. You’d be going around and you’d see a 
house that was brand new and closed and the gate locked and when you’d ask who 
was there, it was young people who built the house maybe and had mortgage 
repayments to make and who knew that the only way they had to pay the mortgage 
was by going and working somewhere and paying for a house that is empty. 
 
p. 214: 
L: They leave the secondary school here and go to college or university and then they 
leave the area. They get their education and then to get a job, well, maybe they’ll do 
a BA but you need a masters or a doctorate in this day in age just to get in anywhere. 
 
p. 215 (first passage):  
I wouldn’t be satisfied with the employment that’s there, there’d be nothing there, well 
I don’t know about forever, but at the moment there’s no job there that I’d be interested 
in. 
p. 215 (second passage): 
you’re not going to do a course, to learn how to be a chef and come out here to go 
cooking for terrible pay. 
 
p. 216: 
G: That’s the kind of person who comes out here [they want] quiet, introversion, sort 
of, or Lithuanians to go working in the hotel. 




G: Every year more people come out. 
B: Really, and why don’t they get islanders? 
G: Because they can pay them badly and shout at them.  
 
p. 217 (first passage): 
P: There’s a house back there . . . and your man, the auctioneer, was thinking they’d 
get 145,000-150,000 for the house. And the owner said ask for 170,000, I want 
170,000. It was sold for 270,000. And local people didn’t have the money to buy it. It 
was two people from Galway [city] who bought it, although they had two houses and 
they sold both of them. So the thing that’s happening is that local people can’t get 
planning permission so they can’t build a house on their own land and then when they 
go to buy a house the price is too high because you can’t get planning for a site. And 
then demand is so high, because house prices in the city increased so much, if you 
have a house in Galway, and especially if you bought it at the right time… 
B: You’ll make a fortune. 
P: You’ll make…exactly! And that means that local people, many of whom are out of 
work already, well they have no chance. 
B: And so they’re leaving? 
P: Well they have no choice. They don’t want to leave. I’m very comfortable with people 
who want to leave for a few years and I think it’s a good thing . . . But if they want to 
come back [they should] have that chance too. And if they want to stay in the first place 
and not go abroad, they should equally be able to do that. 
p. 217 (second passage): 
S: The language, maybe the language is dying. Because blow ins came, a couple of 
people, my wife married in from Scotland . . . a couple of people came like I say, a 




married into the island . . . And it’s, it’s – how would you say – it’s putting the language 
under pressure. 
 
p. 218 (first passage): 
S: Now that more people I suppose from the mainland have moved to the island there 
are more children with English as their first language . . . And instead of making those 
children speak Irish the [local] children switch to English, I suppose to make things 
easier for them.  
p. 218 (second passage): 
E: At this stage somebody from everyone’s family is going to marry someone who 
won’t feel strongly about Irish and then the first thing that will be said to you is well 
“what about the person in your own house?” Y’know. There’s not much you can do 
about it. But then there’s the personal thing too, because if someone’s son or daughter 
marries someone without Irish, it’s very hard for the person at home who has to say 
you have to speak Irish . . . You need to give them time – that’s ten years – at least 
ten years – if you have to give everyone ten years, y’know, to learn it…But I dunno. I 
suppose if there was a plan. Lots of the people who move to the place – this is maybe 
now people who aren’t directly connected to the people of the island – but lots of them 
they move here and at first you’d think that they are very serious about it and it looks 
like they are and they’ll be going to classes. But within two or three years, even two 
years, that’ll be abandoned – “we’re in now and they’ve accepted us and it doesn’t 
matter”. And you don’t know is it ourselves that are at fault, at first you’ll be saying “are 
you learning Irish?” and then after a while you forget, it’s as if you have so much 
practice speaking to them in English that you don’t think of it. 
 
p. 219 (first passage): 
É: If they go for a long time and if they marry someone and they are back around here 
there isn’t the infrastructure to help them with regards to the language – there wasn’t 




strong communities compared to the 70s. So it’s like the old thing . . . who’s immersing 
whom? 
p. 219 (second passage):  
If they come back there’ll be serious implications for the language. It’s a huge question. 
p. 219 (third passage): 
huge question  
 
p. 222-3: 
L: Guth na Gaeltachta had a fantastic vision. They were extremely important. The thing 
is that there was a united voice . . . The people who started it were pioneering, they 
saw the need for a group that would raise a voice for the rights of Gaeltacht people 
and to keep services in this area. They did great work, really good work . . . It was a 
great campaign, a cross-community, cross-party campaign, it had nothing to do with 
political parties. It came from the grassroots and it was focused on Gaeltacht schools 
and everything and community centres and women who kept students at summer 
colleges. Even the meetings I attended . . . there was a big crowd and even an 
atmosphere, it was good for the spirit, for the soul, for the person themselves to be sat 
in the room. And sometimes there was a heated, tense debate taking place and people 
were giving out, but that aside it was good just that there was community and people 
with this common vision. And people were saying, well, here we are together, y’know 
strength in unity, united we stand, divided we fall as the proverbs say . . . We were 
protesting against Bord Snip . . . which was saying close this, that and everything!  
 
p. 223: 
M: I really believed in Guth na Gaeltachta. But at a couple of meetings I raised the 
question, they were against cuts in the Gaeltacht, right, in the Gaeltacht sector. But     
. . . I raised the point that Guth na Gaeltachta should stay as Guth na Gaeltachta but 
be part of the wider thing against austerity and cuts . . . There was a big march in 




representative from Guth na Gaeltachta at the march. And they said “oh no, no, that 
isn’t to do with the Gaeltacht, it’s not to do with Irish”. And I said no but it has to do 
with…Y’know Irish speakers are very good saying people have to stand with us, and I 
agree with them, people should stand with the language, but when the Irish-language 
community isn’t willing to stand with other people, then I can see how they’d feel too: 
“what did the Irish speakers ever do for us?” So what I was saying was just let’s bring 
the banner and we’ll march and look I’m going to Sligo anyway, can I get someone 
else and we’ll carry the banner together? No. 
 
p. 224 (first passage): 
S: It seems that what happened is that because the leadership were working for 
Acadamh na hOllscolaíochta Gaeltachta they were more or less told to be quiet, that 
they were depending on the Department for the Gaeltacht and on Údarás na 
Gaeltachta for money so your jobs are at risk here so you’re not allowed to criticise 
[state policy]. 
p. 224 (second passage): 
M: When they sent the letter to [the first spokesperson] threatening to have him fired, 
that showed how marginal Irish and the Gaeltacht are in the political life of the country. 
If the likes happened in Roscommon or Ballydehob, anywhere, that a spokesperson 
for a community group that was protesting government cuts . . . because he worked 
as a gardener for the OPW they threatened to have him fired, if that happened 
elsewhere in the country, the trade unions, the left, the newspapers would be full of 
articles. Even David Norris would make a statement! But it happened! He resigned! 
And the person who was appointed as a successor after that, even though he did it 
anonymously, he was threatened with being fired . . . And an end was put to Guth na 
Gaeltachta. 
 
p. 226 (first passage): 
C: I find it strange that the Gaeltacht Civil Rights Movement ever happened to tell you 




gone from them altogether. Whatever sort, whatever struck young people at that time, 
I know there wasn’t many of them [but] lots of [the community] just accept the way 
things are nowadays. 
p. 226 (second passage): 
B: I think the fight has gone out of the community, there’s no fight left in them . . . I 
think just that, y’know, the community is kind of tired of fighting all the time. I suppose 
when they’re forgotten – that’s kind of dramatic – but when an area is forgotten why 
would they want to be fighting about water charges or the Dearg le Fearg day? 
 
p. 226-7: 
A: The message we’re getting is do this stuff [with language planning] but don’t expect 
anything or any leadership from us. In fact, maybe you’ll get threatened. That’s a very 
strong message as it shows people that the state isn’t going to stand with you. It’s hard 
enough to be a leader with regard to language, I think. We all understand that. ‘Cause 
even in the Gaeltacht Irish isn’t our main concern. So people who are looking out for 
the language, people look at us, instead of seeing us as people who are perceptive 
and who are doing the right thing . . . people look at us as cranks! And that doesn’t 
help to change that attitude. What incentive are you giving to community groups, or to 
individuals to stand up for the language? 
 
p. 228: 
M: The relationship between the Gaeltacht and the rest of Ireland is strange as the 
organisations we choose to look after the Gaeltacht don’t care about the rest of the 
country. And the rest of the country doesn’t care about the Gaeltacht. So there’s a kind 
of symbiotic relationship there, they ignore each other!  
 
p. 229 (first passage): 
U: I don’t want to be a negative Nancy about everything but when we were organising 




us to go around, take them out of bed, prepare breakfast for them, and carry them on 
your back for the whole march. ‘Cause we were organising free buses. We didn’t care 
how many buses were necessary. At least, y’know, we said we’d get the money . . . 
we’d organise fundraisers, but just get the people. 
p. 229 (second passage): 
U: We were getting in contact with as many people as possible and they just didn’t 
understand why we were doing it. They didn’t understand, they didn’t think it had 
anything to do with their own lives. Because they were saying “what sort of human 
rights? We’re speaking Irish! They’re not taking the language from us!” and things like 
that. They don’t see, if it doesn’t affect them from the moment they get up in the 
morning until they go asleep at night, they don’t see it . . . One of the women who hosts 
learners at summer colleges was complaining about the way that money isn’t being 
spent in the Gaeltacht . . . And like as [the interviewee’s mother] said, “well you didn’t 
come on the march when you should have”. And it’s the right answer. But the answer 
she gave back was “sure I didn’t know why ye were doing it”.  
 
p. 230 (first passage): 
M: I dunno how many buses went to Dublin, and to Belfast a while afterwards. What 
happened? Fuck all. We got a couple of cops who speak Irish, a couple of Garda who 
speak Irish. But nothing big happened.  
p. 230 (second passage): 
B: It’s hard to say, I mean when you see what’s happening with Aer Árann [see 5.6.3.1] 
you have to wonder. I think there was some heed paid to us, even the decision to leave 
the Language Commissioner’s office independent, that was very important. Even with 
regards to the appointment of the new commissioner . . . they could have appointed 
someone much weaker, I was surprised that there was such an appointment. So it’s 
hard to say how much they listened. 
p. 230 (third passage): 
A: With regards to the standing of this office, I think it helped a lot with the strength of 




are listening to what this office says, and that this office understands what is necessary 
. . . I think there is an understanding of that in certain places now.  
 
p. 232 (first passage): 
B: That’s my opinion after talking to the islanders yesterday, to some insiders, to Ó 
Cuív and all the politicians. And to give the politicians their due, every party and the 
TDs, they are all totally behind the islanders. But that’s the thing, they understand. 
That was their strong opinion, they just see the signs . . . That’s my opinion of the air 
service and that’s it about saving money, ‘cause I remember . . . we had a lobbying 
day around the same time in Buswells [a hotel near to the Dáil], and I was talking to 
Michael Ring [the then Sport and Tourism minister] and he was saying honestly to me 
“I said to Dinny [McGinley, then minister for the Gaeltacht] just do it, take one big hit 
and that’s it, it’ll be forgotten about then”. So that’s their only concern – one big hit, it’ll 
be off your plate. It didn’t matter about the fuckin damage that was being done, it didn’t 
matter about the islands. Just look: that’ll save you money. You’ll take one bit hit, it’ll 
be forgotten about and you won’t have to be worried about other people then, you’ll 
have enough to cover it. You’ll take one big hit, it’ll be forgotten about. 
p. 232 (second passage): 
T: The reason that they don’t want an air service is that they think a boat is good 
enough for the Oileáin Árann. And it’s boat services that go to most of the islands on 
the Irish coast and why would there be an air service . . . They think it’s a waste of 
time. The people of Árann, they’ve gotten too much, they complain about everything 
and to hell with them and that’s it. 
 
p. 234:  
H: I see the County Council, Jesus, you’d be pulling out your hair dealing with them! 






p. 238 (first passage): 
before language planning you need to have a roof over your head and you need to 
have a job! 
p. 238 (second passage):  
a question of money 
 
p. 238-9: 
N: Language planning is starting out in a place where the community is already cynical 
about it, as efforts have been made before. As well as that they don’t understand what 
it involves. There was no planning permission for houses until the ‘60s I think, people 
were thinking “what the hell is this, I’m allowed to build whatever I want in my own 
garden”. Now people understand the need for physical planning. It will take time for 
people and I think a big campaign is needed…It’s not a mystery, but it’s a new concept 
for the ordinary community. 
 
p. 239 (first passage): 
G: I was at home talking to my parents and they were saying y’know “what is this, I 
don’t want to go down to the hall talking about Irish”. I don’t know if the community 
know what the goal of it is. Everything to do with it tends to be kind of academic and 
no one…It’s very difficult to express your opinion when filling out a questionnaire. 
You’re putting ticks in boxes. People hate them, I hate them myself. And if you’re not 
working with Irish, I don’t think people realise the mess we’re in. 
p. 239 (second passage): 
R: I must admit, and maybe I shouldn’t say this but I don’t have much respect for 
language planning. Now that said I haven’t read much about it so I suppose I’m 
ignorant in that regard. 





p. 239 (fourth passage): 
B: Y’know this thing they talk about, language planning –  
S: Rubbish! Maybe I shouldn’t say that… 
p. 239 (fifth passage): 
P: Y’know Ben, I know nothing about [this process]. Those things kind of make me 
depressed so I just avoid it. I’d prefer to do my own thing . . . What, the community has 
to put a plan together? I suppose that’s a good thing. But the community isn’t doing it, 
99% of the community has no interest.  
 
p. 240: 
É: And this term . . . “language planning” – imagine you, Ben, you’re a young lad down 
the town drinking pints and you’ve got a nice girl and if someone said to you “would 
you like to go to a meeting about language planning? Would you like to go to a meeting 
about planning for houses?” You’d say “fuckin hell I would not!” 
 
p. 241 (first passage): 
É: The biggest difficulty in the Gaeltacht, believe it or not . . . is that the people doing 
all the work in the communities, development work, that this is thrown in on top of them 
and it’s very heavy and they’re very small . . . They feel all this pressure about 
language planning, this complex thing and at the same time they have to do community 
development, organise festivals… 
p. 241 (second passage):  
it’s the same group who come to everything and that’s not representation of the 
community. 
p. 241 (third passage): 
D: It’s very difficult for them as all the responsibility for this work is on their shoulders, 
like at the end of the day it we don’t manage to put this plan together . . . they lose 




have other responsibilities and, well, as I say, nobody knows what’s going on, but they 




A: Anybody with the same qualifications as I had . . . if they had gotten an even half 
decent job, they weren’t going to give it up to go working on a language plan. You’re 
talking about a short-term contract, without any certainty. You’re not talking about very 
good money . . . And it’s very lonely work, that’s the thing that affected me the most    
. . . It’s difficult work . . . It left its mark on my health even, the stress connected with it     
. . . In my contract it said that it wasn’t full-time work, but it was full-time and more. I 
was working five days a week [and] nearing the end, seven days a week. I’d be getting 
up at seven, going to work, finishing at midnight . . . Because the money wasn’t that 
great . . . I was translating, I was teaching, doing other little jobs [as well] . . . It’s not 
sustainable for a person I don’t think. 
 
p. 242:  
B: Is the funding sufficient to do the work? 
N: I’d say it is, but the one fear I have is that there won’t be the funding to implement 
the plan. Then there’ll be cynicism connected to it again and we’ll be further back than 
ever if that happens. Another effort that failed. That’s a very big danger, that’s the 
biggest danger connected with the whole process. 
 
p. 243 (first passage): 
I’m not willing to promise anything, Ben. 
p. 243 (second passage): 
B: It’s cultivating ridiculous cynicism. And I think that that’s the biggest damage it’s 
doing, as you’re discouraging…And I know it’s hard to get people out, it always was, 




[channels], whatever you want. So it’s hard to get people who are willing to act. Those 
people are extremely valuable and you need to encourage them. What’s happening is 
that you’re discouraging people, misusing those people. And I must say, the fear I 
have with regards to these communities is that people will just say “fuck it! I’ve had 
enough, it’s not worth it”. 
p. 243 (third passage): 
D: I know no government can be 100% sure of anything, but, y’know, they can be 
certain about other things to do with budgets. Y’know, if they’re talking to the IDA they 
can say, well, this corporate tax rate will be in place for however many years, there’ll 
be this rate of interest until whenever…I think it’s, funny isn’t the right word, but 
interesting that they can be certain with regard to lots of other things . . . The support 
that is needed . . . is the certainty, laid out clearly what will happen. Will there be a pot 
of money? Will money be kind of ringfenced for this project? 
 
p. 244: 
A: If there was ever any faith in the process, that faith has been lost . . . There are 
plans being presented to the minister for the Gaeltacht and he’s accepting them, he’s 
signing off on them, but he’s not granting the resources that are needed to implement 
these plans . . . That doesn’t make any sense to me, accepting a plan when there 
won’t be resources for it. It’d be much better to go back and re-draft it and form the 
plan in such a way as it would be implementable on that money . . . These officers 
who will be implementing the plans . . . there’s no way they’ll be able to achieve what’s 
in the plan . . . It seems to me that there’s a logical flaw there. 
 
p. 245: 
A: Those negotiations should be handled at the government level, because if a 
committee or language officer . . . is applying for grants, for schemes and this, that 
and the other – I dunno if you’ve ever seen one of those forms but they are long, 
they’re heavy going . . . If they have to do that to stay afloat, y’know, they won’t have 




p. 246 (first passage): 
G: Language planning will succeed if the state is involved. If the state isn’t involved 
the communities can’t do it themselves. So we can’t say until we see them “in action” 
as they say. But like if the state won’t stand with them, and by that, I mean if the state 
won’t make promises with regards to services in the Gaeltacht, for instance, that they’ll 
be available through Irish, it’s really lopsided against the community and that’s not 
right. So I don’t see, if the state isn’t going to put both hands to the wheel and drive 
this themselves, it’s hard to see how the community can do it on their own.  
p. 246 (second passage): 
P: Get rid of the responsibility. And then if the whole thing collapses . . . they’ll be able 
to say, well, it’s not our fault, we gave that duty to the community and if they let it slide 
. . . it’s the communities that are to blame. 
 
p. 247: 
R: They’re involved in pre-schools, tourism, language, everything. Now they have to 
implement a language plan so they are extremely, extremely central to community and 
economic development. 
 
p. 248 (first passage): 
M: If a third of co-ops succeeded, they’d get value for their money. ‘Cause a co-op 
isn’t moving anywhere. They’re not going to say right whatever terms we got five years 
ago, that’s finished, whatever help you gave to this company . . . that’s us, we’re off. 
As they’re based here, they live here, they’re part of the community!  
p. 248 (second passage): 
R: There’s a co-op and it’s good and maybe one of the best in the country . . . At the 
same time when you go to the AGM there’ll only be ten or fifteen people, so it’s not      
. . . like you would want it to be, that is everyone involved and keeping an eye on 




state organisation and it’s financed by state money and, and that’s the attitude people 
have. 
p. 248 (third passage): 
C: Maybe over the last couple of years it happened, y’know not spread out totally 
through the years, it happened kind of quickly, I’ll put it like that. So the first thing we 
lost was the assistant manager . . . We lost that person first and the next thing they 
cut the operation grant too, y’know? So they cut it everywhere, no doubt, not just us     
. . . They cut it and the Údarás had no option but to cut it. They cut everyone because 
when the money isn’t there you can’t give it out. 
 
p. 249 (first passage): 
We get an operation grant from Údarás na Gaeltachta, so that’s 85,000 a year. Now 
we used to be up at 125,000. That was in the good days!  
p. 249 (second passage): 
C: It really put a lot of pressure on me, like I mean I didn’t used to take holidays or 
anything, I haven’t taken a holiday in years . . . That’s the kind of person I am I couldn’t 
care less . . . but at the same time that’s not for everyone, that’s a bad state of affairs, 
the person who comes after me won’t want that life and they’ll be right . . . I gave 
myself a pay cut. Even one year, I’ll put it like that, I was willing to do five days’ work 
for four days’ pay, do a free day for the co-op . . . I said we have to do something . . . 
as the co-op is very important for the community. 
p. 249 (third passage): 
H: So that comes from my job as well. Oh wow, but you couldn’t take the hit for 
everything . . . Thanks be to God they didn’t cut it for two years, it’s staying at 85,000. 
So I hope to God that it won’t go down because it was difficult, it certainly was. You 
have to look then for things to cut and I don’t want to do that . . . But since we started 
we haven’t pulled anything and I’m proud of that. Now maybe some things should be 
stopped as they’re losing money, but they’re important services for the area. So I mean 




unless you’re making the money back, I’d say alright are we going to shut down the 
day centre [for old people]? 
 
p. 250: 
C: I was like a firefighter . . . Every meeting I was going to I was trying to put out this 
fire instead of doing community development . . . So a lot of last year was spent going 
to meetings, fighting, fighting, fighting, as you do, saying to people, y’know this is going 
to do awful damage to [the community] if you continue on with this . . . If it did anything 
to stop young people being able to stay [in the area]… 
 
p. 251-2: 
G: When I was young I used to go to Pléaráca, Pléaráca used to come to the school, 
we used to have art competitions, poetry competitions. Louis de Paor . . . he did writing 
workshops with us. And thinking back, we didn’t understand it at the time, but y’know, 
things like that – Ríonach Ní Néill came, she did a drama workshop with us. Diarmuid 
de Faoite came, he did things with us. So many came, we had so many chances when 
I was in secondary school . . . And the thing I liked about that, Pléaráca, for example, 
both young and old were involved. I remember they had a concert in an Cheathrú Rua. 
I was pretty young, a huge thing. People came from everywhere . . . It brought the 
whole community together . . . Like the Gaeltacht Glastonbury I suppose!  
 
p. 252-3: 
C: Oh, there’s a huge gap left, there is. The worst gap is . . . in the schools. Because 
they used to fund a group who would be doing drama, writing and poetry . . . Especially 
in transition year they had courses and it was very good for those who were interested 
in writing as they’d be writing drama or poetry or prose. They used to do great work 






p. 253 (first passage): 
A: What’s happened there is that the community infrastructure has been dismantled    
. . . and you need to remember that other things were dependent on a lot of that 
infrastructure. So, say the organisations like MFG [Meitheal Forbartha na Gaeltachta], 
Cumas, Pléaráca – not only were they fulfilling the duties of the specific scheme they 
were being funded by, but they were applying for other schemes and doing other work 
as well in the community. So, y’know, they were, people were employed, they were 
doing projects that were employing people and money was going around in the 
community, it was keeping shops open. 
 p. 253 (second passage): 
S: That government destroyed the voluntary sector . . . It’s to do with ideology really, 
it’s not to do with money. It’s to do with ideology as really these groups were too critical 
of public policy with regards to poverty. The government didn’t like that. The minister 
who was in charge of a lot of those things at the time, Éamon Ó Cuív, he didn’t like 
that. And they destroyed that sector really . . . Pléaráca was one of those organisations 
that was community-based . . . But it was taken out from being under the Department 
of Social Protection, that’s where it started out. And y’know, part of its brief was to deal 
with poverty and social exclusion . . . And because of Éamon Ó Cuív it was put in with 
the Department for the Gaeltacht and Údarás na Gaeltachta and they had no interest 
whatsoever in that agenda, y’know. And in the end they weren’t willing to fund it and 
in the end they said “well if you’re not willing to fund it why would we bother with it?” 
And it fell apart. And that was doing a lot of good for Irish . . . I don’t think it fell apart 
because of money. 
 
p. 254: 
S: The thing that has happened with a lot of these organisations is that they’ve been 
taken back from the community. They used to be . . . much more community-based 
than they are now. They’re put under the charge of the County Council, and the County 
Council has a system of committees that looks democratic but is so bloody 




how it works! . . . The council has so many different committees now and those 
committees are like a buffer zone between the County Council and the community.  
 
p. 256: 
B: What about those who were at school with you, do ye speak Irish to each other or 
would it be more English? 
S: Oh, always Irish, yeah always Irish . . . It’s very natural for us to speak Irish as that’s 
the way we grew up. 
 
p. 256-7: 
B: What about those who you grew up with, do you speak Irish to them? 
M: I speak Irish to the lads. 
 
p. 257 (first passage): 
M: When this girl is around we don’t speak Irish because she wouldn’t speak it to us. 
And it’s so strange because she can speak Irish. The odd day we’d speak a few words 
of Irish to her . . . but she wouldn’t speak it to us unless we pressured her . . . She 
never liked it, “I don’t want to learn it, I want to speak English, it’s not gonna do anything 
for me, everyone speaks English, not many people speak Irish”, that kind of thing. 
p. 257 (second passage): 
B: When you’re spending time with your friends playing pool down in the hotel, do ye 
speak Irish? 
G: Ah always English. 
 
p. 258 (first passage): 
G: The older people would speak Irish amongst themselves and if they knew it was us 




them and a few seconds of small talk and you leave, that’s it, that’s the only Irish you’ll 
speak and then back to English. 
p. 258 (second passage): 
G: Television is in English, the internet is in English, if you go on Facebook all the 
posts are in English . . . So I was on the X-box and speaking English with everyone on 
that. So I lost Irish sooner than [his sisters]. I lost it when I was about 13 – I mostly 
stopped speaking it. Technology came into my life… 
p. 258 (third passage): 
P: Where did you learn English? I didn’t know you could speak English like that!” “Ah 
daddy, I have my own little English school down in my bedroom watching Netflix”. 
 
p. 259 (first passage): 
D: I see [the informant’s grandchildren], they know English from when they’re two 
years old. Even though [his daughter] only speaks Irish to them at home, and their 
father as well. And still…Because every minute they get they’re looking at some video 
or they’re on the computer. 
p. 259 (second passage): 
G: A lot of them speak sort of broken Irish. 
B: Really? Your age group? 
G: Yeah, I mean look at my standard. 
B: You’re not bad! 
G: I can’t put a sentence together without it having an English word in it [informant 
laughs – probably as he said the word for “sentence” in English] 
B: Would you be at the same level as the rest of that group? 
G: Oh, lots of them would be much worse!  
B: Really? 




p. 260 (first passage): 
M: But see I do it sometimes myself . . . But I like Irish, I want, when I have children, I 
want to raise them with Irish. But I feel that sometimes I switch to English. Even 
sometimes I throw in English words like I don’t use my brain to find the word in Irish 
as I have it in English. It’s strange. 
p. 260 (second passage): 
G: You’d only get it from people who were between 18-24 and wanted to look, who 
wanted to be more like [older people] so they were always emphasising Irish because 
they’d always speak Irish together, and they wanted to be more like [the older people]. 
p. 260 (third passage): 
B: And is there anyone who’s, say, 18 now who’d be like that? 
G: No, not any more. 
B: Is that gone? 
G: Well I’m the generation who’s now 18, we’re not like that at all, there’s sort of… 
B: Anyone? 
G: Nah, no one. 
 
p. 261: 
there’s no television in Irish 
 
p. 261-2: 
B: Do you think that the children on the island speak Irish together? 
M: They do at school. But I listen to them out in the playground and oh! . . . Y’know 
when an English-speaking family moves in, all the children everywhere change to 
English instead of them talking Irish. And even though children are more or less 




is very good, it’s all in Irish and I must say they have a very good standard in the 
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